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S. G. and E. L. ELBERT 


jV c J 



Digitized by the Internet Archive 
in 2013 










Vol. II. 






Entered, according to Act of Congress, in the year one thousand eight hundred 

and sixty-eight, by 

In the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the Southern District of New York. 


The events considered in this volume occurred between the ac- 
cession of Mr. Lincoln and the Proclamation of Freedom to the 
Slaves. Chronologically they range from the 4th of March, 1861, 
to the 1st of January, 1863, inclusive. 

An examination of these events shows that they may be conven- 
iently grouped under certain sections or heads. By that means 
they are more easily borne in mind, and their relation to each other 
more clearly understood. 

The secession movement exhibited the character of a conspiracy 
for some time after the accession of Lincoln. There may be a dif- 
ference of opinion as to the exact epoch at which it lost that char- 
acter, but, for reasons subsequently mentioned,! have placed the 
limit at the battle of Bull Run, which also coincides with the 
translation of the Confederate seat of power to Richmond, mani- 
fested by the assembly of a Congress in that city on July 20th, 

The battle of Bull Run satisfied both the national government 
and its antagonist that the results sought by each could not be at- 
tained by the tumultuary levies which the people, then unacquaint- 
ed with war, had up to that time supposed would be sufficient. It 
had become plain that real armies must be called into existence. 
The period during which the resources on both sides were organ- 
ized is closed by Lincoln's general War Order of the 27th of Jan- 
uary, 1862, commanding an advance of the national forces. 

Meantime, however, certain small military affairs had been taking 
place. These, though they excited public attention very much at 
the time, exerted, in reality, little or no influence on the general re- 
sult. We may therefore regard the actions at Bethel, Ball's Bluff, 


and even the campaign in Northwestern Virginia, in the light of 
personal encounters, constituting in their aggregate a mere prelude 
to the true war. 

Though the battle of Bull Run had the effect of convincing the 
nation that its military operations must be intrusted to professional 
soldiers, in contradistinction to politicians, it was not possible, con- 
stituted as the government is, but that political ideas should have 
great influence in determining the form of the war. There are mil- 
itary critics who, judging from subsequent events, are of opinion 
that the course then resolved upon was far from being, in a scien- 
tific point of view, correct. Nevertheless, it was probably at the 
time unavoidable. 

The armed force of the nation was called upon to accomplish 
three objects : 

(1.) To put the seceding states, on their inland, river, and sea 
boundaries, under strict blockade. This beleaguering, or state of 
siege, was effectually accomplished. 

(2.) To open the Mississippi River, obstructed by the inhabitants 
of its lower banks. The achievement of this constituted the war- 
idea of the Free West. 

(3.) To capture Richmond. This constituted the popular war- 
idea of the East. 

In addition to the military and naval operations incident on these 
requirements, there are various other subjects, such as the finances 
of the republic, the progress of the anti-slavery movement, the at- 
titude assumed by the Western European powers, etc., which it is 
necessary to consider. These may be conveniently grouped to- 
gether under the title of Foreign Relations and Domestic Policy of 
the Republic. 

Guided by these views, I therefore divide this volume into the 
seven following sections, continuing the enumeration from the sixth 
section of Volume I. : 


VII. The progress and culmination of the Conspiracy. 
VIII. Vast development of the Warlike Operations. Correspond- 
ing Legislative and Military Preparations. 
IX. Prelude to the great Campaigns. 



X. Campaigns for opening the Mississippi, and piercing the east 
and west line of the Confederacy. 
XI. Campaign for the capture of Richmond. 
XII. The Blockade, and operations connected with it. 
XIII. Foreign Relations and Domestic Policy of the Republic. 

In the composition of this volume I have been greatly indebted 
to some of the chief actors in the events described. I can not suf- 
ficiently express the obligations I am under to them. They have 
not only given me much important — often confidential— informa- 
tion, but have added invaluable counsel as to the treatment of the 
whole subject. 

I shall esteem it a favor if any of my readers who may find on 
these pages errors in the narrative of facts will communicate to 
me such statements as they may consider nearer to the truth. I 
will give to their suggestions my earnest attention. Contemporary 
history must pass the ordeal of examination of many thousand eye- 
witnesses of the events with which it deals, and that, indeed, con- 
stitutes its best recommendation to future times. 

The remaining volume, containing the events from the Emanci- 
pation Proclamation to the close of the war, I shall publish as soon 
as I can. 

John - William Deapek. 


Washington Square, 

New York. 

July, 1SCS. 

II.— A 






Lincoln's Departure from Springfield, 13. — Davis's Journey. to Montgomery; Lin- 
coln's Views of Secession, 14. — Lincoln's Journey to Washington, 15. — His In- 
augural Address, 16. — Buchanan leaves the White House, 17. — Influence of the 
Secretary of State, 18. — Difficulties of the Administration, 19. — Formation of the 
Cabinet, 20. — Arrival of Commissioners Forsyth and Crawford, 21. — Their Ap- 
plication for a Reception, 22, 23. — Offensive Character of their Correspondence, 
24. — Lincoln calls out the Militia and summons Congress, 25. — The Free States 
furnish Troops, 26. — The Slave States refuse Troops, 27. — Proclamation of the 
Blockade, 28. — Blockade and Port-closure, 29. — Secessionist Letters of -Marque, 
29. — Seizure of Telegrams ; additional Troops called out, 30. — Suspension of 
Habeas Corpus; Attitude toward Foreign Powers, 31. — Belligerent Acknowl- 
edgment by England, 32. — Instruction to Foreign Ministers, 33. — The Political 
Ideas of the Time, 34. — Position of the Democratic Party, 35. — Lincoln's Posi- 
tion, 36. — Lincoln and Davis, 37. — Lincoln in Retirement, 38. — Peculiarities of 
his Character, 39, 40. 




Two Phases of the Secession Movement, 41. — The favorable Period for Treason, 
42. — Preliminary Steps of the Conspirators, 43. — Measures determined on, 44. — 
Washington to be seized, 45. — The Attorney General Stanton, 45. — Holt, the 
Secretary of War, 46. — Dix, the Secretary of the Treasury, 47. — Holt's Report, 
48. — Projected Seizure of Washington, 49, 50. — Troops brought to Washington, 
51. — Attempts to have them removed, 52. — Report of the Naval Committee, 53. 
— Censure of the Secretary of the Navy, 54. — Attempts to introduce Spies into 
the Government Departments, 55. — Attempts to bring Maryland and Virginia 
over to the Conspiracy, 56. — Success of the Conspiracy, 57. 



Difficulty of relieving Sumter; the Administration inclines to surrender it, 58. — 
Finally sends an Expedition, 59. — The Frigate Powhatan detached, 59. — Beau- 

viii . CONTENTS. 

regard ordered to attack the Fort, 60. — Proposals to Anderson, 61. — Strength of 
the Assailants, 62. — Bombardment, of the Fort, 63. — Its Surrender, 64. — Criti- 
cisms on the Defense, 65. — The Fort might have been relieved, GG y 67. 



Political Necessity for Aggression in the South, 68. — Effect of the Fall of Sumter, 
69. — Action of the Northern People, 70. — Rumored Intention of seizing Wash- 
ington, 71. — Troops hurried to its Defense, 72. — They are resisted in Baltimore ; 
the Massachusetts Regiments assailed, 73. — Concessions of the Government, 74. 
— Christian Association, 75. — The Troops reach Annapolis, 76, and relieve Wash- 
ington, 77. — Butler seizes Baltimore, 78. 



Virginia reluctant to secede, 79. — She yields a qualified Assent, 80. — She joins the 
Confederacy, 81. — Her Resources given to the Confederacy, 82. — Capture of 
Harper's Ferry Arsenal, 83. — The Norfolk Navy Yard, 84. — It is inadequately 
protected, 85. — Report of the Virginia Commissioner, 86. — Report of the Senate 
Committee, 87. — Richmond made the Confederate Capital, 88. — Its Social Con- 
dition, 89. — Difficulties in. its Domestic Economy, 90. — Extravagant Prices of the 
Necessaries of Life, 91. — Surrender of the Pensacola Navy Yard, 92. — Defense 
of Fort Pickens, 93. 



War Preparations of the Confederacy, 94. — Its Defenses, 95. — The Cotton Paradise, 
96. — Principles of the Leaders of Secession, 97. — Population of the Confederacy 
classified, 98. — First Class, 98. — Second and Third Classes, 99. — Fourth Class, 
100.— Conversion of the Slaves, 100.— Their Conduct, 101, 102.— The South in 
a State of Siege, 103. — Construction of its Political System, 104. — Richmond 
made the Capital, 105. — Washington and Richmond compared, 106. — Possible 
Transfer of the United States Capital, 106. — Opening of the Congress at Rich- 
mond, 107. 



Intended Seizure of Washington, 108. — Troops concentrated at Manassas, 109. — 
National Troops concentrating in Washington, 110. — Preparations for its Defense, 
111. — Invasion of Virginia, 112. — Confederates blockade the Potomac, 113. — The 
opposing Forces near Washington, 114. — The March of McDowell, 115. — First 
Plan of the Battle of Bull Run, 116.— Second Plan, 117.— Distribution of the 
Confederate Force, 118. — McDowell gains the Initiative, 119. — The Battle of 
Bull Run, 120. — The Battle during the Morning, 121; during the Afternoon, 
122, 123, 124.— Conflict on the Plateau, 125.— Rout of the National Army, 126. 
— Davis's Telegram of Victory, 127. — Johnston's Explanation of his Conduct, 
128.— Political Interpretation of the Battle, 129, 130. 






The Second Phase of the War, 131. — The Protestations of the Confederates, 132. — 
Accusations of the Congressional Committee, 133. — The South thrown from the 
Beginning on the Defensive, 134. — Interior of the Confederacy, 135. — Its Mili- 
tary Topography, 136. — Investment of the Confederacy, 137. — Vastness of the 
Siege, 138. — The necessary Military Operations, 139. — The East-west Line, 140. 
— Effects of breaking it, 141. — Solution of the Problem of the Mississippi, 142. — 
Objective of the Atlantic Region, 143. — Effect of Attrition, 144. — Reaction of the 
Slavery War-cry, 145. — Application, of these Principles by Grant and Sherman, 
145. — Changes in the Quality of the Armies, 14G. — Predominating Power of the 
North, 147. — Influence of the Slave Force, 148. 



Secrecy of the Confederate Congressional Proceedings, 149. — Various Acts of Con- 
gress, 150. — Abstract of Davis's Message, 151 to 157. — His Treatment of the 
Slave Question, 158. — Treatment of State Rights, 159. — Necessity of Centraliza- 
tion in the Confederacy, 1G0. — Acts of the Extra Session, 161. — The Congress at 
Richmond, 162. — Session of the 18th of November, 163. — The Permanent Con- 
gress, 163. — War Legislation, 164. — The Conscriptions, 165. — The Conscript Sol- 
diers, 166. — The August Session, 167. — Arbitrary Course of the Government, 168. 
— Decline of the Influence of Davis, 169. — A Reign of Terror, 170. — Deplorable 
Condition of-Domestic Affairs, 171, 172. 



Composition of the Houses, 173. — Position of the Democratic Party, 174. — Mr. 
Douglas's Letter, 175. — Abstract of Lincoln's Message, 175 to 179. — The Presi- 
dent's War Acts, 180. — Reports of the Secretaries, 181. — Action of the House, 
182. — Action of the Senate, 103. — Resume of the Acts, 184. — Character of the 
Opposition encountered, 184. — Pledge* of Congress, 185. 



The Army at the Beginning and End of the War, 186.— Change in the Morale of 
the Army, 187. — Progress of Enlistments and Armaments, 188. — Regulars and 
Volunteers, 189. — Loyalty of the West Point Academy, 190. — Oath taken by the 
Graduates, 191. — McClellan's Report, 191. — Ilis Views on the Conduct of the 
War, 192. — Proposed Composition of the Army, 193. — Subordinate Movements, 
194. — Increase in the Strength of the Army, 195. — Organization of the Infantry, 
195; of the Cavalry and Artillery, 196; of Corps d'Armec, 197. — The Potomac 
and Western Armies, 198. — Actual Strength of the Annies, 199, 200. 




Duties required of the Navy, 201. — The Navy and Dock Yards at the Opening of 
the War, 202.— Requirements of the Blockade, 203,— Of the Sea Navy, 204.— 
Peculiarities of American Construction and Armament, 205.' — The small Gun- 
boats, 205. — The Kearsarge Class, 205. — The Double-ender and the Lackawan- 
na Class, 206.— The Wampanoag Class, 207.— The Armored Ships, 207.— The 
Monitors, 208.— The Monitor Frigates, 209.— Of the River Navy, 210.— The 
River Gun-boats, 211. — Energy in building them, 212. — River Monitors, Tin- 
clads, Mortar Boats, 213. — American Ordnance, 214, 215. 




Minor Military Affairs of 1861. — Early War Movements incorrect, 217. — The Bor- 
der States, 218. — Their Geographical and Political Position, 219. — Their Opin- 
ions and Interests, 220. — Effect of their Neutrality, 221. — Movements in Ken- 
tucky, 222. — Political Action in that State, 223. — Attempts of her Governor, 
224. — The Confederates invade Kentucky, 225. — They blockade the Mississippi, 
226.— Grant attacks them at Belmont, 226. 



Internal Dissensions in Missouri, 227. — The State Convention and the Governor, 
228. — He seizes the Arsenal at Liberty, 228. — Lyon captures his Camp ; Harney 
makes a Compact with him, 229. — The Governor's Proclamation, 230. — Lyon 
defeats him at Booneville, 231. — The Governor declares that the state has se- 
ceded, 231. — Fremont in Command of the Department, 232. — Battle of Wilson's 
Creek and Death of Lyon, 233. — Capture of Lexington and Removal of Fremont, 
234. — Retreat of the National Army ; Halleck takes Command, 235. — His Slave 
Order, 236 ; Curtis's Advance and Battle of Pea Ridge, 237, 238.— Indian Allies 
of the Confederates, 239.— The March of Curtis to Helena, 240. 



Western Virginia adheres to the Union, 241. — McClellan crosses the Ohio, 242. — 
Affair at Romney, 243. — Johnston evades Patterson ; Affair at Rich Mountain, 
244.— Carrick's Ford, 245. — Cross Lanes ; Carnifex Ferry, 246.— General R. E. 
Lee in Command, 246. — Lee and McClellan, 247. — Butler at Fortress Monroe, 
248.— Affair at Bethel, 249.— Defeat of the National Troops, 250.— Tragedy at 
Ball's Bluff, 251, 252. 






Effect of the Battle of Bull Run, 254.— McClellan Commander-in-Chief, 255.— Im- 
mobility of the Potomac Army, 256. — The President's General War Order, 257. 
— Commencement of the War, 258. — The First Line of Confederate Defense, 
258. — Halleck's War Plan, 259. — Operations on the Tennessee, 260. — Strength 
of the opposing Armies, 261. — Operations against Port Henry, 262. — Capture of 
that Fort, 263. — Operations against Fort Donelson, 264. — The premature As- 
sault, 265. — Defeat of the Gun-boats, 266. — Sortie of the Garrison, 267. — Suc- 
cess of the Sortie, 268. — The Confederates forced back, 269. — Floyd's Night 
Council, 270.— Surrender of Donelson, 271.— Fall of Nashville, 272. — Mill 
Spring, 273. — Pope's Attack on New Madrid, 274. — The Confederates evacuate 
it, 275. — Canal of Island No. 10, 276.— Pope's Passage of the Mississippi, 277. — 
Surrender of the Island, 277.' — Destruction of the Confederate Fleet, 278. — Fort 
Pillow and Memphis, 279.— Fall of Memphis, 280. 



Grant's Visit to Nashville, 281, is disapproved of by Halleck, 282. — Sherman's 
Reconnoissance up the Tennessee, 283. — The Topography around Shiloh, 284. 
— Posting of the Troops, 285. — Grant restored to Command, 286. — Concentra- 
tion of the Armies, 287. — Beauregard's Plan of Campaign, 288. — The Field of 
Shiloh, 289. — Position of Grant's Army, 290. — Confederate Attack expected, 
291.— The Battle of Shiloh, 292.— Resistance of Sherman, 293.— Grant's Line 
forced back, 294. — Death of Johnston, 295. — The final Confederate Charge, 296. 
— Preparations for renewing the Battle, 297. — Beauregard's Report, 298. — Ar- 
rival of Buell, 299.— The second Day's Battle, 300.— Aid rendered by Buell, 301. 
— Retreat of the Confederates, 302, 303. — Comments on the Battle, 304. — Sher- 
man breaks the Railroad, 305. — Halleck's Advance to Corinth, 306. — The Fall 
of Corinth, and unjust Disgrace of Beauregard, 307. — Mitchell's Expedition, 308. 
— His Transfer to South Carolina and Death, 309. 




Results of the Shiloh Campaign, 310. — The Marches of Buell and Bragg, 311. — 
Removal of Halleck to Washington, 311. — Position of Grant's Forces, 312. — The 
Confederate Attempts on Corinth; Affair at Iuka, 313. — Escape of Price and 
Van Dom, 314. — Assault on Corinth, 315. — Gallant Conduct of the Confeder- 
ates, 316. — Rosecrans's Report of the Battle, 317. — The first Vicksburg Cam- 
paign, 318.— Capture of Holly Springs, 319.— Arrest of Grant's March, 320.— 
The Chickasaw Bayou, 321, 322. — Sherman's Attempt at Chickasaw, 323; its 
Failure, 324.— Arkansas Post, 325 ; its Capture, 326. 





Preparations for the Capture of New Orleans, 327. — The Fleet under Farragut ; 
Topography of the Mississippi, 328. — Defenses of New Orleans, 329. — Farragut's 
Plan of Attack, 330. — Bombardment of the Forts, 331. — Farragut's Order of 
Battle, 332.— The Battle of the Mississippi, 333 to 336.— The Fleet reaches New 
Orleans, 337. — The Surrender demanded, 338. — The National Flag insulted, 
339. — Surrender of the City, 340. — Baton Rouge, 341. — Operations against 
Vicksburg, 342. — Attack on Williams's Troops ; Capture of Galveston ; Butler 
in New Orleans, 343.— The Woman Order, 344.— The French Consul, 345.— 
Investigation of Butler's Administration, 346. — Butler's farewell Address to the 
People of New Orleans, 346 to 349. 




The Military Condition of the Confederacy, 350.— The Sortie of Bragg, 351.— Os- 
tensible Motive for it, 353. — Buell obliged to fall back, 354. — Bragg's Political 
Proceedings, 355. — He retreats with large Supplies, 356. — The Battle of Perry- 
ville, 357. — Failure of Bragg's Sortie, 358. — He is ordered to renew the attempt, 
359. — Rosecrans's Advance toward Murfreesborough, 360. — The Battle of Mur- 
freesborough, 361 to 365. — Retreat of Bragg to Tullahoma, 366. 




The War-cry of the East, 367. — Problem of the Richmond Campaign, 368. — Mili- 
tary Principles involved, 369. — Errors of the Campaign, 370. — Political Influ- 
ences ; McClellan's Inactivity, 371. — Strength of the Opposing Armies, 372. — 
Public Dissatisfaction, 373. — The Prince de Joinville's Statement, 374. — The 
Confederates evacuate Manassas, 375. — Appointment of Corps Commanders, 376. 
— Their Opinions respecting the Protection of Washington, 377. — The Peninsu- 
lar Expedition sails, 378. — Lincoln's Letter to McClellan, 379. — Siege of York- 
town, 380.— Battle of Williamsburg, 381.— Retreat of the Confederates, 382.— 
Surrender of Norfolk, 383.— Battle of Fair Oaks and Seven Pines, 384 to 388.— 
Stuart rides round the Army, 388. — Lee appointed to command the Confeder- 
ate Army, 389. 



Stonewall Jackson's Campaign in the Valley, 390. — He checks Fremont and at- 
tacks Kenly, 391. — Banks's Retreat to the Potomac, 393. — Consternation in Wash- 
ington and Call for more Troops, 394. — Jackson's Retreat, 395. — Port Republic 
and Cross Keys, 396. — Inactivity of the Potomac Army, 397. — McClellan at 
length advances, but immediately recedes, 398. — The Confederates take the Of- 
fensive, 398. — Perilous Position of the Potomac Army, 399. — The seven Days' 


Campaign, 400. — Battles of Mechanicsville and the Chickahominy, 401. — Battle 
of the Chickahominy, 403, 404.— McClellan's Accusations against the Govern- 
ment, 405. — The Retreat, 406, 407. — Savage's Station, 408. — Battle of Frazier's 
Farm, 409, 410.— Malvern Hill, 411.— Battle of Malvern Hill, 412, 413.— Retreat 
to Harrison's Landing, 414. — Lee's Report of the Campaign, 415. — Withdrawal 
of the Army from the Peninsula, 41G, 417. 



Construction of the Merrimack, 419. — She comes out of Norfolk, 419, destroys the 
Cumberland, 420, and the Congress, 421. — Arrival of the Monitor, 422. — Battle 
between the Monitor and Merrimack, 423, 424. — Results of the Battle, 425. — End 
of the Merrimack and Monitor, 426. 




Pope in Command, 427. — His offensive Order, 428. — His Advice to the Govern- 
ment, 429. — Halleck made General in Chief, 430. — Advance of the Confederates 
to the Rapidan, 431. — Pope's Principles of the Campaign, 431. — Retaliatory 
Measures of the Confederates, 432. — Cedar Mountain, 433. — The Turning of 
Pope's Right, 435. — Pope falls back, 436. — Movements of Pope and Jackson, 
437, 438. — The Battle of Gainesville, 439, 440, 441. — Pope's Accusations against 
Porter, 442. — Retreat to Centreville, 443. — Chantilly, 444. — Pope's Conduct in 
the Campaign, 445. — Critical Position of the Government, 446, 447. 



Invasion of Maryland, 449. — Lukewarmness of the Marylanders, 450. — Object of the 
Sortie, 451. — McClcllan follows Lee, 452. — Forcing of Turner's Gap, 453. — For- 
cing of Crampton's Gap, 454. — Capture of Harper's Ferry, 455. — Lee falls back 
to the Antietam, 450. — Topography of Antietam, 457. — The Battle of Antictam, 
458 to 465. — Lee recrosses the Potomac, 466. — Stuart's Pennsylvania Raid, 467. 
— Burnside at Fredericksburg, 468 to 470. — The Battle of Fredericksburg, 471 
to 474. — Hooker in Burnside's Stead, 475. — Condition of the Confederate Army, 
476 to 479. 




Classification of Naval Affairs, 180.— The Port Royal Expedition, LSI to 484 — 
Blockade of Savannah, 185.- Reduction of Fort Pulaski, 486, 487. — Expedition 
to Fernandinn, 488, 489.— Expedition to Hatteras, 490, 491.— The Roanoke Ex- 
pedition, 492, 495.— Capture of Fort Macon, 496.— Stone Blockade, 497.— Con- 
federate Privateers, 498, 499. — Attack on the Mississippi Squadron, 500. 







Expectations of the National Government and the Confederacy, 501. — Opinion of 
various Classes in England, 502, 503. — Influence of English Journalism, 50-1. — 
Parallel between the Colonial and Confederate Movements, 505. — Tactics of the 
Newspapers, 506. — Criticisms on the South, 507. — Secession is Treason, 508. — 
Prospective Disasters of the South, 509.— Effect of the Morrill Tariff, 510. — 
Partition of the Union inevitable, 511. — Liberal Statesmanship of the South, 512. 
— Common Interest of England and the South, 513. — Neutrality Proclamations, 



Origin of the Mexican Expedition, 515. — Proposed Union of the Southern States 
and Mexico, 516. — Secession the first Step in the Plot, 517. — Course of the Eu- 
ropean Powers, 518. — Half Measures of the Erench, 519. — Intervention in Mex- 
ico,520. — Expectations of the three Powers, 521. — Letter of the Emperor Napo- 
leon, 522. — The French Expedition sails, 523. — The City of Mexico seized, 524. 
— The Mexican Empire established, 525. — Napoleon abandons Maximilian, 526. 
— Impolicy of the Removal of the Erench, 526. — Correspondence of Mr. Seward, 
527. — Failure of the Mexican Empire, 528. — Disappointment of all Parties in 
the Mexican Expedition, 529, 530. 




Attack of European Journals on the Union, 531. — Literary Attacks, 532, 533. — 
The South rising in Favor, 534. — Advantages of Secession to Europe, 535. — 
Summary of the Views of English Journalism, 536. — Indifference to American 
Opinion, 537. — Retaliation of American Journalists, 538. — Change in foreign 
Opinion, and its Cause, 539. — The Trent Affair, 540, 541. — Views of the English 
Government, 542 ; of the French Government, 543. — Instructions to the Amer- 
ican Minister, 544. — Restoration of the Captives, 545. — Lord Lyons on the State 
of Affairs, 546, 547. 




Formation of a Public Debt in England, 549 ; its supposed Advantages, 550. — Dis- 
advantages of direct Taxation ; Experience of the Romans, 551. — Political Ef- 
fect of protective Tariffs, 552. — Finance Report for 1860, 552. — Finances in 1861, 
553, 554. — Intrusion of Slavery in these Affairs, 555. — Slave-owners insulted in 
London, 556. — Chase the Secretary of the Treasury, 557. — Financial Provisions 
for 1862, 558. — Arrangements with the Banks, 559, 560. — The Provisions prove 
inadequate, 561. — Additional Taxes recommended, 562. — Bank Circulation, 563. 
— Advantages of a National Circulation, 564, 565. — Financial Provisions for 


1863, 566. — Suspension of Specie Payments, 567. — A National Circulation rec- 
ommended, 568. — Congressional Financial Acts, 569. — Resume of the Finances, 
570. — Receipts and Deficiency for the Year, 571. — The Value of Gold, 572. — 
Financial and political Effect of a National Circulation, 573. — Wealth of the Re- 
public, 574. — Financial Contrast of the Republic and the Confederacy, 575. — 
The Tendency of Wealth to Concentration, 576. — War Report for 1861, 576, 577. 
— Stanton's War Report for 1862, 578. — Suppression of disloyal Practices, 579. — 
Magnitude of the Military Operations, 580. — Necessity of using the Slave Ele- 
ment, 581 to 583.— Xoyalty of the Slaves, 584. — Political Weakness of the South, 
585.— Navy Report for 1862, 585, 5S6.— Success of the Naval Operations, 587.— 
Development of the Navy, 588, 589. 



Classification of Anti-slavery Movements, 590. — Anti-slavery Measures of Congress, 
591 to 595. — Anti-slavery Acts of the President, 596. — His Views respecting 
Slavery, 597. — He proposes compensated Emancipation, 598. — His Statements 
showing his Reluctance to emancipate the Slaves, 599. — Contradictory Army 
Orders, 600. — Lincoln's Plans of Colonization and compensated Emancipation, 
601, 602. — His Counter-proclamation to Hunter, 603. — His Negotiations with 
the Border States, 604. — His Interview with certain religious Persons, 605, 606. 
— He is constrained to resort to Emancipation, 607. — The preparatory Proclama- 
tion of September 22d, 608, 609, 610. — His religious Interpretation of certain 
military Events, 611. — The Slaves expecting Freedom, 612. — The Emancipa- 
tion Proclamation of January 1st, 1863, 613. — The End of Slavery in America, 







Mr. Lincoln's accession to the Presidency and formation of his Cabinet. 

He refused to receive commissioners sent by the secessionists to Washington seek- 
ing recognition. Hereupon an attack on Fort Sumter, in South Carolina, was 
ordered by the authorities at Montgomery, and he was compelled to meet force 
by force. Accordingly, he called out the militia, proclaimed a blockade, and 
summoned an extra session of Congress. 

The English government conceded belligerent rights to the secessionists. Charac- 
ter of the instructions issued by the American government to its foreign minis- 

State of public opinion at the time of Mr. Lincoln's accession. 

Mr. Lincoln left his home at Springfield, Illinois, on 
the 11th of February (1861). Bidding farewell to his 
neighbors, he said : 

" My Friends, — I can not sufficiently express to you 
Lincoln's departure the sadness I feel at this parting. To you I 

from Springfield. ^ ^j ^ j ^ jj^ j j^ j.^ ^^ 

than a quarter of a century; here my children were born, 
here one of them lies buried. I know not how soon I 
shall see you again. A duty devolves upon me perhaps 
greater than that which has devolved upon any man since 
the days of Washington. He never could have succeeded 







Mr. Lincoln's accession to the Presidency and formation of his Cabinet. 

He refused to receive commissioners sent by the secessionists to Washington seek- 
ing recognition. Hereupon an attack on Fort Sumter, in South Carolina, was 
ordered by the authorities at Montgomery, and he was compelled to meet force 
by force. Accordingly, he called out the militia, proclaimed a blockade, and 
summoned an extra session of Congress. 

The English government conceded belligerent rights to the secessionists. Charac- 
ter of the instructions issued by the American government to its foreign minis- 

State of public opinion at the time of Mr. Lincoln's accession. 

Mr, Lincoln left his home at Springfield, Illinois, on 
the 11th of February (1861). Bidding farewell to his 
neighbors, he said : 

" My Friends, — I can not sufficiently express to you 
Lincoln's departure the sadness I feel at this parting. To you I 

from Springfield. ^ jj ^ j ^ jj^ j j^ jj^ ^^ 

than a quarter of a century ; here my children were born, 
here one of them lies buried. I know not how soon I 
shall see you again. A duty devolves upon me perhaps 
greater than that which has devolved upon any man since 
the days of Washington. He never could have succeeded 


except for the aid of Divine Providence, upon which he 
at all times relied. I feel that I can do nothing without 
the same divine aid which sustained him, and on that Al- 
mighty Being I place my reliance for support. I hope 
that you, my friends, will all pray that I may receive that 
divine assistance without which I can not succeed, but 
with which success is certain. I bid you all an affection- 
ate farewell." 

Mr. Lincoln's journey to Washington was in striking 
contrast to Mr. Davis's triumphant progress to Montgom- 

Davis, enthusiastic in the cause of which he had be- 
come the chosen leader, met a welcome ev- 

Davis's journey to -. tt 1 i x l i • y i t 

Montgomery, and ery where, lie had to deal with a people 

his intentions. \ . m x •*■ 

animated by one influence, seeking one ob- 
ject, and comprehending distinctly the means to which 
they must resort for success. In the various speeches de- 
livered by him, there is no hesitation in accepting without 
reserve his position. If the North will permit his people 
to separate peaceably, it is well ; but if not, her rich val- 
leys, shall be devastated, her cities, the growth of time, 
the product of millions of money, shall be a prey to the 
torch ; her people " shall smell Southern powder and feel 
Southern steel." 

Lincoln, on the contrary, has no correct idea of what 
Lincoln's views of is before him. He has none of the feroc- 
ity of his opponent ; he is full of peace, and 
thinks there is no probability of war. He, the elected 
chief magistrate of the whole nation, will not ungracious- 
ly obtrude on his discontented fellow-countrymen ; per- 
haps he may collect duties, stop the mails, endeavor to 
retake and hold the forts. He affirms that nobody is 
suffering any thing. Overflowing with good-nature him- 
self, he " deems" that nothing more is necessary than to 
state the exceeding absurdity of the doctrine of secession, 


and that its upholders, listening to reason, will forthwith 
submit. He can not understand how it is that a state 
should assert a right to rule all that is less than itself, 
and ruin all that is greater, nor what is to prevent a 
county, a town, an individual claiming a like power. In 
his eyes the Nation is every thing, States nothing. 

When he reached Philadelphia on his way to Washing- 
His opinions change ton, his opinions, however, began to change. 

duringhisjourney. He found ^ ^ difficulty fo ^ to face 

was something more than an election squabble. Informa- 
tion was privately conveyed to him from General Scott 
and Mr. Seward that there was an intention to assassin- 
ate him, either by throwing the train off the track or by 
shooting him as he passed through Baltimore. It was in 
reference to this that he said, in a speech delivered in 
Philadelphia, " I would rather be assassinated on this 
spot than surrender that sentiment in the Declaration of 
Independence which gives liberty not alone to the people 
of this country, but, I hope, to the whole world, for all fu- 
ture time." Acting under the advice of those who under- 
stood the malignant condition of the communities through 
which he had to pass much better than he, and who were 
profoundly impressed with the importance of his personal 
He reaches wash- safety to the nation, he submitted to be con- 
mgton in safety. veyed from ijarrisburg in disguise : the tel- 
egraph wires were cut, and he passed through Baltimore 
in safety at an unexpected hour. 

There was no need for Lincoln's friends to view that 
manner of his entrance into Washington with humilia- 
tion : they would have deserved censure had they advised 
him otherwise than they did. Their course was more 
than justified by his subsequent assassination in the the- 
atre at Washington. 

It had been declared in the South that he should never 
live to be inaugurated. There was an expectation that 


he would be assassinated in the act of taking the oath of 
office ; but military arrangements were made which ena- 
bled him to pass through that ordeal in safety. In a cool 
manner, and with a clear, audible voice, he delivered his 
address from the eastern portico of the Capitol. The day 
(March 4th, 1861) was serene, though cold, as are often 
the first clays of spring. 

In this inaugural address he hastened to assure the 
people of the Southern States that they had 

His inaugural ad- P t . . -, -, • 

chess at the cap- no cause lor apprehension either as to their 
property or persons from the accession of a 
Republican administration, affirming that he had no pur- 
pose to interfere directly or indirectly with slavery in the 
states where it existed. " I believe I have no lawful right, 
and I have no inclination to do so." Referring to the 
disruption of the Union, heretofore only menaced, but 
now formidably attempted, he declared that he held the 
Union to be perpetual — a government, and not a mere 
association of the states ; that no state of its own mere 
motion can lawfully go out of the Union ; that resolves 
and ordinances to that effect are legally void ; and that 
in this view he should take care, as enjoined by the Con- 
stitution, that all the laws of the Union should be faith- 
fully executed in all the states ; that in doing this there 
should be no bloodshed or violence unless this should be 
forced upon the national authority ; that the power con- 
fided to him would be used to hold, occupy, and possess 
the property and places belonging to the government, and 
to collect the duties and imposts ; that he should not at- 
tempt to force obnoxious strangers in the federal offices 
among'the people of the dissatisfied states; that the mails, 
unless repelled, should be furnished to all parts of the 
Union ; that he should do whatever he could with a view 
to a peaceful solution of the national troubles and the res- 


toration of fraternal sympathies and affections. Reason- 
ing with those who still held an attachment to the Union, 
he earnestly asked them to point out, if they could, a single 
instance in which a plainly written provision of the Con- 
stitution had ever been evaded. He tells them that either 
the minority or the majority must submit, or the govern- 
ment must cease. If a minority will secede rather than 
submit, they make a precedent for their own ruin— a 
minority of their own will again secede whenever a ma- 
jority refuses to be controlled ; and hence it is plain that 
the central idea of secession is anarchy. If majorities are 
not to rule, anarchy or despotism is all that is left. 

" In your hands, my dissatisfied fellow-countrymen," he 
added, " not in mine, is the momentous issue of civil war. 
The government will not assail you. You can have no 
conflict without being yourselves the aggressors." 

The inauguration over, Buchanan rode with Lincoln 
Buchananieavestiie to the presidential residence — the White 
House — and bade him adieu, a heartfelt 
adieu, at the door. The ex-President, relieved from his 
heavy burden of cares, retired to the house of his friend, 
Mr. Ould. Even in this trifling incident may be seen the 
character of President Buchanan's associations, the quali- 
ty of the social atmosphere in which he had been living. 
Mr. Ould shortly after left Washington and entered into 
the service of the Confederacy. 

Every effort was made by the conspirators to pervert 
mu . ,. the meaning of the inaugural address, and 

The inaugural is © O / 

SrongKme exasperate the feeling of the South against 
the President. The most ferocious inten- 
tions were attributed to him : he was accused of a blood- 
thirsty purpose of devastating the innocent and much- 
enduring Southern States. 

The American political system is liable to bring inex- 
II— B 


perience to the helm of state. The affairs of thirty mil- 
lions may have to be administered by the unskillfulness 
which would' scarcely answer for three. Lincoln under- 
took his task, not with the decision of knowledge and 
confidence, but with the trepidation of unacquaintance 
and doubt. 

It is not surprising that at this time he submitted to 
the guidance of Mr. Seward, who, he was 

Lincoln, in his in- *-it • -i t it 

experience, relies willing to believe, had more experience, 

upon Seward. • -. . 

clearer views, and a better understanding 
of the political difficulty. But, on his part, Mr. Seward 
did not realize the vastness and energy of secession. A 
veteran politician, he mistook the inflexible determina- 
tion of a more than Catilinean conspiracy for the shift- 
ing intrigues of a caucus. 

Lincoln had no knowledge of the past. He perpetu- 
ally felt that deficiency in contemplating the probable 
future. He saw that he must trust to his Secretary of 
State, who, in the earlier periods of the war, was to him 
historian and prophet combined. 

The affairs of the nation were assuming a most ominous 
aspect ; every day was adding not only to the audacity, 
but to the success of the conspirators. Though it was 
well known that the Norfolk navy yard would be seized, 
and that from its vast supplies the Confederacy would 
be armed, nothing was for a long time done either to pro- 
tect or to destroy it. The administration only looked on. 

But, even had Lincoln been conversant with the man- 
agement of public affairs, it was hardly pos- 

He must satisfy the m i •» i • • ,1 • , • -i , -i , 

clamor of place- sible for him, in this particular, to nave act- 


ed otherwise than he did. Washington was 
overflowing with bands of insatiate office - seekers, fero- 
cious in the pursuit of their objects. Their demands must 
be attended to first; the election pledges must be redeem- 
ed. If the President had thought that the idea of state- 


rights had become extinct in the North, he now found his 

mistake. Place-hunters had to be satisfied, and patronage 

The consequent allotted according to states. Not more than 

procrastination. so man y mus t be gratified from, this, not 

more than so much bestowed upon that. The deafening 
clamor must be harmonized geographically. There was 
more urgency to satisfy the vociferous demand of some 
locally influential politician than to strike down the hand 
clutching at the throat of the nation. 

It was plain that the republic was on the brink of 

Accusationsagainst g reat e Y e . nts ; that new political necessities 
the administration. were arising; that, to meet the unscrupulous 

acts of those who detested the Union and scorned the 
Constitution, something more than the legal forms of the 
Constitution would be required. But it is not true, as 
its enemies affirmed, that " the secret history of the acts 
of the administration at its first assumption of power was 
a lamentable and degrading record of double-dealing, vac- 
illation, turpitude, and colossal ignorance." On the. con- 
trary, the worst that can be said of it is that it was a 
history of good intentions unintelligently, and therefore 
inadequately sustained. 

The political purity of the republic of the Revolution 
change in the char- na( ^ altogether passed away. A new soci- 

acter of the nation. xll * 2. • 1 'ill 

ety had come into existence, animated by 
new desires and guided by new ideas. The character of 
the nation had changed. Necessarily the formulas of its 
life must also change. When great and powerful com- 
munities had resolved that they would no longer be 
bound by written law, and were determined to secure 
their ends by violence, when only a political bribe could 
deter them from resorting to force, it was plain that 
there was imminent peril of the Mexicanization of the 

In reference to this impending danger, Lincoln said, " I 


will suffer death before I will consent, or ad- 

Prevail PTi op of IYTpxi- 

can ideas hi the vise nw friends to consent, to any concession 

South. J . . . J , 

or compromise which looks like buying the 
privilege of taking possession of the government, to which 
we have a constitutional right, because whatever I might 
think of the merit of the various propositions before Con- 
gress, I should regard any concession in the face of men- 
ace as the destruction of the government itself, and a con- 
sent on all hands that our system shall be brought down 
to a level with the existing disorganized state of affairs 
in Mexico." 

Impartial observers saw. clearly that the political diffi- 
culty could only be overcome by the appli- 

It had become . . n n mi n 1 1 c^ i i 

needful to resort cation oi lorce. Ine southern states, un- 
scrupulously resorting to arms, universally 
declared that if the administration could not compel their 
obedience, it had no right to claim to be their govern- 
ment. In the Eepublic, as first formed from the Old En- 
glish Colonies, the doctrine that government rests on the 
consent of the governed had been found an acceptable 
and sufficient rule ; but it had now become painfully ap- 
parent that a very different maxim was necessary, where 
a vast continent, with many conflicting interests, was in 

The first great public duty of the President was the 

Formation of Lin- appointment of the cabinet. Lincoln had 
coin's cabinet. ^ em pi e( jg e( j ^ ma k e Mr. Seward Secretary 

of State, though there were misgivings in the Kepubli- 
can party that this able man would be found not un- 
willing to postpone the strict application of its principles 
for the sake of the consolidation of its power. For the 
other ministerial offices there were rivalries and bitter 
contentions, but in the end the following cabinet was 
formed : 


William H. Seward ..Secretary of State. 

Salmon P. Chase " " the Treasury. 

Simon Cameron " " War. 

Gideon Welles " " the Navy. 

Caleb B. Smith " " " Interior. 

Montgomery Blair Postmaster General. 

Edward Bates Attorney " 

In a few days (March 12th) after the inauguration, Mr. 
Arrival of secession Forsyth, of Alabama, and Mr. Crawford, of 
agents. Georgia, came to Washington. They an- 

nounced themselves as representatives of the Confederate 
government, which had instructed them to make overtures 
to the government of the United States for the opening 
of negotiations with a view to a peaceful solution of all 
questions in dispute, and requested the appointment of a 
clay on which they might present their credentials to the 

The Secretary of State, Mr. Seward, respectfully de- 

sewara declines to clined aE interview with them, and in a 
receive them. memorandum declared that he could not 
recognize in the late events an accomplished revolution 
or an independent nation ; that he could not admit that 
the states referred to had withdrawn or could withdraw 
from the Union without the consent of the people of the 
United States ; that he could not regard, or in any way 
admit, the so-called Confederate States as a foreign power 
with whom diplomatic relations ought to be established ; 
that his duties as Secretary of State confined him to the 
conducting of the foreign relations of the country, and 
did not embrace domestic questions. Unable, therefore, 
not only to comply with the request of the applicants to 
appoint a day for their visit to the President, he must 
also state that he had no authority to recognize them as 
diplomatic agents, or hold any communication with them. 
He concluded by saying that, under a strong desire to 


practice entire directness, and to act in a spirit of perfect 
respect and candor toward Messrs. Forsyth and Crawford, 
and to that portion of the Union in whose names they 
present themselves, he had submitted this paper, though 
there was no necessity for his so doing, to the President, 
who coincided in his views, and sanctioned his decision 
declining official intercourse with those gentlemen. 

To this memorandum the Confederate commissioners 
Eepiy of the seces- replied that their object was to invite friend- 
sion agents to him. jy re ] a tions between the government of the 
United States and the new government of the people who 
had rejected its authority. The territories of the two 
powers being contiguous, their relations must be either 
friendly or hostile ; that, in the spirit of humanity and 
Christian civilization, the government of the Confederate 
States had commissioned them to present the olive-branch 
of peace. 

They continued — that the United States government 
had not met them in a like conciliatory and peaceful 
spirit, but with a persistence untaught, and uncured by 
the ruin that had been wrought, refused to recognize the 
great fact of a complete and successful revolution ; that, 
had they been met with frankness and manliness, they 
would not now have had to return home to tell their gov- 
ernment that its earnest efforts in behalf of peace had 
been futile, and that the United States meant to subju- 
gate them by force of arms ; that impartial history must 
record the innocence of the government of the Confeder- 
ate States, and place the responsibility of the bloodshed 
and mourning that might ensue on those who had set 
naval and land armaments in motion to subject the peo- 
ple of one portion of the land to the will of those of 
another portion. 

They likewise informed the secretary that the old 
Union was broken up, and that its disintegration had be- 


They announce g™- Th ^J considered it proper to advise 
un?rais h broke e n h™ to dismiss all hopes that the people 
up ' of the Confederate States would ever be 

brought to submit to the authority of the United States 
government ; that he was only dealing with delusions 
when he sought to separate the Confederate people from 
their government, and characterized their sovereign act 
as a "perversion of a temporary and partisan excitement;" 
that he would awake to find these dreams as unreaFand 
unsubstantial as others in which he had recently indulged. 
They added that they clearly understood the refusal of 
an interview with the President to be made on the ground 
that this would be a recognition of the independence and 
separate nationality of the Confederate States ; but that, 
in truth, no such recognition had been asked by them: 
they only sought the peaceful adjustment of the new rela- 
tions springing from the accomplished revolution in the 
government of the late Union ; that the refusal to enter- 
tain these overtures and the intention to provision Fort 
Sumter were received by them, and could be received by 
the world, only as a declaration of war against the Confed- 
erate States. They therefore, in behalf of 

And that they ac- . -i ■ T -• . . -, 

cept an appeal to their government ana people, accept the gage 
of battle thus thrown down to them, and, 
appealing to God and the judgment of mankind as to the 
righteQusness of their cause, the people of the Confederate 
States will defend their liberties to the last against this 
flagrant and open attempt at their subjugation to sec- 
tional power. 

The commissioners finally explained the causes of a de- 
lay of about three weeks in presenting this their commu- 
nication, that they had indulged in hopes of a pacific solu- 
tion of the difficulties through unofficial efforts, and that it 
was only when it became clear that Mr. Lincoln had deter- 
mined to appeal to the sword, " to reduce the people of 


the Confederate States to the will of the section whose 
President he is," that they had resumed official negotia- 

In these communications to the national government 
the seceding states were not more fortunate 

Insincere and offen- , ci j i /i i • i i i s -i • 

sive character oftne than feouth Carolina had been (vol. i.\ p. 

correspondence. \ ? ± 

545) in the correspondence of her commis- 
sioners at Washington. Impartiality could not approve 
of such an air of defiance and audacity. The commis- 
sioners seemed to forget that in the eye of public law 
they were traitors, and that an energetic government 
would have seized them and tried them for their lives. 
The self-complacent grandeur they exhibited might have 
been appropriate at the close of a triumphant war, but 
not at the inception of a conspiracy. 

Under such, insincere and clamorous pretenses for peace, 
the leaders of secession were incessantly pressing on their 
preparations for war. They were expecting to secure 
great military resources by the forcible seizure of nation- 
al property. Their Congress had, on the 9th of March, 
passed an act for the organization of an army ; they were 
rapidly constructing offensive works in Charleston Har- 
bor for the reduction of Fort Sumter ; they had prohibit- 
ed the supply of fuel, water, provisions to national ships; 
one of their states— Florida, the territory of which had 
been bought from Spain with the money of the Union, 
and rescued from the Indians by the national army — had 
actually passed a law punishing with death any of its 
citizens. who should hold office under the United States 
after a collision had taken place. Above all, they over- 
looked that a revolt against an established government, 
whether successful or unsuccessful, must in modern times 
justify itself in the sight of law and order, and that, even 
admitting that the Confederacy had already triumphant- 


ly and permanently established itself, the insolent spirit 
of its correspondence could not be tolerated by any for- 
eign power. 

As soon as it was known that the commissioners would 
not be received at Washington, the conspir- 

The conspirators or- . . -, ^ ■, . . ,-, . 

der an attack on ators took measures for bringing their case 

Fort Sumter. . -P i -i • 

to a forcible issue. They ordered their gen- 
eral, Beauregard, to effect the reduction of Fort Sumter, 
and wrest from the national government that public work. 

By this high-handed measure — a measure of defiance — 
they did indeed secure the co-operation of the Slave 
States, but they accomplished more than that — they 
united the Free States. 

There was no other course for Lincoln but to resist. It 
Lincoln com died was impossible that such an attack on the 
tL r St^and°sum- national authority should pass without a 
vindication by him of the national suprem- 
acy. On the 15th of April he therefore issued the fol- 
lowing proclamation, calling forth the militia, and sum- 
moning an extra session of Congress : 

" Whereas the laws of the United States have been for some time 
past and now are opposed, and the execution thereof obstructed in 
the states of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, 
Louisiana, and Texas, by combinations too powerful to be suppress- 
ed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings or by the powers 
vested in the marshals by law — now, therefore, I, Abraham Lincoln, 
President of the United States, in virtue of the power in me vested 
by the Constitution and the laws, have thought fit to call forth the 
militia of the several states of the Union, to the aggregate number 
of seventy-five thousand, in order to suppress said combinations, 
and to cause the laws to be duly executed. 

" The details for this object will be immediately communicated 
to the state authorities through the War Department. I appeal to 
all loyal citizens to favor, facilitate, and aid this effort to maintain 
the honor, the integrity, and existence of our national Union, and 
the perpetuity of popular government, and to redress wrongs al- 
ready long enough endured. I deem it proper to say that the first 
service assigned to the forces hereby called forth will probably be 


to repossess the forts, places, and property which have been seized 
from the Union, and in every event the utmost care will be ob- 
served, consistently with the objects aforesaid, to avoid any devas- 
tation, any destruction of, or interference with property, or any dis- 
turbance of peaceful citizens of any part of the country. And I 
hereby command the persons composing the combinations aforesaid 
to disperse and retire peaceably to their respective abodes within 
twenty days from this date. 

" Deeming that the present condition of public affairs presents 
an extraordinary occasion, I do hereby, in virtue of the power in me 
vested by the Constitution, convene both houses of Congress. The 
senators and representatives are therefore summoned to assemble 
in their respective chambers at 12 o'clock, noon, on Thursday, the 
4th day of July next, then and there to consider and determine 
such measures as in their wisdom the public safety and interest 
may seem to demand. 

" In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and caused 
the seal of the United States to be affixed. 

"Done at the City of Washington this 15th day of April, in the 
year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-one, and 
of the Independence of the United States the eighty-fifth. 

"Abeaham Lincoln. 

"By the President: 
"Wm. H. Seward, Secretary of State." 

Scarcely was this proclamation issued when one of the 

chief hopes of the conspirators was extin- 

compiy with Ms guished. They had expected that the Free 

call for troops. S? • x 

states would make no warlike resistance, 
and had inculcated that expectation on their communi- 
ties. They found, however, that not only had the Presi- 
dent's demand upon those states been complied with in 
a few hours, but that in all directions vast preparations 
were making for a contest which, regarding it now as in- 
evitable, the North accepted. The Northern governors 
thoroughly sustained the President, and in their turn were 
enthusiastically supported by their people. 

They who had denied that slavery had any thing to 
do with the public troubles, and had asserted that it was 
the tariff or other subordinate matters which had caused 


the alienation, received in what now took place a complete 
answer. The geographical boundary between allegiance 
and opposition to the government was at once ascertained 
to be the slave line. 

The governors of Maryland and Delaware only prof- 
The siave states fered troops^ for the defense of Washington 
refuse. City. All aid by the other Slave States was 

refused. The Governor of Virginia replied that he should 
furnish none for any such purpose as that proposed. He 
denounced the object as for the subjugation of the South- 
ern States, and accused the President of inaugurating civil 
war. The Governor of North Carolina declared that he 
would be no party to such a wicked violation of the laws 
of the country, and to a war on the liberties of a free peo- 
ple. The Governor of Kentucky replied, " I say emphati- 
cally that Kentucky will furnish no troops for the wicked 
purpose of subduing her sister Southern States." The 
Governor of Tennessee would not " furnish a single man 
for coercion, but fifty thousand, if necessary, for the de- 
fense of our rights and those of our Southern brethren." 
The Governor of Missouri replied, " Your requisition is 
illegal, unconstitutional, revolutionary, inhuman, diaboli- 
cal, and can not be complied with." The Governor of 
Arkansas replied, "Your demand is only adding insult to 

The calling forth of the militia was immediately fol- 
lowed by another very important measure, 

Lincoln establishes .-■ 1 i ~i' l i •* i i i i t t 

a blockade of the the establishment or a blockade. In a sub- 

Southern ports. T ... - ,.. 

sequent chapter 1 shall consider the politic- 
al necessities which demanded the prohibition of South 
ern commerce. 

There were two methods by which this might be done: 
(1), by the establishment of a blockade; (2), by the clos- 
ure of the ports. Of these the former was selected. 


Events showed that the course thus adopted was in- 
correct. But it is to be borne in mind that Mr. Seward 
had not in the State Department a board of confidential 
advisers such as exists in similar departments in Europe, 
and much must in excuse be attributed to the urgency 
and confusion of the times, and to the inexperience of a 
new administration. 

The blockade proclamation bore upon its face a pure- 
The proclamation ty defensive character. It recited that an 
of the blockade, insurrection had broken out in South Caro- 
lina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana, 
and Texas, in which states the revenue laws could no 
longer be executed ; that the persons combined in this 
insurrection had threatened to grant letters of marque 
against the commerce of the United States. It called at- 
tention to the President's proclamation just previously 
issued, and announced that a blockade of the ports of the 
states aforesaid would be forthwith established. It con- 
cluded by declaring that persons molesting the commerce 
of the United States in the manner threatened would be 
held amenable to the laws of the United States for the 
prevention and punishment of piracy. 

On the 27th of April, by another proclamation, the 
An additional wock- ports of Virginia and North Carolina were 

ade proclamation. indudei ^ wLole gouthem COast WaS 

therefore now embraced. 

The political effect of a blockade is different from that 
of a closure of ports : the latter is purely 

Respective effects of -, . ™ . , n . • , i • , 

a blockade and of a a domestic anair ; the former carries with it 

port-closure. . , . 

grave international consequences. A nation 
can not blockade its own ports, but only those of a for- 
eign power. In the special case under the consideration 
of the government, the course which was taken invested 
by implication the Southern Confederacy with the rights 
of an independent power, raising it into the position of a 


lawful "belligerent, and conceding that it was not to be 
treated as in rebellion, but as engaged in lawful war. 

Had a closure of the ports been resorted to, all ques- 
tions arising under it would have been dealt with, not by 
international, but by municipal law. The government 
might, if such were its pleasure, consider those engaged 
in secession in the light of rebels, and apply against them 
the penalties of treason. 

It must not be overlooked, however, that in effective- 
ness the Blockade has advantages over the Closure. Ac- 
tion against an offender under the latter could take place 
lawfully only in American waters ; under the former there 
might be pursuit out in the open sea. 

The incorrect position into which things were brought 

by this selection was quickly discovered. In 

mistake m proclaim- a dispatch of Mr. Seward to Mr. Adams, 

ing a blockade. -n/r • i i i it i i -1 

May 21, 1861, it had been declared that the 
crews of Confederate privateers should be treated as pi- 
rates, as had been announced in the proclamation; but the 
government was constrained to recede, from that position, 
and consider them as prisoners of war. The blockade had 
acknowledged them as belligerents. 

Nor was it alone as regards persons taken at sea that 
the consequences of this false step were manifested. The 
government had evidently brought itself into an embar- 
rassed position in all its dealings with the Confederacy. 
It had given to foreign powers disposed to unfriendly 
acts the excuse that it had itself been the first to confer 
on the insurgents belligerent rights. 

But the conspirators, on their side, were not inactive. 
Not only had they issued a proclamation of- 
issue letters of fering letters of marque against the com- 
merce of the nation : they had garrisoned 
all the forts they had seized ; they were rapidly transport- 
ing an army of 20,000 men into Virginia ; they had ob- 


tained a loan of eight millions of dollars for war pur- 

They raised a cry throughout the South against the 
tyrannical coercion to which they affirmed the govern- 
ment was about to resort. In the tempest of passion thus 
excited the secession of Virginia was accomplished. 

Finding itself environed by treason, the government, 

on the 20th of April, caused to be seized all 

seizes telegrams of the dispatches which had accumulated in 

the past year. , x 

the various telegraph offices during the past 
year, the avowed object being the detection of movements 
that had been made in aid of the conspiracy. A more 
important end, however, was gained in the paralyzing or 
prevention of such movements for the future. Later, in 
the summer (August 26th), with a view of preventing 
the post-offices being used for disloyal purposes, the Post- 
master General directed that certain newspapers, which 
had been presented by a grand jury as disloyal, should 
not be forwarded by the mails. 

During May and June the secessionists were energet- 
ically raising and organizing troops and 

Great military prep- . . , , T7 . . . -. , , 

arations of the se- transporting them to Virginia and the oth- 

cessiouists. x J? ° 

er Border States. At the close of that pe- 
riod the force amounted to more than 100,000 men. 
There was no other course for the United States govern- 
ment than to make similar preparations for its own de- 
fense. On the 3d of May the President issued a procla- 
mation calling for 42,034 volunteers for 
caiis g out e more n three years, ordering 22,714 officers and 
men to be added to the regular army, and 
18,000 seamen to the navy. Shortly afterward, by a proc- 
lamation dated May 10 th, he ordered the commander of 
the United States forces in Florida to permit no person to 
exercise- any office or authority upon the islands of Key 
West, the Tortugas, and Santa Rosa inconsistent with 


the laws and Constitution of the United States ; author- 
ABd suspends the izin g nim > if needful, to suspend the writ of 
habeas corpus. foafaas corpus, and to remove from the vicin- 
ity of the United States fortresses all dangerous or sus- 
pected persons." 

The attitude assumed toward foreign powers by the 
government is indicated by the instructions 

Relations of the re-. i-s/r a 1 / i •■ • J iji 

public to foreign given to Mr. Adanis, the minister at the 

countries. EL . 

.Lnglish court. He is directed to express 
the appreciation of the American government for the 
marks of good- will which had been shown to the United 
States, but to be careful not to rely on any such sympa- 
thies or national kindness. He is to make no admission 
of the weakness of his government, but rather to assert 
its strength. He is to listen to no suggestions of compro- 
mise of the present disputes under any foreign auspices. 
If he finds the English government tolerating the appli- 
instructions to the cation of the seceding states, or wavering 

ministers abroad. ^^ ^ j^ ^^ ^ for & mQmmt leaye 

them to suppose that they can grant that application and 
remain friends of the United States. Promptly he is to 
assure them that if they determine to recognize, they 
must, at the same time, prepare to enter into alliance with 
the enemies of the republic. He is to represent in Lon- 
don his whole country, not a part of it. If he is asked to 
divide that duty with others, diplomatic relations be- 
tween Great Britain and the American republic will be 
at once suspended. 

He is forbidden to rest his opposition to the applica- 
tion of the Confederate States on any ground of favor, or 
to draw into debate before the British government any 
opposing moral principles at the foundation of the exist- 
ing controversy. He must indulge in no expressions of 
harshness, disrespect, or even impatience toward the seced- 
ing states or their people, but steadfastly bear in mind 


that, notwithstanding the present temporary delusion, 
these states must always continue to be honored mem- 
bers of the Federal Union. 

Before Mr. Adams could reach London, the British gov- 
The secessionists ernmen t had determined to acknowledge the 
bem|ffeu d tf e by as Confederates as a belligerent power. The 
England. French government also took a similar 

course. Against this Mr. Adams was directed to protest 
energetically. The ministers of those governments at 
Washington requested an interview with the Secretary 
of State, that they might read to him the instructions 
they had received. This was declined* it being under- 
stood that the purport of the paper was to the effect that 
the British government had arrived at the decision that 
" this country is divided into two belligerent parties, of 
which this government represents one, and that Great 
Britain assumes the attitude of a neutral between them." 
Mr. Seward, in a letter to Mr. Adams (June 19th), says, 
" This government could not, consistently wdth a just re- 
gard to the sovereignty of the United States, permit itself 
to debate these novel and extraordinary positions with 
the government of her Britannic majesty, much less can 
we consent that that government shall announce to us a 
decision derogatory to that sovereignty at 

Instructions to Mr. i • i • , i • i • ; i , • i 

Adams, the minis- which it has arrived without previously con- 

ter to England. x . ^ 

ferrmg with us upon the question, lhe 
United States are still solely and exclusively sovereign 
within the territories they have lawfully acquired and 
long possessed, as they have always been. They are at 
peace w T ith all the world, as, with unimportant exceptions, 
they have always been. They are living under the obli- 
gations of the law of nations, and of treaties with Great 
Britain, just the same now as heretofore. They are, of 
course, the friend of Great Britain, and they insist that 
Great Britain shall remain their friend now just as she 


has hitherto been. Great Britain, by virtue of their re- 
lations, is a stranger to parties and sections in this coun- 
try, whether they are loyal to the United States or not, 
and Great Britain can neither rightfully qualify the sov* 
ereignty of the United States, nor concede, nor recognize 
any rights, or interests, or power in any party, state, or 
section in contravention to the unbroken sovereignty of 
the Federal Union. What is now seen in this country is 
the* occurrence, by no means peculiar, but frequent in all 
countries, more frequent even in Great Britain than here, 
of an armed insurrection engaged in attempting to over- 
throw the regularly constituted and established govern- 
ment. There is, of course, the employment of force by the 
government to suppress the insurrection, as every other 
government necessarily employs force in such cases. But 
these incidents by no means constitute a state of war, ini 
pairing sovereignty, creating belligerent sections, and en 
titling foreign states to intervene or to act as neutrals be 
tween them, or in any other way to cast off lawful obli 
gations to the nation thus for the moment disturbed 
Any other principle than this would be to resolve gov 
ernment every where into a thing of accident and caprice 
and ultimately all human society into a state of perpetual 

The American ministers at all the foreign courts re- 
instructions to oth- ceived instructions of a similar tenor. They 

erforeignministers. were empliatically foj^ U YoU Can not be tOO 

decided or explicit in making known to the government 
that there is not now, nor has there been, nor will there 
be, the least idea existing in the government of suffering 
a dissolution of this Union to take place in any way 
political ideas at At the time of the inauguration of Lin- 

the time of Lin- i , i 1 t , • i • i , 

coin's accession, coin there were two political ideas strug- 
gling for supremacy in the republic. 
II.— C 


The first may be conveniently designated the New En- 
™ ^ ™ , * gland idea. Its embodiment would have 

The New England o 

idea - been the Union expanding all over the con- 

tinent — a vast republic inhabited altogether by free men, 
and resting on individual intelligence. 

The second or Southern idea would have been realized 
by the consolidation of the Slave States un- 

The Southern idea. n . , /» i m 

der one strong government ot a purely mil- 
itary type, and separated from the Free States of the 
Union. Such a government, accepting negro slavery as 
its essential basis, would have renewed the African trade. 
It would have looked forward to territorial expansion 
round the Mexican and Caribbean Seas, and expected 
eventually to embrace the West India Islands. In cot- 
ton, sugar, coffee, and other tropical products it would 
have found sources of vast wealth, and in the possession 
of the mouths of the Mississippi a control over all the 
interior of the North American continent. 

An embodiment of the first of these ideas would there- 
fore have been a republic founded on Reason ; an embod- 
iment of the second would have been a military empire 
founded on Force. 

The former had innate strength; it was in harmony 
with the spirit of the age ; it accepted the traditions of 
the republic founded by Washington. It had therefore 
a past history, and was identified with Liberty, Justice, 

The second was in opposition to the conclusions of 
modern civilization. Its success implied Injustice, Op- 
pression, and Violence. Nevertheless, as a political con- 
ception, it was not without barbaric splendor. 

Simultaneously there also existed with these two ideas 
a minor but not unimportant influence. Its 

Position of a por- . . . n -. . . . n . -, 

tion of the Demo- representatives were round m a portion ol the 

cr&tic Durtv 

Democratic party — that party which long, 


and often with brilliant success, had swayed the destinies 
of the republic. The political movements of the civil 
war can not be understood without a clear appreciation 
of the position and action of this influence. 

The retention of power by the Democratic party had 
heretofore depended on an alliance between the slave 
interest of the South and the democracy of the North, 
That democracy had, however," in the course of time, be- 
come affected by the spirit of the age. The contagion 
was not limited to its lower ranks, for among the great 
statesmen who guided it there were some whose actions 
plainly indicated that they could no longer accept the 
rigid traditions of the past. The South took alarm when 
she saw what their intentions were in relation to the na- 
tional territories. Imperious and impetuous, she broke 
with them. After the meeting of the Convention for 
the nomination of a President in Charleston (1860), the 
quarrel could no longer be concealed. 

At this moment, therefore, the Democratic party w T as di- 
vided in itself, and hence was intrinsically weak. There 
were very many persons belonging to it animated by the 
purest patriotism, who had accepted its maxims as not 
unsuitable in times of peace, but who repudiated them 
instantly and utterly when it became apparent that the 
life of the nation was about to be assailed. Among them 
the republic found some of its noblest and ablest defend- 
ers. Democracies never betray their country. That is 
done only by privileged classes. 

But there was, as has been said, a portion of the party 
who sought only for a perpetuation of place and power. 
These were ignobly insensible to the scorn with which 
the angry South was treating them. They had a seces- 
sion scheme of their own. If New England, with her 
troublesome ideas and dangerous influence, could be cut 
off, a predominance would once more be given to the 

36 LINCOLN. [Sect. VII. 

Southern scale of the balance, and they, with their old 
ally, might enjoy another period of power. They took 
encouragement from the belief that in revolutions it is 
factions which always rule. 

Surprise has been sometimes expressed at the extraor- 
dinary deception which the South apparently practiced 
on herself in looking for a divided North, and aid in her 
warlike proceedings from the Democratic party, which 
party must have become a nonentity with the success of 
secession. That expectation, however, rested on a knowl- 
edge of this state of things. 

This fragment of the Democratic party was therefore 
selfish and ignominious in its aim. With protestations 
of devotion to human liberty, it did not shrink from be- 
ing the accomplice of slavery. It reflected none of the re- 
publican grandeur issuing from the first idea, none of the 
imperial splendor of the second. Ignobly hunting for 
place, it offered as a price the life of the nation, and was 
spurned with unutterable contempt by that very South 
whose favor it sought to conciliate. 

With infinite labor and anxiety, Lincoln had at length 
organized his administration, and settled its domestic and 
foreign policy. 

One of his Illinois neighbors, who had long known him, 
says, "This tall, gaunt, melancholy man float- 

Lincoln gains the -. . , » • ■ i nr»-i ■ • _£» *i 

support of the peo- ed into our county in lool in a trail canoe 
clown the North Fork of the Sangamon River, 
friendless, penniless, powerless, alone — begging for work 
in this city — ragged, and struggling for the common nec- 
essaries of life. This man, this peculiar man, left us in 
1861 the President of the United States, backed by 
friends, and power, and fame." Notwithstanding his rus- 
tic manners and want of social polish, there was some- 
thing in his demeanor which made even those who were 


greatly his superiors in these respects, but who looked 
only to the good of the country, feel that its administra- 
tion was safe in his hands. Such as were hoping for 
the overthrow of the government regarded him with 
hatred and disgust. When Mr. Seward desired to pre- 
sent to him Mr. Mason, who subsequently became one 
of the agents of the Confederacy in Europe, that senator, 
with a scowl of horror and scorn, shook his head and de- 

But Lincoln soon found that there was a sustaining 
power behind him on which he could securely rely — the 
people — the plain people, as he affectionately called them. 
They cared nothing about his fashionable short-comings; 
they looked only to the greatness of his purposes. If he 
chose to speak in parables, they knew that it was not the 
first time in the world that that had been clone, and that 
parables have been delivered which will instruct the hu- 
man race to the end of time. When it was said in for- 
eign countries Davis is creating a nation and making his- 
tory in Richmond, and Lincoln is telling stories in Wash- 
ington, they were content to await the event. 
pareTwfth C that Thev knew that for nations splendid talents 

of Davis 

are not always the safest guide. While 
Davis was driving his rivals from his presence, and throw- 
ing into obscurity or exile the ablest men of the South — 
those who could have made the rebellion successful, had 
that been possible — Lincoln was selecting his advisers 
from his political opponents. Davis was exasperating 
the passions of his people, and teaching them revenge ; 
the weakness of Lincoln was benevolence. And the issue 

was such as might have been expected. 

Davis continually mi ., • , • -1 , • t • i -i -t i 

declines in infiu- lhe enthusiastic devotion which had wel- 


corned Davis to power was succeeded by 
distrust, dissatisfaction, hatred. The wreck of the Con- 
federacy, the ruin of the people, were at last imputed to 

3 8 LINCOLN. ' [Sect. VII. 

him. On the other hand, the misgivings which attended 
Lincoln's accession were replaced by confidence ; he end- 
ed by becoming politically omnipotent. 

Clad in black, the ungainly-looking President might be 
seen, after the honr had come for visitors to be excluded, 
pacing to and fro past the windows of his apartment, his 
hands behind him, his head bent forward upon his breast, 
lost in profound meditation, a picture of sorrow, care, and 
Lincoln m Ms hours anxiety. The artist Carpenter, who enjoyed 
frequent opportunities of thus observing him 
in his moments of retirement, says, " His was the saddest 
face in repose that I ever knew. His eyes, of a bluish gray 
tint, always in deep shadow from the upper lids, which 
were unusually heavy, gave him an expression remark- 
ably pensive and tender, often inexpressibly sad. A pe- 
culiar dreaminess sometimes stole over his face." 

As is not unfrequently observed of Western men, there 
were mysterious traits of superstition in his 

The superstitious •» . a r> • i • . . n 

traits of his char- character. A Iriend once inquiring; the cause 
of a deep depression under which he seemed 
to be suffering, " I have seen this evening again," he re- 
plied, " what I once saw before, on the evening of my 
nomination at Chicago. As I stood before a mirror, there 
were two images of myself — a bright one in front, and 
one that was very pallid standing behind. It complete- 
ly unnerved me. The bright one, I know, is my past, the 
pale one my coming life." And feeling that there is no 
armor against Destiny, he added, " I do not think I shall 
live to see the end of my term. I try to shake off the 
vision, but it still keeps haunting me." 

He began to receive threatening letters soon after his 
nomination. He kept them by themselves, labeled, "Let- 
ters on Assassination." After his death, one was found 
among them connected with the plot which had suc- 

Chap. XXXIV.] LINCOLN. 39 

" I can not help being in this way/' lie said; " my father 
was so before me. He dreamed that he rode through an 
unfrequented path to a strange house, the surroundings 
and furnishing of which were vividly impressed on his 
mind. At the fireside there was sitting a woman whose 
features he distinctly saw. She was engaged in paring 
an apple. That woman was to, be his wife. Though a 
very strong-minded man, he could not shake off the vision. 
It haunted him incessantly, until it compelled him to go 
down the unfrequented way. He quietly opened the 
door of what he recognized to be the house, and saw at a 
glance that it was where he had been in his dream. 
There was a woman at the fireside engaged in paring an 
apple. And the rest of his dream came to pass." 

" There will be bad news to-night," he said on another 
occasion. " Why, how do you know that, Mr. President V 
" I dropped asleep, and saw in a dream what has often be- 
fore been the precursor to me of disaster. I saw a ship 
sailing very fast." And that night bad news came ! 

Perhaps, in the opinion of the supercilious critic, these 

idle stories are unworthy of the page of history. The 

materialist philosopher may say, " Had Lincoln taken the 

trouble to hold up a candle before his mirror, he might 

have seen a dozen pale images of it ! That 

But other great men . . t> i i ^ i • ± 1 

have experienced is very true. I3ut does not history record 

simil^i* flplusioDS 

that some of the greatest soldiers, statesmen, 
lawgivers — men who have left ineffaceable marks on the 
annals of the human race — have been influenced by like 
delusions ? There was connected with the most import- 
ant of all proclamations ever issued by an American Pres- 
ident — the proclamation of slave emancipation — an inci- 
dent of the kind : a vow that in a certain contingency it 
should be put forth. Lincoln implicitly believed that it 
is the Supreme Euler who determines our fate. Trifles 
though these may be, it is not for the historian to hide 

40 LINCOLN. [Sect. VII. 

them from his reader, who perhaps may add the reflec- 
tion that it is better to have the child -like, innocent 
dreams of Lincoln, than the guilty and appalling mid- 
night visions of the conscience-stricken Davis. 

Under a weight of responsibility and care pressing 
upon him unceasingly by day and by night, Lincoln in- 
stinctively felt the necessity of momentary relief. An 
anecdote well told, an amusing incident, would rescue him 
ms necessity for from deep depression. A strip of steel must 
be pulled back before it can spring forward. 
And so it was with Lincoln's mind — it must be relaxed 
before it could display its force. Perhaps this was never 
more strikingly seen than on the occasion of his submit- 
ting the Proclamation of Emancipation to his cabinet — 
declared by himself to be the great and central act of his 
administration. He introduced it by reading some of the 
grotesque sayings of Artemus Ward. 

Day by day the good sense and integrity of the rustic 
President shone forth more brightly in the sorest trials. 
It is not in foreign wars, but in domestic troubles that 
the greatness of a ruler is seen. In a country of the in- 
habitants of which it is said that every one forgets yes- 
terday, the massive virtues of the President 

The unbounded con- , , -,--,-. . , 

ndence of the people were borne in mind. His countrymen learn- 
in him. m *L , 

ed by experience to look upon him, unpol- 
ished as he was, as a monolith hewn out of the living 
rock, and capable of safely sustaining the heaviest weight 
of empire. 



The conspirators, taking advantage of the approaching Presidential interregnum, 
had appointed a Convention to be held at Montgomery, and taken measures for 
raising an army. They proposed to seize Washington, and prevent the inaugu- 
ration of Lincoln. They attempted to bring over the Border States to their 
cause, and succeeded with Virginia, agreeing to the conditions she exacted, that 
her internal slave-trade should be protected, and that Richmond should be made 
the seat of the proposed government. 

The conspiracy may be considered as ending in complete success at the epoch of 
the opening of the Confederate Congress at Richmond. 

After that epoch the Secession authority presented the character of an organized 

The entire secession movement presents two phases: 

1st. A conspiracy of individuals against the 

phases in the seces- republic. 2d. The action of an organized 

sion movement. x ° 

It may be a question at what point we ought to place 
the line of demarcation between these phases. Some 
persons may be disposed to select the ejDoch of the estab- 
lishment of the Confederate government at Montgomery ; 
but for a long time subsequently to that event the aspect 
The boundary be- of a conspiracy was not lost. This is par- 

tween them x* 1 1 *i? x 1 ' xl I? xl 

ticularly mamtested m the case ot the seces- 
sion of Virginia, which was brought about partly by in- 
trigue and partly by violence. But it committed to the 
movement the most powerful of all the Slave States, and, 
by the seizure of the navy yard at Norfolk, contributed 
to it essential war-supplies. Had Virginia not joined the 
secessionists they could have had no hopes of success. 
Again, there are reasons which would lead us to adopt 


is the battle of Bun as the boundary - mark the opening of the 
ing n o?tneco e n?eder- Confederate Congress at Richmond and the 

ate Congress. . .,. , 

contemporaneous military occurrence, the 
battle of Bull Run. The events of the time seem to har- 
monize very well with this view, and accordingly I shall 
venture to adopt it. Such artificial divisions are very 
useful for historical purposes, since they enable us to 
group events more distinctly, and discover their mutual 

The primary object of the conspirators was the reten- 
tion of political power long enjoyed, but which they 
plainly perceived was about to slip from their grasp. 
The first seat of their action was the United 

The first seat of the , m . n ... . 

conspiracy was in fetates feenate : the most effective of their 

Washington. . 

earlier co- laborers were ministers in the 
cabinet of Buchanan. History furnishes no parallel to 
the midnight treachery of that cabinet except in the 
dark and bloody mysteries of the palaces of Oriental 

There is a period in the affairs of the republic which 
The favorable peri- singularly favors the perpetration of treason. 

It is during the last days of a retiring, and 
the first days of an incoming President. He who is about 
to lay down power has but little motive for energetic 
action. He desires to close his administration in tran- 
quillity. He feels that his strength is gradually declin- 
ing — that the men around him are turning from the set- 
ting, and expecting the rising sun. Nothing is done to- 
day if it can possibly be postponed until to-morrow ; no 
trials and dangers are encountered if they can be left for 
the succeeding administration to meet. And this, in its 
turn, offers facilities to the conspirator. It takes posses- 
sion of the government unfamiliar with practical details, 
and hardly knowing what it ought to do. For a season 


it can not give due attention to public affairs, no matter 
how urgent they may be; the clamorous demands of 
those who have promoted it to power for office and emol- 
ument must be attended to first. Sweeping removals are 
made in every department; the new-comers are ill-in- 
formed of the business of the offices they have gained. 
Still worse, all this does not occur unexpectedly ; it is 
foreseen, and hence may constitute an essential element in 
a plot. In Europe, no one can tell when the sovereign 
will die; his successor has long been ascertained, and 
when the change occurs the machinery of state moves on 
without embarrassment. 

In previous chapters I have related how, through the 
origin of the con- operation of Physical and Political Causes, 
a tendency to partition in the republic had 
arisen. Wherever such a tendency exists, it eventually 
finds an actual expression. So here and there through- 
out the South there were not wanting persons, each of 
whom had his own plan of secession. For example, there 
were Virginians who would have seized Washington in 
1856 if Fremont had been elected. 'In South Carolina, 
in Alabama, and indeed throughout the Cotton States, 
there were many different disunion schemes ; but the one 
which at length reached a fatal issue was organized by 
United States senators and members of the cabinet of 

Though these men did not know the strength, they 
knew well the weaknesses of the government they under- 
took to betray. They knew what was the proper time 
Adoption of a popn- for action, and that "Danger to slavery" 
was their correct war-cry. Witli that the 
Southern people could be unified. By dexterous manip- 
ulations with the governors and Legislatures of the Bor- 
der States they expected to attach those important com- 
munities to their cause, and oppose them as a bulwark to 


Measures first deter- the attacks of the loyal portion of the na- 
tion. They intended to seize Washington, 
to prevent the inauguration, or to depose, perhaps to dis- 
pose of, the new President, to secure the government — to 
Mexicanize the nation. They concerted for the capture 
of all the national works in the Slave States, and pre- 
pared garrisons for them ; they entrapped the army, and 
dispersed the navy of the nation, which they insidiously 
disarmed. Taking advantage of the offices they control- 
led, they threw into confusion its finances, robbed its 
treasury, and broke into its mints. They stripped its ar- 
senals of rifles and cannon, its dock-yards of ships. They 
rendered nugatory its courts of law, and seduced from 
their allegiance the officers of its army and navy. They 
introduced insubordination into the public service, and 
thereby paralyzed it. They kept their confederates in 
Congress for the express purpose of obstructing legisla- 
tion, and ruining the government which had been intrust- 
ed to their hands. They tried to exclude from Washing- 
ton all means of defense, and thereby make it easy of 

Posterity will regard such hideous crimes with detesta- 
tion. It will look with admiration on that great govern- 
ment which at length, after many trials, having these mal- 
efactors at its mercy, could nobly refrain from vengeance, 
and act on the principle recommended by Caesar to the 
Senate of Rome respecting the culprits of the conspir- 
acy of Catiline, " not to retaliate, but to consider rather 
what w^as worthy of its own majesty than what might 
justly be inflicted on its enemies." 

A secret meeting of the conspirators had been held in 
Washington (January 5th, 1861), at which the senators 
from Georgia, Alabama, Louisiana, Arkansas, Texas, Mis- 
sissippi, and Florida were present. They decided on the 
plan of action subsequently carried out, and determined 


that a Convention of the seceding states 

A Convention to be , -,-, -.-, ■ -nr , -1 • 

held at Montgome- should assemble at Montgomery during the 
following month. The secession of the Slave 
States which had not yet joined in the movement was to 
be secured, if possible, without submitting the matter to 
a vote of the people ; but their senators and representa- 
tives were to remain in Congress as long as they could, to 
paralyze any movements hostile to the conspiracy; the 
arming of the South was to go on unceasingly ; munitions 
of war of every kind were to be assiduously provided, 
. . and such preparations made that a military 

and an army raised. ± x ( j 

force of 100,000 men, exceeding any thing 
that it was supposed the government could raise, was to 
be in readiness at the time of Lincoln's inauguration. 
Every exertion was to be made to obtain possession of 
the forts, dock-yards, arsenals, custom-houses, mints, and 
other public property, to induce the resignation of army 
and navy officers, and to constrain the various legal and 
other agents in the South to refuse to do their duty. 

The seizure of Washington had become a part of the 
Washington is to be plan, and hence the importance of prohibit- 
ing, by Congressional action, if possible, the 
accumulation of troops in it. If that could be accom- 
plished, and Lincoln's inauguration prevented, his elec- 
tion was to be declared unconstitutional, and possession 
of the government taken by the conspirators under plea 
of the right of self-preservation. 

During these dark days the fortunes of the republic de- 
pended on the firmness of the attorney general, Stanton. 

When the cabinet of Buchanan had become disorgan- 
ized through the resignation of so many of its members, 
there were three things of supreme importance to the na- 
tion to be done : 1st, to secure the Secretaryship of War ; 
2d, to secure the Secretaryship of the Treasury ; 3d, to 
make Washington safe from seizure. 


As respects the War Office, when the defalcation in 
the Department of the Interior was detect- 

Importance to the n t -r-yi -n t n t * i 

nation of. securing ed, and _b loyd s acceptances round m place 

the War Office. . 

of the stolen Indian bonds, it became impos- 
sible for that minister to continue any longer in the cabi- 
net. With the deepest reluctance was Buchanan con- 
strained to admit Floyd's complicity. Often was he 
heard by his friends to exclaim, " He can not have done 
it, he can not have done it !" When Floyd's letter of 
resignation was handed to him, foreseeing its purport, his 
emotion could not be concealed. His trembling hand set 
the crisp and crumpling sheet nearer and then farther 
from his eyes, which seemed to refuse their office. With 
difficulty he deciphered the well-known but now mazy 
and swimming characters. The fortunate star of the re- 
public was for the moment in the ascendant, and, at the 
Hoit appointed sec- earnest recommendation of the attorney 
general, Joseph Holt, a Kentuckian, who 
was true to the nation, received the vacant appointment. 
The peril to the republic would have been extreme 
importance of se- had the War Office and the Treasury pass- 
cunng the Treasury. e( j .^^ ^ e ]2 an (J s f men connected with 

the secession conspiracy. As respects the latter, on the 
resignation of Cobb, of Georgia (December 10th), Mr. 
Thomas, who had been Commissioner of Patents, was 
placed in his stead ; but there was reason to apprehend 
that Buchanan, regarding this as a temporary arrange- 
ment, might confer the office on some one who could not 
be trusted. The bitter altercations going on unceasingly 
around him perfectly unmanned him. Thus, when news 
came of the movement into Fort Sumter, he was sitting 
at the fireside in a faded dressing-gown, his slippers on 
his feet. At once he turned ghastly pale. With out- 
stretched hands and in a tremulous voice, he piteously im- 
plored forbearance. Some of the conspirators were in an 
adjoining room. 


For once, the financial embarrassments of the nation 
proved to be its salvation. The condition of the Treasury 
was deplorable. The government could do nothing with- 
out the aid of the capitalists of New York. Again the 
influence of the attorney general came to the public suc- 
cor. Instructed partly by their own patriotism, and part- 
ly by his clear information of the existing imminent dan- 
ger, a deputation of those capitalists hastened to Wash- 
ington, and gave the President distinctly to understand 
that the Treasury Department must be placed in charge 
of one in whom they had confidence, and that they should 
not be satisfied unless John A. Dix, of their 

Dix appointed Sec- . . 1 , t tt -r» i 

retary of the Treas- state, was selected. Hereupon .Buchanan 
gave him the appointment. 
A French writer (Laugel) says, " Stanton, Holt, and 
Dix saved Washington to the Union." 

Stanton, Dix, and a i • 1 11 • 1 rm -it 1 • 

Hoit secure wash- And so, m truth, it w^as. lne obligations 
of the republic to those three ministers, and 
especially to the first, can never be repaid. Had the Vir- 
ginians succeeded in their intention and seized the city, 
nothing could have prevented the Mexicanization of the 

But the resolute action of these three determined men 

was signally aided by the course of the 

aided by the Gov- Governor of Maryland. It was the plan of 

ernor of Maryland. , J . , . 

the conspirators to use in their movements 
the Legislatures of the Border States. Hicks, the Gov- 
ernor of Maryland, desiring to steer a middle course, re- 
fused to call an extra session of his Legislature, though 
vehemently urged to that step. While he was dreaming 
that the great conflict might be composed through the 
mediation of a foreign embassador, and when he did call 
his Legislature together, declaring to them that " the safe- 
ty of Maryland lay in maintaining a neutral position," 
events were rapidly marching on. Maryland, as a state, 

48 HOLT'S REPOET. [Sect. VII. 

could not be brought to act ; Virginia would not act with- 
out her. During this condition of indecision and impedi- 
ment, the three energetic cabinet ministers found means 
to make the capital of the nation secure. 

The salvation of the metropolis lay in the celerity 

with which troops could be brought into 

projected seizure of it. Holt, the Secretary of War, in reply to 

Washington. / . J f J 

a resolution of inquiry passed by the House 
of Kepresentatives, made to the President a report (Feb- 
ruary 18th, 1861) as to the circumstances under which 
this had been done. "I shall make no comment," he says, 
" upon the origin of the revolution which for the last 
three months has been in progress in several of the South- 
ern States. That revolution has been distinguished by 
a boldness and completeness of success rarely equaled 
in the history of civil commotions. Its history is a his- 
tory of surprises and treacheries. The forts of the United 
States have been captured and garrisoned, and hostile 
flags unfurled upon their ramparts. The arsenals have 
been seized, and the vast amount of public arms they 

contained appropriated to the use of the 

He relates the early . -, .-. .-, i -\ n •it c 

success of the con- captors, while more than halt a million of 


dollars found in the Mint at New Orleans 
have been unscrupulously applied to replenish the coffers 
of Louisiana. Officers in command of revenue cutters 
of the United States have been prevailed on to violate 
their trusts and surrender the property in their charge, 
and, instead of being branded for their crimes, they, and 
the vessels they betrayed, have been cordially received into 
the service of the seceded states. These movements were 
attended by yet more discouraging indications of immo- 
rality. It was generally believed that this revolution was 
guided and urged on by men occupying the highest po- 
sitions in the public service, and who, with the responsi- 
bilities of an oath to support the Constitution still rest- 


ing upon their consciences, did not hesitate secretly to 
plan, and openly to labor for the dismemberment of the 
republic whose honors they enjoyed, and upon whose 
treasury they were living. The unchecked prevalence of 
the revolution, and the intoxication which its triumphs 
inspired, naturally suggested wilder and yet more desper- 
ate enterprises than the conquest of ungarrisoned forts, 
or the plunder of an unguarded mint. At what time 
the armed occupation of Washington City 

Their intention of , n -, -. . 

capturing wash- became a part 01 the revolutionary pro- 

ington, - 1 - . •/ j. 

gramme is not certainly known. More 
than six weeks ago the impression had already exten- 
sively prevailed that a conspiracy for the accomplishment 
of this guilty purpose was in process of formation, if not 
fully matured. The earnest endeavors made by men 
known to be devoted to the revolution to hurry Virginia 
and Maryland out of the Union were regarded as pre- 
paratory steps for the subjugation of Washington. This 
plan was in entire harmony with the aim and spirit of 
those seeking the subversion of the government, since no 
more fatal blow at its existence could be struck than the 
permanent and hostile possession of its seat of power. 
It was in harmony, too, with the avowed designs of the 
revolutionists, which looked to the formation of a con- 
federacy of all the Slave States, and necessarily to the 
conquest of the capital within their limits. It seemed 
not very indistinctly prefigured in a proclamation made 
upon the floor of the Senate, without qualification, if not 
exultingly, that the Union was already dissolved — a proc- 
lamation which, however intended, was certainly calcu- 
lated to invite, on the part of men of desperate fortunes 
or of revolutionary states, a raid upon the capital. In 
view of the violence and turbulent disorders already ex- 
hibited at the South, the public mind could not reject 
such a scheme as at all improbable. That a belief in its 
II— D 


existence was entertained by multitudes there can be no 
doubt, and that belief I fully shared. My conviction rest- 
ed not only on the facts already alluded to, but upon in- 
formation, some of which was of a most conclusive char- 
acter. Superadded to these proofs were the oft-repeated 
declarations of men in high political positions here, and 
who were known to have intimate affiliations with the 
revolution, if, indeed, they did not hold its 
the inauguration 2 reins in their hands, to the effect that Mr. 

of Lincoln. 7 . 

Lincoln would not and should not be inau- 
gurated in Washington. Such declarations from such 
men could not be treated as empty bluster. They were 
the solemn utterances of those who well understood the 
import of their words, and who, in the exultation of the 
temporary victories gained over their country's flag in 
the South, felt assured that events would soon give them 
the power to verify their predictions. Simultaneously 
with these prophetic warnings, a Southern journal of 
large circulation and influence, and which is published 
near the City of Washington, advocated its seizure as a 
possible political necessity. 

" The nature and power of the testimony thus accumu- 
lated may be best estimated by the effect produced upon 
the popular mind. Members of Congress too, men of 
calm and comprehensive views, and of undoubted fidelity 
to their country, frankly expressed their solicitude to the 
The president is President and to this Department, and form- 
Sps to b the me- a Uy insisted that the defenses of the caj)ital 
tropoiis, should be strengthened. 

" Impressed by these circumstances and considerations, 
I earnestly besought you to allow the concentration in 
this city of a sufficient military force. To those who de- 
sire the destruction of the republic, the presence of these 
troops is necessarily offensive ; : but those who sincerely 
love our institutions can not fail to rejoice that by this 


which is according- timely precaution they have possibly es- 
lydone * caped the deep dishonor which they must 

have suffered, had the capital, like the forts and arsenals 
of the South, fallen into the hands of the revolutionists, 
who have found this great government weak only because, 
in the exhaustless beneficence of its spirit, it has refused 
to strike even in its own defense, lest it should wound 
the aggressor." 

But this bringing of troops to the city was not accom- 
plished without opposition. A resolution was offered in 
the House of Representatives " that the quartering of 
troops of the regular army in the District of Columbia 
and around the Capitol, when not necessary for their pro- 
The secessionists in tect j on from a hostile enemy, and during the 
have^he 8 troopfrS session of Congress, is impolitic and offen- 
sive, and, if permitted, may be destructive 
of civil liberty ; and, in the opinion of this House, the reg- 
ular troops now in this city ought forthwith to be re- 
moved therefrom." 

That resolution was offered by a member from North 
Carolina ; but Jefferson Davis, who was soon to become 
the representative of the secession movement, would not 
only have extended the principle of national disarmament 
thus proposed to be applied to Washington to all the se- 
ceding states — he would even have armed 

and to provide for , , . , . o it , 

the arming of their them to the preiudice 01 the government. 

states, 1 J o 

In the Senate (January 2d, 1861) he had of- 
fered the following joint resolution : 

"Be it resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives, 1 ^^ 
upon the application of a state, either through a Convention or the 
Legislature thereof, asking that the federal forces of the army and 
navy may be withdrawn from its limits, the President of the United 
States shall order the withdrawal of the federal garrisons, and take 
the needful security for the safety of the public property which may 
remain in said state. And be it further resolved, That whenever a 
State Convention duly and lawfully assembled shall enact that the 


safety of the state requires it to keep troops and ships of war, the 
President of the United States be, and he is hereby, authorized and 
directed to recognize the exercise of that power by the state, and 
by proclamation to give notice of the fact, for the information and 
government of all parties concerned." 

Mr. Mason, of Virginia, also, shortly after, offered a 
joint resolution to the effect that, in view 

and to suspend the « ., • n r\ ii s~i t 1j1 

national laws in ot the secession ot koutn Carolina, and the 

South Carolina, . 

consequent suspension of the laws of the 
United States therein, and to avoid any hostile collision 
between the authorities of that state and those of the 
United States, that the laws of the United States direct- 
ing the mode in which the President shall use the army 
and navy in aid of the civil authorities executing the laws, 
and all laws for the collection of revenue, be suspended 
and made inoperative in the State of South Carolina. 

A representative from North Carolina (February 11th, 
1861) offered the following resolution: 

" Whereas the States of South Carolina, Florida, Alabama, Geor- 
gia, Mississippi, and Louisiana have seceded from the Confederacy 
of the United States, and have established a government under the 
name of c the Confederacy of the United States South;' and where- 
as it is desirable that the most amicable relations should exist be- 
tween the two governments, and war should be avoided as the 
greatest calamity which can befall them — 

"JResolved by the Senate and House of Representatives, etc., That 
the President of the United States be, and is hereby required to ac- 
knowledge the independence of the said government as soon as he 
is informed officially of its establishment, and that he receive such 
envoy, embassador, or commissioner as may or shall 
edgetoe^ndepend- ^ e appointed by such government for the purpose 
instate? 6 seced " °^ am i ca bly adjusting the matters in dispute with 
said government." 

Such were the attempts to secure the military disarm- 
Meantime the navy j n g of tne government. Its naval disarni- 
is dispersed. j n g ] ia( j \ )eeR already and effectually accom- 



In reply to a resolution of inquiry of the House of 
Representatives respecting the navy, the 
mittee on Naval committee reported (February 2 1st, 1861) 
"That the entire naval force available for 
the defense of the whole Atlantic coast consisted of the 
steamer Brooklyn, twenty-five guns, and the store-ship Re- 
lief, two guns, and that the former was of too great a 
draught to permit her to enter Charleston Harbor with 
safety except at spring tides, and the latter was under or- 
ders to the coast of Africa, with stores for the African 
squadron. Thus the whole Atlantic sea-board has been 
to all intents and purposes without defense during all the 
period of civil commotion and lawless violence to which 
the President has called our attention as of " such vast 
and alarming proportions as to be beyond his power to 
check or control." 

Commenting on the fact that several of the most im- 
portant ships had been dispatched to distant stations 
since the secession troubles had begun, the committee 
proceed to say : 

" To the committee this disposition of the naval force 
at this critical time seems most extraordinary. The per- 
mitting of vessels to depart for distant seas after these 
unhappy difficulties had broken out at home, the omission 
to put in repair and commission, ready for orders, a single 
one of the twenty-eight ships dismantled and unfit for 
service in our own ports, and that, too, while $646,639 79 
of the appropriation for repairs in the navy in the pres- 
ent year remained unexpended, were, in the opinion- of 
the committee, grave errors in the administration of the 
Navy Department, the consequences of which have been 
manifest in the many acts of lawless violence to which 
they have called attention. The committee are of opin- 
ion that the secretary had it in his power, with the pres- 
ent naval force of the country at his command, and with- 


out materially impairing the efficiency of the service 
abroad, at any time after the settled purpose of over- 
throwing the government had become manifest, and be- 
fore that purpose had developed itself in overt acts of 
violence, to station at anchor, within reach of his own or- 
ders, a force equal to the protection of all the property 
and all the rights of the government and the citizens, as 
well as the flag of the country, from any outrage or insult 
at any point on the entire Atlantic sea-board. The fail- 
ure to do this is without justification or excuse." 

The committee proceeded also to comment with great 
severity on the Secretary of the Navy, in that he had ac- 
cepted the resignations of navy officers, citizens of the dis- 
loyal states, thereby enabling them to join the service of 
the insurgents without incurring the penalties of treason. 
They presented in detail several cases of an aggravated 
character, and recommended the adoption of the follow- 
ing resolution : 

"Hesolved, That the Secretary of the Navy, in accepting, without 

delay or inquiry, the resignations of officers of the 

Censure of seces- navy who were in arms against the government 

sionist Secretary 1 J ... - -i ' Vj-i i i , 

of the Navy. when tendering the same, and ot those who sought 

to resign that they might be relieved from the re- 
straint imposed by their commissions upon engaging in hostilities 
to the constituted authorities of the nation, has committed a grave 
error, highly prejudicial to the discipline of the service, and injurious 
to the honor and efficiency of the navy, for which he deserves the 
censure of this House." 

The resolution was agreed to by the House. 

As the time approached for the contemplated meeting 

at Montgomery, the chief conspirators re- 
Montgomery be- o J i x 

quStera ofth a e d " tired to that place, many persons of less 

conspiracy. importance, who were in hopes of place and 

emolument in the projected Confederacy, accompanying 

them. There remained, however, still in Washington, no 

inconsiderable number of their friends, who held clerk- 


ships and various other positions in the government of- 
fices ; they remained partly for the sake of making them- 
selves useful for the purposes of the conspiracy, but 
chiefly on account of their salaries. Though ostensibly 
the capital of the nation, Washington was essentially a 
Southern town ; the predominance of Southern influence 
in the government had filled it with Southern placemen 
and their dependents. These persons, foreseeing the loss 
of their emoluments through the incoming of a Repub- 
lican administration, constituted a most embittered class. 
They acted as spies upon the government, and transmit- 
ted whatever information they could gather to Mont- 
gomery. That city soon replaced Washington as the 
focus of revolutionary action, and to it these persons, as 
they were removed by the incoming administration from 
the offices they had enjoyed, instinctively repaired. The 
tone of Washington society remained, however, for a long 
time unchanged ; it was essentially that of a slaveholding 

The new administration sometimes barely escaped in-. 

... ., . . sidious attempts to establish an espionage 

Attempt to intro- a Jr o 

the%^rtment s in its offices. Thus, at the time of the seiz- 

at Washington. ^ q{ fa g^ft^ forf^ ft wag Q f fa ut . 

most importance to the conspirators to know the move- 
ments of the national ships. In the evening of the 1st 
of April, a package was brought from the President by 
his private secretary, and handed to the Secretary of the 
Navy. It ordered the removal of Commodore String- 
ham, a loyal officer, to a distant station, and the appoint- 
ment of Captain Samuel Barron in his stead. It was di- 
rected that the latter should be put in possession of full 
information concerning the navy, its officers, its move- 
ments. Unwilling to have a person whom he had reason 
to distrust placed in his department in such a confiden- 
tial position, the secretary forthwith sought an interview 


with the President, and explained to him that the sym- 
pathies of Captain Barron were altogether with the con- 
spirators. The order was, of course, revoked. "This 
dangerous paper must have passed through high places 
somewhere before it could have reached the President. 
Captain Barron soon after deserted his flag, openly es- 
poused the rebel cause, and was one of the very first of- 
ficers captured after the war began." 

In Montgomery every influence was used, and every 
.*.-.. exertion was made, to secure the secession 

Attempts to bring ' 

vlSiniatothec^ of Maryland and Virginia. It was supposed 
spn-acy. ^ a t if those states could accomplish that 

movement successfully, they would necessarily carry the 
District of Columbia with them. Notwithstanding this, 
as we shall presently see, Maryland was not only thwart- 
ed in her intention of attaching herself to the Confed- 
eracy, but also in her attempt to prevent the passage of 
Northern troops through her territory for the defense of 

The conditions ex- Washington; and as to Virginia, she did 
acted by Virginia. no £ sece( j e until she had exacted a thorough 

protection for her domestic slave-trade, and the transfer 
of the Confederate government to Richmond. 

Events have shown that the views taken by Davis 
of the impolicy of this latter measure, the removal to 
Richmond, were correct. He strenuously resisted it at 
first, and gave a reluctant consent only when overborne 
by extraneous considerations. 

Few conspiracies recorded in history have been more 
success of the con- successful than this of Secession. It had 
spn-acy. completely effected the establishment of an 

insurrectionary government, organized in all its branches, 
and able to resist the legitimate government. It had ac- 
complished nearly all the objects it had proposed, the 
seizure of forts, public works, munitions of war, the ex- 
clusion of the national authority from its domain, the 


unification of its own communities. The enthronement 
of the Confederate authority in Richmond, as manifest- 
ed by the opening of its Congress, may be regarded as 
the culmination and close of its labors. 

But there was not reserved for the Confederate govern- 
ment that success which had been vouchsafed to its pre- 
cursor, the Conspiracy. As will be seen on the following 
pages, from occupying at first the pinnacle of power, it 
exhibited a continuous decline, and fell in utter exhaus- 
tion at last. 



The administration was constrained by public sentiment to defend Fort Sumter, 

and fitted out a relieving expedition, which failed. 
The fort was bombarded by orders from Montgomery, and, after a feeble defense, 


On the day after his inauguration, President Lincoln 
Difficulty of reiiev- received a communication from Major An- 
derson to the effect that Fort Sumter could 
not now be relieved by less than a force of 20,000 men. In 
this opinion General Scott, who had earnestly and repeat- 
edly drawn the attention of the preceding administration 
to the subject at a time when re-enforeements could have 
been sent without difficulty, coincided. Animated by a 
desire to avoid hostilities, the new administration had ac- 
tually entertained an intention of surrender- 
ee administration . , n n n . - , , ' ' . -. . -. 

inclines to Barren- ins: the tort, and oi vindicating; the national 

derit. & . & 

honor by making a stand at Fort Pickens. 
But it was found that the people would not be satisfied 
with that substitute. In Charleston the government had 
public opinion in- been scorned and defied, and there the battle 

sists on its defense. n ±1 j • j_ "L. i? 1 j_ rrn • j. 

oi the nation must be fought, lnis exter- 
nal pressure eventually decided Lincoln, and at a cabinet 
meeting (March 21st) it was determined that an attempt 
should be made to re-enforce and provision the garrison. 
It so happened that the only feasible plan of accom- 
a fleet is fitted out plishing this involved the employment of 

the frigate Powhatan, then at New York. 
Orders were therefore given to have that ship fitted for 


«ea at the earliest moment, and on March 30th Captain 
Fox was sent to New York to superintend the prepara- 
tion of the expedition. This consisted of three war ships, 
three transports, and two steam -tugs. Three hundred 
sailors, and a full supply of armed launches were re- 
quired, and they were carried by the Powhatan. 

The ships duly sailed from New York, but when the 
The Mgate Pow- Powhatan was passing Stat en Island, an or- 
hatan detached, ( j er was "brought on board, directing her cap- 
tain to transfer her to Lieutenant Porter, who took her to 
Fort Pickens instead of Fort Sumter. The Sumter relief 
expedition therefore necessarily failed. " This order was 
extracted, on the recommendation of Secretary Seward, 
from President Lincoln himself." The Secretary of the 
Navy was not consulted, and, indeed, knew nothing about 
it. He supposed the ship had gone to Charleston. " It 
was charged at the time, or as soon as the facts were 
and the expeduion known, that the Secretary of State, having 
fails ' committed himself unofficially to the rebel 

commissioners, determined to thwart the purpose of the 
President, and prevent the relief of the fort." President 
Lincoln, however, assumed the responsibility of the affair, 
and stated that the sending away of the Powhatan was 
"an accident." In accordance with an understanding 
which had been entered into with the South Carolina 
authorities, notice was given to the governor of that state 
(April 8th) of the attempt about to be made. 

At this period Mr. Seward exercised a predominating 
influence in the government, the necessary consequence 
of the eminent position he had held among the poli- 
ticians of the triumphant Republican party. Even the 
President was for a time under his control. It was Mr. 
Seward's sincere belief that there would be no war ; pos- 
sibly there might be a disturbance, but it would be over 
in a few days. He had been accustomed all his life to 


the management of parties, and supposed that the princi* 
pies so advantageously resorted to with them would be 
sufficient still — that promises and compromises would 
compose the trouble. He did not comprehend that the 
South was determined to be satisfied with nothing less 
than separation, and resolved to have that, no matter 
what it might cost. 

The diverting of the Powhatan from the Sumter ex- 
pedition, without the knowledge of the Secretary of the 
Navy, was not the only indication that other members 
of the administration could not, as yet, exert their proper 
influence. In the cabinet meetings at which Buchanan 
in his day had presided, the order of business had been 
conducted with precision and circumstance; he was, as 
Davis well said, " a stickler for the ceremony of power." 
But in the early months of Lincoln's administration such 
meetings were very far from being stately ceremonials. 
The President's unfamiliarity with formal affairs, and 
especially his genial disposition, had given them a differ- 
ent turn. Some of the most important movements were 
the result of conversations with his friend the Secretary 
of State, and occasionally they caused no little surprise 
to the other responsible cabinet ministers. 

The secession authorities were now moved by three con- 
„ ,. , ,, '. siderations: 1st. The failure of their commis- 

Motives for attack- 
ing the fort. sioners to obtain an audience with the Pres- 
ident in Washington (p. 22) ; 2d. The impending pro- 
visioning of the fort; 3d. The necessity of powerfully ex- 
citing the flagging enthusiasm of their people. They de- 
termined, therefore, to send orders (April 10th) to Beau- 
regard, whom they had placed in command at Charleston, 
to require the immediate surrender of the fort, and, if this 
were refused, to reduce it. Accordingly, on the next day, 
the demand was made by that officer, and compliance 


with it promptly declined. But Anderson, the command- 
ant of the fort, having remarked to the aids who had 
brought the summons that he should be starved out in the 

Proposals are made C0UrS . e ° f a feW <% S > 5t WaS Imposed to him 

to Anderson, ^^ {f ^q WO uld state the time at which he 

must, under those circumstances, evacuate, and agree not 
to use his guns in the interval, unless Fort Sumter was 
fired upon, his assailants would abstain from attacking 
him. To this Anderson replied that he would evacuate 
the fort on the loth instant, should he not receive, prior 
to that time, controlling instructions from his government, 
or additional supplies; that he would not, in the mean 
time, open fire, unless compelled to do so by some hostile 
act against the fort or against the American flag. 

It is to be remarked that the main point of this nego- 

and are declined tiation had reference to the expected relief 

by him. fleet. Had Anderson accepted Beauregard's 

terms, he would have incapacitated himself from assisting 

or protecting the fleet in its attempt. 

Beauregard now hastened the attack. The summons 
to surrender had been given at two o'clock in the after- 
noon; the letter of inquiry was dated at eleven of the 
same night, and before daybreak Anderson was notified 
that in an hour the batteries would open on him. 

Fort Sumter has already been described (vol. i., p. 542) ; 
strength of the ^e f° rce originally brought into it consisted 
garrison. of 55 artillerists, 9 officers, 30 laborers, 15 

musicians ; the artillerists had, however, been reduced to 
35. No preparation had been made for resistance. There 
were only 700 cartridges. No means of pointing the 
guns properly were at hand ; they could be fired only by 
guess. The garrison had no bread ; the rice had been ac- 
cidentally mixed with fragments of glass through the 
shattering of some window-panes. The wooden barracks 
had not been removed. So little prevision had been ex- 



[Sect. VII. 

Strength of the 

ercised that the spare material which could have been 
used for that purpose had not been turned into cartridge 

For many months the assailants had been permitted to 
construct their works unmolested. They 
had now 14 batteries of 30 heavy guns and 
17 mortars which they could bring into play. One of 
these batteries on Morris Island was sheathed with rail- 
road iron, and a floating structure was protected in the 
same manner. It was intended to be used as a battering 
raft 7 but, being found unsuitable, was grounded on Sulli- 
van's Island and used as a fixed battery. 


At the expiration of the notified hour fire was open- 
ed on the fort from a battery on James Island. Soon 


Fire opened on afterward all the guns were in operation. 
the fortress, j n j^ e course f thirty -four hours there 

were thrown into the work 2360 shot and 980 shell. 
There were. about 3000 men engaged, and 4000 or 5000 
in reserve. 

Fort Sumter made no reply for nearly three hours. At 

and answered ? ' cl ° ck 0n Fri( % morning, April 12th, 

byit ' 1861, Captain Abner Doubleday fired the 

first shot in the Civil War in defense of the American 

It was very soon found that, in consequence of the se- 
But the means of vei % of tne Confederate vertical fire, the 
defense fail. barbette guns — from which alone, under the 
circumstances, shell could be thrown — could not be used. 
Anderson was restricted to his lower tier. In five hours 
he had exhausted his cartridges, and new ones had to be 
made out of blankets and articles of clothing. There 
were .only six needles which could be used for sewing 
cartridge bags. 

About noon on Friday the relief fleet was seen off 
The relief fleet at ^ ne Bar from the fort, and signals were ex- 
hand ' changed with it. At dark the embrasures 

were closed, and no answer was made to the Confeder- 
ate fire. 

On Saturday the reply of the fort was necessarily very 
The barracks tired languid. At about 9 o'clock the barracks 
by hot shot. were set on fire by the red-hot shot of the 

Confederates, and so dense was the smoke that the men 
could not see each other, nor breathe except through wet 
cloths. The flag-staff was repeatedly struck. 

As the conflagration spread, the garrison found it neces- 

The fort surren- saT T ^° c l° se the magazine, and eventually 

ders - to throw most of the powder brought from 

it into the sea. All but live barrels were thus disposed 

of. The flag, which again had been shot away, was nailed 


to a temporary staff and raised on the ramparts. At the 
time when it was down, Mr. Wigfall, who had formerly 
been a United States Senator from Texas, appeared at one 
of the embrasures, and, representing himself as a messen- 
ger from Beauregard to offer terms, was admitted. He 
was shortly after succeeded by other officers, who stated 
that he had acted without Beauregard's knowledge. 
Terms of evacuation were, however, agreed upon. 

In his letter to the Secretary of War, Anderson says, 
" Having defended Fort Sumter for thirty-four hours, un- 
til the quarters were entirely burned, the main gates de- 
stroyed by fire, the gorge wall seriously injured, the mag- 
azine surrounded by flames, and its door closed from the 

effects of the heat, four barrels and three car- 
Anderson's report. ._. _. •-i-it t 

triages ot powder only being available, and 
no provisions but pork remaining, I accepted the terms 
of evacuation offered by General Beauregard, being the 
same offered by him on the 11th inst., prior to the com- 
mencement of hostilities, and marched out of Fort Sumter 
on Sunday afternoon, the 14th inst., with colors flying and 
drums beating, bringing away company and private prop- 
erty, and saluting my flag with fifty guns." 

In Charleston the bells were chiming, the guns were 
Rejoicings in firing, the ladies waving handkerchiefs, the 
Charleston. people cheering. It was regarded as the 
greatest day in the history of South Carolina. The gov- 
ernor of the state, in a speech which he made to the citi- 
zens on the evening of the evacuation, exultingly said, 
" We have humbled the flag of the United States. I say 
unto you it is the first time in the history of the country 
that the stars and stripes have been humbled. We have 
defeated their twenty millions; we have brought down 
in humility the flag that has triumphed for seventy years ; 
but to-day — on this thirteenth day of April*— it has been 
humbled, and humbled before the glorious little state of 
South Carolina." 


Not one of the combatants on either side had been 
„ „. ... killed, and hence the defense of Fort Sumter 

Public criticisms ' 

of the defense. fc^ no fc p ass without public criticism. In 
Virginia it gave rise to bitter disappointment. The 
Unionists said, "Anderson has made a feeble defense, or 
no defense of Sumter. He told Beauregard on the first 
summons that he would evacuate the fort in two days." 
They inquired " how many shell were thrown from Sum- 
ter in these two days of terrific cannonading, and nobody 
hurt on either side, and the flag of the United States low- 
ered to King Cotton V- In Europe the enemies of the re- 
public already began to sneer : they said, "An American 
battle is not as dangerous as an American steam-boat." 
Captain Foster, the engineer officer of the fort, in his 
Report of the report to the Secretary of War, remarks, 
engineer. "After the cessation of fire, about 600 shot- 

marks on the face of the scarp wall were counted, but 
they were so scattered that no breached effect could have 
been expected from such a fire. The only effect of the 
direct fire during the two days was to disable three bar- 
bette guns, knock off large portions of the chimneys and 
brick walls projecting above the parapet, and to set the 
quarters on fire with hot shot. The vertical fire pro- 
duced more effect, and it prevented the working of the 
upper tier of guns, which were the only really effective 
ones in the fort. 

" But we could have resumed the firing as soon as the 
walls cooled sufficiently to open the magazines, and then, 
having blown down the walls left projecting above the 
parapet so as to get rid of flying bricks, and built up the 
main gates with stones and rubbish, the fort would actu- 
ally have been in a more defensible state than when the 
action commenced. The weakness of the defense lay prin- 
cipally in the lack of cartridge bags. The want of pro- 
visions would soon have caused the surrender of the fort; 
II.— E 


but, with plenty of cartridges, the men would have cheer- 
fully fought five or six days, and, if necessary, much lon- 
ger, on pork alone, of which we had a sufficient supply. 
I do not think that a breach could have been effected in 
the gorge at the distance of the battery on Cummings's 
Point within a week or ten days, and even then, with the 
small garrison to defend it, and means for obstructing it 
at our disposal, the operation of assaulting it with even 
vastly superior numbers would have been very doubtful 
in its result." 

The commandant of the fort, however, did all that was 
The fault lay with P 0SS1 bl e in the circumstances of the case. 
notw1th r Se n r- His apparent indecision was in truth the 
necessary consequence of the irresolution of 
the government. How was it possible for him to act 
when the government could not determine what it would 
order him to do % The fort was in fact surrendered when 
the Confederates were permitted to establish batteries 
within reach of its guns, and the garrison left unprovis- 
ioned and unre-enforced for fear that the Charlestonians 
might be angry. 

The engineer officer whom I have just quoted, in his 
report to the Committee on the Conduct of 

The fort might have , ^ Tr -, , , A -, . -. 

beeu relieved with- the W ar, remarks, "Almost every day we 

out difficulty. 7 . \ . V J 

saw new batteries m progress, intended to 
destroy the fort that we were placed to defend. In ad- 
dition, after these works were completed and armed, their 
garrisons practiced the guns with shot and shell to ob- 
tain our range, and frequently burst their shells on differ- 
ent sides of the fort, and sometimes over it. Not content 
with this, the iron-clad battery on Morris Island, in its 
morning practice on the 8th of March, 1861, fired a solid 
shot at the sally-port of the fort, barely missing it by 
striking the sea wall." 

" Thus terminated the siege of Fort Sumter after over 


three months' duration, during all of which time it could 
easily have been re-enforced by vessels running in at 
night. As a proof of this, witness the ease with which 
the blockade-runners during the war ran into Charleston, 
sometimes even through three lines of blockading vessels, 
and past our batteries on Morris Island." 



The conspirators were constrained by their political necessities to aggression. By 
the bombardment of Eort Sumter they drew the whole South to their cause. 
On the other hand, the Northern people rose up as one man to vindicate the 
honor of the national flag and to sustain the republic. 

The plot of the secessionists was to prevent the passage of troops through Balti- 
more, and to seize Washington while in a defenseless condition. 

The Northern troops forced their way through Maryland, held that state in subjec- 
tion, and saved Washington from capture. 

" Strike a blow : the very moment that blood is shed, 
Virginia will mate common cause with her sisters of the 
South." " Sprinkle blood in the faces of the people of 
Alabama, or else they will be back in the Union in less 
than ten clays." 

In the interior of Fort Sumter, a Carolinian commis- 
sioner, who . knew well the frantic condi- 

Politio«il liGCGSsitv 

for aggression m tion of his people, had sought an interview 

the South. '■ >n. i n • i 

with Anderson. " Give up the fort ; in the 
name of humanity, I conjure you to give it up, or thou- 
sands will howl round these walls, and pull the bricks 
out with their fingers." 

Such were the exclamations of the leaders of secession 
throughout the South — such the pitch of frenzy to which 
they had wrought up their people. 

Not less intense was the feeling produced in the North 
as soon as Fort Sumter fell. It found expression, how- 
ever, in a different manner. Already those constitutional 
peculiarities which distinguished the two antagonists on 
many a subsequent bloody field were manifesting them- 


selves. In the supreme moment of rushing to a charge, 
the battle-cry of the Southern troops is " a yell of de- 
fiance ;" that of the Northern troops, a u deep-toned cheer." 
Very truthfully had the conspirators declared that it 
would be hard to provoke the North to 

Eeluctance of the n , rr , , , . \ . ._ 

North to enter on n^ut. lo the last, when it was certain that 

the war. ° ' 

war could not be avoided, she hoped against 
hope ; she prayed to be delivered from the trial. When 
the news came that Sumter had fallen, and that the flag 
of the nation was dishonored, the instant effect produced 
Effect of the fail of was that of solemn silence — that silence 

which, in the resolute man, is the precursor 
of irrevocable determination ; and then there arose all 
through the country, from the Canadian frontier to where 
the Ohio, rolling his waters westwardly for a thousand 
miles, separates the lands of freedom from those of slav- 
ery, not the yell of defiance, but the deep-toned cheer. 

The political interpretation of the effect of the bona- 
interpretation of bardment of Sumter on the North is that 

it at once produced a coalescence of the 
Union and anti-slavery sentiment; on the South it irre- 
sistibly carried whatever Union sentiment existed into 
secession. On each side of the Ohio the populations 
were unified. That river at once became their separating 

In vain some of the journals, which, through their an- 
Effect on the jour- tipathy to the Republican party, had leaned 
nahsm of the North. to the gkYe Merest, accused the govern- 
ment of commencing war, and blamed it for irritating 
South Carolina by sending relief to Fort Sumter ; in vain 
they declared that the South, fighting for its dearest in- 
terests, could never be conquered ; in vain they clamored 
for a treaty of peace, and begged that the dissatisfied 
states might be permitted to depart : the people intuitive- 
ly saw the true position of affairs, and that the only 


course to be taken was an energetic support of the gov- 

The journals, which drift with public opinion, felt that 
it was impossible to resist the torrent, and, as is their cus- 
tom, boisterously proclaimed that they had all along 
counseled the policy which it was evident must now be 
followed. Some of them, which but a few days previ- 
ously had accused Lincoln of picking a quarrel with the 
South, became at once his loud supporters. The North 
would no longer tolerate treason, no matter what guise it 
might assume. 

The garrison of Fort Sumter lowered their flag and 
marched out of the work on Sunday, April 

The surrender of the . ( ..■, -» T . . n ii i 

fort followed by the 14th. JN'ext morning appeared the procla- 

proclamation. . • i /» i tt • i a 

mation of the .President of the united states 
(p. 25), calling forth the militia, appealing to the people, 
and summoning an extra session of Congress. 

The governors of all the Northern States at once re- 
sponded to the proclamation ; they infused 

Determination of 
the North to res: 
the insurrection 

i to resist energy into the administration. To an eye- 

witness there was something very impress- 
ive in the action of the people. A foreign observer re- 
marked, " With them all is sacrifice, devotion, grandeur 
and purity of purpose — with the poor, if possible, even 
more than with the rich." In the large cities great meet- 
ings were held, in which men of all parties united. Par- 
ty lines vanished. There was none of that frantic de- 
lirium which was manifested in the Slave States, but a 
solemn acceptance of what was clearly recognized to be 
a fearful but unavoidable duty — " Faint not, falter not ; 
the republic is in peril." 

If the Northern communities had been thrown into a 
contemplated seiz- momentary reverie, followed by indignation 

ure of Washington. ^ ^ outrage Qn ^ nat i ona l flag at Fort 

Sumter, they were thoroughly roused to resistance on 


finding that an attempt was forthwith to be made for the 
seizure of Washington City. The highway to that cap- 
ital lay through Baltimore. The plot of the secessionists 
was for Maryland to stop the passage of all re-enforce- 
ments through her territory, under the plea that such pro- 
ceedings outraged her sovereignty, and Virginia might 
then, with a prospect of success, attempt to capture the 

Once committed to the insurrection, there were four 
great captures which it was essential that 

It is one of the du- -r T . .. •, i i * i / -* \ ttt i • i 

ties devolving on Virginia should make : (1.) Washington 
City; (2.) Fortress Monroe; (3.) The Ar- 
mory at Harper's Ferry ; (4.) The Navy Yard at Norfolk. 
She did accomplish the third and fourth; the first and 
second were beyond her power. Had she been able to 
carry out her intention fully, the Union would have been 
in the most imminent peril. The loss of Fortress Mon- 
roe would have been a great military calamity to the 
nation ; that of Washington would perhaps have been 

All through the winter there had been rumors that the 
pians for its ac- Virginians contemplated a surprise of Wash- 
compiisnment. i n gton. When it was plain that their state 
was on the brink of secession, it became certain that the 
attempt would be made. It was expected that a few res- 
olute conspirators would carry it by a coup de main. A 
Texan adventurer was affirmed to be at the head of the 
plot. The President, his cabinet, and other chief officers 
of state were to be sent as hostages to the South. Not 
that there was any intention of a permanent occupation 
under Southern rule. All that was proposed was to 
blow up the Capitol and the Treasury building, to burn 
the President's house and other public edifices, and to 
leave in the blackened wreck of the ruined city a proof 
to the world that the Union was ruined. 


It is impossible to give an adequate idea of the effect 
of these tidings on the Northern people. They literally 
rose up as one man. When, as we are now to find, all 
communication with Washington was for several days 
cut off by the partial success of the plot, and nothing was 
known of what had befallen the government, the patriot- 
ic fervor knew no bounds. 

On the day after the proclamation was issued some 
Pennsylvania companies reported for duty in 

Troops hurried to - XTT , . .—,, , , ^ n 

the defense of the Washington. I hey marched at once to the 
Capitol, and were quartered in the Hall of 
Eepresentatives. They were just in time to prevent the 
seizure of the city. Matters had become so urgent that 
Senator Wilson had already telegraphed to the Governor 
of Massachusetts to send instantly twenty companies. 
Four regiments forthwith mustered with full ranks on 
Boston Common. General Butler was commissioned by 
the governor as a brigadier general. The Massachusetts 
Sixth was ordered without delay through Baltimore ; an- 
other regiment was dispatched to secure Fortress Monroe. 
Thus, in four days, that state, true to her 
ing e thr g n ve?u- or glorious annals, had troops five hundred 
miles on their march, and in less than a 
week her whole quota was far advanced toward Wash- 
ington. The Legislature of Pennsylvania passed a resolu- 
tion pledging the faith and power of that state to support 
the government, sanctioned a loan of three millions of 
dollars, and organized a reserve corps. The Legislature 
of New York, instead of furnishing 17,000 men for three 
months, gave 30,000 for two years, and added a war loan 
of three millions of dollars. Many other of the states 
acted in like manner. Rhode Island not only instantly 
sent her quota and added a loan, but her governor, 
Sprague, went at the head of her troops. 

The Sixth Massachusetts left Boston on the 17th, and 


Attack on the Mas- 

reached Baltimore on the 19th. They found 

AttacK on tne mas- ,-i , •, . i n , • • , 

sachusetts troops that city the scene 01 great excitement, news 

in Baltimore. _ . . . , ^ -, TT 

havmg just arrived 01 the capture ot Har- 
per's Ferry by the Virginians. The slavery and seces- 
sion party received them with threatening cheers for " the 
Southern Confederacy and President Davis," and in pass- 
ing from the Philadelphia to the Washington Railroad 
station they were assaulted by a mob. A part of the reg- 
Attempts to prevent iment wnicn happened to be in the rear cars 
pSng' through was separated, and compelled to fight its 
that city. wa y ^j. ail gjj. an infuriated rabble who had 

obstructed the track in the streets. The mayor, with a 
police force, attempted to clear the way; but one of the 
soldiers being shot dead with his own musket, wrested 
from him by a rioter, the troops were compelled to fire, 
killing eleven and wounding four of their assailants. The 
fire being returned with revolvers and muskets, the loss 
of the regiment was three killed and eight wounded. In 
this manner they forced their way for two miles. and a 
half, from the Philadelphia to the Washington station in 
Baltimore, bricks, stones, pieces of iron being thrown 
from the upper windows of the houses upon them. Even 
after they had reached the cars for Washington they were 
fired at, and attempts were made to tear up the rails. 

As soon as the news reached Massachusetts, the gov- 
ernor of that state telegraphed to the Mayor of Balti- 
more : 

"I pray you to cause the bodies of our Massachusetts soldiers 
dead in Baltimore to be laid out, preserved in ice, and tenderly sent 
forward by express to me. All expenses will be paid by this Com- 

To this the mayor returned an appropriate reply, de- 
ploring the event, and declaring that the authorities had 
exerted themselves to the best of their ability to prevent 
the trouble ; but that the people viewed the passage of 

Concessions of the 


armed troops of another state through the streets as an 
invasion of their soil, and could not be restrained. 
The Governor of Massachusetts replied : 

" I appreciate your kind attention to our wounded and our dead. 
I am overwhelmed with surprise that a peaceful march of American 
citizens over the highway to the defense of our common capital 
should be deemed aggressive to Baltimoreans." 

The excitement had now reached such a pitch that 
President Lincoln was obliged to interfere. 
He requested the Governor of Maryland and 
the Mayor of Baltimore to come to him for consultation. 
The governor happening to be absent, the mayor went 
without him, and was informed by the President that 
either troops must be brought through Maryland, or the 
capital surrendered to armed treason. The wishes of the 
Baltimoreans were, however, so far gratified that some 
Pennsylvania troops then approaching by railroad were 
ordered back to their own state. 

This, however, did not end the commotion. Maryland 
was full of emissaries from the Cotton States. 
The rioters were determined that Washing- 
ton should not be relieved. They therefore destroyed 
the bridges over the streams. They stopped the mails ? 
cut the telegraph wires, and detained military stores be- 
longing to the government. The more audacious of them 
made ready for an attack on Fort M'Henry. Still un- 
willing to be drawn into a collision, though compelled to 
have troops from the North to defend the national capi- 
tal, the President, under the advice of General Scott, di- 
rected that the regiments should march round Baltimore, 
and not through it. 

Among the influences brought to bear upon the Presi- 
dent by the Baltimoreans was that of a so- 
christian Asso- cietv known as the Young; Men's Christian 

ciation. ... at • t* • 

Association. A deputation from this body 


requested that an end should be put to the unnatural 
conflict impending by a concession of all the demands of 
the Slave States ; that the forces in Washington should 
be dismissed ; and particularly that no more troops should 
be brought to the capital through Maryland. Religious 
men throughout the South had become blind to the atroc- 
ity of slavery. They had forgotten what their great 
statesman Jefferson had written : " We must wait with pa- 
tience the workings of an overruling Providence, and hope 
that that is preparing the deliverance of these our breth- 
ren. When the measure of their tears shall be full — 
when their groans shall have involved heaven itself in 
darkness, doubtless a God of Justice will awaken to their 
distress. Nothing is more certainly written in the Book 
of Fate than that this people shall be free." " I tremble 
for my country when I reflect that God is just ; that his 
justice can not sleep forever; that, considering numbers, 
nature, and natural means only, a revolution in the wheel 
of Fortune, an exchange of situation, is among possible 
events — that it may become probable by supernatural in- 
terference ! The Almighty has no attribute which can 
take side with us in such a contest." 

Encouraged by the forbearance that had been shown, 

the Governor of Maryland again (April 2 2d) 

Maryland desires entreated the President that no more troops 

foreign mediation. _ x 

should be brought through the state, and 
that those at present in it should be sent elsewhere. He 
farther urged that a truce should be offered to the insur- 
gents, and suggested that the English minister should be 
asked to mediate between the contending parties. 

To this the President directed the Secretary of State 

Repiy of the Secre- t0 ^7 that tlie f ° rCeS flight thrOUgh 

taryofstatetohim. Maryland were intended solely for the de- 
fense of the capital; that "the national highway had been 
selected, after consultation with prominent magistrates 



[Sect. VII. 

and citizens of Maryland, as the one which, while a route 
is absolutely necessary, is farthest removed from the pop- 
ulous cities of the state, and with the expectation that it 
would therefore be the least objectionable.' 1 With re- 
spect to the suggestion of foreign mediation, he added 
that " no domestic contention whatever that might arise 
among the parties of this republic ought in any case to 
be referred to any foreign arbitrament, and least of all to 
the arbitrament of a European monarchy." 

General Butler, on arriving at the Susquehanna (April 
The Massachusetts 20 th) with his detachment of Massachusetts 
waytowSmug-' troops, found the bridges burned. Deter- 
mined to make his way to Washington, he 
seized a steam-boat at the ferry of Havre cle Grace, and 



carried his forces to An- 
napolis. The governor 
again protested against 
this landing of North- 
ern troops on the soil of 
Maryland. "They are 
not Northern troops," re- 
plied Butler ; " they are 
a part of the whole mili- 
tia of the United States, 
obeying the call of the 


The Massachusetts troops resumed their march from 
Annapolis on the 24th, repairing the bridges and laying 
rails as they went. At Annapolis Junction they reached 
a train of cars from Washington, and, with the New York 
Seventh Regiment in advance, arrived in that city on the 
25th. From the clay of the attack on the Massachusetts 
troops in Baltimore, Washington had been cut off from 
The public bund- ^ ne North. The Treasury building and the 
tafoc°cup h ild C by" Capitol had been barricaded, and howitzers 
put in their passages; subsequently the 
basement of the Capitol was turned into a bake-house, 
and the chambers of the Senate and Representatives con- 
verted into barracks. The only guard had been«some 
Pennsylvania companies, a few regulars collected together 
by General Scott, and a body of volunteers under Cassius - 
M. Clay. 

When the Legislature of Maryland met, the governor, 
Action of the Mar - * n n * s message, admitted that the passage of 
laud Legislature, troops through the state to the capital could 
not be prevented, and he earnestly counseled, as the only 
safety, the maintenance of a strict neutrality, so that, " if 
there must be war between the North and the South, we 
may force the contending parties to transfer the field of 
battle from our soil, and our lives and property be se- 
cure." Reluctantly consenting to these views, the Legis- 
lature accordingly resolved not to secede from the Union. 
Secession, however, had now become impossible, for But- 
Baitimore seized ^ er -^ad taken military possession of Balti- 
b y Butier. more. He entered it with a detachment of 

the same Massachusetts regiment which had been assault- 
ed in its streets, and, encamping on Federal Hill, had the 
city completely under command. In vain the Legislature 
declared that the war against the Confederate States was 
unconstitutional and repugnant to civilization; in vain 
they protested that they sympathized with the South in 


this struggle for its rights; in vain they resolved that 
Maryland implores the President, in the name of God, to 
cease this unholy war ; that she consents to, and desires 
the recognition of, the independence of the Confederate 
States. She could do nothing against the overwhelming 
power of the North, and she was forced to succumb. 



Virginia acceded to secession after exacting the foremost rank in the Confederacy, 

¥ and protection for her slave interests. 

She then seized the National Armory at Harper's Ferry, and the Navy Yard at Nor- 
folk, with its vast war-supplies, turning them, with all her own military resources, 
over to the Confederacy. 

Her chief city, Richmond, was made the capital of the new republic. 

Ephemeral glory of the new metropolis. 

The secession movement was not advancing so trium- 
The reluctance of phantly as its originators had hoped. At 
virgmm to ; ^ Q ^\ f p or t Suinter only seven Slave 

States had joined the Confederacy; the others were va- 
cillating. It was absolutely necessary for the insurrec- 
tionists at Montgomery to induce or compel them to act. 

Pre-eminent among these lingering states, through her 
traditions, through her geographical position, and through 
her political power, was Virginia. To a very large por- 
tion of her people the souvenirs of the Union were sources 
of honorable pride ; the Constitution had been, to no in- 
considerable degree, the work of her great men, who also, 
through so many of the earlier years of the republic, had 
administered the government. 

Virginia had been very far from approving of the 
thoughtless haste of the South Carolinians 

She is influenced by . ..-,.-,. n . -,--,- 

her traditions and in passing their ordinance 01 secession. Her 

interest ^^ 

inhabitants, characterized by more mental 
maturity (vol. i., p. 102) than those of the Gulf States, 
looked to the consequences of their acts. The inevitable 
course which the new Confederacy must take was alto- 
gether in opposition to her interests. Whatever might 


be the present protestation, it was perfectly clear that the 
logical issue of the Confederacy, if successful, was the re- 
opening of the African slave-trade. But Virginia was at 
this epoch the chief slave-producing, slave-selling state. 
The resumption of that trade would have destroyed this, 
her great source of profit. Influenced thus by her tradi- 
tions and her interests, she was reluctant to join the Slave 

Ten days after the passing of the ordinance of secession 
by South Carolina, a commissioner from Vir- 

She sends commis- . . . -, . / ^., -, .-p., -p . -. 

sioners to south gmia arrived in Charleston. Ine Lesrisla- 

Carolina, & , & 

ture Of his state had declared its desire to 
procure amendments to, or guarantees in the Constitution 
of the United States. The Carolina General Assembly, 
however, declined co-operation for such purposes. They 
answered that they took no farther interest in that Con- 
stitution, and considered that " the only appropriate ne- 
gotiation they could have with the federal government 
was as with a foreign state." 
But, though at this time Virginia unquestionably looked 

with disapproval on what the Cotton States 

and yields a quali- -,. , /3r» i i ipjt 

tied consent to se- were domsr, she sultered herself to become 

cession. _. Y . 

entangled m their movements by consenting 
that if the government should resort to coercion of the 
seceding states, she would make common cause with 
them. It therefore only remained for them to provoke 
the use of force not only to secure her alliance, but, as 
they hoped, that of all the other Border States, which it 
Avas thought would follow her movement. This was one 
of the motives that induced them to make an attack on 
Fort Sumter. 

On the day of the surrender of that fort, delegates from 

she sends a com- Virginia had an interview with the Presi- 

coin. dent, their ostensible object being to inform 

him that the industrial and commercial interests of the 


country were suffering ; that a disturbance of the public 
peace was threatened. They desired to know from him 
what policy he intended to pursue. But events wer§ 
marching more rapidly than negotiations. Lincoln was 
compelled (April 15th), by what was taking place in 
Charleston, to issue the proclamation calling forth the 
militia, and summoning Congress to meet. To the dele- 
gates that was, of course, an answer. Nevertheless, he 
courteously replied to them, referring them to what he 
had said in his inaugural address, and explaining some 
portions of it. 

The proclamation was imperatively required by the 
Effect of the procia- imminent danger in which it was apparent 
mation on her. jjj^ -(j^ ca pital was placed. But it gave to 

the dissatisfied Virginians their opportunity. On the 
17th of April their ordinance of secession was passed. 
This was clone by their Convention in secret session, and 
The secession ordi- ^ ne injunction of secrecy has not been re- 
nance passed. moved. The votes were, however, subse- 
quently discovered and published. It then appeared 
that there were 88 yeas and 55 nays. One delegate was 
excused, and eight did not vote. 

So strong was the disapproval of the Carolinian move- 
ment in Virginia, that all those arts which 

• Difficulty in per- ,. . . „ T v 1 in 

suading her peo- politicians use tor the accomplishment ot 

pie to secede. x . x 

their ends had to be resorted to. I he le- 
gal Convention was overawed by an irresponsible gath- 
ering of unauthorized persons from various parts of the 
state, who called themselves a people's spontaneous Con- 
vention. Prominence was given to this assemblage by 
the recognition the leading secessionists extended to it. 
Thus Mr. Wise and ex-President Tyler entered it arm in 
arm to announce the result of the deliberations of the 
legal Convention, and the former of these personages, in a 
•speech he made before it, lamented " the blunders which 
II.— F 


had prevented Virginia from seizing Washington before 
the Republican hordes got possession of it." The latter 
declared that if the Slave States only presented a united 
front, no war of any consequence would ensue. When 
the President's proclamation reached Richmond, every ex- 
ertion was made by the malcontents to misrepresent it. 
They succeeded in causing such an excitement that under 
cover of it the secession ordinance was passed. 

To that ordinance another was added, adopting the 
Constitution of the provisional government 

Her resources \ 

thTconfel- t0 a ^ Montgomery, and also an agreement giv- 
eracy. -^ ^ Q ^^ g 0vernme nt the whole military 

resources of the state, and turning over to it whatever 
public property Virginia might seize from the United 
States. These were passed, however, upon condition that 
the vote of the people upon the ordinance of secession 
should sustain it, and that vote was directed to be taken 
one month subsequently (May 23d). With a view of 
enabling the people to come to a suitable conclusion, 
some minor points were enacted, as that any 

Means used to se- -r- T . . . -i i -i • or* t ,i tt • 1 l 

cure the popular Virginian holding omce under the United 
States after the 31st of July should be ban- 
ished from the state and declared an alien enemy, and 
any Virginian undertaking to represent the state in the 
Congress of the United States should, in addition to the 
above penalties, be considered guilty of treason, and his 
property be liable to confiscation. 

But this submission to the people was insincere. The 
allotted month had scarcely begun, before the affair had 
passed out of their control. Without a moment's delay, 
the leaders of the movement made war on the Union; 
they attempted to seize the United States Arsenal at 
Harper's Ferry, and took possession of the navy yard at 
Norfolk. Indeed, they actually commenced obstructing 
the channel to the latter place on April 16th, the nightf 


before the ordinance was passed. And when the popu- 
lar vote for secession was taken, a large part of it came 
from soldiers of the Confederate army who had just ar- 
rived from other states. 

Through all the subsequent years of the war it was a 
Her failure to seize source of profound regret in the Confeder- 
Fortress Monroe. aC y that Virginia had acted so tardily, and 

that she had not at this time secured the great national 
work — Fortress Monroe. It would have been of incal- 
culable advantage to her, and have changed the whole 
current of events. Her governor had contemplated the 
possibility of seizing it even before the state had seceded, 
but had been less resolute than the South Carolinians. 
In his annual message to the Legislature of the state (De- 
cember 31st, 1861), he regretted that it was not in his 
possession. He stated that he had " consulted with a per- 
son of experience whose position enabled him to know all 
about the fortress," and that he had been discouraged, by 
reason of the strength of the place, from attempting its 
capture ; that at no time previously to secession had Vir- 
ginia a military organization powerful enough for that 

The attack on Harper's Ferry was made on the 18th 
of April. The officer in charge of that es- 

She captures the ,-itt i-iti i i* 

arsenal at Har- tablisnment had, however, become aware ol 

per's Ferry. . ' ' 

what was intended. He blew up or set on 

fire the various workshops and the arsenal, and effected 

a safe retreat into Pennsylvania. Though many arms 

were in this manner destroyed, much of the machinery 

was saved by the assailants, and subsequently carried to 


Simultaneously with the attack on Harper's Ferry, Vir- 

vaine of the naval ginia accomplished the seizure of the great 
station at Norfolk. naval station? t]ie Gosport navy yard, near 

Norfolk. It contained founderies, ship-yards, docks, ma- 



[Sect. VII. 

chine shops. There were in it at least two thousand can- 
non, three hundred of them Being Dahlgren guns. In 
connection with it, too, were magazines containing more 
than a quarter, of a million pounds of gunpowder, and 

great quantities of shot and shell. There were twelve 
war ships, of various rates. Among them may particular- 
ly be mentioned the Merrimack, a very fine steam frigate 
of 40 guns. The value of the entire establishment was 
estimated at more than ten millions of dollars. 

JSTo measures had been taken for the protection of this 
its inefficient de- great depot beyond general instructions to 
Captain M'Cauley, the officer in command, 
to " put the shipping and public property in condition to 
be moved and placed beyond danger, but in doing so to 
take no steps that could give needless alarm." In Nor- 
folk the militia was defiantly paraded, and threats made 
that if any action were taken by the government for the 
protection of the yard, it should be attacked. On the 
night of April 16 th, the entrance to the harbor was ob- 


structed by sinking two light-ships. Captain M'Cauley 
suffered himself to be overpersuaded by the sinister ad- 
vice of his junior officers, and acted with irresolution. Or- 
ders had been received from Washington on April 12th 
to have the Merrimack instantly removed to Philadel- 
phia, the chief engineer being sent down to Norfolk ex- 
pressly for that purpose. Yet when her steam was up, 
and she was ready to leave, Captain M'Cauley directed 
her to be detained, notwithstanding the remonstrances 
of the engineer. 

Indeed, it was not until many of his officers, who were 
from the Slave States, had resigned, and the 

The officers in com- /-* n i i i m i • n it • i 

mand destroy or Confederate general laliaferro had arrived 
from Richmond, that he seemed to compre- 
hend the condition of things. On the 19th he made prep- 
arations for abandoning the place, and commenced spik- 
ing the guns, doing it, for the most part, ineffectually, with 
cut nails. Next day he promised the insurgents ; that 
none of the vessels should be taken away, nor a shot fired 
except in defense. He then drdered all the ships, except 
the Cumberland, of 24 guns, to be scuttled. That ship, 
with a full armament and crew on board, 

though they had - , . . .. _ 

ample means for lay in such a position as to command the 

its defense. * . x % m 

entire harbor, the cities of TS orfolk and Ports- 
mouth, the navy yard, and the approaches to it. The 
mere threat of her broadside would have quelled the 
trouble. The whole militia force of the place was not 
five hundred men, inadequately armed, and with only 
eight or ten little field-pieces. 

The government, now becoming alarmed, sent Captain 
Paulding from Washington with orders to take command 
of all the naval forces afloat at Norfolk, and defend the 
property of the United States, repelling force by force. 
He had fully 1000 men, among whom were 350 Massa- 
chusetts troops obtained at Fortress Monroe. But, in his 


judgment, nothing remained except to complete the work 
of destruction, and abandon the place. The scuttled ships 
were in the act of settling under the water. He there- 
fore gave directions to fire the yard and what remained 
of the ships. The ships, which might have been removed, 
were accordingly destroyed, but the shops in the yard 
were unaccountably spared, and were subsequently of 
great use to the Confederacy. A large amount of war ma- 
terial fell into the hands of the insurgents. A commis- 
sioner of the State of Virginia, subsequently 

Report of the Vir- . -, -. ■■.-.'■* . . -> • ■ Pl1 

ginia commissioner authorized to take an inventory of the prop- 
on its acquisition. . J 7 XJ - 

erty thus seized, reports : " I had purposed 
some remarks upon/ the vast importance to Virginia, and 
to the entire South, of the timely acquisition of this ex- 
tensive naval depot, with its immense supplies of muni- 
tions of war, and to notice briefly the damaging effects of 
its loss to the government at Washington ; but I deem it 
unnecessary, since the presence, at almost e^ssery exposed 
point on the whole Southern coast, and at numerous in- 
land intrenched camps in the several states, of heavy 
pieces of ordnance, with their equipments and fixed am- 
munition, all supplied from this establishment, fully at- 
tests the one, while the unwillingness of the enemy to at- 
tempt demonstrations at any point, from which he is ob- 
viously deterred by the knowledge of its well-fortified 
condition, abundantly proves the other, especially when 
it is considered that both he and we are wholly indebted 
for our means of resistance to his loss and our acquisition 
of the Gosport navy yard." 

This great national disaster, which, as thus affirmed, in 

reality armed the South, and gave it the 

Disastrous conse- n . . . , -, . , 

qnences to the 'means ot resistance to the government, must 


be imputed partly to irresolution at Wash- 
ington, and partly to the indecision of the commanding 
officer. The money loss to the government was great, 


but it was a totally inadequate measure of the intrinsic 
value of the war material at that moment. The South 
was armed and the North disarmed. The indirect con- 
sequences were of incalculable importance. When Cap- 
tain M'Cauley gave orders that the frigate Merrimack 
should not sail, and thereby left her to be raised and con- 
verted into an iron-clad ram, he closed the James River, 
and prepared unspeakable disasters for the subsequent 
peninsular campaign. 

A select committee of the Senate of the Unite'd States, 
directed to inquire into these subjects, re- 
ate committee oS" ported that, in their iudgment, (1.) The ad- 

the subject. / v / 

ministration of Mr. Buchanan was guilty of 
neglect in not taking extraordinary care and employing 
every possible means to protect and defend the Norfolk 
navy yard after indications of danger had manifested 
themselves; (2.) The administration of Mr. Lincoln can 
not be held blameless for suffering thirty-seven days to 
elapse after he came into power before making a move- 
ment for the defense of the yard ; (3.) Captain M'Cauley 
was highly censurable for neglecting to send the Merri- 
mack from the yard as he was ordered, and also for scut- 
tling the ships and preparing to abandon the yard before 
any attack was made or seriously threatened, when he 
should have defended it and the property intrusted to 
him, repelling force by force, as he was instructed to do 
if the occasion should present itself. Captain Paulding 
was likewise considered by the committee to be censura- 
ble for ordering the property to be burned and the yard 
abandoned before taking proper means to satisfy himself 
that any necessity for such measures existed. 

Thus Virginia severed her connection with that repub- 
lic which her great men of the former generation had 


done so much to establish, and which she had so long 

ruled. She accepted a measure leading at once to civil 

war, to public calamity, and domestic sorrow. Few social 

lessons can be more instructive than her ex- 
Richmond as the . .-. n n -,-, -, ., 

confederate cap- penences in the lour following years while 
Richmond had the vain glory of being the 
capital of the new Confederacy — experiences which have 
been recorded by her own people. Let us listen to what 
one of her daughters relates — the serpent beguiled her 
and she did eat — in a very instructive little volume she 
tells us how the aj>ple of secession tasted. 

She says that during the Secession Convention the hall 
of meeting; became the favorite place of re- 

The delight of its . „ . , ° , . * 

inhabitants at se- sort ot the women, who occasionally engaged 


> in political discussions in the intervals of the 
meetings of the members. Every woman in Richmond 
was a politician. On the ordinance of secession being 
passed, the people were in a delirium of joy ; the cannon 
were saluting, the bells ringing, neighbors shaking hands 
with each other, the ladies waving their handkerchiefs. 
In the evening there was an illumination, the favorite 
form being the Southern cross ; the sky was alive with 
Roman candles and variegated rockets. At this time 
Richmond was in a very prosperous condition ; its trade 
was flourishing, articles of food and clothing were very 
cheap, and pauperism was actually unknown. All this 
was, however, considered as nothing in comparison with 
the prosperity which it was expected that secession would 
bring. The clergy, forgetting the terrible denunciation 
that Jefferson had formerly pronounced against slavery, 
declared that the smiles of God were upon the cause ; and 
it was thought to be more than a mere omen that on the 
Sunday following the passage of the ordi- 

Secession Sunday. ■ , , 1 . . -, -. c* r\ 

nance there occurred in the lesson tor the 
day, as read in the Episcopal churches, the words " I will 


remove far off from you the Northern army, and will 

drive him into a land barren and desolate, with his face 

toward the east sea, and his hinder parts to the utmost 

sea, and his stink shall come up, and his ill savor shall 

come up, because he hath done great things." 

Soon, however, the population began to change, and 

Gradual chafes m strange faces appeared in the streets. Sol- 
Richmond society. ^ QTQ f rom ^ e Cotton States were pouring 

in. They were followed by that loose society, male and 
female, which always hovers round armies. The first 
regiments that appeared were from South Carolina. They 
received a hearty welcome. The gay throng who had 
lately crowded the halls of the Secession Convention was 
now wandering through the camps. But the pride of 
the young ladies was touched to the quick by the gas- 
conade of their new friends. " We have come here to 
fight the battles of you Virginians." Estrangement was 
embittered by the reflection that the blows so wantonly 
provoked by South Carolina must fall first on Virginia. 
But, though the Carolinians gave no offense, save that 
arising from their conceit, it was not so with the troops 
of the Southwest. The New Orleans Zouaves stole what- 
ever they could lay their hands upon, robbed and insult- 
ed citizens in the public streets, caroused riotously in the 
restaurants and hotels, and told the proprietors to charge 
the bills to the Confederate government. 

An elegant establishment was provided for President 
The president and Davis. Receptions like those in the White 
Richmond nfe. Houi3e at Washington were held. It was 

necessary that every man should appear in the streets in 
a military garb. There was the reveille in the morning 
and taps at night. In the autumn of that first year of 
the war the weather was more beautiful than for a lone: 
time had been known; the Indian summer brought an 
exquisite dreamy haze ; the gorgeous foliage of the forest 


was absolutely magnificent. This was while M'Clellan 
was holding his great army at Washington waiting for 
the weather to improve. The president of the Confed- 
eracy w^as often, seen riding on horseback through the 
city with one of his children before him. It was thought 
to be an affecting sight. 

By degrees, however, things changed. Speculators, 
Decline of patriotic gamblers, and persons of bad character 
sentiment. flocked into the new metropolis. The 

blockade began to be felt. The vilest extortions were 
practiced by dealers in' provisions. They ran up the 
price of coffee to fifty dollars per pound. Dried leaves 
of the sage, willow, currant, were substituted for tea. 
The president declined in public esteem; his arbitrary 
control of military affairs irritated the chief generals. It 
was remarked that the first anniversary of the fall of 
Sumter was signalized by the fall of Pulaski. Then 
came M'Clellan's peninsular campaign, and trouble in 
Difficulties in do- the domestic economy of Richmond. It 
mestic economy. was yer y hard, our fair informant plaintive- 
ly says, to procure a dinner at all. Then followed the 
Chickahominy battles. " The month of July can never 
be forgotten ; we lived in one immense hospital ; we 
breathed the vapors of a charnel-house." The Confeder- 
ate Congress, on M'Clellan's approach, had run away; 
when the members returned in August after he was gone, 
they were unmercifully twitted for their flight by the 
women. The chief magistrate, embittered by the course 
of events, had now become a stern autocrat ; he kept 
both houses of Congress in mortal terror. A public 
The president be- clamor arose that his cabinet should be 
comes unpopular, fagged. He turned a deaf ear to it. It 
was said that his obstinacy was strengthened by the flat- 
tery of the parasites around him — the dependents on his 
will. In his first report to the permanent Congress he 


had represented the financial condition as one of safety ; 
" in less than twelve months the currency was at a dis- 
count of a thousand per cent." There was a pitiable 
and necessary arti- scarcity of the most necessary articles; for 
cies very scarce. instance, paper could hardly be had. The 
old and respectable residents, who had long lived in ease 
on their competent resources, were now reduced to dire 
necessities. The women turned their well-worn dresses 
upside down and inside out to pass them off as new, 
and grimly jested at the seedy aspect of their male 
friends, whose garb was incapable of that device. De- 
cayed gentility saw with indignation the splendid car- 
a gioom settles on ™ges of upstart speculators rolling through 
thecity ' the streets, and listened perhaps with too 

much credulity to stories of the vast fortunes wrung by 
contractors out of the impoverished state. The cheerful 
sounds of the piano became less frequent in the houses ; 
they were replaced by the hum of the spinning-wheel. 

Not without curiosity, mingled with sympathy^ do we 
Extravagant prices rea< i ^ ne declaration of our fair Confederate 
of clothing. friend, that " the wardrobe of a lady be- 

came enormously expensive at last." "For an ordinary 
calico, for which we formerly paid 12 \ cents a yard, we 
were forced to pay from thirty to thirty-five dollars ; for 
an English or French chintz the price was fifty dollars a 
yard. A nice French merino or mohair dress was from 
eight hundred to a thousand dollars. A cloak of fine 
cloth was worth from one thousand to fifteen hundred 
dollars. A pair of Balmoral boots for ladies, two hun- 
dred and fifty dollars. French gloves sold at from one 
hundred and twenty-five to one hundred and seventy-five 
dollars per pair. Irish linen commanded from fifty to 
one hundred dollars per yard." But it is needless to 
continue this catalogue of feminine sorrows : something 
infinitely sadder was coming. 


The inevitable hour struck at last. Richmond, aban- 
doned and defenseless, stood alone in pres- 
Richmond Is a ence of the Great Power it had defied. The 

metropolis. .... ,, 

Confederate authorities had fled, and had 
given orders to set it on fire. In vain the inhabitants, 
pallid with terror, implored to be spared that atrocity, 
it is fired by the se- With exquisite wickedness, the hose of the 
cession officers, fire-engines had been cut. There was noth- 
ing to stop the devouring flames. An unparalleled con- 
flagration was the result. Richmond, once the great 
mart of the internal slave-trade, was entered by conquer- 
ing regiments of negro troops. They came through the 
smoke, amidst blazing houses, bursting shells, and explod- 
ing magazines, singing " Old John Brown." They came, 
not to revenge, but to protect, 

And the republic founded by Washington, a Virgin- 
ian, forgetting in a moment the long agony 

audits people saved iit-i -i, -i , -, -i 

from famine by the she had s been made to endure, stretched 

United States. 7 

forth both her hands to succor and sustain 
bleeding and fainting Virginia. Men, women, and chil- 
dren who were famishing in Richmond, were fed by the 
merciful conqueror. 

In connection with the capture of the navy yard at 

surrender of the Norfolk may be mentioned the disgraceful 
pensacoiayard. surrender of ttat at p en sacola, in Florida, 

by the officers having charge of it, and the honorable de- 
fense of Fort Pickens. 

Florida, purchased from Spain by the money of the 
Union, had seceded on January 12th, and immediately 
made a demand for the yard. Of the works guarding it 
the most important was Fort Pickens, a stone casemated 
structure on Santa Rosa Island. On the shore opposite 
to it there was a smaller work, Fort M'Rea; and a third, 
Fort Barrancas, about a couple of miles distant. At the 





time when the American flag was hauled down at the 

navy yard, and the stores, guns, and munitions turned 

over to the insurgents, Fort Barrancas was abandoned. 

But this scene of military disgrace was not consum- 

Defense of Fort mated. The little Fort M'Kea was in charge 

Pickens. £ a y 0Tin g officer, Lieutenant Slemmer. He 

collected together what force he could, and, obtaining 

some marines from the steamer Wyandotte, in all about 

eighty men, he spiked the guns of M'Rea, and threw 

himself into Fort Pickens, holding that important work, 

which was one of the keys of the Gulf of Mexico, until 

the middle of April, when it was effectually garrisoned 

and provisioned by the government. 



The South secured her sea-coast Jine by seizing the national fortresses ; her north- 
ern line by asserting the rights of neutrality of the Border States. On the West 
she blockaded the Mississippi. 

Shut up thus within herself, she established throughout her territory an iron des- 

There were four classes in her population. Their condition became that of a state 
of siege. 

Comparison of the political value of Richmond, the metropolis of the Confederacy, 
with that ofWashington. 

Though assurances were perpetually given by the lead- 
war preparations in ers of secession that their design would suc- 
the confederacy. cee( j without difficulty, and perhaps with- 
out a resort to war, they made every preparation to ob- 
tain military security for their new Confederacy. They 
commenced by seizing all the fortresses and depots estab- 
lished in their limits by the United States for the defense 
of the Atlantic and Gulf coasts. Some of these had been 
very costly; several were very powerful works — a cor- 
don along the shore, judged to be amply sufficient to give 
security to that part of the republic in case of European 
war, but capable of being appropriated without difficulty 
by the people it was intended to defend, since it was vir- 
tually ungarrisoned. 

The sea and Gulf fronts of the new Confederacy thus 
protected, it was supposed that the land- 

The coast front and ^ , , . , ■• -i , i -n 

the north front thus front, looking northward toward the Jbree 

made safe, . 

States, might be made secure by resorting 
to the apparently peaceable measure of playing off the 


Constitution against itself. No pains were spared to se- 
cure in the Border States — the tier of states intervening 
between the cotton region and the free North — reliable 
governors and Legislatures. These states, by assuming a 
position of neutrality, might ward off the forces of the 
republic under the plea that they had done nothing to 
justify invasion by it. Meantime their military popula- 
tion was individually, and therefore, it might be said, im- 
perceptibly, able to re-enforce the armies of the Confeder- 
acy, and their military resources could be quietly added 
to its strength. 

Under the protection of this vast breastwork, this tier 
of ostensibly peaceable and neutral states, reaching from 
beyond the Mississippi eastward to the Atlantic Ocean, 
the people who had revolted from the republic expected 
to organize- their political institutions in security; and 
that, even should war break out, its shock would not fall 
upon them. The Border States must be the battle-field 
of the Confederacy. • 

Distance, and the impracticability of carrying on mili- 
the west front inac- tary operations in a sparsely peopled country 
— a country without good roads and with- 
out available resources, seemed to give ample security on 
the western frontier. The Mississippi Biver, as a central 
ana the Mississippi avenue to the interior recesses of the Con- 
federacy, might be closed without difficulty 
against all adventurers. The forts at New Orleans pro- 
hibited any ascent, and batteries could easily be construct- 
ed below the junction of the Ohio at Cairo that would 
bar all descent down the stream. 

If such was the encouraging prospect when the de- 
Thc national army fenses of the Confederate territory were con- 
aud navy dispersed. s j ( j ere ^| y not less satisfactory was the condi- 
tion of its expected assailant. With provident care for 
the success of the conspiracy, Floyd had dispatched the 


mass of the United States army to the frontier. The 
Secretary of the Navy had sent the national ships to dis- 
tant parts of the world. History lent no countenance to 
the supposition that it would be possible to put a shore- 
line of many thousand miles under a valid blockade. 
When Lincoln came into power he had only forty-two 
national ships with which to do that and meet all other 
naval requirements. 

It was, therefore, not without reason, expected that the 
The confederacy cultivation of tobacco and cotton, those great 
gooiwSs^? sources of wealth, could be carried on as 
Europe. heretofore; that unrestrained access to the 

ocean on the one side, and the urgent necessities of Eu- 
rope on the other, would continue the profitable com- 
merce which for so many years past had enriched the 
South. So clear did this' appear, that it was not consid- 
ered necessary by the leaders of secession to resort to any 
measures for the immediate transportation of the great 
stock of those staples on hand to Europe, it being con- 
cluded that, should the government undertake any such 
measures as a closure of the ports or the establishment 
of a blockade, the western powers of Europe would at 
once interfere. 

Behind the impregnable rampart of the Border States 
Life in the cotton there would thus exist, in peace and secu- 
Paradise. r j.^ a c tton Paradise, its free inhabitant 

relieved from the primeval curse, and gaining his bread 
by the sweat of another man's brow. Should the African 
trade be reopened, every one of the ruling race might 
have as many laborers as he pleased. It was not very 
material what terms were contained in the written Consti- 
tution of the new nation, since the recognized right of 
peaceable secession covered every difiicul- 

Secession a reme- , ~.. -tin ,1 /n -i • • ,i 

dy for aii political ty. Should South Carolina, m the course 

ilia J ' 

of events, readopt the policy she had at the 



close of the last English war, aided in imposing on the 
old Union — the tariff policy — and should, as probably 
might be the case, her associates object to her proceed- 
ings, what more would be needful for her, if determined 
to gratify her own willfulness, than to retire from the 
Confederacy, as she had formerly retired from the Union. 
Or, should Florida, recalling her traditions, and remem- 
bering that on her soil the African first set his foot on 
this continent, desire a reopening of the profitable Guinea 
trade, and make ready her depots at Pensacola and St. 
Augustine, in vain would the slave-breeding states of the 
Confederacy exert their opposition. Falling back on her 
sovereign rights, it was only for her to secede from her 
associates and carry out her intent. 

But the founders of the Confederacy never seriously 
contemplated the recognition of such a po- 

Real principles of , . . , , -.. , •-«. n • . • . 

the leaders of se- Iitical absurdity as the right 01 secession; it 

cession. *> , ° # - 7 

was too slippery a principle; they never 
practically accepted its kindred delusion of individual 
state rights as against the united whole ; they never be- 
lieved that a powerful dominion could be constructed 
out of disconnected communities. They were too astute 
to attempt to build a tower whose top was to reach to 
the sky, with nothing but slime for mortar. They knew 
that when something of that kind was formerly tried, it 
led to a confusion of tongues and the dispersion of the 

On the contrary, once in possession of power, they sub- 

They institute a J ected everything to a despotism of iron. 

despotism. Instead of a garden of Eden, in which every 

one might gratify his own will, the South became a vast 
intrenched camp, and instant obedience was exacted to 
the orders of a military superior. The poor white, who 
had innocently amused himself with a day-dream of an- 
ticipated idleness, riches, pleasure, and liberty to the verge 
II.— G 


of license, was aghast when he found that he was torn 
from his home, and even from his state, and compelled to 
march to the battle front by order of a central authority 
at Eichmond. 

The population of the proposed Confederacy may be 
considered as having presented four distinct- 

The population of, i i t • • . 

the confederacy ]v marked divisions or groups, constituting;, 

classified. J . o I ? o' 

socially and intellectually, a descending se- 
ries. (1.) The planters, or great land and slave owners ; 
(2.) Persons constrained by their circumstances, more or 
less narrow, to occupy themselves in certain industrial 
pursuits — professional politicians, clergymen, lawyers, 
merchants, mechanics, farmers, laborers ; (3.) Domestic 
slaves ; (4.) Field slaves. It is not necessary to add to 
these the free negroes, for they, in truth, were of little po- 
litical importance. 

(1.) The planters were a true aristocracy — a ruling 

class. They were educated, wealthv, hos- 

The. first class. . —~ . _ 7 i 

pitable. Jjoreseemg that, under the opera- 
tion of the existing Constitution, the North must neces- 
sarily take from them that control of the national govern- 
ment, which they had so long enjoyed, they had become 
alienated from it.- Accustomed to command, impatient 
of any control, a civil government of the representative 
type suited them far less than a purely military rule — 
one readily adapting itself to actual occurrences, and able 
to enforce its laws and resolves promptly and emphatic- 

As forming what might be termed a section of this 
group were its young men. Brave, splendid riders, cap- 
ital shots, bold to rashness, they held labor in absolute 
contempt, and pined for the maddening excitements of 

(2.) The small farmers, mechanics, merchants, profes- 
sional men. This group probably numbered three fourths 


of the white population. They had no real 
interest in the establishment of a Southern 
Confederacy. Some were led, and some driven to take 
the risk of war ; they hoped to be benefited by it some- 
how, but they knew not how. Guided by the opinions 
of the great slaveholding planters, they had become intol- 
erant supporters of the overshadowing institution. 

One portion of this group — the clergy — has still to 
The course of the render to the world an account of its con- 
duct. At the bar of civilization it has yet 
to explain or to defend its support of slavery. It took 
the responsibility of training the women of the South in 
the belief that that institution is authorized by Chris- 

(3.) Of the slave groups, the domestic slaves had gained 
The third class, do- a certain degree of intellectual culture from 
mestic slaves, ^^ Y closer association with the whites. 

When it is said that the proportion of mulattoes to the 
whole slave population had risen in 1860 to one eighth, 
the statement does not convey the whole truth. It was 
on the class of domestic slaves that the adulteration chief- 
ly fell. Persons who were extensively and familiarly ac- 
quainted with Southern society were disposed to believe 
that more than a majority of this group showed unmis- 
takable traces of white blood. The women of it, from 
their necessary connection with the household, were more 
exposed to their masters, and perhaps they were not less 
attractive from the fact that many of them possessed lin- 
eaments of a European cast, and had lost the repulsive 
features of the African. As a general thing, they were 
treated with kindness ; but, from the political knowledge 
they incidentally acquired ; from their comparative physi- 
ological elevation above the true black, aris- 

a dangerous class. . „ , , . . ./? *i • 

ing from the white constituent of their 
blood ; from the bitterness awakened in them against the 


whites through the trivial daily incidents of their lives, 
they constituted emphatically the dangerous class of the 

(4.) As for the field slave, every thing tended to em- 
The fourth class, fitter him. On him fell heavily all the 
hardships of the plantation — yet not on him 
alone, for the female field slaves shared all the toils of 
the men. It was the intention of the slave system to 
keep these people in animal-like ignorance ; it considered 
them in the light of machines, useful for the gains they 
could create. And yet, even under these most disad- 
vantageous conditions, human nature would often assert 
its power. There were many of this class who manifest- 
ed no uncertain tokens of a capacity for better things ; 
who endeavored, with what intelligence they had, to act 
faithfully in the station in which Providence had placed 
them, and w\ho found a consolation for the sorrows of the 
present life in the religious hope of a happier future be- 
yond the grave. 

Justice has not yet been done to the white women of 
the South for their conduct to the slave 

Conversion of the , . rr , 1 , , . - , . 

slaves to chris- population. lnroug;h their benevolent m- 

tiamty. x x ° 

fluence, and not through any ecclesiastical 
agency, was the Christianization of this African race ac- 
complished — a conversion which* was neither superficial 
nor nominal, but universal and complete. The paganism 
of the indigenous negro had absolutely disappeared from 
the land. Nor must it be supposed that this wonderful 
change was accomplished merely by the passive example 
of the virtues which adorn the white woman; she took 
an active interest in the eternal well-being of those who 
were thus cast upon her hands, administering consolation 
to the aged, the sick, and the dying, and imparting relig- 
ious instruction to the young. The annals of modern 
missionary exertion offer no parallel success. 


" Our clergy and our women are the real leaders of se- 
cession" — such was the declaration of Southern political 
writers, and such was unquestionably the truth. We can 
not fail to remark that there was hardly a war order is- 
sued by a Southern general which did not contain a ref- 
erence to, or derive inspiration from, the women. It 
will ever remain a psychological paradox that they who 
were, in a moral point of view, most outraged by slavery, 
should not have been its bitterest enemies ; that the 
Southern matron, recognizing the lineaments of her own 
children in the young slaves playing round her door, 
should not have regarded it with the most implacable 
jealousy and hatred. 

It was impossible to foresee what would be the rela- 
tions between these white and black races 

Doubtful position -, -, . ^ T t , 

of the slaves be- m the impending; war. Verv contradictory 

fore the war. .. *■ -.-,-, T -ihvt-it 

opinions were held. In the .North slavery 
was looked upon as a source of weakness to the Confed- 
eracy.; it was believed that an insurrection was inevita- 
ble. On the contrary, in the South the institution was 
considered as imparting great strength. The fidelity of 
the negroes to their masters in the wars of the Revolu- 
tion and of 1812 was often cited as indicating what 
would now take place. In this sanguine expectation, it 
was perhaps forgotten that a great mental change had, 
during the last thirty years, happened to the slaves. 
They had gathered hopes of freedom, and were univer- 
sally expecting that the North would be their deliverer. 
Their conduct during the war was above all praise. 
, .' It extorted the admiration of even their 

Their conduct dur- 
ing the war. masters. The plantations were left at their 

mercy; the women and children were almost without 

protection. And yet the slaves took no advantage of 

their opportunity; no passion was gratified, no wrong 

avenged. In regions at a distance from military move- 


ments, they continued peaceably their accustomed agri- 
cultural labors; in those near which the national armies 
passed, they merely escaped to freedom. But if, on the 
one hand, they nobly abstained from retaliation, on the 
other they exhibited fidelity to their friends. The na- 
tional officers, many of them reluctantly, but all in the 
end, frankly bore testimony to the invaluable services 
they rendered. The information they gave was uniform- 
ly found to be true — so true that great army movements 
sometimes depended on it. They never deceived and 
never betrayed the Yankee. 

Many very affecting narratives have been published of 
the escape of national prisoners of war from their Confed- 
erate guards. In all these it is the same story ; the fugi- 
tive is passed on from one negro cabin to another ; he is 
hidden by day and guided by night; he is fed, and 
clothed, and comforted. 

But, if thus the negro, by abstaining from riot, insur- 
rection, and the perpetration of private atrocities, in part 
repaid to the female society of the South in its hour of des- 
olation and distress, the deep obligation he was under for 
his conversion from a pagan to a Christian life, he showed 
that he could vindicate himself as a man when publicly 
called upon by the authority of his country, and clothed 
in the uniform of her soldiery. Then he met his former 
master in open warfare face to face, and on many a blood- 
stained field made good his title to freedom. 

- * 
By the blockade, and the armies gathered on the fron- 
tier, the slave power was shut out from the world. It 
was encircled with a wall of fire. 

Far from being the paradise predicted by the authors 
of secession, that inclosure was a scene of 

Actual condition of -. _ T .-., , , 

the south during tvrannv and woe. JNo one will ever lustly 

the war. J *> . . 

measure the desperate energy with which 


its inhabitants tried to burst through the investing line ; 
no one will ever fully know the agony they endured. 
As soon as military operations assumed a determinate 
, character, the Southern States stood in the 

It was a state of > 


attitude of a beleaguered fortress — the war 
was, in truth, a vast siege ; that fortress covered an area 
of more than 700,000 square miles ; the lines of invest- 
ment around it extended over more than 10,500 miles. 
Eight millions of people of European descent, their men 
second to none on earth in those virtues which insure 
military glory, and yielding only to their own women in 
fervid patriotism, were shut up with four millions of Af- 
rican slaves. It was a siege, but such a siege as had 
never been witnessed before. 

In two particulars the South had at the outset of 

the movement great advantage. Her lead- 
Advantages pos- in ,i • i , • 

sessed by its mi- ers were men who, irom their long connection 


with the United States government, had be- 
come familiar with the methods of administration. The 
president of the Confederacy, Davis, had for many years 
been the national Secretary of War. In this respect he 
stood in signal contrast to his antagonist, Lincoln; the 
one had a practical knowledge of all the requirements 
and all the details of military life, but the wordy warfare 
of country law-courts, the noisy disputations of contested 
elections, were the only preparation of the other. 

In a second particular the South had a great advant- 
age. She entered upon the conflict not only 

Advantages in its -, , , , n , 

manner of arm- armed, but armed at the cost oi her enemy. 

ing. ' • # . J 

The warlike munitions she obtained through 
the acts of Twiggs in Texas, and Floyd in Washington ; 
through the seizure of so many forts upon the coast, and 
of dock-yards, armories, and other places of depot, gave 
her all that at the outset she required. The value of 
these acquisitions was not to be measured merely by 


their money worth, though that was very great, amount- 
ing to many millions of dollars. Their opportuneness 
was of equal moment. The South, Minerva-like, sprang 
to the contest ready both in head and hand. 

To Europeans, by whom these great advantages were 
at first imperfectly understood, the South 

Rapid construction -, . . 

of their political presented a very imposing spectacle. Even 
to those who regarded h.6r movement with 
unfriendly eyes, the sudden completion of her political 
fabric appeared very surprising. In the Old World rev- 
olutionary movements have been commonly undertaken, 
not by those who have been all their lives habituated to 
public office, who are familiar with every state secret, who 
have had for years an opportunity of shaping the course 
of things to suit their own ends, who are in a position to 
seize a large part of the material means of the state, but 
by persons whose position is unfavorable, and whose 
means often inadequate. The organization of an efficient 
government by the Confederates loses much of its impos- 
ing appearance when it is remembered that Davis did no 
more than is done by any new President of the United 
States on his accession. Lincoln, in fact, had much more 
formidable difficulties to encounter. He had to make 
provision against treachery. 

I have already related the facts connected with the 
formation of the Confederate government at Montgomery 
(vol. i., p. 528, etc.), and in a subsequent chapter shall 
speak of its more important special acts. Of these, 
however, there is one which it is needful now to bring 
into prominence: it is the transference of 

Richmond made the -, , n < c ~\ if i > 

capital, to aiiure the the seat or £0 vemment irom Montgomery to 

Border States. ° . 

Richmond. It has been mentioned that, all 
things considered, this offers perhaps the most suitable 
point of division between the secession conspiracy and 
the establishment of an organized government. 


The Conspiracy had no intention originally of establish- 
ing its seat of government at Richmond. That was a part 
of the price exacted by Virginia for her secession, and it 
was not paid without reluctance. It is to be remember- 
ed that at that time every thing seemed to turn on what 
the Border States would do. Lincoln spared no exertion 
to induce them to retain their allegiance : it was that con- 
sideration alone that caused him to deal so reluctantly 
with the slave question. On the other hand, Davis, both 
by promises and by violence, sought to draw 

That measure was -. . -. .. -1 TT -, ^ , 

due to political ne- them over to his side. Had a Southern town, 

cessity. ' 

as Montgomery, been selected for a capital, 
measures like those which were actually carried into ef- 
fect for the defense of Richmond must have been resort- 
ed to. Virginia, the most powerful of the Southern States, 
must have been stripped of her troops for the defense of 
a distant point, as Florida and Arkansas w T ere, and there- 
by left an unresisting prey to the devastation of Northern 
armies; but by establishing the seat of government at 
Richmond, it became certain that the most powerful of 
the Southern armies would always be present in Virginia. 
If Virginia had been abandoned, all the Border States 
would have gone with the North. 

So far as the permanent interests of the Confederacy 

were concerned, the views of those who look- 

Richmond was not 

the seat of power to ed with disfavor on the selection of Rich- 

the Confederacy. t . 

mond were doubtless correct. But, in fact, 
in such movements as that of secession, the seat of power 
lies not in any territorial locality; it is in the army. 
Richmond might have been taken, as Nashville was, and 
that without producing any definite result. Had M'Clel- 
lan crowned his Peninsular campaign with its capture, it 
would have availed nothing so long as there were power- 
That was in the ftd armies still in the field. The overthrow 

of the Confederacy could be accomplished 


only, and, indeed, was accomplished only, by the destruc- 
tion or surrender of those armies. 

Very different was it with Washington ; that was rec- 
ognized all over the world as the long-estab- 

But Washington is,.,-, , n ,i a • i t i 

the seat of power of lisned seat oi the American government. Its 

the nation. ° 

fall would have been to the North an irrep- 
arable loss. There is now but little doubt that, had the 
Confederacy been able to seize it, European recognition 
would at once have followed. It was the clear percep- 
tion of this relative value that controlled Lincoln's move- 
ments in the Peninsular campaign: he perceived that 
Richmond was no equivalent for Washington. And, on 
the other hand, there never was a moment at which Davis 
would not have been glad that Richmond should have 
been wrested from him, if, at the same time, he could have 
secured Washington. 

It may, perhaps, not be inappropriate here to remark 

that the reasons w T hich originally led to the 

Coincidence of the , . pttt t • ii t, 

metropolis with the selection oi W asnington as the metropolitan 

centre of power. . . ° i -i • 

site have in the course of events lost their 
weight. So long as the republic consisted of the colonial 
settlements on the Atlantic border, Washington was cen- 
trally situated. But what might answer for a narrow 
coast border does not apply to a continent. Washington 
has been captured by a foreign army once, and has been 
in imminent peril of capture again and again during the 
Civil War. It has ceased to be the appropriate site for 
the metropolis of the great continental republic. During 
the recent strife its defense not only cost many thousands 
of lives and many millions of money : it also paralyzed 
some of the most important movements of the war. But 
as the old colonial states decline in relative political sig- 
nificance, and the weight of power settles in the West, it 
possible transfer- is not improbable that Western influence 

ence to the Mis- -. . ', »n i ,i • j l1 , j lj1 

sissippi valley, predominating will draw the capital into the 


Mississippi Valley, in absolute security from all foreign 
attack, and territorially central. 

The Confederates Laving determined on the transfer of 
their seat of government to Richmond, the 

Opening of the Con- . . -i i i t 

federate congress in necessary preparations were completed, and 

Richmond. . ■ V -T * . x . . 7 

their Congress opened its nrst session in that 
city on the 20th of July, 1861. 



The Confederate authorities concentrated troops at Manassas for the purpose of 

capturing Washington and Mexicanizing the republic. 
Lincoln was compelled, by their encroachments upon him, to invade Virginia, and 

to construct fortifications for the defense of Washington. 
He was constrained to use the three-months' men, obtained by the proclamation, 

to attack the Confederates on the line of Bull Run. 
The Battle of Bull Run. The South was dissatisfied that its great victory 

was not crowned by the capture of Washington. 
Political interpretation of the battle. 

When the news of the fall of Fort Sumter reached 
Montgomery, the Confederate Secretary of 
expecuoseSe e ' War, Mr. Walker, declared : "No man can 
foretell the events of the war now inaugu- 
rated ; but this I will venture to predict, that the Con- 
federate flag will, before the 1st of May, float over the 
dome of the Capitol at Washington." 

That minister had reasons for his prophecy. He knew 
and engage in plots that " a formidable organization had existed 
for that pmpose. aU the wmter m Baltimore, and in the coun- 
ties adjacent to Washington, having for its object the cap- 
ture of that city, the seizure of the government officers, 
and the inauguration of a provisional government in the 
interests of the South. The conspirators expected by this 
step to obtain control of the Army, Navy, and Treasury. 
Their forces were under the orders of two leading South- 
ern men — one from Texas, who was subsequently slain in 
battle ; the other from Virginia." 

In a speech delivered at Atlanta, Alexander H. Ste- 


phens declared that, " if Maryland secedes, the District of 
Columbia falls to her by reversionary right, as Sumter 
fell to South Carolina. When we have that right we 
will demand the surrender of Washington just as we did 
in other cases, and will enforce our demand at every haz- 
ard and at whatever cost." 

This desperate scheme, originally plotted in secrecy, 
was soon publicly hailed with transport. In all direc- 
tions the Southern newspapers urged that it should be 
instantly carried into effect. They declared that it was 
the unanimous resolution of the Southern 
raised for its cap- people, and that President Davis would soon 
march an army through North Carolina and 
Virginia to Washington. They recommended volunteers 
to hold themselves in readiness to join the expedition. 

Accordingly, as soon as Virginia had resolved to join 
the Confederacy, and had placed her military resources 
at its command, the most strenuous exertions were made 
to accomplish this great object. 

Troops from all parts of the South were hurried to 
Troops concentra- Manassas Junction, a point on the railroad 
between Washington and Richmond, where 
a branch comes in from the Shenandoah Valley. It was 
no especial prevision of military science which led to the 
selection of that position. It was no perception that the 
Confederacy must be first defended at its outworks, for, 
so far from supposing that it would be put into a state of 
siege, the universal belief was that the war on which "it 
was entering was to be an expedition of invasion, an of- 
fensive movement against the North. Manassas Junction 
was selected, not because it covered Richmond, but be- 
cause it threatened Washington. It is about thirty miles 
from the latter city. 

This important point secured, the next step would have 
been the occupation of Arlington Heights, which over- 


look Washington, and command it. , Could 

Batteries to be con- 
structed on i 
ton Heights. 

■ " » ■ i . { h this have been accomplished, and Lincoln ex- 

pelled before the fourth of July, the day on 
which Congress was summoned to meet, the nation would 
have been Mexicanized, and European recognition of the 
Confederate authorities as the de facto government of the 
United States, or recognition of the separation and inde- 
pendence of the Confederacy probably insured. 

If Washington was to be retained, or rather preserved 
— for the Confederate authorities had no intention of 
holding it as their permanent capital, which obviously 
must be in a more central position in the South — there 
was no time to be lost. Already their outposts were oc- 
cupying the heights, and their engineers selecting suita- 
ble positions for batteries. 

But if Southern soldiers had been pressing forward to 
Meanwhile national Manassas, Northern soldiers had been press- 
SSSgtowShffg^ iflg forward to Washington. As we have 
related, on the first note of alarm the militia 
of Pennsylvania, New York, and Massachusetts had quick- 
ly found their way to the capital. They were merely the 
advance-guard of a vast body making ready to concen- 
trate at the threatened point. Soon there was no danger 
that the republic would have to endure the ignominy of 
having its capital seized by the coup de main of an insig- 
nificant band of conspirators, headed by a desperado ; its 
capture could be accomplished now only by the rush of 
a large and formidable mass. 

At this moment the opinions of both contending par- 
,. „. ties was that the difference between them 

Expectation that 

oatueTutnSta would be quickly settled. They saw that 

wan there would inevitably be a battle, but no 

one had risen to the belief that there would be a war. 

It was universally supposed by each that the overthrow 

of its antagonist in the struggle at hand would be an end 


of the strife. No one as yet comprehended that that 
would be attained only after many years, by the absolute 
military exhaustion of whichever should prove to be the 

But, even at this early stage, one of the cardinal condi- 
mu , e e tions of the contest had become obvious. 

The defense of 

S«t be " The defense of Washington was instinctive- 
mount duty. ly TeQO ginzea. ^y ^ \ 0J8i i Atlantic States 

as their incumbent duty, just as the forcing open of the 
Mississippi became the battle-object of the Northwest. 
And this — the safety of the metropolis — was never lost 
sight of *in all the subsequent "changing fortunes of the 
war. All the great movements of the Army of the Poto- 
mac were predicated on an absolute recognition of that 

It was in accordance with these ideas of a sharp and 
tv, i:v a. '* conclusive strife that President Lincoln had, 

It was thought that 7 

moSSwou?dbe ree as we have seen, on April 15th, called forth 
enough. seventy-five thousand of the militia for a 

period of three months, unless sooner discharged. A force 
was thus speedily made available for the protection of 
the seat of government ; but not without the utmost re- 
luctance was any thing beyond that under- 

The government is -, -,- . , .,,. , , 

reluctant to invade taken. Lincoln was unwilling to be the 

the South, & 

first to cross what had now apparently be- 
come the boundary-line ; he did not wish to incur the re- 
sponsibility of invading Virginia. 

But, though he was thus circumspectly unwilling to 

press upon his antagonist, his antagonist 

but the Confeder- L . „ ■ * , , ° .,,. . ° 

ates very willing to manifested no such unwillingness to press 

invade the North. t ° * 

upon him. From his residence, the White 
House, Lincoln might see the Confederate flag flying on 
the other side of the Potomac: with his field-glass he 
might observe Confederate engineers busy selecting suit- 
able points for the establishment of batteries to expel 


him from the city. There was truth in what he so sol- 
emnly remarked subsequently: "I have not controlled 
events, but events have controlled me;" and accordingly 
now he found himself compelled to invade 
m seif-defense to m- Virginia. If he failed to do that, he must be 

vade Virginia. . ° . . . ' . 

driven lgnommiously from Washington. 
„ On the night of May 23d national troops were there- 
The national troops f° re thrown across the Potomac into Vir- 
otomac, gj n j a> They took possession of the city of 
Alexandria, on the Potomac, nine miles below Washing- 

Without delay, earthworks were constructed on Ar- 
and defenses for the Hngton Heights and in the vicinity, and the 
city thrown up. ca pital made safe from the Confederate 
troops threatening it at Manassas Junction. The com- 
mand of the forces thus thrown into Virginia was given 
McDowell assigned to General McDowell. General Scott, the 

to the command. i • i • r» j in i • n 

commancler-in-chiei, was too old and infirm 
to take the field himself, and, from the patriotic motive 
of setting an example of loyalty, was unwilling to resign 
his position to another. In this determination he was 
sustained by many political aspirants, who supposed that 
in case of his brilliant military success he would not stand 
in their way for the next presidency. 

In taking possession of Alexandria, an incident occur- 
The tragedy at ai- re d which at the time gave rise to a deep 

sensation. Such sad events, however, be- 
came common enough in the Border States before the 
summer was over. A Confederate flag had been seen 
from the President's residence in Washington flying over 
an inn, the Marshall House, kept by a person of the name 
of Jackson. This flag Colonel Ellsworth, of the New 
York Fire Zouave regiment, accompanied by three or 
four of his soldiers, removed, and, on coming down the 
stairs of the house, was shot by Jackson, who was him- 


self instantly killed by one of Ellsworth's companions. 
The colonel's body was carried to the President's house, 
where funeral services were performed, Mr. Lincoln him- 
self being one of the mourners. Throughout the South 
Jackson was regarded as a patriotic martyr who had lost 
his life in the defense of his fireside. 

Batteries were constructed by the Confederates on the 
Virginia bank of the Potomac below Alex- 

The Confederates 



i e the po- andria, and small affrays were continually 

occurring: between them and the national 
shipping on the river. Eventually these works proved 
to be not only a troublesome inconvenience, but also a 
public indignity. They kept the river approaches to 
Washington under blockade. 

The term for which the three-months' troops had en- 
gaged would end about the close of July. 
the three-months' A clamor had arisen in the North that some- 
thing should be done to obtain an advan- 
tage from the large army which, at so much expense, had 
been collected, before it should spontaneously dissolve. 
It was of course impossible to permit that to take place 
while the Confederates still remained intrenched and un- 
touched at Manassas. The passive resistance of the troops 
in Washington was not enough. Unless something more 
were done, the enemy had only to bide his time quietly in 
his camp, and when the national army had dispersed by 
the limitation of its own enlistments, to move forward 
and take possession of the coveted city. 

That the conflict would end in " three months or soon- 
er" was already discovered to be a delusion, 
the confederates Evidently the essential thing; to be done 

at Manassas. ^ tit • n 

could not be accomplished by an idle en- 
campment round Washington. A vigorous blow must be 
struck at the force which lay at Manassas. That force, 
II.— H 



[Sect. VII. 

gathered for the capture of Washington, must be dispersed 
"before Washington could be considered safe. In addition 
to this paramount consideration, there were others of se- 
rious weight which called for such active operations. The 
Confederate Congress was to assemble in Eichmond on 
the 20th of July. It was necessary to avoid the national 
discredit that must arise from' the undisturbed organiza- 
tion of an insurgent government in its newly-selected cap- 
The force under McDowell in front of Washington was 
about 45,000 men. It extended from Alex- 
strength of andria to the Chain Bridge. At Martins- 

McDowell's force. ° 

burg, toward the northwest, there were 
18,000 more, under the command of Patterson. 

On the other hand, the Confederates had a force of 
20,000, under the command of Beauregard, 

Disposition and -» «- ^. . -, . .-•. .-i 

strength of the con- near Manassas. Considering this as tne cen- 

federate force. . . ° _ , 

tre of their army, their right rested on tne 


Potomac below Alexandria, and held the batteries that 
were blockading the river. Their left, about 8000 strong, 


under Joseph E. Johnston, lay at Winchester, in the Shen- 
andoah Valley. 

Patterson and Johnston, therefore, confronted each oth- 
pawerson enjoined &• The former was strictly enjoined to hold 
to hold Johnston. tlie Confederates at Winchester, and prevent 

their joining Beauregard at Manassas. 

Orders were given on July 15th for McDowell to move 
McDowell ordered an( l attack the Confederate position at Ma- 
to attack Manassas. nassas j unc tion. He commenced carrying 

them into effect on the folio wing day. His marching 
force was about 30,000, nearly all of them being three- 
months' men. Among them were, however, 800 regulars. 
Fifteen thousand, Runyon's division, had been left for the 
defense of Washington, and the remainder, in four divi- 
sions, under Brigadier General Tyler, and Colonels Hunt- 
er, Heintzelman, and Miles, advanced. 

The forward movement from the Potomac was executed 

in four columns, converging; to Fairfax Court- 
order of his march, ' . i • -i • i 

house. On neanng that point, barricades 
were encountered, but they were either removed or passed 
round without difficulty. It had been expected that the 
Confederates would have made a stand here, but it was 
found that they had retired through Centreville to Bull 
Run, a stream flowing in front of their position at Ma- 
nassas Junction. 

Much difficulty had been experienced in obtaining a 
and its disorderly reliable map of the country in which opera : 
character. tions were now to be carried on, though it 

was so near to Washington. McDowell commenced his 
movement with very imperfect information in that re- 
spect. Neither the soldiers nor their officers knew any 
thing about marching ; the army was little better than a 
picturesque mob in gay uniform. Under a burning sun, 
for the weather was excessively hot, the men moved 
along through roads, in the woods, or by the zigzag fences 


of maize-fields, singing and joking as they went. They 
stopped to pick blackberries, stepped aside to avoid 
mud-puddles, and refilled their canteens at every stream. 
Many of the houses by the wayside had been deserted, 
except by negroes, who were here and there peeping at 
the window-corners or at the halfclosed doors. 

McDowell's first intention, on finding that his enemy 
had evacuated Centreville, was, under cover 

McDowell's first „ . -, - . ,-!•/>, 

plan of the bat- ot a vigorous demonstration on their front, 

tie. a 

to turn their right. A personal reconnois- 
sance, however, satisfied him that this was impracticable. 
The country was too densely wooded and too difficult. 
He therefore now changed his plan, and made prepara- 
tion for turning the Confederate left, so as to seize the 
railroad in their rear. 

But, while McDowell was exploring the Confederate 
right, Tyler, supposing that he might march 
attack, and is worst- without much difficulty directly on Manas- 
sas, moved down from Centreville into Bull 
Run Valley. He opened an artillery fire on the forest 
bank opposite, and deployed his infantry along the 
stream. When too late, he saw the twinkling of the en- 
emy's bayonets in the woods, and found himself exposed 
to their artillery and musketry. They were so concealed 
that he could only fire at the flash of their guns. He at- 
tempted to dislodge them by sending several regiments 
into the wood ; but, though he brought up Sherman with 
the third brigade, he was compelled to fall back, having 
suffered in this imprudent affair a loss of nearly one 
hundred. The Confederate loss was about seventy. This 
check was an admonition to the military politicians who 
were swarming into the army that the harvest of glory 
they were expecting would not be easily reaped. By 
parading their doings in the newspapers, they had hoped 
to create election and office capital. 


McDowell now made ready to carry into effect his at- 
McDoweirs second tempt to turn the Confederate left, and had 
plan of the battle. ^ e necessar y reconnoissance made on Fri- 
day, the 19th. Bull Kun, opposite Centreville, and equi- 


distant about three miles between the headquarters of 
the national and Confederate armies, flows from the north- 
west to the southeast. A road descending from Centre- 
ville crosses it at Blackburn's Ford : there is a lower one. 
to Union Mills Ford, and an upper one, the Warrenton 
Turnpike, which, at four miles from Centreville, passes 
the stream over a stone bridge. These three points — the 
stone bridge, Blackburn's and Union Mills Fords, were 
the Confederate left, centre, and right, respectively. Be- 

The topography of s ^ es these, two miles above the Confederate 
Bun Run. i e ff. ^} iere was a f orc [ near S U( ll e y' s Spring, 

but only a path through the woods leading to it from 


Centreville. Between the Sudley's Spring Ford and the 
stone bridge was Red Hill Ford, and again, between 
Blackburn's and Union Mills, M'Lean's Ford. To reach 
the stone bridge or the ford near Sudley's Spring, a 
branch of Bull Bun, called Cub Run, must be crossed. 

McDowell hoped to make his attack on the 20th. As 
he had been disappointed in reaching Centreville, the in- 
experience of his officers and men making him lose a day, 
McDoweirs attack so n °w he was again disappointed through 
is delayed, a f a ji ure m receiving his supplies. The 4th 

Pennsylvania and Variants battery of the New York 8th 
insisted on leaving him, their term having expired. He 
says in his report that, " on the next morning, when the 
army went forward into battle, these troops moved to the 
rear to the sound of the enemy's cannon. In the next 
and Ms troops be- " few days, day by day, I shall have lost ten 

gin to leave him. ttougand Q f ^ begt armed? drilled, bfficer- 

ed, and disciplined troops in the army." He had, how- 
ever, now 28,000 men and 49 guns. 

At this moment the Confederates had six brigades 
Distribution of the posted along Bull Run, through a distance 

Confederate force. rf e j ght ^^ ^ ^ foUowillg Qrder . £g 

Ewell's, at Union Mills Ford ; (2.) Jones's, at M'Lean's 
Ford ; (3.) Longstreet's, at Blackburn's ; (4.) Bonham's, 
at Mitchell's; (5.) Cocke's, at Ball's Ford; (6.) Evans's, 
at the stone bridge. The brigades of Early and Holmes 
were in reserve in the rear of the right, and those of Jack- 
son and Bee on the left. Their total strength was about 
22,000 ; it was less, therefore, than McDowell's, but they 
had the great advantage of a thorough knowledge of the 

Though Patterson had received the most positive or- 
ders not to permit Johnston to escape from 

Johnston deceives -, . -, p . n -. , -, r^,, r^ n ~i 1 

Patterson and joins him, he tailed to do so. I he Confederate 

Beauregard. 7 -iii i a i 1 i n 

general marched through Ashby s Gap to 


Piedmont, and, there taking the railroad to Manassas, 
joined Beauregard on the 20th with about 6000 men. 

McDowell's intention was to turn the Confederate left 
by crossing Bull Run with his right at Sudley's Spring 
Ford, and thereby drive them from the stone bridge, 
press them from the Warrenton Turnpike, and seize Ma- 
nassas Gap Railroad in their rear. He supposed that he 
McDoweirs orders should thus intervene between Beauregard 
and Johnston, not knowing that a junction 
had already taken place between them through Patter- 
son's fault. 

To carry this out, he directed Tyler to move to the 
stone bridge, threaten it in front, and, at the proper time, 
cross it. He was to move down the Warrenton Turnpike, 
while Hunter and Heintzelman, following him for a cer- 
tain distance, were to make a detour to the north, cross- 
ing Bull Run near Sudley's Spring, and thus come down 
on the flank and rear of the Confederates posted at the 
stone bridge. Miles, who was to remain in reserve at 
Centreville, was to aid in the operation by sending a 
brigade to make a demonstration at Blackburn's Ford. 

The movement was to commence at half past two 

The troops begin o'clock on Sunday morning, July 21st, the 

expectation being that Tyler would reach 

his point when day broke, at about four o'clock, and that 

Hunter and Heintzelman would come into action at about 


But simultaneously the Confederate generals had also 
resolved to make an attack without delay on McDowell, 
before Patterson had time to re-enforce him. They sup- 
posed that such a junction would take place as soon as 
it was discovered that Johnston had reached Manassas. 
The confederates They intended to cross Bull Run on the 

lose the initiative. ^^ Qf ^ ^^ McDowe l 1? however, 

moved first, and, as will be seen, threw them on the de- 


That night there was hardly a breath of air in the 
The night of Buii vale of Bull Run. The misty, yellowish 
haze, which so often pervades the summer 
nocturnal atmosphere for many thousand miles, deprived 
the sky of its purity, and rendered gray or invisible the 
western mountains, which by daytime, from the heights 
of Centre ville, seem of a purple tint. At intervals a 
cloud passed across the moon, casting on the forests of 
Manassas a slowly-moving shadow. It needed but little 
imagination to give life to the dusky phantom. Over 
those woods the arch-fiend Slavery, poised on his sail- 
broad vans, was glaring on the Genius of Freedom, and 
making ready for a death-clutch with her on the morrow. 
Tyler delayed his movement long after the appoint- 
• , . ed hour, and thus prevented Hunter and 

Delays in the march. TT . 1 it, * -n -i • 

, -tiemtzelnian, who had to follow him some 
distance down the road, from commencing their march. 
On leaving the turnpike their course lay through an un- 
frequented country path, made undistinguishable by the 
moonshine and twilight shadows of the trees. Heintzel- 
man was to follow Hunter for a couple of miles, and then, 
turning to the left, was to cross the Run below him. The 
head of the column led the rustling way through the 
dark green woods on either hand, dipping down into the 
gloomy hollows of the road, and not without some confu- 
sion ascending the slopes of the hills. Hunter's soldiers 
lingered for a while on reaching the Sudley's Spring Ford, 
some filling their canteens, and some bathing their feet in 
the stream. 

It was half past six instead of four when Tyler reached 

Turning of the con- ^ ne stone bridge and fired his signal gun. 
federate left. jj. wag near iy ^ en instead of six when Hunt- 

er had moved through his semicircular detour, and was 
coming down toward the Warrenton Turnpike. After 
crossing Sudley's Ford, he had turned directly down the 


west side of the Run, and marched albout a mile through 
the woods; he was then ready to pass into the rolling 
and open fields, which would bring him to the rear of the 
bridge. The tardiness of the movement had so exhaust- 
ed McDowell's patience, that, though very ill, he mounted 
his horse, rode through the troops, and showed them the 
way to their battle-field. 

Colonel Evans, who, with only a regiment and a half, 
commencement of was holding the stone bridge for the Con- 
the front attack, f e a erat es, believed at first that Tyler's at- 
tack on his front was the real one ; but, perceiving that 
a large force was passing through the woods on his left 
and toward his rear, he discovered what was about to 
take place, and changed his front, so as to become paral- 
lel to the Warrenton Eoad, making ready to receive the 
enemy as soon as he should emerge. At about ten, Burn- 
side's brigade, of Hunter's division, had gained the open 
fields. Porter's came out on his right, and Griffin's bat- 
tery was quickly got into position. 

As soon as Burnside emerged from the woods the con- 
commencement of ffict began. Evans, unexpectedly pressed by 

the main battle. r\ ,• i ■ in' i i ' 11 /* 

the national troops, was compelled to call for 
re-enforcements. Accordingly, Bee, who was next in what 
had now become his rear, descended the hill-side toward 
the turnpike. With him came six guns of Imboden and 
Richardson. It was necessary for Burnside to be re-en- 
forced at once, and Sykes's regulars were sent to him from 
Porter on the right. At this time Hunter was wounded, 
and Burnside had to take command in his stead. In the 
sharp contest that ensued, every thing proved favorable 
for the national army. 

By midday McDowell had completely carried out the 
The confederates first P ar t of his plan. He had turned his 

antagonist's left; he had pressed him from 
the Warrenton Turnpike ; he had uncovered the stone 


bridge. Sherman's brigade, of Tyler's division, had crossed 
the river at a ford just above the stone bridge. On the 
other wing, Porter was corning down the Sudley Road. 
The Southern troops were flying in the utmost disorder 
up the slope in their rear. They had been resisting Sher- 
man on their right, Burnside and Sykes at their centre, 
and Porter on their left, and these were all now conver- 
ging upon them. 

The left wing of the Confederates had thus been turned 
ciose of the first an d routed. This constitutes the first phase 

phase of the battle. Q f t h e battle. 

During the early morning Johnston and Beauregard 
The confederate had been occupied in preparing the attack 
geuerais aroused. ^ e y we re intending to make on the nation- 
al army, which they supposed was still encamped at Cen- 
treville. At «&bout half past ten they had, however, 
discovered McDowell's movement. It therefore became 
necessary for them at once to abandon their intention. 
The heavy sound of guns informed them too clearly that 
their antagonist had seized the initiative, and that there 
was serious work on their left. Their line, which had 
been parallel to Bull Run from Union Mills Ford to the 
stone bridge, must be broken, to send re-enforcements to 
the endangered point. The issue was, that it was event- 
ually brought round nearly to a right angle, and stood 
concentrated and parallel to the Warrenton Turnpike. 
Bull Run, a little below the stone bridge, receives a 

They make a stand creek— Young's Creek— coming from the 
on the plateau. ^^ It wftg down ^ northern slope of the 

valley in which this creek flows that the national troops 
had descended ; it was up the opposite, or southern slope, 
that the Confederates had been driven. Between these 
slopes Young's Creek runs in a curve concave to the south, 
and on that side the slope, furrowed by ravines, and rising 
for a hundred feet or thereabouts, leads to a flat space or 


plateau. This plateau is of an oblong form, a mile in 
length from northeast to southwest, and about half a mile 
in width. On its eastern and southern brow is a w r ood of 
pines ; on its west the Sudley Road runs through a broad 
belt of oaks. There were three houses upon it, the most 
northerly being that of Robinson ; the most southerly 
that of Lewis ; and intermediate, and somewhat to the 
west, that of Henry. 

And now occurred McDowell's fatal mistake. Thus 

McDoweirs mis- f ar ^ s Sl ^ ccess had been complete ; it only 
take- remained for him to carry out the rest of 

his plan. In the opinion of a very great soldier, who was 
present, had he, instead of pursuing his flying enemy to 
the hill forest, in which they had taken refuge, simply 
moved beyond the range of their rifles to Manassas Depot, 
the' victory would have been his. A stream of Confed- 
erate fugitives, momentarily increasing in number, and 
terrified that their flight would be. intercepted, was al- 
ready setting to that point. 

But Destiny would have it otherwise. Instead of strik- 
ing at Manassas Depot, McDowell pursued 

Stonewall Jackson , . n . . . . . -, -, ttti 

stops the flight of his nvins: antagonists up the slope. When 

the Confederates, «'. ^. n . ■, 

the broken Confederates gained the plateau, 
they there found General T. J. Jackson, who had just ar- 
rived; he had been posted behind Bee, with five regi- 
ments, and thus constituted a reserve. " They are beat- 
ing us back," exclaimed Bee. " Well, sir," replied Jack- 
son, " we will give them the bayonet." Bee rallied his 
men with " There's Jackson standing like a stone wall." 
a Stonewall Jackson !" shouted the soldiers. And from 
that moment the name he had thus received in a baptism 
of fire displaced that which had been given him in the 
baptism of water. Under that name he was ever after 
known, not only by his affectionate comrades, but by all 
who hold a brave soldier in honor. 


The air had now become excessively hot under the 
midsummer and midday sun ; clouds of red 

who thereupon n L n ,1 t t i 

stand fast on the dust rose irom the slope as pursued and 
pursuers rushed, up it; a fog of cannon 
smoke was already surging off the edge of the plateau. 
As the assailants attempted to make good their ground 
over the crest, they were received with a bitter but inter- 
mitting fire ; at one moment the musketry lulled off to a 
pattering, and then rose to reverberating volleys again. 
It was nearly twelve o'clock when Johnston and Beau- 
regard reached the plateau. They found 
strength on the upon it a force of" about 7000 men, with 
thirteen guns. It was sheltered in the thick- 
et of pines. The battle was apparently lost. Johnston 
rallied the shattered regiments on the right, Beauregard 
those on the left. It was none too soon that they hast- 
ened up the brigades of Holmes, Early, Bonham, Ewell, 
and the batteries of Pendleton and Albertis. 

The second phase of the battle — the contest for the 
plateau — was now reached. Beauregard 

Opening of the sec- 1 T • j_i r» i n ttti 

ond phase of the took command in the field, and Johnston 

battle. . _ . \ 

stationed himself at the Lewis House, from 
which there was a good view. By the time the contest 
was renewed, they had upon the plateau about 10,000 
men and twenty-two guns. By degrees the lower fords 
were stripped, Miles' s demonstrations there being discov- 
ered to be a mere ruse, and every man w T ho could be 
made available was hurried to the focus of the fight. 
At this phase of the battle — preparatory to the attempt 

to carry the plateau — on the national side, 

McDowell attempts -^ . ptt j i t • • ,i • i • 

to carry the posi- Jrorter, ot Hunter s division, was on the rismt. 

tion. \ . ' ° . 

Franklin and Wilcox, of Heintzelman's, in 
the centre ; with them were Griffin's, Ricketts's, and Ar- 
nold's batteries, and Sherman and Keyes, of Tyler's divis- 
ion, on the left. Howard's brigade, which had been de- 


tached from Heintzelman in the morning, was upon the 
Run. Burnside had been withdrawn, his ammunition be- 
ing exhausted. Schenck was ready to cross at the bridge. 
For the attack on the plateau there were 13,000 men 
and sixteen guns. They met with a fierce 

A desperate conflict . . n . n . . -, 7 

on the right, round resistance m forcing their way up the slope, 

the batteries. 

but their right gained a footing on its west- 
ern edge, Ricketts's and Griffin's batteries being in their 
front. There was a rise of ground southeast of the Henry 
House, which, if it could be seized, would enable them to 
enfilade the Confederate batteries : it was the key of the 
position. Five regiments, with Ricketts's and Griffin's 
batteries, attempted to carry it ; but Ellsworth's Zouaves, 
who were supporting the batteries, mistaking an Ala- 
bama regiment for a national one, were broken by the 
fire* they received, and ridden through by some cavalry. 
Their disorganization was so instant and complete that, 
though they continued to fight as individuals, they ap- 
peared no more as a regiment. 

Other regiments were now ordered up to rescue the 
batteries, the horses of which had been killed; but, though 
thrice re-enforced, they were thrice compelled to retire. 
The battle now raged with alternate success. 

While this was occurring on the right, McDowell's left 

Attack by the na- was a -^ so attempting to carry the plateau. 

tionai left. jj. encountered a very severe fire — so severe 

that the loss in Sherman's brigade was nearly one fourth 
of that of the whole army. 

Keyes, who was on the extreme left, had forced his 
way up the slope and reached the Robinson House, but 
so furious was the resistance that he was compelled to 
fall back. He moved round the brow of the plateau un- 
til he reached its eastern edge, unsuccessfully endeavor- 
ing to regain his foothold upon it. 

The crisis of the battle had come. It was determined 


through Patterson's fault in permitting: the 

The crisis of the bat- . 

tie. junction of escape of the Confederates from his front in 

Johnston's troops. x . __. . . . 

Upper Virginia. Ricketts's and Griffin's bat- 
teries had been taken and retaken ; the national troops 
had been swept from the plateau and had recovered their 
ground. The Confederates had brought all their troops 
within reach from the fords of Bull Run ; the roar of 
the cannon was incessant. At that moment there rushed 
across the fields from Manassas 1700 fresh troops. They 
were Elzey's brigade, led by Kirby Smith, the last of the 
re-enforcements that had eluded Patterson in the valley. 
Hearing the noise of the battle, they had stopped the 
cars at the point nearest to the sound. In the supreme 
moment, they struck the national right full on its flank. 
Their cross-fire, added to the fire in front, was irresistible. 
A cry went through the national ranks, " Here's Johnston 
Ront of the national from the Valley !" Instantaneously McDow- 
army * ell was driven from the plateau and head- 

long down the slope. It was not a repulse, but a rout. 

In vain McDowell tried to cover the retreat with his 
800 regulars. Howard's brigade, and whatever was in 
the way of the fugitives, was swept off in their rush. The 
men threw away their arms and encumbrances as they 
fled toward Bull Run ; but it was not until they con- 
verged to the bridge at Cub Run that the flight became 
a panic. A shell had burst among the teamsters' wagons, 
a caisson had been overturned, and the -passage was stop- 
ped. Horses were cut from their traces ; artillery was left 
might of the panic- to be captured ; soldiers, civilians, camp fol- 

strfcken soldiers. lows j^^^ not Qn l y t Q Centrevffle, but 

beyond it to Washington, where they spread the most ex- 
aggerated reports of their disaster. 

And now the great error that General Scott had com- 

scott's great mis- mitted was discovered when it was too late. 

He had a force at his disposal of nearly 


eighty thousand men : he had divided it into three parts, 
and thrown one of them unsustained on the enemy. 

Davis had left Richmond in the morning as soon as the 

telegraph informed him that the battle had begun. He 

reached Manassas Junction about four o'clock, with 

gloomy forebodings, for he encountered the Confederate 

fugitives from the national advance. He 

Davis's telegram of , -■ . , , • p, » , i , i it 

victory to Rich- rode direct to the front, and telegraphed 

mond. . y-i 

that night to the Confederate Congress : 

"Manassas Junction, Sunday night. 

"Night has closed upon a hard-fought field. Our forces were 
victorious. The enemy was routed, and fled precipitately, abandon- 
ing a large amount of arms, ammunition, knapsacks, and baggage. 
The ground was strewed for miles with those killed, and the farm- 
houses around were filled with wounded. 

" Pursuit was continued along several routes toward Leesburg 
and Centreville until darkness covered the fugitives. We have 
captured several field batteries, stands of arms, and Union and State 
flags. Too high praise can not be bestowed, whether for the skill 
of the principal officers or for the gallantry of all our troops. The 
battle was mainly fought on our left. Our force was 15,000 ; that 
of the enemy estimated at 35,000. 

" Jeffekson Davis." 

In this dispatch, Davis's estimate of the strength of his 
antagonist may possibly be excused, but not so his pur- 
posed falsification of his own force. He knew very well 
that it was nearly the double of what he affirmed. This 
its evii effect on his deception speedily brought disaster. The 
Southern soldiery was confirmed in its su- 
preme contempt for its antagonist. The troops left the 
army in crowds and returned to their homes, justly infer- 
ring that an inconsiderable force against such a cowardly 
enemy was all that would be needful to establish the 

The Confederate loss in this battle was 378 killed, 
The battle losse, 1489 wounded. The national loss was 481 
killed, 1011 wounded, and 14G0 prisoners. 


Surprise and indignation were soon expressed in the 
J, f . , . . . South that the Confederate General John- 

Dissatisfaction in 

Washington was s ^on made no energetic pursuit, and failed 
to enter Washington with the fugitives. He, 
however, himself subsequently (1867) published his rea- 
sons, which are substantially as follows : The pursuit was 
not continued because the Confederate cavalry, a very 
small force, was driven hack by the solid resistance of the 
United States infantry. Its rear-guard was an entire di- 
vision, which had not been engaged, and was twelve or 
fifteen times more numerous than our two little bodies of 
cavalry. Expectations and hopes of the capture of Wash- 
ington were not expressed by military men who under- 
johnston'sjustifica- stood the state of affairs. A pursuit would 

tion of his conduct, j^ beeR fr^gg . we CQuld j^j haye ^ 

ried the intrenchments before Washington by assault, 
and had none of the means to besiege them. Our assault 
would have been repulsed, and the enemy, then the vic- 
torious party, would have resumed their march to Rich- 
mond. And if even we had captured the intrenchments, 
a river a mile wide lay between them and Washington, 
commanded by the heavy" guns of a Federal fleet. We 
could not have brought 20,000 men to the banks of the 
Potomac. Our troops believed that their victory had es- 
tablished the independence of the South — that the war 
was ended, and their military obligations fulfilled. They 
therefore left the army in crowds to return to their homes. 
The exultation of victory cost us more than our antago- 
nists lost by defeat. The Federal troops south of the Po- 
tomac were not a rabble. Mansfield's, Miles's, and Run- 
y on's divisions, a larger force than we could have brought 
against them, had neither been beaten nor engaged ; and 
the reports of the commanders of the brigades engaged 
show that they entered the intrenchments organized, ex- 
cept those who fled individually from the field. These 


latter undoubtedly gave an exaggerated idea of the rout 
to the people of Washington, as those from our ranks met 
by President Davis, before he reached Manassas, on his 
way to the field, convinced him that our army had been 
defeated. The failure of the subsequent invasions con- 
ducted by Lee proves that the Confederacy was too weak 
for offensive war. 

It remains now to ascertain the political interpretation 

political interpret of the battle of Bull. Bun. In a military 
uon of the battle. senS6j it was a great victory for the Confed- 
eracy — a humiliation for the nation. 

But military movements are for the purpose of accom- 
plishing political results. They receive their general, 
their true interpretation when the degree to which they 
have 'advanced their political intention is ascertained. 

Feeling instinctively this truth, the Southern people 
were very far from being satisfied with their splendid 
victory. In the opinion of many of them, and, among 
others, of very high officials, Johnston, who commanded so 
brilliantly, had . actually passed under a cloud. They 
were not satisfied with what had been done. 

Here it is necessary for us to ask two questions : (1.) 

The object sought What WaS the ° b J eCt Wnicn Lad ^OUght 

by each party. ^ Confederates to Manassas ? (2.) What 
was the intention of the national government in hurling 
its three-months' militiamen on the line of Bull Bun be- 
fore their term expired ? 

(1.) The seizure of Washington was at this period the 
great political object of the Confederate authorities. For 
that alone their army lay at Manassas, and had its out- 
posts almost within sight of the Capitol. But the vic- 
tory of Bull Bun did not secure that result, and in this 
— the political, the true sense — the Confederate campaign 
was a failure. 
II.— I 


(2.) The object of the national government in its of- 
fensive movement was so to use its three- 

The political ad- , , .-.. . , * ., . - , . «,-, . 

vantage to the months militia before the expiration of their 

North. „ , n 

term as to paralyze the enemy s force at 
Manassas, and relieve Washington of all danger from 
them. Events showed that, though its army suffered de- 
feat on the field of Bull Run, the political intention was 
secured. A blow so staggering was dealt at the Con- 
federate force, that, as its commanding general declares, 
it was found to be wholly unable to undertake any thing 
serious against the city. 

If, then, the South had reason to be vain of her vic- 
tory, the more grave and reflective North 

The military tri- • -i . i ; i ; i in i 

tunph was to the lnigiit also congratulate herself on a sub- 

S0Uth. • 1 "¥71 

stantial result. Fortune, who, as the Ro- 
mans used to say, directs all the affairs of men, divided 
in this instance her favors, giving to one the military, to 
the other the political advantage. 

From this time the Mexicanization of the republic 
ceased to be possible. The Civil War presented another 





From the beginning of the war the South was forced to take the defensive. 

The chief offensive operations on the part of the National Government at this time 
were^of three kinds : 

1st. A blockade of the Southern sea and land frontier; the recapture of the sea- 
coast forts ; and the restoration of the authority of the republic in New Orleans. 

2d. Expeditions in the rear of the Mississippi for the opening of that river ; v break- 
ing the Memphis and Charleston Railroad; and having in view the strategic 
point Chattanooga. 

3d. Operations in contemplation of the capture of Richmond, and the destruction of 
the army defending it. 

From the history of the Conspiracy which culminated 
The second phase i n the Southern victory at Bull Run, we 
have now to turn to the details of the sec- 
ond phase of the war. 

To the tumultuary rush of brave but inexperienced 
levies the deliberate movement of powerful armies suc- 
ceeds. I have now to describe how great military and 
naval forces were brought into existence, and the manner 
in which they were used. 

In this section there are five points presented for con- 
sideration : (1.) The form assumed by the war; (2.) The 
legislative measures of the Confederate Congress; (3.) 
Those of the national Congress ; (4.) The creation of the 
national army ; (5.) The creation of the national navy. 
To each of these I shall devote a chapter. 


" Let us alone !" 

That was the passionate cry of the people of the South 
The demand of the — ^ ne insincere demand of their authorities. 
It had become clear that Washington could 
neither be seized by a band of conspirators, nor captured 
by an army such as could then be brought into the field. 
After her overthrow at Bull Eun the republic was stun- 
ned for a moment, but it was only for a moment. Any 
observer of what she forthwith prepared to do might be 
satisfied that it was no longer a battle, but a w T ar that 
was at hand. 

While the Confederate troops were commencing their 
The protestations of movement toward Manassas, the President 
of the Confederacy, in a message to his Con- 
gress, declared : "We feel that our cause is just and holy. 
We protest solemnly, in the face of mankind, that we de- 
sire peace at any sacrifice save that of honor. In inde- 
pendence w r e seek no conquest, no aggrandizement, no ces- 
sion of any kind from the states with which we have late- 
ly confederated. All we ask is to be let alone." 

But Davis and his co-laborers for many months past — 
Report of the com- as was declared by the national Congres- 

mittee of Congress ^^j Committee on fl^ Conduct of the 

War — "had been* actively and openly making prepara- 
tions to defy the jurisdiction of the government, and re- 
sist its authority. They had usurped the control of the 
machinery of one state government after another, and had 
overawed the loyal people of those states. They had even 
so far control of the national government itself as to make 
it not only acquiesce for the time being in measures for 
its own destruction, but to contribute to that end. They 
had seized its arms and munitions of war. They had 
that the south is not scattered and demoralized its army. They 
^offending, -^d sent its navy to the most distant parts 

of the world. They had put treason in the executive 


mansion, treason in the cabinet, treason in the Senate and 
House of Representatives, treason in the army and navy, 
treason in every department, bureau, and office. They 
had taken possession, almost without resistance, of every 
fort and harbor on their sea-coast, Fort Pickens at Pen- 
sacola, and the isolated fortifications and 

but has done what -, •. ^ m , -, T7 - -r Tr . -, . 

it could to provoke harbors ot lortugas and Key West, being 
the only exceptions. They were masters of 
the territory of the revolted states, much of which had 
been purchased with the national money, and for part of 
which the nation still remained in debt — a debt which 
they rejected. Depots, arsenals, fortifications had been 
seized by them. A speedy march upon the capital, a 
speedy overthrow of the legal government, a speedy sub- 
mission of a people too pusillanimous to maintain its 
rights, and. a speedy subjection of the whole country to 
their assumptions, were their expectations." 

Such was the accusation brought against them in the 
and had even com- Congress of the nation. It denied that they 
menced it. were an oppressed, a much-enduring, an in- 

nocent people. It declared that they had themselves in- 
itiated war, and had made resistance not only necessary, 
but unavoidable. Government does not mean influence — 
it means force ; a government which has neither the reso- 
lution nor the power to prevent itself being assassinated 
has no right to live. 

So thought the free North. She foresaw that the par- 
The North is com- tition of the republic meant the end of all 
peiied to resist. representative government on this conti- 
nent. It meant a cordon of custom-houses on the bound- 
ary-line, and, more than that, vast standing armies. If 
friends could not make laws without their bein£ nullified, 
could aliens make treaties without their beinc: broken? 
The history of the republic had demonstrated that the 
slave power, in the necessities of its existence, was essen- 


tially aggressive ; to invigorate it would not 

The slave power es- -, . . n ,1 , v? o 11? 

sentiaiiy aggress- deprive it oi that quality, belt -preserva- 
tion compelled the North to resist. She saw 
that every thing she prized was at stake. Peace based 
upon partition was, in the very nature of things, illusory. 
In the former and happier days of the Union, nothing 
had given rise to more bitterness of feeling than the es- 
cape and non-restoration of fugitive slaves. Across the 
separating line of the two nations would they cease to 
flee ? and was it to be supposed that they would ever be 
returned? But if not — what then? Very clearly the 
condition of the slave power in America was this — it 
must either dominate all over the continent or die. 
But in the clamor, "Let us alone," there was something 
deeply connected with the topic which has 

The South, from the . -, » -, -i • , i • i , ,i /> 

beginning, on the to be considered m this chapter — the form 

defensive. - tit t i 

oi the war. It needed but little penetration 
to perceive that the South had already intuitively discov- 
ered her inevitable position in the coming contest. What- 
ever her wishes, her passions might "be, in the momentous 
conflict she had provoked she was compelled to take the 

It is the autumn after Bull Kun. Let us scale, in any 

view of the interior P lace tliat we may, the rampart of the Bor- 
of the confederacy. ^ QY gf^tes, and peer into the recesses of the 

Confederacy beyond. Confederacy of states ! is that what 
we see ? Are there governors, and Senates, and Houses 
of Representatives enacting' and executing independent 
laws ? Mo ! but sitting in Richmond there is one man 
who is holding the telegraphs and railroads. Along the 
former he is sending forth his mandates which no one 

a despotism is ai- ma y disobey ; along the latter he is drawing 
ready inaugurated. f rom pl aces near or distant their reluctant 

men and bounteous means. The aristocracy that lords it 

Chap.XLL] interior of the confederacy. 135 

over those white cotton lands, those fields of tobacco and 
maize, has engendered its natural, its inevitable product. 
It is no political confederacy that we look upon — it is a 

Along the sea-coast, on every fort a flag is flying — 
not those of the various sovereign states. It is the flag 
of a central power, every where the same. Men are con- 
structing fortifications in all directions — some in the in- 
terior, some on the line of the Mississippi, some along the 
sea. Cannon, the spoils of Norfolk Navy Yard, are being 
dragged to these works. In every town, and court-house, 
and hamlet, men are drilling ; their uniform clothing in 
gray answers to the uniform flag. The pursuits of peace 
are turned over to slaves. The factories that are busy 
are armories, machine-shops, founderies for shot and shell, 
gunpowder laboratories. White tents that are dotting it 
all over tell us that this is not the agricultural country 
it used to be. It is a vast military camp. 

A despotism and a military camp ! No matter under 
what name things may be passing, that is the reality to 
which they have come ! 

To the eye of the national military critic, looking from 

Mmtarytopography tlie Nortll > the country it is now proposed 
of the confederacy. ^. assa i] presents three distinctly marked 

regions, to which he gives the designations of the right, 
the central, the left, respectively. They are not bounded 
by merely imaginary lines, but parted by grand geograph- 
ical objects. The right region is all that portion of the 
insurgent territory west of the Mississippi River ; the 
its three regions, or central region is the country lying between 
zones - the Mississippi and the Alleghany Mount- 

ains ; the left is that lying between those mountains and 
the Atlantic Ocean. The great natural lines of separa- 
tion thus dividing the Confederacy are the Mississippi 
River and the Alleghany Mountains. 


These three military regions are not of equal impor- 
tance. The right, or trans-Mississippi, is nec- 

Their relative value. ' . . . \ \ 

essanly weaker, since it is separated trom the 
others by a broad and difficult river, across which com- 
munication- may be interrupted : it is intrinsically of lit- 
tle military value, sparsely peopled, unhealthy, its resour- 
ces comparatively little developed, its roads and lines of 
transportation imperfect. On the other hand, in the left 

The left zone the region, or that included between the Alle- 
most important. ghany Mounta i ns and the Atlantic Ocean, 

are many great cities, among them the capital of the 
Confederacy. This region has a dense population, many 
lines of locomotion, and abundant facilities for transporta- 
tion. Virginia, which is its most northerly portion, stands 
like a vast bastion to the Confederacy, its flanked angle 
projecting toward the Free States. The upheaval of the 
Alleghanies in former ages (vol. i., p. 68) has given her 
a system of longitudinal valleys running to the north- 
Miiitarytopo°raphy eas ^ : Ber mountain ranges consist of majes- 

of Virginia. = ^ foUs q£ ^ ^j^ -^ ^^ ^^ ^ 

pressions between them. Here and there transversal and 
secondary valleys cross through the mountain lines — gaps, 
in the country language. Screened from observation, 
through the main valleys as through sally-ports the 
forces of the Confederacy may securely move. 

Such was the general aspect of the South. Her capaci- 
ty for war lay in the staple products she had on hand 
and those that her slaves might be found willing to raise. 
Her financial strength, which was the meas- 

The financial capac- n -, . ■• . -, -, 

ity of the cotton ure ot her war-strength, turned on the pos- 

States for war. . , -. . 

sibility of converting those products into 
gold. None but desperate gamesters would undertake 
to conduct vast military movements by an unlimited is- 
sue of paper based upon nothing ; but the rattle of dice 


was already audible in the council chamber at Richmond. 
There were, however, many able and patriotic men in the 
seceding states, who, accepting as an accomplished fact 
the calamity into which their country had been plunged, 
and willing to make the best of it, unceasingly urged 
upon the Confederate government the seizure of the cot- 
ton and its rapid shipment to Europe. As 

Mistake in not send- . -, . -> . ,i n -% -, 

ing the cotton to Eu- is commonly the case in the uproar of rebel- 
lions and revolutions, the voice of wisdom 
was not heard. 

And now arose before the national government the 
question how it should reduce this insurgent population 
— a population brave enough and numerous enough to 
accomplish its intention, if only it were rich enough. But 
this population had never clothed itself, never fed itself. 
» It depended on foreign sources. If such had 

The South must de- ■, ■, . . -, . . . . n 

pend on foreign sup- alwavs been its condition in a state of peace, 

plies. / . . X 

much more must it be so now m a state 
of war : rifles, cannon, munitions of every kind must be 
brought from abroad. Three million bales of cotton 
might, perhaps, be raised by the slave force : this would 
go far to meet these wants if it had an unobstructed 
transit across the sea. 

Such considerations, therefore, settled the question as 
to what, for the national government, was the proper form 
of war. A closure of the Southern ports or their block- 
ade was the correct antagonism. In the ur- 

A blockade of her n , , -. , -, -, . 

ports determined gency ot the moment a blockade was adopt- 
ed. Perhaps it had been better (p. 29) had 
a simple closure been preferred. Practically, however, so 
far as the government and its oj)ponent were concerned, 
the same force must be resorted to in either case. 

Thus the character or aspect which the war must needs 
conditions of a assume was quickly manifested. The issue 

complete blockade, ^fo^y turne J Qn ftjg . IIad ^ govern- 


ment sufficient physical power to enforce and maintain 
such a "beleaguering ? Could it make the Atlantic an im- 
penetrable sea? 

But more — it must arrest ingress and egress along the 
north front of the Border States, and along the west front 
of the trans-Mississippi regions. To accomplish all this, it 
must call into existence powerful navies and vast armies. 

It must shut up hermetically an area of 733,144 square 
The vast extent of miles ; it must guard by .armies an interior 
country shut up. ib 011I1 (j ar ne 7031 miles in length, and by 

ships a coast-line of 3523 miles, a shore-line of 25,414 
miles — that is, actually more than the entire circumfer- 
ence of the earth (24,895 miles). 

What — viewed as a military operation — was all this ? 
Was it not a vast siege, throwing into nothingness all pre- 
vious sieges in the world's history ? 

We may, then, excuse the incredulity with which for- 
eign nations regarded the attempt of the re- 
Apparent impossi- -iti ii • i j • n i 

biiity of such an public to carry out her intention of reducing 

investment. x -i» i mt* n • 

to obedience twelve millions of people in- 
trenched in what seemed to be impregnable works, Es- 
pecially may we do this when we recall the fact that the 
initial military force by which it was to be accomplished 
was an army of 16,000 men, and a navy of 42 ships. 

But it was not merely a passive encircling of the 
character of the ag- Confederacy which was needed ; there must 
gressive operations. a ] so i^ offensive and aggressive movements. 

Hence it was necessary to determine what were the 

proper points of the application of force, and which the 

correct lines of its direction. 

At this time the military topography of the country 
preliminary mis- was little known, and many mistakes were 
takes committed. ma d e in dealing with this problem. It was 

long before those generals who had true professional 

Chap.xli.] the necessary military operations. 139 

views on the subject could secure their adoption, and ac- 
complish a separation of crude political intentions from 
scientific military movements. In the inexperience of the 
times, instead of one grand and overwhelming plan of op- 
erations, a dozen little ones were resorted to. Wherever 
there was political influence there was a political clamor, 
and to that point a military force must be sent. In the 
beginning of 1862, the period we have now more partic- 
ularly under consideration, " there were not less than ten 
different national armies, and as many different lines of 
operation, all acting more or less concentrically on the 
theatre of war. Not one was so strong but that the Con- 
federates might have concentrated a stronger against it." 
The ablest military critics were loudly declaiming against 
such a violation of the rules of their art. 

In deciding on warlike operations, two things must be 
considered : 1st. The political object proposed to be at- 
tained. 2d. The military movements necessary for its ac- 
complishment. Not unfrequently these seem to involve 

The opening of the Mississippi was the political object 
Theponticai objects of the West ; the capture of Eichmond that 
proposed. f ^ e East ; but, in a military sense, neither 

of these could in itself be decisive, and, so far as they 
might be made the ultimate object- of the warlike opera- 
tions, they could be considered only as mistakes. 

At first it was supposed that the opening of the Mis- 
sissippi must be accomplished by operations 

First ideas as to the • , • • • it n 

mode of opening on its waters, an opinion much strengthened 

the Mississippi. / x . " 

by the brilliant success of Farragut in the 
capture of New Orleans ; but that great officer himself 
was destined to furnish a proof of the inadequacy of this 
method. In the attack he made on Vicksbur^, though 
many hundred shot and shell were thrown into the place, 
no impression whatever was made uj)on it ; not a single 


gun was dismounted ; only seven men w T ere killed, and fif- 
teen- wounded. # • 

Once more let us reconnoitre the recesses of the Con- 
view of th, notary fed eracy, examining not its political, but its 
condition. military condition. What do we see ? 

There is one long line of railroad reaching from Mem- 

The great west-east P nis > on the Mississippi, to Charleston, on 
line - the Atlantic. It is the only complete east 

and west bond connecting the Confederacy through its 
breadth. What if this vital line w^ere snapped % It would 
be the severing of the Confederacy. The Atlantic por- 
tion would be parted from the Mississippi portion. The 
unity of the Confederacy hangs on a very slender thread. 
The Richmond government plainly discerns how much 
is depending on this line. Slender though 

Means prepared by 
the Confedera 
for its defense 

it may be, it is indispensably necessary to 

them.* For its protection, for the avoid- 
ance of the catastrophe which must follow . its rupture, 
they have established parallel to it, and one hundred 
and fifty miles to the north of it, a military line consist- 
ing of fortresses, armies, an intrenched camp. That mil- 
itary line extends from Columbus, on the Mississippi, 
through Forts Henry and Donelson, to Bowling Green. 

The work of an assailant is, therefore, manifestly to 
burst through the military line, and break the railroad 
line beyond. 

But, furthermore, there is a navigable river, the Ten- 
nessee, flowing; perpendicularly through the 

Availability of the n . n ,-. •.. -• . n i • 

Tennessee for hrst ol these lines, and running parallel to 

breakiugit. ; ° A 

the second. I hat is the invader s true path. 
Plainly along it, and not down the impregnably fortified 
and impassable Mississippi, blows fatal to the Confed- 
eracy may be delivered. The Mississippi itself is not the 
true line of attack. Even if it w T ere seized, the great rail- 

Chap. XLL] 



& TS 1* "§ 

M. "^ X 1 0, 


road is not necessarily touched. Moreover, it is a mili- 
tary consequence that the strong fortresses on the Missis- 
sippi must be surrendered on the passage of an army in 
their rear. 

Two great events will therefore necessarily follow the 
passage of an arnry strong enough to main- 

The two results fol- f . ° if i ri I'm rni 

lowing that opera- tarn ltselt along the lennessee. Ihey are: 

tion. , *f d 

1st. The bisection of the Confederacy, its 
eastern and western portions being severed. 2d. The 
gratification of the popular demand that the Mississippi 
should be opened. 


With the railroad untouched, the Confederate govern- 
ment can rapidly mass its troops on the Atlantic or on 
the Mississippi region, and hurl them at pleasure, right or 
left, on its antagonist. With the railroad broken, such 
movements become very difficult, perhaps even imprac- 

If the eye follows the line of this road from Memphis, 
Military importance orL the Mississippi, eastwardly, it is seen to 
of Chattanooga. (j^y^e w hen it reaches the great strategical 

position Chattanooga: its upper branch runs northeast- 
wardly to the capital of the Confederacy, Richmond ; its 
lower branch runs southeastwardly to the important 
cities Savannah and Charleston. Chattanooga and its im- 
mediate environs present, therefore,, a vital military point. 

To General Halleck must be given the credit of the 
correct solution of solution of the Mississippi problem. He 
operSn g b o e ftiie m?s- showed that the correct movement was a 
sisslppl - march on the line of the Tennessee. The 

truth of this principle was strikingly exemplified by the 
event. The victories on that river opened the Mississippi 
from Cairo to Memphis, and, in the opinion of a very great 
military authority, had Halleck's army at that time pos- 
sessed the tenacity of Sherman's in 1864, he could have 
completed the opening by continuing his march south 
from Corinth to Mobile. 

Such were the views taken by the national generals 
opposing efforts of wno successfully solved the problem of the 
the confederates. military destruction of the Confederacy. On 

the other hand, their antagonists, thrown from the begin- 
ning on the defensive, recognized with equal precision the 
correctness of these principles. When one military line 
was broken through, they attempted to establish a sec- 
ond in a parallel direction. " When the Memphis and 
Charleston Railroad was effectually severed, they made 
haste to construct a parallel one by completing the more 


southerly line from Meridian to Selma, This likewise 
was, in its turn, destroyed. 

Considered thus, so far as military topography is con- 
cerned, it was plain that decisive operations 

General course of . ,-. , -1 •,! 

the correct military must commence in the central region with a 


view to the destruction of the east and west 
line of communication, and securing possession of the 
strategic point Chattanopga. The opening of the Missis- 
sippi followed as a corollary upon their successful issue. 
The great result, however, would be the partition of the 

Whatever armed force the Confederacy might have in 
the Atlantic region would now be placed between two 
antagonists, one threatening it from the north of Eich- 
mond, the other through the portal of Chattanooga. 

The whole male population of the Confederacy being 
in the armies, there could be no resistance except where 
those armies were. The decisive result could alone be 
reached by their destruction. 

In the Atlantic region of the Confederacy, to the cor- 
rect military eye, the proper objective was 

The proper object- , c ^ \ x 1 ■ TT . ? . ^. , 

ive of the Atlantic thererore the great army of Virginia. Kich- 

region ° *> ° 

mond and Charleston were in themselves 
nothing. The Confederacy could afford to lose one, or 
both, or a dozen such, and would not be weakened there- 
by. And that these views were correct the event showed. 
Charleston fell by the inarch of Sherman, who never took 
the trouble to go to it ; and Richmond fell by the oj)em- 
tions of Grant, who disdained to enter it. 

The military object to be aimed at was, therefore, not 

the political object proposed. It w r as not 

is the extermination tl .. n • , . .. i,,i 

of the vii-inia the occupation ot a city or territory, but the 

army. • 1 • n 1 • 

extermination 01 the opposing army. 
Battles conducted by generals of not unequal skill, and 


ending without a signal catastrophe, usually exhibit losses 
not far from equal on the opposing sides. In armies of 
equal strength, and operating in a similar region, the waste 
of life in the hospitals may also be considered as equal. 

A general who is acting upon these principles, and is 
Effect of incessant aiming, not at the seizure of territory, but a.t 
the life of the antagonist army, will foresee 
an inevitable issue to his campaign. If he can bring into 
play during the whole operation two hundred thousand 
men, and his antagonist only one hundred and fifty thou- 
sand, he will certainly secure his result when, by this 
process of attrition, each side has lost one hundred and 
twenty-five thousand. 

Now the available military force of the South was 
never numerically equal to that of the North, and the 
disparity became still greater when the slaves were armed 
by the North. Military errors or catastrophes were there- 
fore of far more serious moment to the insurgents than 
to the government. There was danger *that exhaustion 
would ensue. It actually did at last occur. , 

Doubtless there is something very dreadful in a meth- 
od which looks with indifference on the issue of battles, 
whether there has been a victory or a defeat, but inquires 
with earnestness how many of the enemy have been de- 
stroyed, and discerns with a frigid, a Machiavelian sat- 
isfaction the mathematically inevitable superiority of 
the greater mass after equal attrition of both conflict- 
ing bodies. 

The duration of resistance of the weaker party in this 
process of attrition or extermination will necessarily turn 
on the magnitude of the political object at stake, and the 
facility or possibility of effecting an ostensible compro- 
mise. But it is politically impossible that an aggressive 
Aristocracy and an aggressive Democracy should coexist 
in the same nation after they have once been in open con- 


flict. And that was the real character of the contending 
antagonists of this Civil War. Moreover, though the 
South, at the beginning, derived most important advan- 
tages in accomplishing the unifying of her entire popula- 
tion by putting forth the preservation of Slavery as the 
Reaction of the grand object of the war, it led eventually to 

Slavery war-cry. fl ^j ^^ rpj^ gl ^ became ftt 1^ not 

fictitiously, but in reality, the stake played for. The South 
could not lose him without absolute ruin. It was the loss 
of her labor-force, without which her lands were worth 

Persons who thus considered the subject perceived that 
the war would be no affair of ninety days, but that it 
would go on until the weaker party was utterly exhaust- 
ed and the great stake won. 

By those skillful officers who brought the war to a 
close, these principles were clearly recog- 

Application*of these -. -, .-> . . 

principles by Grant mzed, as may be seen from the strategy 

and Sherman. ' " 0,/ 

they adopted. They looked upon all oper- 
ations in the right region as without effect ; they consid- 
ered it as incorrect to have many converging lines of op- 
eration ; they perceived the true function of the central 
region, and the inevitable effect of a powerful movement 
through it. They did not fill a second time into the 
blunder of making the main operation in the left region 
a combined one of the army and navy, as was done> in the 
Peninsular campaign. Coast operations and expeditions 
they regarded in the light of mere indecisive adventures. 
They raised no cry for the capture of Richmond; they 
did not even deign to enter it in triumph when it was 
spontaneously falling, but pursued the fugitive remnant 
of the ruined army with inexorable energy, applying the 
military principle that had been inaugurated in the Wil- 
derness, until Appomattox Court-house was reached. 
IL— K 


Viewed in the manner thus presented, the various op- 
erations of the war stand in their proper 

The events of the ... n i t p • , , 

war interpreted position, and are capable of easy mterpreta- 

on these ideas. x . ' #» t* it f» i 

tion. I he battle of Bull Run, as we have 
seen, was nearlywithout military significance ; politically, 
it meant the failure of that portion of the plan of the Con- 
spiracy which had reference to the capture of Washing- 
ton. Nor is there any importance to be attached to the 
affairs of Big Bethel, Ball's Bluff, Drainesville. They were 
merely personal encounters. 

In fact, true warlike operations can not be said to have 

begun until the issue of Lincoln's order di- 

True epoch of the . T n . -, . t^ i 

commencement of rectmg the movements of the armies on h eb- 

the war. ° . 

ruary 22d, 1862. The issue of that order 
followed the appointment of Stanton as Secretary of War, 
and was due to his suggestions. 

7 Though the completion of the organization of the Army 
The changes in its °^ ^ ne Potomac by General McClellan marks 
conduct. the close of the preparatory period and the 

commencement of military movements properly speaking, 
these movements still continued to be of a mixed kind — 
not purely military, but influenced also by political con- 
siderations. There may be discerned on the part of the 
government an intention to give to certain officers the op- 
portunity of acquiring military reputation. But this can 
not be regarded as altogether blameworthy. A govern- 
ment influenced by profound convictions that the princi- 
ples on which it is acting are those most certain to insure 
the welfare of the nation is entitled to bring into fitting 
prominence men who will carry those principles into 

The quality of the armies themselves by degrees under- 
went an observable change. It is a great 

any reachecf by step from McDowell's army of Bull Run to 

the armies. x . , . . .,, 

McClellan's of the Peninsula, but it is a still 


greater to Grant's army of the final Virginia campaign. 
The cohesion, mobility, and co-ordination of all its parts, 
which makes an army like a beautiful machine, is only 
slowly attained. " Not until after Vicksburg did the 
armies begin to assume the form and consistency of real 
armies ; not until after that can their generals be held to 
a closer criticism." Halleck's campaign, ending in the 
breaking of the Memphis and Charleston Kailroad, is the 
transition to the great campaigns of Grant and Sherman, 
which were conducted with purely military intentions, 
and on purely military principles. 

The possibility of putting the Confederacy in a state 
of siege demonstrated, in the most unmis- 

Predominating , -. -, , , . . 

power of the takable manner, the predominating power 
of the North ; but that predominance w T as 
not to be measured by the relative population of the two 
sections. It was commonly said that the population of 
the insurgent states was twelve millions; that of the 
loyal states eighteen ; but the disparity between them 
was vastly greater than is indicated by those numbers. 
The machine power of the South bore no appreciable pro- 
portion to the machine powder of the North; and more par- 
ticularly was this true of marine machinery; but it was 
upon that form that the capability of maintaining an ef- 
fective blockade depended. 

The South was thus thrown upon the defensive from 
sorties of the the beginning of the struggle, and very soon 
south. effectually beleaguered. Her four great mil- 

itary movements, culminating at Antietam, Murfreesbo.r- 
ough, Gettysburg, and Nashville, present the aspect of 

There was another fact which manifestly and seriously 

Eventual influence diminished the intrinsic power of the South. 
of the slave force. Qf ^ e es tirnated twelve millions of her pop- 
ulation, one third was negro slaves. As long as her an- 


tagonist, from political motives, refrained from touching 
this element, it added a delusive strength to the Confed- 
eracy. The slave prepared food and forage in the fields 
while the master and his sons were in the army. It 
was, however, impossible that such a condition of things 
should continue long. Legitimately as a measure of war, 
the government- might detach that dangerous class from 
the side of the South — a measure which, under the cir- 
cumstances, could not fail to be decisive of the strife. 




The important measures of the Confederate Congresses were transacted in secret 

At the meeting specially summoned by Davis for the 29th of April, 1861, he gave 

an exposition of the causes which had led to secession. 
The provisional Congress ended its sessions on the 15th of February, 1862, and was 

succeeded by the permanent Congress. The chief public acts of each related. 
The government of the Confederacy became so despotic in its conduct, and secret 

in its proceedings, as to give rise to great dissatisfaction. 

The public acts of the Confederate Congress present a 
very imperfect view of the measures adopted by the Con- 
federate government. 

Before hostilities commenced, it was found expedient 
that all- the more important of those meas- 

The important ses- -, -, -, , -, . -r\ • 

sions of congress ures should be matured m secrecv. During: 

secret. m * *-> 

the war the necessity of this course became 
more and more urgent. A standing resolution required 
that all war business should be transacted in secret ses- 
sion, and by degrees this included every thing of general 
interest. Attempts were repeatedly made by different 
members of Congress to bring about a change ; but they 
were unavailing. The war operations controlled all oth- 
er movements ; they were determined, perhaps too often, 

by the Confederate President himself. The 

The President con- , -i • , n ,i n n i • i . 

trois aii military secret history ot the Confederacy is not to 

operations. ° , ", 

be looked for in the secret sessions of its 
Congress — not even in the councils of the cabinet. On 
the President rests the responsibility of what was done. 


In vain all over the South a cry was raised against this 
secret despotism. ' Even thoughtful men were constrained 
to submit because they saw it was unavoidable. 

In the Confederate Congress, after the inauguration of 
various congres- a provisional President (February 18th, 

sional acts. ^^ fl reso l ution wag ff ere( } touching the 

expediency of laying a duty on exported cotton, there be- 
ing a very general opinion that such a course would aid 
very much in compelling the powers of Europe to ac- 
knowledge the independence of the Confederacy. It was 
one of the delusions of the South that the great military 
monarchies of Europe could be coerced by trade consid- 
erations. Her politicians, who had so often succeeded in 
carrying their point in domestic legislation by the exer- 
cise of pressure, persuaded themselves that similar princi- 
ples might with impunity be resorted to in foreign affairs. 
When financial provision was made for the war by au- 
thorizing the borrowing of fifteen millions of dollars, an 
export duty was at length laid on cotton, but it was with 
the intention of creating a fund to liquidate the principal 
and interest. 

An act was passed in reference to the navigation of the 
Mississippi, declaring it free, and one defining the punish- 
ment of persons engaged in the African slave-trade. The 
postal system was organized, and the privilege of frank- 
ing abolished, except so far as concerned the business of 
the post-office itself. Breadstuffs, provisions, munitions 
of war, and merchandise imported from the United States 
before the 14th of March, were admitted duty free. 

With a view of exerting a salutary pressure upon 
Northern creditors, a bill was reported to the effect that, 
so long as the United States refused to acknowledge the 
independence of the Confederate States, no court of the 
latter should have cognizance of civil cases in which citi- 
zens of the former were concerned. To conciliate the lit- 


Authority conceded erary influence of Europe, the President was 
to the president. authorized to negotiate international copy- 
right treaties. Four days before the inauguration of Lin 
coin, the provisional Congress authorized Davis to as 
sume control of the military operations in every Confed 
erate state. Subsequently (March 6th) he was author 
ized to accept the services of one hundred thousand vol 
unteers for twelve months. Anticipating but little diffi 
culty in obtaining European recognition, commissioners 
were appointed to various foreign governments. On the 
11th of March the permanent Constitution was adopted, 
and the Congress adjourned. 

When it became obvious that the administration of 
Extra session of Lincoln was about to take a more resolute 
congress action than that of Buchanan, Davis sum- 

moned (April 12th) the Congress to meet on the 29th 
of April. In the interval between its summons and its 
session Lincoln had called for 75,000 militia (April 15th), 
and had announced the blockade of the Southern ports 
(April 19th). 

The message sent by Davis to the Congress on this oc- 
The message of the casion is perhaps the ablest of his state 
papers. He began by congratulating that 
body on the ratification of the permanent Constitution by 
Conventions of the states concerned, and expressed his 
belief that at no distant day the other Slave States would 
join the Confederacy. 

It was not, however, for the purpose of making this an- 
nouncement that he had summoned the mem- 

He affirms that the n , iit i'i t» • "i i /• 

united states have bers together, but because the 1 resident ot 

declared war, ^ 7 

the United states had made a declaration 
of war against the Confederacy, and thereby had render- 
ed it necessary to devise measures for the defense of the 
country. That mankind might pass an impartial judg- 
ment on the motives and objects of the Confederates, he 


briefly reviewed the relations between the contending 

He stated that, during the war between the colonies 
and England, the former entered into a con- 

and describes the /♦ -i ' , • • , i t ,i /» , -i • 

origin of state sov- iederation with each other tor their common 
defense ; and, that there might be no mis- 
construction of their compact, they, in a distinct article, 
made an explicit declaration that each state retained its 
sovereignty, and every power and right not expressly del- 
egated to the United States by this contract. 

He added that in the treaty of peace in 1783, the sev- 
eral states w^ere by name recognized to be independent. 

He then drew attention strongly to the marked caution 
with which the states endeavored, in every possible man- 
ner, to exclude the idea that the separate and independ- 
ent sovereignty of each was, merged in one common gov- 
ernment or nation. The states, when invited to ratify 
the Constitution, refused to be satisfied until amendments 
were added to it placing beyond doubt their reservation 
of their sovereign rights not expressly delegated to the 
United States in that instrument. 

In spite of all this care, a political school had arisen in 

The centralizing "the North claiming that the government is 
ideas of the North. aboye ^ ^^ exalting ^ e creature above 

its creator, and making the principals subordinate to the 
agent appointed by themselves. 

The people of the Southern States, devoted to agricul- 
ture, early perceived a tendency in the Northern States 
to render a common government subservient to their pur- 
poses by imposing burdens on commerce as protection to 
their manufacturing and shipping interests. Controver- 
sies grew out of those attempts to benefit one section at 
the expense of the other, and the dangers of disruption 
were enhanced by the fact that the population of the 
North was increasing more rapidly than that of the 


South. By degrees, as the Northern States gained pre- 
ponderance in Congress, self-interest taught their people 
to assert their right as a majority to govern 
ernmenfbymSor- the minority. President Lincoln had de- 

itics - - * 

clared, at length, that the theory of the Con- 
stitution requires that in all cases the majority shall gov- 
ern. He likens the relations between states and the 
United States to those between a county and the state in 
which it is situated. On this lamentable error rests the 
policy which has culminated in his declaration of war 
against the Confederate States. 

Mr. Davis pointed out that, in addition to the deep- 
The obnoxious char- seated resentment felt by the South at the 
acter of tan ff laws, ejivickblg f the North through the tariff 

laws, there was another subject of discord, involving in- 
terests of su&h transcendent magnitude as to create an 
apprehension that the permanence of the Union was im- 

He then gave a brief history of American negro slav- 
The story of Amer- er y> affirming that originally ' it existed in 
icauslavery ' twelve out of fifteen of the states; the right 

of property in slaves was protected by law, recognized in 
the Constitution, and provision made against loss by the 
escape of the slave ; that, to secure a due slave supply, 
Congress was forbidden to prohibit the African slave- 
trade before a certain date, and no power was given to it 
to legislate disadvantageously against that species of 

The climate of the Northern States being unpropi- 
Anti-siavery con- tious to slave labor, they sold their slaves 

duct of the North. ^ ^ gout ^ ^ ^^ prohil)ite<1 s l aver y jft 

theif own limits. ■ The South purchased this property 
willingly, not suspecting that quiet possession of it was 
to be disturbed by those who not only were in want of 
constitutional authority, but prevented by good faith as 


vendors from disquieting a title emanating from them- 

This done, as soon as the Northern States had gained 
a control in Congress, they commenced an organized sys- 
tem of hostile measures against the institution. They de- 
vised plans fox making slave property insecure ; they sup- 
plied fanatical organizations with money to excite the 
slaves to discontent and revolt ; they enticed them to ab- 
scond ; they neutralized and denounced the fugitive slave 
law ; they mobbed and murdered slave-owners in pursuit 
of their fugitive slaves ; they passed laws punishing by 
fine and imprisonment Southern citizens seeking the re- 
covery of their property ; they sent senators and repre- 
sentatives to Congress whose chief title to that distinc- 
tion was their ultra-fanaticism, and whose business was 
to awaken the bitterest hatred against the South by vio- 
lent denunciations of its institutions. 

A great party was then organized for obtaining the 
organization of the administration of the government, its object 
Anu-siavery party. k e i n g ^ exc i U( i e the Slave States from the 

public domain, to surround them by states in which slav- 
ery should be prohibited, and thereby annihilate slave 
property worth thousands of millions of dollars. This 
party succeeded, in November last, in the election of its 
candidate for the presidency of the United States. 

Mr. Davis then proceeded to show that, on the other 
hand, under the genial climate of the South- 

Development of on, i • , , i n ,i ' 

slavery in the em states, and owing; to the care tor their 
well-being, which had been dictated alike by 
interest and humanity, the slaves had augmented from 
six hundred thousand at the adoption of the Constitution 
to upward of four millions ; that, by careful religious in- 
struction, they had been elevated from brutal savages into 
docile, intelligent, civilized laborers, whose toil had been 
directed to the conversion of a vast wilderness into culti- 


vated lands covered with a prosperous people. During 
the same period the white slaveholding population had 
increased from one million and a quarter to more than 
eight millions and a half; and tho productions of the 
South, to which slave labor was and is indispensable, 
formed three fourths of the exports of the whole United 
States, and had become absolutely necessary to the wants 
of civilized man. 

With interests of such overwhelming magnitude im- 
perii arising to the periled, the South had been driven to protect 
slave institution, itge j £ Conventions had been held to deter- 

mine how best it might meet such an alarming crisis in 
.its history. 

Ever since 1798 there had existed a party, almost un- 
interruptedly in the maiority* based upon 

The Slave States ,, -i ,i , t , , • . ,i i , 

determine to se- the creed that each state is m the last re- 
cede. , 

sort the sole judge, as well of its wrongs as 
of the mode and measures of redress. The Democratic 
party of the United States had again and again affirmed 
its adhesion to those principles. In the exercise of that 
right, the people of the Confederate States, in their Con- 
ventions, determined that it was necessary for them to re- 
voke their delegation of powers to the federal govern- 
ment. They therefore passed ordinances resuming their 
sovereign rights, and dissolving their connection with the 
Union. They then entered into a new compact, by new 
articles of confederation with each other, and organized a 
new government, complete in all its parts. 

Mr. Davis continued — that one of his first desires and 
acts had been to endeavor to obtain a just 
peaceable com- and equitable settlement between the Con- 
federacy and the United States, and that he 
had therefore selected three distinguished citizens, who 
repaired to Washington. He affirmed that the crooked 
paths of diplomacy can scarcely furnish an example so 


wanting in courtesy, in candor, and directness as was the 
it is perfidiously c °urse of the United States government 
repeiied. toward these commissioners. While they 

were assured, through an intermediary of high position, 
of the peaceful intentions of that government, it was in 
secrecy preparing an expedition for hostile operations 
against South Carolina; that at length they were in- 
formed that the President of the United States had de- 
termined to hold no interview with them whatever — to 
refuse even to listen to any proposals they had to make. 
Mr. Davis then related the circumstances under which 
south Carolina cap- F°rt Sumter had been reduced, describing in 

tares Fort Sumter, ^jj ^ treadierous manceuvre f which 

he declared the United States government had "been 
guilty. , He paid a tribute of respect to that noble state 
—South Carolina — the eininent soldierly qualities of 
whose people had been conspicuously displayed. He 
showed how that, for months, they had refrained from 
capturing the fortress, and how they had evinced a chiv- 
alrous regard for the brave but unfortunate officer who 
had been compelled by them to lower his flag. 

Scarcely had the President of the United States learned 

and war is declared °f the failure of his schemes in relation to 
agamst them. p or £ g um ^ erj wnen he issued a declaration 

of war against the Confederacy. This it was which had 
prompted Mr. Davis to convoke the Congress. Not with- 
out a sentiment of contempt he proceeded to analyze that 
" extraordinary production," that " singular document," se- 
lecting from it such expressions as were likely to wound 
the pride of the South, and particularly drawing atten- 
tion to the fact that Lincoln had called " for an army of 
75,000 men, whose first service was to capture our forts;" 
that, though this was a usurpation of a power exclusive- 
ly granted to the Congress of that country by its Consti- 
tution, it was not for the executive of the Confederacy 


The south obii-ed ^° °L ues ti on that point, but to prepare for de- 
to defend itself f e nse. He therefore liad called on the Con- 
federated States for volunteers, and had issued a procla- 
mation inviting applications for letters of marque and re- 
prisal ; and though the authority of Congress was neces- 
sary to these measures, he entertained no doubt that that 
body would concur in his opinion of their advantage. 

Referring to the proclamation of the President of the 
its ports are block- United States announcing the blockade of 
aded ' the Southern ports, he almost doubted its 

authenticity, and-inferred that, if it had been issued at all, 
it could only have been under the sudden influence of 
passion. He denounced it as a mere paper blockade, so 
manifestly a violation of the law of nations that it would 
seem incredible that it could have been issued by author- 
ity. Its threat to punish as pirates all persons who should 
molest a vessel of the United States under letters of 
marque issued by the Confederate government, he be- 
lieved, would not be sanctioned by the people of the Uni- 
ted States. 

He then informed the Congress that commissioners had 
it seeks foreign rec- been sent to various European governments 
asking for recognition. He offered congrat- 
ulations on the fact that Virginia had at length joined 
the Confederacy. He could not doubt that " ere you shall 
have been many weeks in session, the slaveholding states 
of the late Union will respond to the call of honor and 
affection, and, by uniting their fortunes with ours, promote 
our common interests, and secure our common safety." ~ 

Directing attention then to the reports of the Secretary 
of War and of the Navy, and congratulating the Confed- 
eracy on the patriotic devotion of its people, assuring 
them of the smiles of Providence on their efforts, Mr. 
Davis concludes with these remarks : 

" All we ask is to be let alone — that those who never 


anddesirestobeiet ne ld power over us shall not no w attempt 
our subjugation by arms. This we will — 
we must resist to the direst extremity. The moment that 
this pretension is abandoned, the sword will drop from 
our grasp, and we shall be ready to enter into treaties of 
amity and commerce that can not but be mutually bene- 
ficial. So long as this pretension is maintained, with a 
firm reliance on that Divine Power which covers with its 
protection the just cause, we will continue to struggle for 
our inherent right to freedom, independence, and self-gov- 

Such is the purport of this long and very able state 
Davis's shorter ex- paper. Davis, however, on a subsequent oc- 
position. casion, and with much more brevity, forcibly 

declared, in a dozen words, the motives of the Confeder- 
ates : " We left the Union simply to get rid of the rule 
of majorities." 

It has been mentioned (vol i., p. 533) that, in his inau- 
gural address, Davis made no allusion to 

He is obliged to deal , 7 . -ii-i; •• , n i n 

with the slave ques- slavery, hoping by that omission to nnd fa- 
vor in the eyes of Europe ; and, in truth, he 
succeeded in that. But the Southern people, who had 
been taught by their clergy to regard the institution of 
slavery as " just and holy," thought that such silence im- 
plied shame. They looked upon his precaution as need- 
less, and were far from being satisfied with his course. 
On this occasion he therefore brought the slave question 
into its proper and prominent position. 

But the commissioners, or other diplomatic agents who 
were sent to Europe, were careful not to provoke the 
religious or political disfavor of the governments from 
whom they sought recognition. Thus Messrs. Yancey, 
Mann, and Kost, in communications had 
commission r e e rfdeai with Lord John Russell (August, 1861), as- 

with that question. , v ° ' . 

sured him that the real cause 01 secession 


was not Slavery, but the Tariff, which kept out English 
goods. He stated this in a dispatch to Lord Lyons, the 
English minister at Washington. In other communica- 
tions they threw the odium of the protection of slavery 
on the United States government. They declared that 
"the object of the war (on the part of the North), as of- 
ficially announced, was, not to free the slave, but to keep 
him in subjection to his owner, and to control his labor, 
through the legislative channels which the Lincoln gov- 
ernment designed to force upon the master ." The obvi- 
They fan to impose ous. in sincerity of such declarations doubt- 
on England. 2 egg j nc ^ e( j L or( j Eussell to express his ap- 
prehensions that it was the intention of the Confederacy 
to reopen the African slave-trade ; and the offense which 
these audacious misrepresentations offered to his under- 
standing perhaps, led him eventually to reply, "Lord Eus- 
sell presents his compliments to Mr. Yancey, Mr. Rost, and 
Mr. Mann. He had the honor to receive their letters and 
inclosures of the 27th and 30th of November, but in the 
present state of affairs he must decline to enter into any 
official communication with them." 

Davis, in his message, thus found a justification for se- 
cession and civil war in the principle of 
rights in the bon- state rights. Not without curiosity may 
we examine how that anarchical principle 
was dealt with by him in his subsequent acts of govern- 
ment. It is the testimony of a member of the Confeder- 
ate Congress, Mr. Foote, that " Posterity will hardly be- 
lieve the statement, and yet it is absolutely true, that the 
ultra-secessionists, who professed to have brought on the 
war chiefly to maintain the right of separate state seces- 
sion, were the first to deny the existence of any such right 
when certain movements were understood to be in prog- 
ress in North Carolina looking to peaceful secession from 
the Confederate States themselves; and these persons 


urged most vehemently the putting of the whole country 
under military law, in order to counteract all such at- 
tempts at withdrawal." The same authority says " that 
state rights and state sovereignty no longer exist south 
of the Potomac River ; that in that once happy but now 
forlorn region, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, the 
right of jury trial, and, in fact, all the muniments of civil 
liberty most highly prized in countries actually free, are 
completely prostrated; that corruption and imbecility 
sit grimly enthroned where it was once hoped that vir- 
tue and ability would exercise supreme sway ; and that 
a selfish, hypocritical, and tyrannical executive chief, un- 
blushingly sanctioned and sustained by a servile and in- 
competent Congress, has well-nigh deprived a high-spirit- 
ed and. eminently chivalrous people of all ground of hope 
as to their own future safety and happiness." 

In theory the Confederacy was founded upon state sov- 
ereignty, and its consequence state rights; 

Necessity of a cen- 1 1 , -. , . 1 

trai power in the but scarcelv had the secession movement be- 

Coufederacy. ? 

gun when it was discovered, as had been dis- 
covered eighty-five years before, in the war of the colonies 
with England, that the object in view could never be 
gained by a feebly-joined league of quarrelsome states. 
It demanded a central — a national power. Even "in 
Richmond itself, as soon as the ordinance of secession was 
passed, many persons had come to the conclusion that it 
was best to obliterate state lines, and merge all the South 
into one indivisible nation or empire. They thought the 
old, cumbrous, complicated machinery could not be main- 
tained. It was said, state rights gave us the right to se- 
cede ; but what is in a name V 

It was not possible that the government should be any 
thing else than a military despotism, and accordingly that 
it forthwith became. The plea of state necessity over- 
rode every thing, and justified every thing. 


This session of the Confederate Congress lasted from 
Acts of the extra the 29th of April to the 22d of May, much 
session. o £ -^ -jj^g^gg "being transacted in secret. 

Among its more important public acts may be mentioned 
a recognition that war with the United States was ex- 
isting, and an authorization of the issue of letters of 
marque. A patent-office was established, and a bill pass- 
ed for the issue of fifty millions of dollars in bonds. Cit- 
izens of the Confederate States were prohibited paying to 
citizens of the United States any debt due. Those owing 
such debts were directed to pay them into the Confeder- 
ate treasury. When the Congress adjourned, it adjourned 
to meet in Richmond on the 20th of July. 

But this transfer did not meet with unanimous ap- 
proval in the South. Davis himself, in the 
transfer to men- first instance, objected to it, and vetoed the 

mond. * # ... 

bill authorizing it. A strong opposition to 
it existed in the Gulf States, founded on an apprehension 
that it would enable the Virginians to do as they had 
clone in the Union, and engross too much of office and pa- 
tronage. However, like the provision in the Constitu- 
tion against the reopening of the slave-trade, it was one 
of the stipulated conditions on which the secession of Vir- 
ginia was obtained, and there can be no doubt that, by 
many who were not completely informed of the intentions 
of the master-minds who were projecting a great slave 
empire, the establishment of the Confederate government 
at Richmond was regarded as a temporary affair. 

The Congress assembled at Richmond transacted much 

Acts of the con- of its business in secret session. Recogniz- 
iuchmond. - n ^ ag j^ £j ia ^ o £ ^| ie United States, that it 

had a great war on its hands, it, immediately after the 
battle of Bull Run, authorized the raising of 400,000 men. 
It provided for the issue of one hundred millions of dol- 
lars in treasury notes, payable six months after the ratifi- 
II— L 


cation of peace ; and the same amount in bonds, bearing 
eight per cent, interest, and payable in twenty years; 
the imposition of a war tax of half of one per cent, on all 
real and personal property, including slaves, but except- 
ing persons whose property was less than four hundred 
dollars. It Authorized the seizure of all telegraphic lines ; 
the appointment by the President of agents to supervise 
all communications passing over them ; the forbidding 
of communications in cipher, or such as were of an enig- 
matical character ; the banishment of all alien enemies ; 
the confiscation of their property, with the exception of 
debts due to them from the Confederacy or a confeder- 
ated state. Every male thus liable to banishment, if 
above fourteen years of age, was required to leave the 
Confederacy within forty days; if he lingered beyond 
that time he was to be imprisoned, and then removed ; 
if he returned, he was to be dealt with as a spy or pris- 
oner of war. In retaliation for the Confiscation Act of the 
United States, measures of the strictest kind for the dis- 
covery of property of alien enemies w^ere enacted. Every 
citizen in the Confederacy was required to tell all he 
knew about such matters, and that voluntarily, and with- 
out being specially interrogated. Should he fail of this, 
he was to be held guilty of a misdemeanor, to be fined 
not more than $5000, imprisoned not more than six 
months, and be liable to pay double the value of the prop- 
erty in question. It- was anticipated that these measures 
would bring three hundred millions of dollars into the 
Confederate treasury. That result, however, was not at- 
tained. The Sequestration Bill was passed on August 
6th, 1861, and the Confederate Secretary of the Treasury 
reported that, up to September 30th, 1863, the treasury 
had received from sequestration less than two millions 
of dollars ($1,862,650). 

In this, its first session at Richmond, an act was also 


passed directing the form under which evidence should 
be taken respecting abdrflcted slaves, with a view to the 
exaction of indemnity- subsequently from the United 
States ; and an act to aid the State of Missouri in repel- 
ling invasion. The adjournment was to the 18th of No- 
From the beginning the Confederate government had 
constituted itself a Committee of Public 

Despotic character ^ n . -. T ... .. tl -w-^ it* * 

of the confederate feaiety. JN o committee in the r rencn Kevo- 

government. ' ' ". '" v .-,.. ...... 

lution was more vindictive, more terrible in 
its acts. In its 'eyes neutrality was the highest crime. 
Nothing was sacred ; nothing was sj3ared that stood be- 
tween it and its purposes. 

The session commencing on the 18th of November pro- 
c • **<'**& vided for the increase of the naval force and 

Session of the 18th , 

of November. fa e enlistment of 2000 seamen. It made ap- 
propriations of sixty millions for the army and four mill- 
ions for the navy ; but all its important measures were 
transacted in secret. 

The permanent Congress succeeded the provisional on 
The permanent ^ e l^h of February, 1862. Mr. Davis was 
congress. inaugurated as permanent President- four 

days subsequently. The day was very rainy, and the fes- 
tivities, as described by an eye-witness, lugubrious. " The 
permanent government had its birth in a storm." 

The state of the army was the first object of the atten- 
Legisiation respect- tion °f Congress. The sessions were for the 
mg the army most part secret. In his message the Pres- 
ident had said, " Events have demonstrated that the gov- 
ernment has attempted more than it had the power suc- 
cessfully to achieve. Hence, in the effort to protect by 
our arms the whole territory of the Confederate States, 
sea-board and inland, we have been so exposed as recent- 
ly to suffer great disasters." But, in truth, it was not the 
diffusion of the military force that gave disquiet ; it was 


the too plainly recognized decline of the military spirit 
that caused the alarm. The term of those soldiers who 
had enlisted for a year was about to expire. They had 
found, by fearful experience, that each Southerner was not 
equal to five Yankees. The first enthusiasm had alto- 
gether died "but. The delusion that there would be no 
war had passed aw r ay. Every one now knew that there 
would be a long and dreadful war, and that instead of 
pageantry and pomp there would be hardships, mutila- 
tion, and death. 

The want of military success to which Davis alluded 

ana the conduct of was attributed by many to the faulty man- 
the war. ner j n ^j^ -j^ war was carried on. There 

was a clamor that the Confederacy, instead of remaining 
on the defensive, should throw its armies into the ene- 
my's country. Scarcely had the session opened when a 
resolution (February 20th) was offered to that effect, and 
complaint made that some one was imposing defensive 
war on the country. A bill was reported to indemnify 
owners of cotton, tobacco, and other produce destroyed to 
prevent its capture by the enemy. The Senate adopted 
a resolution (February 27th) to the effect that no peace 
propositions should be entertained which surrendered any 
portion of the Confederate States, and that war must be 
continued until the enemy was expelled from Confederate 
territory. In the House a resolution was passed advising 
the non-cultivation of cotton and tobacco, and the raising 
of provisions in their stead. After the disaster of Fort 
Donelson, a message was received from the President to 
the effect that he had suspended Generals Floyd and Pil- 
low ; the former officer was, however, subsequently rein- 
stated at the request of the Legislature of Virginia. A re- 
The conscription morseless conscription law was now (April 
Act - 16th) passed. It annulled all previous con- 

tracts with volunteers; it took every man between the 


ages of eighteen and thirty-five, not legally exempt, from 
state control, and placed him absolutely under the orders 
of the Confederate President during the war. "Was it to 
this that state rights had come ? Not a little was added 
to the bitterness now felt when it was found that many 
of the states thus stripped of their able-bodied men were 
to be left to the mercy of the invader. "Arkansas," said 
her governor in his address, " severed her connection with 
the United States upon the doctrine of state sovereignty. 
She has lavished her blood in sujoport of the Confeder- 
acy: she did this because she believed that when the 

Disappointment of evil nour eame u P on ter the Confederate 
the states. ^ a g wou i c "[ ib e found floating upon her bat- 

tlements, defying the invader, and giving succor to her 
people. Arkansas — lost, abandoned, subjugated — is not 
that Arkansas who entered the Confederacy, nor will she 
remain Arkansas — a Confederate state, as desolate as a 
wilderness. It was for liberty she struck, and not for 
subordination to any created secondary power North or 

Hard as it was, this conscription law was thoroughly 
executed. It accomplished its purpose. For the time it 
was the salvation of the Confederacy. The reluctant con- 
scripts were hurried into Virginia to confront McClellan, 
and, raw as they were, they hurled him out of the Penin- 
sula. They, saved Richmond, put Washington in immi- 
nent peril, invaded Maryland, and watered their horses 
in the rivers of Pennsylvania. 

But this was not enough. Conscription had again to 
• Renewed conscrip- be pressed until the very brink of social ex- 
haustion was reached. The first body of 
100,000 volunteers had been exhausted; a second body 
of 400,000 volunteers had proved to be insufficient. At 
this period there were not fewer than 210,000 men in the 
Confederate service. Volunteering was at an end. Pro- 


crastinated independence and disappointment were break- 
ing the spirit of the South. Compulsion must take what 
enthusiasm could no longer give. The product of the first 
conscription bill was being fast devoured by cannon, or 
melting away with fearful rapidity in the hospitals. An- 
other conscription was actually enacted in the following 
year. It demanded all men between eighteen and forty- 
five years of age, except those legally exempted. They 
were ordered by proclamation to repair voluntarily to 
the conscript camps. They were to be punished as de- 
serters if they did not comply. Troops from the same 
state were brigaded together — a last, a grim recognition 
of state rights. * 

Torn from their firesides, deported from their native 
The conscript soi- states, these conscripts formed that incom- 
parable infantry which the South will never 
remember without affectionate emotion, and whose mili- 
tary deeds the North will never recall without a secret 
pride. A lady — an eye-witness — writing to a friend 
about the prisoners who were taken at Shiloh, and brought 
to Camp Douglas at Chicago, says: "But I have not 
told you how awfully they were dressed. They had old 
carpets, new carpets, rag carpets, old bed-quilts, new bed- 
quilts, and ladies' quilts for blankets. They had slouch 
hats, children's hats, little girls' hats, but not one soldier 
had a soldier's cap on his head. One man had two old 
hats tied to his feet instead of shoes. They were the 
most ragged, torn, and worn, and weary-looking set I ever 
saw. Every one felt sorry for them, and no one was dis- 
posed to speak unkindly to them." Yet this was that, 
infantry — that magnificent infantry, wdiich had nearly 
wrenched victory from Grant on the blood-stained field of 
Shiloh. It had faced, without flinching, famine, naked- 
ness, the hospital, and the sword. Would to God that it 
had had a different enemy and a different cause ! 

Chap.XLIL] the august session. X67 

On the 21st of April Congress adjourned to the third 
The A^t session Monday in August. When it met (August 

of Congress. 

18th), the condition of the army was a sub- 
ject of deep concern. This was manifested by the fact 
that hardly had Congress entered on its duties when a 
resolution was offered inquiring into the expediency of 
compelling the Commissary Department to furnish more 
and better food to the soldiers. Much of the public leg- 
islation had immediate reference to questions arising from 
the war. Among war measures, bills were submitted for 
its various war the-treatment of captives ; one to retaliate for 
measures. ^ e se } zure . f citizens ; and one for the pun- 

ishment of negroes in arms : it provided that Federal ar- 
mies, incongruously composed of whites and blacks, should 
not be entitled to the privileges of war, or to be taken 
prisoners ; the negroes, if captured, to be returned to their 
masters, or publicly sold ; their commanders to be hanged 
or shot, as might be most convenient. Another bill w T as 
introduced declaring that Federal soldiers taken with 
counterfeit Confederate notes in their possession should 
be put to death. When Lincoln's proclamation of Sep- 
tember 2 2d respecting slavery w r as received, retaliatory 
measures were at once contemplated. It was proposed 
that every man taken in arms against the Confederacy, 
upon its soil, should be put to death, and that the black 
flag should be hoisted. These motions were disposed 
of on the last day of the session by a resolution declar- 
ing that Congress would sustain any retaliatory meas- 
ures which the President might adopt. 

There was a growing, an irrepressible dissatisfaction 
... ,. , ,. ... with the management of the armies, an in- 

Dissatisfacticm with o * 

the state of affairs. cessan t demand to carry the war into the 
enemy's country. " If," said a member from South Caro- 
lina, " you will give Stonewall Jackson half our armies, 
he will drive the whole 000,000 of the enemy into the 
Northern States." 


It must not be supposed that Davis, and those who act- 
opposition to the e ^ with him, carried their measures without 
president. "serious opposition in their Congress. The 

member of that body whose testimony I have quoted (p. 
159) .remarks that even in the provisional Congress a 
tendency to centralization was apparent, and that " Mr. 
Davis vetoed more bills during that provisional regime 
than all the presidents of the United States, from Wash- 
ington to Lincoln inclusive." 

In vain a few independent members attempted to pre- 

Arbitrary course of Vent tlie P^SSage of laWS SUSpendillg the 

the government. wr y. £ j^^g corpus ; confiscating the es- 
tates of all who could not conscientiously range them- 
selves in opposition to the flag of their fathers ; putting 
under conscription > all male citizens capable of bearing 
arms, whether they were friendly or hostile to the Con- 
federate cause ; forcibly impressing private property, 
wheresoever situated, at the discretion of men endowed 
temporarily with military authority; declaring and enforc- 
ing martial law. In spite of them, inefficient and mis- 
chievous officials were appointed, to the exclusion of the 
capable and virtuous; able military commanders were 
displaced to make way for others despised by the army, 
and hated and distrusted by the citizens. 

These measures, and others of a like character, were 
carried against all opposition. A single member, by mov- 
ing it, could force the House to sit with closed doors, 
and thus in secret session, and under what was known as 
the ten minutes' rule, measures the most dangerous and 
doubtful might be passed. It was thus with the Erlanger 
loan, a shameless speculation introduced under the auspi- 
ces of Messrs. Slidell and Benjamin ; thus, too, with the 
Confiscation Act. 

As it became more and more apparentthat the prom- 
ises Davis had made of a short and successful war were 


Deimeoftheinflu- no ^ likely to ^ e realized, his popularity de- 
euce of Davis. clined. An influential newspaper declared 
that he had been " hastily and unfortunately inflicted on 
the Confederacy at Montgomery, and, when fixed in posi- 
tion, banished from his presence the head and brain of the 
South, denying all participation in the affairs of the gov- 
ernment to the great men who were the authors of seces- 
sion." Elsewhere it was affirmed that " the great men of 
the past and their families are proscribed as if this gov- 
ernment was the property of a few who happen to wield 
power at present." It was declared that 

Neglect of the lead- ., , , -. ■> . . . -, 

ers of the move- " the people can no longer get access to the 

ment. x x o o 

President ; he is surrounded by officers like 
an imperial court." Nor were these accusations ground- 
less ; the ablest writers of the South — such as Fitzhugh, 
De Bow ; Fisher — whose works had in reality formed pub- 
lic opinion, and who were entitled to the most prominent 
positions, were treated with contumely ; one was offered 
a low clerkship, which he spurned with contempt } an- 
other died of a broken heart. 

" He has notions of imperial greatness ;■" " his head is 
Accusations against completely turned by his sudden elevation ;" 

"he is the victim of the weakest weakness, 
vanity /" " he is the dupe of the intriguing machinations 
of cunning and unscrupulous managers, whose true char- 
acter he has never penetrated" — such were the bitter ob- 
jurgations of those who had recently been Davis's friends. 
One pointed out in detail that all the military reverses 
of the Confederacy might be directly traced to his unhap- 
py interventions ; another sneeringly recalled that when 
McClellan was in sight of Richmond, the President was 
being baptized at home, and then privately confirmed in 
St. Paul's Church; that, during the battle of June 28th, 
" he was in the lanes and orchards near the field of ac- 
tion praying for abundant success." 


These bitter animosities were not restricted to the Pres- 
and against his ident ; his cabinet bore their share. The 

chief officers. • n ,i , r* 

ignorance 01 one; the incompetence of an- 
other; the want of ordinary honesty in a third, were 
openly proclaimed. It was affirmed that a person who 
had pursued the empirical practice of a vegetarian quack- 
doctor was intrusted with one of the most important mil- 
itary offices. " His manners were coarse, overbearing, and 
insulting ; he was utterly ignorant of the duties of the 
post assigned to him, and was not at all solicitous to make 
himself acquainted with them. He exhibited a brutal 
indifference to the sufferings of the Confederate soldiery, 
by all of whom he was most cordially detested." 

Mr. Foot e declares: "As chairman of a special com- 

imprisonment of niittee of the Confederate Congress, organ- 
suspected persons. j ze( j a £ m y own mo ^ on £ or f-^e purpose of 

inquiring into cases of illegal imprisonment, I obtained 
from the superintendent of the prison-house in Richmond, 
under the official sanction of the Department of War it- 
self, a grim and shocking catalogue of several hundred 
persons then in confinement therein, not one of whom 
was charged with any thing but suspected political infi- 
delity, and this, too, not upon oath in a single instance. 
Before I could take proper steps to procure the discharge 
of these unhappy men, the second suspension of the writ 
of liberty occurred, and I presume that such of them as 
did not die in jail remained there until the fall of Rich- 
mond into the hands of the Federal forces." 

These imprisonments were very far from being restrict- 
Barbarities prac- ed to persons little known or in the humbler 

ticed upon them. ^^ q{ j^ rpj^ ^ g^ ^ for ^^ 

years had been one of the most prominent men in polit- 
ical life in Virginia, says that he was arrested in March, 
1862, sent to a filthy negro jail, and kept there in solitary 
confinement for eight weeks ; not even a chair or table 


was furnished him ; no one was permitted to speak to 
him. He adds " that more than one hundred and fifty 
persons were in like manner confined. Many of them 
were subsequently sent to Salisbury, in North Carolina, 
where some went crazy, and many died. In the Rich- 
mond Prison they had the naked floor for a pallet, a log 
of wood for a pillow, the ceiling for a blanket. At Salis- 
bury it was still worse. They were exposed to all the 
weather — cold rains and burning suns alternately." " But 
the object was effected by my arrest and imprisonment 
and that of others: It effectually sealed every man's lips. 
All were afraid to express their opinions under the reign 
of terror and despotism that had been established in Rich- 
mond. Every man felt that his personal liberty and safe- 
ty required silent submission to the tyranny of the Con- 

It was this Mr. Botts who first uttered that sentiment, 
which became eventually so current among the brave and 
much-enduring, the shoeless, ragged, famished, noble. con- 
scripts — " It's the rich man's war,, and the poor man's 

Things were fast going from bad to worse in domestic 
life in the Confederacy. A clerk in the War 

Deplorable condi- / ^. ~, . -,. r» i • r» »i m • , n 

tion of domestic af- Omce, m a diary oi Iris tamily anairs, tells 


us : " The shadow of gaunt Famine is upon 
us. All the patriotism is in the army ; out of it the de- 
mon Avarice rages supreme. Every one is mad with 
speculation." By the middle of November, 1862, salt was 
selling in Richmond at more than a dollar a pound ; boots 
at fifty dollars a pair ; clothing was almost unattainable. 
The city was full of accusations, of speculations, extortion, 
cheating the government. It was found, from an exam- 
ination of the accounts of disbursing agents, that nearly 
seventy millions of dollars were not accounted for. The 
remorseless pressure of the blockade had readied the re- 


cesses of private life. "Pins are now so rare that we 
pick them up with avidity in the streets." Enthusiasm 
had died out. Blank despair was settling on multitudes 
to whom .pride had "been a temporary support. The la- 
dies were no longer seen sewing uniforms in the churches 
as in the first days of secession, and boasting that they 
had postponed all engagements until their lovers had 
fought with the Yankees. But, faithful to the end, as 
they will always be, they were watching by their wound- 
ed in the hospitals, or decorating with flowers the graves 
of their dead. 



The Republican party had a majority in Congress, and was sustained by the mass 
of the Democratic party in all measures needful for the support of the govern- 

President Lincoln, in his message, gave an exposition of the state of affairs, and of 
the causes which had led to the existing crisis. 

Congress in its acts exceeded his recommendations, pledging itself to bring into op- 
eration the whole power of the nation for the suppression of the rebellion. 

The Thirty-seventh Congress met on the 4th of July, 
1861, in extra session, in accordance with 
the President's proclamation of the 15th of 

The Republican party had a majority in both houses. 
part com osition ^ n ^ ne Senate it had thirty-one votes out of 
of the houses, forty-eight ; in the House of Representatives, 
one hundred and six out of one hundred and seventy- 

Of the House of Representatives, a large number of the 
, ... .. members were new men who had never been 

compared with the 

preceding session. j n Congress before. Though the Bepublic- 
an party had in this three representatives less than in the 
last session, it had, through the non-representation of the 
seceding states, the above-mentioned majority. 

The last Senate had consisted of sixty-six members ; in 
this there were but forty-eight. In the former case the 
Democratic party had a majority over the Republican in 
the proportion of three to two. This gave to the South 
a control of the Senate, and through it a control of the 


The control thus maintained by the slave power is in- 
dicated by the distribution of the chairmanships of the 
standing committees. The important ones were held by 
the South. Thus Mississippi had that of Military Affairs ; 
Florida, Naval Affairs and the Post-office ; Delaware, the 
Justiciary; Virginia, Foreign Relations, and also Finance ; 
Alabama, Commerce; Arkansas, Public Lands; Louisiana, 
Public Land Claims. Of twenty-two such committees, 
the slave power controlled sixteen. These chairmanships 
were in the hands of persons soon to be found in open 
opposition to the government. To the North had been 
assigned the more insignificant, such as Printing, Patents, 
Public Buildings. 

As in the House, so in the Senate, the non-representa- 
tion of the seceding states threw the power 

Effect of the with- 
drawal of Son 
ern members. 

- into the hands of the Republicans, and, in 

addition, many senators, as well as many rep- 
resentatives who had heretofore acted with the Democrat- 
ic party, joined cordially in support of the administration 
as soon as they plainly perceived that the life of the na- 
tion was in peril. 

The sentiments animating a very large portion of the 

Democratic party were well expressed by 
emment by the Mr. Douglas, who had been its candidate 

Democratic party. ° . ' . . 

for the presidency m opposition to Lincoln. 
They occur in a letter to the chairman of the Democratic 
Committee of his state, written but a short time before 
his death : 

" I am neither the supporter of the partisan policy, nor 
in the apologist of the errors, of this adminis- 

Views expressed by in 

Mv. Douglas. tration. My previous relations to it remain 

unchanged. But I trust the time will never come when 
I shall not be willing to make any needful sacrifice of 
personal feeling and party policy for the honor and in- 
tegrity of my country. I know of no mode by which a 


loyal citizen may so well demonstrate his devotion to his 
country as by sustaining the flag, the Constitution, and 
the Union against all assailants, at home and abroad." 
"The hope (of a compromise) was cherished by Union men 
North and South, and was never abandoned until actual 
war was levied at Charleston, and the authoritative an- 
nouncement made by the revolutionary government at 
Montgomery that the secession flag should be planted on 
the walls of the Capitol at Washington, and a proclama- 
tion issued inviting the pirates of the world to prey upon 
the commerce of the United States." " There was then 
but one path of duty left open to patriotic men. It was 
not a party question, nor a question involving partisan 
policy. It was a question of government or no govern- 
ment — country or no country ; and hence it became the 
duty of every friend of constitutional liberty to rally to 
the support of our common country, its government and 
flag, as the only means of checking the progress of revo- 
lution, and of preserving the union of the states." 

On the day after the organization of Congress, the Pres- 
ident transmitted to it his message. 

He stated that, since the beginning of his term, the func- 
The President's tions °f the government, with the exception 
message, £ those of the Post-office Department, had 

been suspended in South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mis- 
sissippi, Louisiana, and Florida ; that forts, arsenals, dock- 
yards, and other property had been seized, strengthened, 
and armed, and were held in open hostility to the govern- 
ment ; that a disproportionate quantity of national mus- 
specifying the acts ^ e ^ s an( l r i^ es had in some manner found 

of the insurgents, J^ way to t}lQSe ^^ ^ wag ^^ t() 

be used against the government ; that accumulations of 
revenue had in like manner been taken ; that the navy 
had been scattered to distant seas ; that officers both of 
the army and navy had resigned in great numbers, and 


many of them were in arms against the government ; that 
ordinances of secession had been passed by each of the 
states designated, and an illegal organization established 
which, in the character of a confederation, was seeking 
the intervention of foreign powers. 

That, recognizing it to be his imperative duty to arrest 
this attempt at the destruction of the Union, 

and particularly the ■ ■. ; -. - ' , n . -. n , 

capture of Fort he had at nrst resorted to peaceful nieas- 

Sumter. L 

ures, seeking only to hold the public prop- 
erty, collect the revenue, and continue, at the government 
expense, the mails to the very people who were resisting ; 
that he had notified the Governor of South Carolina of 
an attempt about to be made to provision Fort Sumter, 
and had also informed him that, unless this were resist- 
ed, there would be no effort to send re-enforcements. 
Thereupon the fort was* bombarded and captured, with- 
out even awaiting the arrival of the provisioning expe- 

From this it might be seen that the assault "on Fort 

Sumter was in no sense a matter of self-cle- 

That they had made n ,, , n ,t «t i •, i • 

war on the govern- fense on the part ot the assailants, it beino; 

ment. . . . 

impossible that the garrison could commit 
any aggression upon theni ; that their object was to drive 
out the visible authority of the Union ; that there were 
no guns in the fort save those sent to that harbor many 
years before for the protection of the assailants them- 
selves. In doing this they had forced upon the country 
the distinct issue — " immediate dissolution of the Union 
or blood." 

This issue presents the question whether discontented 
individuals, too few in numbers to control the adminis- 
tration according to law, may, upon pretenses made arbi- 
trarily or not at all, break up the government. It forces 
us to ask, " Is there in all republics an inherent and fatal 
weakness ?" " Must a government, of necessity, be too 


strong for the liberties of its own people, or too weak to 
maintain its own existence V 

Under these circumstances, the government was com- 
pelled to resist the force employed for its 

The government , . , n n -. n . 

had been compelled destruction by iorce employed lor its pres- 
to resist. . - 

The President then proceeded to say that the response 
The course that vir- of the country had been most gratifying, yet 

ginia had taken, ^ nQne q{ ^ gj^ gtates ^^ j^ 

ware had furnished a regiment. He drew attention to 
the course that Virginia had taken. A Convention, of 
whom a large majority were professed Unionists, had 
been elected by the people of that state for the purpose 
of considering secession ; on the fall of Sumter, many of 
them went over to the secession party, and undertook 
to withdraw the state from the Union, but, though they 
submitted their ordinance for ratification to a vote of the 
people, to be taken a month subsequently, they, without 
any delay, commenced warlike operations against the 
Union. They seized the government armory at Harper's 
Ferry and the Norfolk navy yard ; they received, per- 
haps invited, large bodies of troops from the other seced- 
ing states ; they made a treaty with the Confederate 
States, and sent representatives to their Congress; they 
permitted the installation of the insurrectionary govern- 
ment at Richmond. 

In the other Border Slave States there had been an at- 
tempt to assume a position which they called 

and the armed neu- -, . -, . . .-p,-, -. -, . . . 

traiity of the Border armed neutrality, I hey would permit nei- 

States. . J J L 

ther the insurgents nor the government to 
cross their soil. Under this guise of neutrality they gave 
protection to and screened the insurgents, securing dis- 
union without a struggle. 

He then stated the circumstances under which the gov- 
ernment had called out seventy-five thousand militia, and 
II.— M 


instituted a blockade of the insurrection- 

War measures re- -, . . , . . -, . 

sorted to by the ad- ary districts, the insurrectionists having an- 

ministration. d 7 . f . ° 

nounced their purpose of entering on the 
practice of privateering. Other calls had been made for 
volunteers, and also for large additions to the regular 
army and nav*y. These measures had been ventured 
upon under what appeared to be a public necessity, and 
in the trust that Congress would readily ratify them. He 
had also authorized the suspension of the writ of habeas 
corpus, so that dangerous persons might be arrested or 
detained. He presented the considerations which had 
led him to regard this step not only as justifiable, but 

In view of the existing condition of things, he then 
its recommenda- called upon Congress to give the legal means 
twns to congress. £ or ma k m g ^jg con test short and decisive. 

He asked for 400,000 men, and $400,000,000. 

The President also pointed out the manner in which 
the people of the Slave States 4iad been be- 

Lincoln's views re- .-, -, . ,—,. , -. n , 

specting state sov- guiled into treason, lhe leaders ot the 

ereignty, CJ 

movement had for more than thirty years 
been laboring to persuade them that any state of the 
Union, by virtue of its supremacy or sovereignty as a 
state, might constitutionally, and therefore peacefully and 
legally, withdraw at its pleasure from the Union. But, 
with the exception of Texas, not one of them had ever 
been a state out of the Union. The original ones passed 
into the Union before they had cast off British colonial 
dependence. Not one of the. states, save Texas, had ever 
been sovereign. The Union gave each of them whatever 
independence and liberty it had. It is older than any 
of them, and created them as states. Not one of them 
ever had a state Constitution independent of the Union. 
Even if they had reserved powers, they certainly had not 
a power to destroy the government. Eecalling the fact 


that the nation had purchased with its money several of 
the seceding states, he asked, Is it just that they should 
separate without its permission ? Florida, for instance, 
had cost $100,000,000. The nation is actually now in 
debt for moneys it has thus paid. A part of the existing 
national debt was contracted to pay the debts of Texas. 
Is it just that she should secede, and pay no portion of 
it herself? 

After showing the constitutional absurdities of seces- 
sion, and questioning whether in any state, with perhaps 
the exception of South Carolina, a majority of the voters 
was in favor of secession, he referred to the 

and his opinion of i-ii • ,-i , ,i • • i i i • ~i 

the sentiments of great blessings that the nation had derived 

tllG PCOdIc 

from free institutions, affirming his belief 
that the " plain people" understood that this was essen- 
tially a people's contest. He drew attention to the fact 
that, while ,so many of the officers of the army and navy 
had proved false, not one common soldier or common sail- 
or was known to have deserted his flag. " This is the 
patriotic instinct of plain people. They understand, with- 
out any argument, that the destruction of the government 
made by Washington means no good to them." 

Alluding to his purposes in the event of the suppres- 
sion of the rebellion, and expressing his deejD concern that 
he had been compelled to resort to the war power, he felt 
that he had done what he believed to be his duty, know- 
ing that he had no moral right to shrink, or even to count 
the chances of his own life in what might follow. Com- 
mending, therefore, to Congress what he had done under 
a deep sense of his great responsibilities, he -sincerely 
no invokes the sup- hoped that its views and actions might so 

port of Congress. ^^ ^^ j^ ^ ^ ^^ ^ ■ foj^ftj fifo 

zens who have been disturbed in their rights a speedy 
restoration of them under the Constitution and the laws. 
The points brought into relief in this message are the 


The chief points of aggressive character of the insurrection, its 
e message. leaders having determined to make good 
their secession by force of arms ; the unpatriotic and un- 
fair position in which the Border States were endeavor- 
ing to stand, and the war measures to which the govern- 
ment had been compelled to resort. 

These war measures, more explicitly stated, are as fol- 
offldai war acts of lows i 1st. On the 15th of April, Lincoln 
called upon the several states for 75,000 
men. 2d. On the 19th of April he set on foot a block- 
ade of the ports of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, 
Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas. 3d. On the 
27th of April he did the same as respects the states of 
Virginia and North Carolina. 4th. On the 27th of April 
he authorized the commanding general of the army of the 
United States to suspend the writ of habeas corpus at 
any point on or in the vicinity of any military line be- 
tween the city of Philadelphia and the city of Washing- 
ton. 5th. On the 3d of May he called into the service 
of the United States 42,034 volunteers, increased the reg- 
ular army by 22,714 men, and the navy by 18,000 sea- 
men. 6th. On the 10th of May he authorized the com- 
mander of the United States forces on the coast of Flor- 
ida to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, if necessary. 

The silence with which the message treated slavery 
snence respecting showed clearly that, in the President's judg- 
siavery. ment, the preservation of the Union w r as the 

first thing — the relations of the government to slavery a 
secondary affair. He understood thoroughly that the 
real point at issue with the leaders of secession was the 
possession of national power, but that with the people 
whom they w^ere forcing into their measures it w 7 as the 
retention of their slaves. They had been brought to a 
unanimity of action by the belief that their domestic in- 
stitution was in peril. 


The Secretary of War reported that after the term of 
Report of the secre- "the three-months' volunteers had expired, 
taryofwar. there would remain 230,000 men. Volun- 

teering had exceeded the demands. He recommended 
that the regular army should be increased; that appro- 
priations should be made for the establishment of gov- 
ernment railroads and telegraphs, and provision for a 
supply of improved arms. 

The Secretary of the Navy complained of the neglected 
Report of the secre- condition in which he had found his depart- 
taryoftheNavy. men ^ Instead of ninety vessels, carrying 

2415 guns, it had dwindled down to forty-two vessels, 
with 555 guns. The fleet seemed to have been posted 
with the express design of rendering it useless in the 
present emergency. Between the 4th of March and the 
1st of July, not less than 259 officers had resigned their 
commissions or had been dismissed. Vessels, however, 
having been purchased or chartered to meet the public 
exigency, the government had now in commission eighty- 
two ships, carrying 1100 guns. 

The Secretary of the Treasury asked for $320,000,000, 

of which 240,000,000 were for w T ar purposes, 

taryoftheTreas- and 80,000,000 for ordinary demands for 

ury. ■%■••■ 

the ensuing year. He proposed to raise 
$146,000,000, consisting of the above 80,000,000 and 
66,000,000 already appropriated, by increased duties on 
specified articles, by certain internal imposts, and by di- 
rect taxation on real and personal property. To meet the 
amount for war purposes, he proposed a national loan of 
not less than $100,000,000 in the form of treasury notes, 
bearing an annual interest of seven and three tenths per 
cent. Should this loan prove insufficient, he proposed to 
issue bonds to an amount not exceeding $100,000,000, re- 
deemable at the option of the government after a period 
not exceeding thirty years, the interest not to exceed sev- 


en per cent. He also recommended the issue of other 
treasury notes, not exceeding $50,000,000, bearing inter- 
est of 3-^-q per cent., exchangeable for the first -named 
notes at the will of the holder. 

The House of Representatives, with a view to the ex- 
Action of the House pediting of business, and limiting its action 

of Representatives. ^ Q ^ p ur p 0ges f or which the extra Session 

had been called, passed a resolution that it would consid- 
er only bills relating to the military, naval, and financial 
affairs of the government, referring all other matters to 
the appropriate committees, without debate, for action at 
the next regular session of Congress. 

The temper of the House of Representatives was man- 
ifested by the adoption of a resolution of- 

the suppression of fered by Mr. McClernand, a Democrat of li- 
the rebellion. , ^ , ' , 

lmois : " This house hereby pledges itself to 
vote for any amount of money and any number of men 
which may be necessary to insure a speedy 'and effectual 
suppression of the rebellion, and the permanent restora- 
tion of the Federal authority every where within the lim- 
its and jurisdiction of the United States." It passed by 
a vote of 121 to 5. 

In the discussions arising on the various measures be- 

Resistanceofthe fore tne two houses, every exertion was 
slave interest. made by the remnant of the slave interest 

and its party allies to embarrass and procrastinate legis- 
lation, or divert it in favor of the insurrection. It was, 
however, one of the benefits, that accrued to the nation 
from its great disaster at Bull Run, which happened while 
these discussions were in progress, that a powerful public 
sentiment was aroused which greatly restrained these 
proceedings — a determination to tolerate nothing that 
stood in opposition to the safety of the republic. 

Lincoln was spared the difficulty which so often ob- 


structs representative governments, that for 

Congress thorough- -, . n n , 

ly sustains the gov- every measure adopted an opposing formula 

ernment. * -t i ri 

can be produced. Congress at once rose to 
the height of the occasion, and, recognizing that the safe- 
ty of the republic is the supreme law, with Roman firm- 
ness legalized whatever was needful for that end. It ac- 
cepted, in all its subsequent action, the idea expressed by 
one of its members, " Tax, fight, emancipate." 

Senator Baker, who a few weeks later fell at the dis- 
Actioninthesen- aster of Ball's Bluff, thoroughly represented 

the roused spirit of the nation when he de- 
clared in the Senate, " I propose to put the whole power 
of this country, arms, men, money, into the hands of the 
President. He has asked for four hundred millions of 
dollars — we will give him five hundred millions ; he has 
asked for four hundred thousand men — we will give him 

five hundred thousand." 


After a session of thirty-three days Congress had ac- 
Eesumeoftheacts complished its work. It had approved and 

of the extra session. legalize( J ^ actg and orderfl of ^ J> regi . 

dent ; it had authorized him to accept half a million of 
volunteers ; it had added eleven regiments to the regular 
army; it had raised the pay of the soldier to thirteen 
dollars a month, with a bounty of one hundred acres of 
land at the close of the war ; it had authorized the pur- 
chase or building and arming of as many ships as might 
be found requisite ; it had appointed a committee to take 
charge of the construction of iron-clads and floating bat- 
teries; it had facilitated the importing of arms from 
abroad by the loyal states, voted ten millions of dollars 
for the purchase of arms, and undertaken to indemnify 
the states for all expenses they might incur in raising, 
paying, subsisting, and transporting troops. It had au- 
thorized the President to close the ports of entry at his 
discretion, to declare any community to be in a state of 


insurrection, and to prohibit commercial intercourse with 
it. It had provided that, after proclamation by him, all 
property used or intended to be used in aid of the insur- 
surrection should be seized and confiscated; and specially 
that if the owner of any slave should require or permit 
such slave to be in any way employed in military or na- 
val service against the United States, all claim to him or 
his services should be forfeited by such owner. It had 
appropriated two hundred and twenty-eight millions of 
dollars ($227,938,000) for the army, and forty-three mill- 
ions ($42,938,000) for the navy. It had made provision 
for these appropriations by imposts and taxation, and 
authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to borrow two 
hundred and fifty millions ($250,000,000). 

But these and other important measures were not car- 
ried without encountering a most strenuous 

Character of che op- ... ,-p,, -. n ■, 

position they had opposition. Hie rear -guard ot slavery m 

encountered. /-i n iiii -it mi 

Congress fought the battle to the last. The 
House resolution, " That, in the judgment of this house, 
it is no part of the duty of the soldiers of the United 
States to capture and return fugitive slaves," was carried 
by a vote in which all the affirmatives were Republicans. 
The resolution in the Senate expelling from that body 
Messrs. Mason, Clingman, Wigfall, and others, who were 
openly attempting the overthrow of the government, was 
in like manner resisted. An attempt was made to attach 
to the army appropriation bill the proviso " that no part 
of the money hereby appropriated shall be employed in 
subjugating or holding as a conquered province any sov- 
ereign state now or lately one of the United States, nor 
in abolishing or interfering with African slavery in any 
of the states." Resolutions were offered condemning as 
unconstitutional the increase of the army, the blockade 
of the Southern ports, the seizure of telegraphic dispatches, 
the arrest of persons suspected of treason, As had been 


the case in the House in the instance just referred to, so 
in the Senate on the occasion of the bill for reorganizing 
the army, an amendment was proposed " that the army 
and navy shall not be employed for the purpose of sub- 
jugating any state, or reducing it to the condition of a 
territory or province, or to abolish slavery therein." This 
was by Mr. Breckinridge, recently Vice-President of the 
United States, and shortly to be a general in the Confed- 
erate service. When the bill freeing slaves who had been 
used in aid of the insurrection was before the Senate, it 
met with earnest opposition because "it will inflame sus- 
picions which have had much to do with producing our 
present evils; it will disturb those who are now calm 
and quiet, inflame those who are restless, irritate numbers 
who would not be exasperated by any thing else, and will, 
in all probability, produce no other effect than these. It 
is therefore useless, unnecessary, irritating, unwise." 
With a firmness which recalls the action of the Ro- 
man Senate, on the clay after the disastrous 
gress to suppress battle of Bull Run, while the demoralized 

the rebellion. , . ~ , 

wreck of the national army was filling the 
streets of Washington, and the victorious Confederate 
troops were momentarily expected, the House of Repre- 
sentatives resolved " that the maintenance of the Consti- 
tution, the preservation of the Union, and the enforce- 
ment of the laws are sacred trusts which must be exe- 
cuted ; that no disaster shall discourage us from the most 
ample performance of this high duty ; and that we pledge 
to the country and the world the employment of every 
resource, national and individual, for the suppression,- 
overthrow, and punishment of rebels in arms." 

A few days later (July 29th) the Senate passed a res- 
olution to the same effect. 



The national government, after the battle of Bull Run, commenced the organiza- 
tion of those great armies which eventually attained a strength of more than a 
million of men. 

The process of collecting, officering, and arming the troops. 

Organization and development of the Army of the Potomac under General McClel- 
lan. For this army the most abundant provision was made. 

The Western armies were less perfectly supplied. 

Remarks on the ostensible and working strength of the armies during the Civil 

To create, command, and disband a great army are 
among the most difficult acts of a free government. 
At the period of the inauguration of Lincoln, the 
' . . ... United States were really without an army. 

The national mill- •> # J 

Siningonhe The insignificant force which had formerly 
war passed under that name had been dissipated 

by the perfidy of Floyd, the Secretary of War; the most 
important portion of it had been disarmed and destroyed 
in Texas by the treason of General Twiggs. 

At the close of the war the army numbered- about 
1,050,000 men. Such was its strength when 

and at its close. . _ . , , , 

it was disbanded. 
Enthusiasm furnished in the beginning what seemed 
to be an adequate supply of volunteers. 

Modes by Avhich -r-» , ,-t • < 

troops were ob- J3ut enthusiasm can not be relied upon as a 

tained. . . , n . -. . T . 

steady principle of national action. It is 
quickly excited, and, under the influence of adversity, as 
quickly subsides. Men were next obtained by the allure- 
ment of bounties, and that eventually failing of its pur- 
pose, they were taken by draft. 


The quality of the force thus arising changed with the 
changes of its origin. To the experienced 

Gradual change in .-•. . jij • ,1 . • t 

the morale of the military eye, the troops in the national serv- 
ice up to the epoch of the battle of Bull 
Run constituted an armed multitude, but not an army. 
Then it became evident that something more effective 
was necessary. Many months were consumed, and the 
skill of a trained officer, General McClellan, was exhaust- 
ed ; unstinted supplies were lavished ; but, though a great 
improvement was accomplished, perfection was very far 
from being reached. Not without the utmost difficulty, 
and after many disasters, were the political aspirations of 
officers and men extinguished. It was in the West that 
the army first became what an army ought to be — a mere 
m . centre of human force, capable of being; di- 

What an army * Sr o 

ought to be. rected with mathematical precision along 
any given line, and brought to bear irresistibly on any 
given point. In the judgment of a very high military 
authority, this degree of perfection w 7 as first manifested 
in General Grant's campaign from Grand Gulf to Vicks- 

To attain to this, an army must have lost all outward 
political thought; it must have implicit reliance on the 
mind which is guiding it. It must have complete cohe- 
sion in all its parts — from that tenacity results. Each 
soldier must thoroughly feel that, no matter how insig- 
nificant he as a single individual may be, he is absolutely 
sustained in what he is about to do by the unswerving 
and unfailing power of the whole force. The highest ex- 
cellence is reached when the converse of this conception, 
is attained, and the individual soldier considers that on 
him personally the safety and honor of the whole army 
may be depending. In the wars of Napoleon the Impe- 
rial Guard had been brought to this state. It is not by 
the pageantry of reviews that this grand ideal is reached ; 


the perfect soldier, like his own weapon, must have passed 
through the ordeal of fire. 

Congress at its extra session more than complied with 
Army legislation of ^ ne ca ^l °f the President. He asked for 
congress. 400,000 men— he was authorized to accept 

500,000. , 

In a report to the President (December 1st, 1861), the 

Report on the prog- Secretary of War, Mr. Cameron, states that, 
ress of enlistments, af . tM commencement of t n i s rebellion, in- 
augurated by the attack upon Fort Sumter, the active 
military force at the disposal of the government was 
16,006 regulars, principally employed in the West to hold 
in check marauding Indians. In April 75,000 volunteers 
were called upon to enlist for three months' service. The 
people responded with such alacrity that 77,875 were im- 
mediately obtained. Under the authority of the act of 
Congress of July 22d, 1861, the states were asked to fur- 
nish 500,000 volunteers to serve for three years or during 
the war, and by the act approved on the 29th of the 
same month, the addition of 25,000 men to the regular 
army was authorized, the result being an army of 600,000 
men. If to this be added the number of discharged three- 
months' volunteers, the aggregate force furnished to the 
government between April and December exceeded 
700,000 men. 

At first the government found itself deficient in arms 
and on the provi- an d munitions of war through the bad faith 
of those intrusted with their control during 
the preceding administration. The armory at Harper's 
Ferry had been destroyed'. The only reliance was on the 
single armory at Springfield and upon private establish- 
ments. Measures had promptly been taken to increase 
the capacity of the Springfield establishment until it was 
expected to produce in the ensuing year 200,000 rifles. 
A special agent had been sent to Europe, with two mill- 


ions of dollars, to obtain an immediate supply, part of 
which had been already received. 

By a very important provision of the law enacted in 
July (1861), it was permitted to detach reg- 

Regular officers may -1 /v» 1 • 1 1 i 1 (* 

serve iu the voiuu- ular omcers to serve in the volunteer force. 


Special provision was also made permitting 
* the appointment of general officers from any grade in the 
regular army, the officers not forfeiting their positions in 
the old army. This proved to be one of the most judi- 
cious laws in reference to the army passed by Congress 
at the inception of. the war. In a great measure it broke 
down all distinction between regulars and volunteers. 
Regulars were commanding volunteers, and volunteers 
quickly became as well disciplined as regulars. 

The bounties by states, and counties, and cities were 
given to volunteer troops, and not enjoyed by regular 
troops. It therefore became difficult to fill the regular 
regiments. In actual operations, all distinctions between 
them practically disappeared. If jealousy did exist, it 
was little more than in name — not more, perhaps, than 
occasioned wholesome rivalry. 

In the early period of the war, it was supposed by 
The Academy at man y political demagogues that service in 
west Point. t jfa e arm y W ould prove to be the quickest 

and most effectual method of creating political capital for 
themselves. The battle of Bull Run, to some extent, dis- 
pelled that illusion. However, while it lasted, they, and 
the newspapers acting in their interest, spared no pains 
to depreciate those officers who had been professionally, 
educated at West Point, and whom they considered as 
standing in their way. They not only derided all pre- 
paratory military study, but openly accused that nation- 
al institution of inculcating aristocratic sentiments, and, 
what is worse, of a tendency to disloyalty. They pointed 


to the more prominent Confederate officers who had grad- 
uated there. 

But, from a critical inquiry into the subject, General 
Loyalty of its grad- Cullum has shown that, at the commence- 
uates ' ment of the war, out of 1249 graduates of 

the Academy then supposed to be living, 821 were in the 
army, and 428 in civil life. Of the 821, only 184, or a 
little more than one fifth, went over to the South; 627, 
or nearly four fifths, remained loyal ; 10 took neither side. 
Of the 428 in civil life, only 99, or less than one fourth, 
were known to have favored the Confederates; 292, or 
nearly three times that number, remained loyal. The ca- 
reer of 37 is unknown. It thus appears that, out of 1249, 
more than three fourths remained true. 

Of the loyal graduates in civil life, 115 re-entered the 
national service. Among these, 54 were over the age of 
45 years. Of those who, from disability or other causes, 
did not take an active part in the war ; many performed 
useful services in civil capacities requiring military knowl- 
edge ; others, who had tendered their services, were una- 
ble to procure commissions. The graduates of the Acad- 
emy were in command at nearly all the great victories of 
the national arms ; they were the chief organizers and di- 
recting agents of the various staff branches of the serv- 
ice. They planned defenses, conducted sieges, bridged the 
boldest streams. They silently executed an incalculable 
amount of work in keeping in active motion the compli- 
cated machinery of war. 

Of the graduates of the Academy thus serving in the 
national army, one fifth' were killed in battle, and more 
than one third — probably one half — were wounded. 

Those officers in the Confederate service who had re- 
ceived their military education at the national expense 
had taken the following oath on entering the army as 
commissioned officers. It is from the tenth Article of War, 


act of Congress 1806. It still remains for them to justify 
their conduct. 

" I, A. B., do solemnly swear (or affirm, as the case may 

be) that I will bear true allegiance to the 

uates tm?86?cm a United States of America, and that I will 

entering the army. -.__ , 

serve them honestly and faithfully against 
all their enemies and opposers whatsoever ; and observe 
and obey the orders of the President of the United States, 
and the orders of the officers appointed over me accord- 
ing to the Eules and Articles for the government of the 
armies of the United States." 

Immediately after the battle of Bull Kun, Major Gen- 
GeneraiMccieiian eral McClellan was assigned to the com- 
mSatwSg- mand of the Military Department of Wash- 
ton * ington and Northeastern Virginia. Lieuten- 

ant General Scott retained his command as general in 
chief of the American army until the end of October. 

" I found," says General McClellan in his report, " no 
state of the army at army to command — a mere collection of reg- 
iments cowering on the banks of the Poto- 
mac, some perfectly raw, others dispirited by the recent 

" Nothing of any consequence had been done to secure 
the southern approaches to the capital by means of de- 
fensive worts ; nothing whatever had been undertaken 
to defend the avenues to the city on the northern side of 
the Potomac. 

" The number of troops in and around the city was 
about 50,000 infantry, less than 1000 cavalry, 650 artil-. 
lerymen, with nine imperfect field batteries of thirty 

" In no quarter were the dispositions for defense such 
as to offer a vigorous resistance to a respectable body of 
the enemy, either in the position or number of the troops, 


condition of the or the number and character of the defen- 
fortmcations. ^ woifa Earthworks in the nature of 

tetes de pont looked upon the approaches to the George- 
town Aqueduct and Ferry, the Long Bridge and Alexan- 
dria, and some simple defensive arrangements were made 
at the Chain Bridge. With the latter exception, not a 
single defensive work had been constructed on the Mary- 
land side. 

" There was nothing to prevent the enemy shelling the 
city from heights within easy range, which could be oc- 
cupied by a hostile column almost without resistance. 
Many soldiers had deserted, and the streets of Washing- 
ton were crowded with straggling officers and men absent 
from their stations without authority, whose behavior in- 
dicated the general want of discipline and organization." 

In a memorandum addressed to the President a few 

days subsequently (August 4th, 1861), Gen- 

on the conduct of eral McClellan indicated his views as to the 

the war. 

objects and conduct of the war ; *' that it had 
become necessary to crush a population sufficiently numer- 
ous, intelligent, and warlike to constitute a nation, and 
not only to defeat their armed and organized forces in the 
field, but to display such an overwhelming strength as to 
convince all our antagonists, especially those of the gov- 
erning aristocratic class, of the utter impossibility of re- 
sistance." " Their success in the battle of Bull Eun would 
enable the political leaders of the rebels to convince the 
mass of their people that we are inferior to them in force 
and courage, and to command all their resources. The 
contest had begun with a class, now it is with a people ; 
our military success alone can restore the former issue." 

General McClellan then stated that, as the rebels have 
™ a f ».• ■♦*• -i chosen Virginia as their battle-field, it seems 

The form he thinks o ' 

it should have. proper for us to make the first great strug- 
gle there. With that he would also advise another move- 


ment, to be made simultaneously on the Mississippi, the 
expulsion of the insurgents from Missouri, and a move- 
ment through Kentucky into Eastern Tennessee, for the 
purpose of assisting the Union men of that region, and of 
seizing the railroad leading from Memphis to the east. 
He supposed that the possession of the road and the 
movement on the Mississippi would go far toward deter- 
mining the evacuation of Virginia. He advised the occu- 
pation of Baltimore and Fortress Monroe by garrisons 
sufficiently strong, but believed that the importance of 
Harper's Ferry and the line of the Potomac in the direc- 
tion of Leesburg would be very materially diminished as 
soon -as the army at Washington became organized, strong, 
and efficient, averring that no capable general would cross 
the river north of that city if there were an army ready 
to cut off his retreat. 

The Army of the Potomac was therefore considered as 
being charged with the main duty ; all other forces were 
of a secondary and subordinate character. 

The main army was to have the following composi- 
tion : 

250 regiments of infantry 225,000 men. 

100 field batteries— 600 guns .... 15,000 " 

28 regiments of cavalry 25,500 " 

5 regiments of engineer troops . . 7,500 " 

Total 273,000 " 

This force was to be supplied with engineer 

Composition pro- -, .. -.. .. . , -, . 

posed for the main and pontoon trams, and in connection with it 

army. *■ ' 

a powerful naval force, to protect the move- 
ment of a fleet of transports intended to convey troops 
from point to point of the enemy's sea-coast. The naval 
force was also to co-operate with the army in its efforts 
to seize the important sea-board towns. 
The movement down the Mississippi, and the j)rogress 
II.— N 


of the main array .in the East, it was expected, would mu- 
tually assist each other by diminishing the resistance to 
be encountered by each. 

General McClellan also advised a movement from Kan- 

subordinate move- s f? and Nebraska, through the Indian Ter- 
ments suggested. r r itory, upon Red River and Western Texas, 

for the purpose of protecting and developing the Union 
sentiment known to exist in those regions. He likewise 
suggested that permission should be obtained from the 
Mexican government for the use of certain of their roads, 
and hinted that it perhaps might be desirable to take 
into service, and employ in these operations, Mexican sol- 

He proposed with his main force not only to drive the 
enemy out of Virginia and occupy Richmond, but also 
Charleston, Savannah, Montgomery, Pensacola, Mobile, 
and New Orleans. 

Toward the latter part of October, in consequence of 
condition of the tne anxiety of the President for 4 the speedy 
army in October, employment of the army, General McClellan 
reported to the Secretary of War its condition at that 
time. " While I regret that it has not been thought ex- 
pedient, or perhaps possible, to concentrate the forces of 
the nation near Washington (remaining on the defensive 
elsewhere), keeping the attention and efforts of the gov- 
ernment fixed upon that as the vital point where the issue 
of the great contest is to be decided, it may still be that, 
by introducing unity of action and design among the va- 
rious armies of the land, by determining the courses to be 
pursued by the various commanders under one general 
plan, transferring from the other armies their superfluous 
strength, and thus re-enforcing this main army, whose des- 
tiny it is to decide the controversy, we may yet be able 
to move with a reasonable prospect of success before the 
winter is fairly upon us." " The advance should not be 


postponed beyond the 25th of November, if possible to 
avoid it." 

The strength of the Potomac Army, on the morning of 
October 27th, had risen to 168,318 officers and men of all 
grades and all arms. This included the sick, the absent, 
troops at Baltimore, Annapolis, and on the Upper and 
Lower Potomac. The force present for duty was 147,695, 
but of these 13,410 were unarmed or unequipped. The 
infantry regiments, to a considerable extent, were armed 
with unserviceable weapons. The general farther stated 
that quite a large number of good arms, w T hich had been 
intended for this army, had been ordered elsewhere, leav- 
ing the Army of the Potomac insufficiently, and, in some 
instances, badly armed. On September 30th there were 
with the army 228 field guns. 

The strength of the army increased until the follow- 
its subsequent ing * February, as shown in the subjoined 

strength. ' ^j^ 

December 1, 1861 198,213 

January 1, 1862 219,707 

February 1, " '. . 222,196 

March 1, " 221,987 

These numbers represent the total, present and absent. 
The troops in Maryland and Delaware are included. 

In consolidating this army and preparing it for the 
organization of the field, the first step taken was to organize the 
infantry, infantry into brigades of four regiments each, 

retaining the newly-arrived regiments on the Maryland 
side until their armament and equipments were issued, 
and they had obtained some little elementary instruction, 
before assigning them permanently to brigades. When 
the organization of the brigades was well established, and 
the troops somewhat disciplined and instructed, divisions 
of three brigades each were gradually formed. It was 


intended eventually to introduce a higher unit — the army 

When new batteries of artillery arrived, they also were 
retained in Washington until their armament and equip- 
ment were completed, and their instruction sufficiently 
advanced to-justify their being assigned to divisions. The 
same course was pursued with regard to the 

and of the cavalry, -, A . ni . . 

cavalry. As rapidly as circumstances per- 
mitted, every cavalry soldier was armed with a sabre and 
revolver, and at least two squadrons in every regiment 
with carbines. It was intended to assign at least one 
regiment of cavalry to each division of the active army, 
besides forming a cavalry reserve of the regular regiments 
and some picked regiments of volunteer cavalry. It was 
determined to collect the regular infantry to form the 
nucleus of a reserve. 

With respect to the artillery, the following principles 
were observed in its organization : 

The artillery should be in thfe proportion 

of 2 J pieces to 1000 men, to be expanded, 
if possible, to 3 pieces. Each field battery was to have, 
if possible, six guns, none less than four, and in all cases 
the guns to be of uniform calibre. The field batteries 
were to be assigned to divisions, not to brigades, four to 
each division. In the event of several divisions consti- 
tuting an army corps, at least one half of the divisional 
artillery w T as to constitute the reserve artillery of the 
corps. The reserve artillery of the whole army was to 
be one hundred guns. The ammunition to accompany 
field batteries was not to be less than four hundred rounds 
per gun. The siege train to be of fifty pieces. This was 
subsequently expanded at the siege of Yorktown to very 
nearly one hundred pieces, and comprised the unusual 
calibres and heavy weight of metal of two 200-pounders, 
five 100-pounders, and ten 13-inch sea-coast mortars. 

Chap.XLIV.] organization of the army. 19^ 

In March, 1862, the artillery of the Army of the Po- 
immense increase tomac had risen from the 30 guns, 650 men, 

in the artillery. ^ ^ j^^ ^^ ^ a( J C OmpOSed it in 

the preceding July, to 520 guns, 12,500 men, and 11,000 
horses, fully equipped, and in readiness for active field 
service. During the short period of seven months all 
this immense amount of material had been issued by the 
Ordnance Department, and placed in the hands of the ar- 
tillery troops after their arrival in Washington. 

On the 8th of March, 1862, the President directed the 
Formation of corps organization of the active portion of the Ar- 
my 'of the Potomac into four army corps, 
and the formation of a fifth from the divisions of Banks 
and Shields. 

The entire system of defenses for the protection of 
organization of oth- Washington was carried into execution, en- 
'gineer and bridge trains were organized, the 
latter upon the French model, the topographical, medical, 
quartermaster's, subsistence, ordnance, provost - marshal's 
departments were established, signal and telegraphic corps 
were instituted ; the latter of which had constructed up- 
ward of 1200 miles of telegraphic line before the close 
of 1862. The air-balloon was not infrequently used, and 
often furnished very valuable information. 

Considering the military condition of the nation when 
General McClellan undertook the formation 

The time consumed -, . . . n . -, , A n . -, 

in the*e prepara- and organization oi the great Army of the 

tions. ° , ° . ' f , 

Potomac, the time consumed m bringing 
that force into a satisfactory condition was far from be-* 
ing too long. The preceding paragraphs show how much 
was necessary to be done and how much was actually ac- 
complished. From the resources furnished without stint 
by Congress McClellan created that army. Events show- 
ed that his mental constitution was such that he could 
not use it on the battle-fieid. 


Events also showed that McClellan's solution of the 

Problem of the Form of the War w r as incor- 

as to the Form of rect. He did not recognize the importance 

the War. .... & 

of the Mississippi Valley, and looked upon 
military operations there as of secondary importance. 
Though the force he had accumulated was already un- 
manageable in his hands, he unceasingly importuned the 
government to strip the Western armies of whatever they 
could for the sake of adding to his already unwieldy 
Lavish provision for mass. There probably never was an army 

the Potomac army. ^ ^ ^^ gQ j^^y supplied. aS that of 

the Potomac before the Peninsular expedition. General 
McDowell, who knew the state of things well, declared, 
in his testimony before the Congressional Committee on 
the Conduct of the War, " There never was an army in 
the world supplied as well as ours. I believe a French 
army of half the size could be supplied with what we 

While these things were lavished on the Army of the 
East, no superfluities were given to the 

Imperfect provision . r* ii ttt , x i • • ■ j • i 

for the western Army oi the W est. In his examination be- 

armies. ■ J r ' , 

lore the same Congressional Committee, 
General Pope testified that the Western army had labored 
under a great many disadvantages, but it had always pur- 
sued an aggressive policy from the beginning. So far as 
material was concerned, it was indifferently supplied com- 
pared with the Army of the East : he added, " We had 
nothing, you might say ; I have seen men go into action 
there with the locks of their muskets tied on with strings. 
I have seen them wearing overcoats to hide their naked- 
ness, as they had no pantaloons. When I left there there 
were some troops that had been there over a year, and 
yet had but two or three ambulances to a regiment of a 
thousand men." To the question, " Was it all appropri- 
ated for the Army of the Potomac ?" he replied, " I do not 


say what became of it. I do not know that it had an ex- 
istence ; at least we never saw it. Our troops suffered 
very much, and I must say that it was understood by 
them to have been from neglect on the part of the gov- 

It was the man in the overcoat, with the lock of his 
rifle tied on with a string, who won victories — not the 
pampered, neatly-uniformed soldier. 

I shall close this chapter by quoting some instructive 
■ . . . remarks on the national armies of the Civil 

Actual working 

Sefdu/iig 6 War. They occur in a communication made 
the war. ^ Q me ^ one Q £ ^ Q g re atesi and most suc- 

cessful of the generals. " Our paper armies were very 
large, while the officers and men for actual duty were 
small in comparison. As a rule, in a well-ordered army, 
if sixty-six per cent, of the men ' present 7 can be brought 
into battle, it is a good average ; the other thirty-three 
per cent, are employed as cooks, teamsters, nurses, serv- 
ants, etc., etc. — are sick, on furlough, detached. Then the 
men reported as ' absent' to guard rivers, depots, prisons, 
railroad stations, escorts, etc., etc., make fearful blanks in 
every regiment and subdivision of the army. During 
our war, at no time do I think one half of the men receiv- 
ing pay were engaged with the fighting armies at the 
front, and this half was subjected to the farther diminu- 
tion of the thirty-three per cent, before mentioned, so that 
in an army whose muster-rolls would give 100,000 men 
1 present' and ' absent' for pay, no general could expect to 
bring into battle, at any distance from his base of sup- 
plies, more than 35,000 men. By way of illustration, I 
take the case at the close of the war, when for the first 
time we got at the real facts and figures. 1,050,000 men 
were then on the muster-rolls to be paid off and dis- 


" The active fighting armies then were : 

Grant at Richmond 80,000 

Sherman at Raleigh 65,000 

Schofield in North Carolina 15,000 

Canhy at Mobile and in the Southwest 30,000 

Wilson's cavalry at Macon, Georgia 12,000 

Stoneman in East Tennessee 5,000 

Thomas in Kentucky and Tennessee 40,000 

West of Mississippi (Missouri and Arkansas) . . 15,000 


Where were all the rest \ 

" Guarding thousands of miles of sea-coast, rivers, and 
roads, guarding prisoners, and acting as provost guards, or 
loafing about the country. I do not mention this in crit- 
icism, but to show how in war such vast expenses do 
arise, and how often the country overestimates the exact 
strength of armies from the official returns. 

"At no single time during the late Civil War — not even 
in 1864, the time of the greatest pressure, do I believe 
that fifty per cent, of the men drawing pay as soldiers 
were actually within striking distance of the enemy. To 
this cause may be traced some of the worst failures, when 
the government and people behind pushed their officers 
'on,' supposing that figures could handle muskets and 
fight battles." 



Immediately after the proclamation of the blockade, the National Government com- 
menced the building of war-ships suitable for that purpose, and for defense against 
Confederate and foreign attack. 

It found that the navy, consisting of about forty ships, had been purposely dispersed, 
the dock-yards shamefully neglected, and that many of the officers had been un- 

It built many different classes of sea-ships, both wooden and armored, and especial- 
ly developed Ericsson's invention, the Monitor. 

It constructed, with great energy, a fleet of river-ships, armored and unarmored, 
for duty in the West. 

Peculiarities of American naval artillery. Guns in service and reserve at the be- 
ginning and the end of the war. 

The navy eventually numbered nearly seven hundred ships. 

. * 

For the overthrow of the Confederate power, it was ab- 
Dutiesofthe Navy solutely necessary, as we have seen (Chapter 

Department. jj^. p ^^ ^ ^ fore J gn commerGe f 

the South should "be prohibited. To accomplish, this, it 
had been determined to establish a blockade. 

But providing for an effective blockade was by no 
means the only duty of the Navy Department ; it had to 
protect the sea-board also, to recover the forts that had 
been seized, to prepare expeditions against strategic points 
on the coast, to pursue Confederate cruisers on the sea, to 
force open and patrol the rivers, to be in readiness for a 
contingency apparently at one time imminent — a foreign 
war — and to meet the vast demands of the army for 
transportation of troops and supplies. 

To accomplish these objects, it must have ships of many 
various kinds of different kinds — some powerful and swift 
ships required. f or ocean serv i ce? som e of light draught to 

penetrate through shallow waters, some iron-clad to en- 


counter batteries, and riflemen on river banks. The sat- 
isfaction of these requirements demanded not merely the 
invention of new models, but the introduction of new 
principles in naval construction, and radical changes in 

The Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Welles, has thus stated 
the first duties of his department : " To make available 
every naval vessel ; to recall our foreign squadrons ; to in- 
crease our force by building new vessels, and by procur- 
ing for naval purposes from the merchant service every 
steamer which could be made a fighting vessel ; to enlarge 
at once the capacity of the navy yards ; to put in requi- 
sition the founderies and work-shops of the country for 
supplies of ordnance and steam machinery ; to augment 
the number of seamen ; and to supply the deficiency of 
officers by selecting experienced and able shipmasters 
and others from the merchant marine." 

At the opening of the w^ar, the force possessed by the 
Navy Department consisted of 42 vessels of 

W6ukn6ss of tbc • 

navy at the opening various classes — steamers and sailing; ships, 

of the war. . ° x ' 

carrying 555 guns and about 7600 men. 
They were dispersed on different stations — the Mediter- 
ranean, the African coast, the coast of Brazil, the East In- 
dies, the Pacific coast, etc. So effectually had the disper- 
mu - ,-. . sion and neutralization of the national fleet 

The ships dispersed. 

been accomplished, that there was actually 
but one efficient war vessel on the Northern coast when 
the conflict began. The conspirators had therefore ample 
time to seize the forts, and establish themselves in the 
strong-holds of the coast unmolested. 

In addition to this scattering of the ships, measures had 
The dock yards pur- been taken to incapacitate the dock-yards, 
pose y neglected. I ns t ea d of there being an accumulation of 

timber suitable for ship-building, the stock had been per- 
mitted to diminish until very little remained. The cus- 
tomary purchases had not been made. 

Chap.XLV.] the navy report. 203 

Still more, " demoralization prevailed among the naval 
The officers unMth- officers, many of whom, occupying the most 
responsible positions, betrayed symptoms of 
that infidelity which has dishonored the service. But, 
while so many officers were unfaithful, the crews, to their 
honor be it recorded, were true and reliable, and have 
maintained, through every trial and under all circumstan- 
ces, their devotion to the Union and the flag." " From 
the 4th of March to the 4th of July, 1861, two hundred 
and fifty -nine officers of the navy either resigned or were 
dismissed from the service." 

Events showed that, to complete the blockade, nearly 
Kequirements for S1X hundred vessels, most of them steamers, 

the blockade. • i mi • / a i i i 

were required, ihis vast fleet was demand- 
ed by the peculiarities of the coast. Its outer line is 
more than three thousand miles in length, and, " had it 
been merely necessary to guard the ports of the principal 
cities of the South, the task would have been compara- 
tively easy. But this external coast-line' is merely the 
outer edge of what may almost be called a series of isl- 
intncate character ands, some long, some short, some wide, and 

others very narrow, stretching along the 
whole Atlantic, behind which are sounds and connecting 
channels forming an almost continuous line of water, nav- 
igable for small vessels from Norfolk to Florida." Navi- 
gable inlets give passage from the ocean to these interior 
channels, affording many secure and secret entrances to 
blockade runners. These inlets, moreover, are subject to 
incessant changes, new ones continually opening, and old 
ones closing up, especially in stormy weather. 

The rapid increase of the navy is shown 

Strength of the navy , „ -., . , , * , -. ., 

at the close of the in the following table or steamers and sail- 
war. . . ° 

mg ships in commission : 

204 THESEAtfAVY. [Sect. VIII. 

March 4, 1861 42 

July 4, 1861 82 

December 1, 1861 264 

December 1, 1862 427 

December 7, 1863 588 

December 1, 1864 671 

The completeness and stringency of the blockade is 
completeness of the proved by the general destitution of the 
South at the close of the war, and by the 
fact that there still remained in those states cotton of the 
value of three hundred millions in gold, which it had 
been impossible to ship. 

In giving the details of the creation of this navy, it 
may be conveniently classed under two heads: (1.) The 
Sea Navy ; (2.) The River Navy. 

(1.) Of the Sea Navy: 

The first measures taken by the Navy Department to 
meet the requirement were directed to the 

First measures for , n , . , . , 

increasing the navy purchase oi such steamers in the commercial 

by purchase. x . 

marine as could be adapted to the service. 
Orders were issued (April 21) to the officers in command 
of the navy yards at Boston, New York, and Philadelphia, 
to charter twenty steam-ships, each capable of carrying a 
nine-inch pivot-gun, the charter to be for three months, 
and the government to have the privilege of purchasing 
at a stipulated price. Orders for vessels of other classes 
were speedily given, and the government became possess- 
ed of some of the best and fastest steamers. 

In building new ships, a work which was entered upon 

with great energy, the principles already ac- 

Peculiarities of , -, . ., . . »p 

American naval cepted in the American navy were uniiorm- 

construction. x .... ™ rT ,, • 

ly carried into effect. Ihese are, to attain 
the highest speed possible under the circumstances; to 


concentrate the projectile power; and, in armored ships, 
to reduce the exposed surface to a minimum. The attain- 
ment of high speed implies an increase in the length of 
the ship and a diminution of her breadth; the concentra- 
tion of projectile power implies diminution of the num- 
ber of guns and increase in the weight of the shot. 
At the epoch of the last Anglo-American war (1812), 
the principle of concentration of power had 

Relative concentra- lr ir 1 

gH^°aSmerS been so f ar carried out that an American 
ship8, forty -four gun frigate was very nearly as 

powerful a machine as an English line-of-battle ship. Un- 
der an equality of rate there was therefore a very great 
disparity of force. Thus the English forty-four gun frig- 
ate Guerriere, brought into action with the American 
frigate Constitution, also rated 'as a forty-four, was con-* 
quered in fifteen minutes, the weight of the broadside 
she threw being 517 pounds, that of her antagonist 768 

To aid in enforcing the blockade, twenty-three small 
The fleet of smaii gun-boats were forthwith constructed. They 
were for service in the shallow waters, each 
being of about five hundred tons burden, their speed 
nine knots, their armament one eleven-inch pivot-gun, two 
tw r enty-four-pound howitzers, and one twenty-pound how- 
itzer. Their length was as great as that of the frigates 
of 1812, their breadth only half as much, their tonnage 
only one third. A large portion of this fleet was built 
and put in commission before December, 1861. These 
ships, together with those that had been purchased, es- 
tablished a blockade acknowledged in Europe as being" 

With a view to the pursuit and capture of the armed 

The kearsarge cruisers built in England, a class of steamers 

was constructed of which the Kearsarge may 

be taken as the type. They were of about 1000 tons bur- 


den ; their length 200 feet, their breadth 33 ; their arma- 
ment two eleven-inch guns, one thirty-pound rifle, and four 
thirty-two-pounders, smooth bore. They were therefore 
longer than the old seventy-four-gun ship, and twenty feet 
narrower. It was one of this class, the Kearsarge, which 
sunk the Alabama. 

It having been found that screw steamers were some- 
times inefficient in narrow channels, because they can not 
retire without turning round, an operation sometimes very 
difficult in such confined places, and exposing the broad- 
side to the enemy's fire, twelve side- wheel steamers, of 850 
tons each, w T ere built. These were followed by the con- 
The double-end?!- struction of another class, twenty-seven in 
number, of about 974 tons burden, with a 
maximum speed of 14^ 'knots per hour. They received 
the name of double-enders from the fact that the ends 
were built alike, and they could move backward or for- 
ward with equal facility. Seven additional ones of the 
same type were added; they were of heavier burden and 
greater speed. 

A third class, still more powerful, was provided, their 
The Lackawanna length 237 feet, their breadth 38, their bur- 
class ' den 1530 tons. The armament of these ships 

was very powerful, though not the same in all. That of 
the Lackawanna was one 150-pounder rifle, pivot; one 
50-pounder ditto; two eleven-inch rifles, 166-pounders; 
four nine-inch broadside guns. Comparing this ship with 
the old frigate Constitution, both were of about the same 
burden, 1500 tons; the broadside of the former 712, of 
the latter 768 ; but the Lackawanna was iive feet nar- 
rower and sixty-two feet longer than the Constitution. 
The concentration of power is seen in the fact that the 
former has only eight guns, the latter had fifty. More- 
over, these heavy modern guns were also shell guns. 
In view of the contingency of war with England or 

Chap.XLV.] the akmored ships. 207 

_. w France, and of the fact that the republic 

The Wampanoag " # a 

class - possessed no foreign coaling stations, still 

another class of ships was built, of which the Wampanoag 
is the type. This vessel is 3200 tons burden, 335 feet 
long, 45 feet in breadth. With the same breadth they 
have twice the length of the frigates of 1812. They are 
full ship -rigged, with an enormous spread of canvas. 
They carry the most powerful engines that their hulls 
can bear. Their armament consists of a few very heavy 
guns. The sails of these sea-racers are to be used to 
spare their coal until they reach their hunting-ground, 
for they are intended to act against the merchant marine 
of the enemy, and clear it from the sea. Their speed, 
either under sail or steam, is to be fifteen knots per hour. 

The Confederate government at an early period turned 
its attention to the construction of iron-clad 
ships. At the seizure of the Norfolk navy 
yard, the Merrimack, one of the largest frigates in the 
service, had been sunk (p. 84), but under such circum- 
stances that she was raised without difficulty. 

There was thus supplied extemporaneously to the Con- 
federates the hull of a very powerful ship. 

The Confederate y^,, -, n , . . . 

iron-ciad Mem- 1 hey proceeded to convert it into an iron- 

mack. * ■*• 

clad on the plan of the shot-proof raft that 
had been used in Charleston Harbor, covering her, when 
properly cut down, with an iron roof projecting into the 
water. At or below the water-line the mail extended in 
the opposite way, so that a shot striking in the air would 
glance upward, and in the water would glance down- 
ward. She was, therefore, a broadside iron -clad with 
sloping armor, and carrying a very formidable battery. 
The national Congress had appointed a special board 

to examine and report on the subject of 

Congressional ap- . -, -• i i -i -i • 

propriatipn for iron-dads, and had made an appropriation 
of $1,500,000 for the experimental construe- 


tion of one or more armored ships. Contracts were ac- 
cordingly made for three such vessels, one a small cor- 
vette, the Galena, plated with iron three inches thick : she 
The three ex eri- P rove d to be a failure, being easily perfo- 
mentai ships. rated with heavy shot. The second was a 
frigate, the New Ironsides : she was constructed as a 
broadside iron-clad, and with her powerful battery of 
eleven-inch guns did good service. The third was the 
Monitor, invented and constructed by John Ericsson. 
The Monitor is essentially a shot-proof revolving tur- 
ret, containing; a battery, and carried on a 

The first Monitor. ' , ,",""° , V i 

rait or null so much submerged as to pre- 
sent the smallest possible surface to an enemy's fire. 

The guns of a monitor can be trained to any point of 
Advantages of the the horizon, even though the ship herself 
monitor type. should be aground. They are mounted over 
the centre or axis of the vessel, and hence those of the 
heaviest weight may be used ; the principle of condensing 
the weight of the broadside into a few heavy shot may 
be perfectly carried into effect. A monitor, in compar- 
ison with a broadside armored ship, requires a small 
number of men. Its fire is more effective because of the 
greater steadiness of the vessel, which exposes but little 
surface to the waves. 

The first monitor was built chiefly for the purpose of 
neutralizing the Confederate iron-clad Mer- 

Ericsson's success- . -, _ _^ . 

fui completion of rimack. Mr. Ericsson, with sreat enersrv, 

his contract. 7 i A 1 

commenced her construction before the con- 
tract for her was signed. He bound himself to finish her 
within 100 days. She reached Fortress Monroe at a most 
critical moment, when her antagonist had begun her work 
of unresisted destruction. By a crew inexperienced in 
her management, and worn out with a stormy voyage, she 
was carried without hesitation into action against her en- 
emy, fought the battle for which she had been built, and 
won it. 


The length of the Monitor was 173 feet, her breadth 
42^ feet; her side armor at the water-line 

Dimensions and ^ .-. , -i • i i ± j_ • i a j_1 - i 

armament of his live inches thick: ner turret ei^nt thick- 


nesses of one-inch iron ; its inside diameter 
was 20 feet, its height nine feet. Her armament was 
two eleven-inch guns mounted side by side. 

The government at once ordered nine monitors, of 
nf . ., , somewhat larger size, and having such im- 

Other monitors at o ' o 

once bmit. provements as experience had suggested. 

The armor was of greater thickness, that of the turret 
being eleven inches. They carried one fifteen-inch and 
one eleven-inch gun. 

This class of monitors was followed by another of light 
Failure of tW light: draught. These proved to be failures, not 
having sufficient flotation. Still another class 
was ordered, larger than any of the preceding, their length 
being 225 feet, their turrets and side-armor eleven inches 
thick. They were considered more formidable than any 
broadside ship afloat. 

To the foregoing two monitor frigates were added. 
There was significance to the Confederates 

The monitor frig- , , , , -_ . 

ates Pmitan and m the names tnev received — the runtan 

Dictator. , d 

and the Dictator. The former is double- 
turreted, the latter single — she is the smaller ship of the 
two. Her length is, however, 314 feet; she is built alto- 
gether of iron ; her side-armor is eleven inches thick, her 
turret fifteen inches ; she has a ram of solid oak and iron ; 
her engines of 5000 horse-power, her armament two fif- 
teen-inch guns. 

Still larger and more powerful, the ram frigate Dunder- 

The ram frigate ^ er g i ,s 378 feet long and 68 feet in breadth. 

Dunderuerg. ghe was i ntenc [ ec t to combine the advan- 
tages of a ram, a casemated broadside, and a monitor, car- 
rying twenty-inch guns. This vessel, probably the most 
powerful war-ship ever built, was not finished until the 
II.— O 


close of the war, and was then sold to the Emperor of the 

With a view of carrying out the monitor type in ocean 
The Miantonomoh cruisers, a class of vessels of which the Mian- 
tonomoh is an example was built. These 
have a sea-speed of eleven knots ; their side-armor is elev- 
en inches thick, their turrets twelve, their armament four 
fifteen-inch guns, and the weight of their discharge 1800 
pounds. Their sea-going qualities have been found to 
answer expectation. They cross the Atlantic without dif- 

Finally, there was nearly completed, at the end of the 

The Kalamazoo war, a class of monitors of which the Kala- 

class ' mazoo is an example, their length 342 feet, 

their breadth 56f feet, their deck solid to the water-line, 

their turrets fifteen inches thick, their intended armament 

twenty-inch guns. 

(2.) Of the Eiver Navy : 

If the republic had only a single available war-ship 
River navy of fhe on the North Atlantic coast at the break- 
west. j n g ou £ £ ^ e i nsurrec tion, it was actually 

still worse prepared on the Mississippi and its tributaries, 
on which there was not so much as a single gun. The 
reopening of those streams, seized by the Confederates 
without resistance, and the conduct of warlike operations 
upon them, implied the creation of a powerful navy, the 
guns of which might sweep the level shores for miles. 

Gun-boats on the Western rivers must be mainly plan- 
Requirements for ne( i f° r resistance and offensive movements 
nver gun-boats. a g a i ns t batteries on the banks, and engage- 
ments with other ships like themselves. Since they are 
to operate in smooth water, principles of construction may 
be adopted in them which would be inadmissible in ships 
exposed to the Atlantic. 

Chap.XLV.] the kiver navy. 211 

The Confederates had strongly and without molesta- 
tion fortified the most important strategic points upon the 
Mississippi — Columbus, Island No. 10, Fort Pillow, Mem- 
phis, Vicksburg, Grand Gulf, Port Hudson, Baton Rouge, 
New Orleans. On the Tennessee they had Fort Henry, 
on the Cumberland Fort Donelson, on the Arkansas Fort 
Hindman, etc. 

At first the government directed the purchase of such 
stout and swift steam-boats as might answer 

Their dimensions , ■• r^, -, . -, , 

and plan of con- the purpose. 1 hev were altered so as to nave 

struction. f x , ■„ -. . -,. 

better protection for their machinery, but 
were not plated with iron. The Conestoga, Tyler, and 
Lexington were of this class. They were side- wheel steam- 
ers. In July, 1861, the government advertised for the 
construction of iron-clad gun-boats. " It was decided to 
construct seven vessels, each of about six hundred tons, to 
draw six feet, to carry thirteen guns, to be plated with 
iron two and a half inches thick, and to steam nine miles 
an hour. They were one hundred and seventy-five feet 
long, and fifty-one and a half wide ; the hulls of wood." 
The principles adopted by the Confederates in the con- 
struction of the Merrimack were here reproduced. " Their 
sides were placed out from the bottom of the boat to the 
water-line at an angle of about thirty-four degrees, and 
from the water-line they fell back at about the same angle, 
to form a slanting casemate, the gun-deck being but a foot 
above water. This slanting casemate extended across the 
hull, near the bow and stern, forming a quadrilateral gun- 
deck. Three nine or ten inch guns were placed on the 
bow, four similar ones on each side, and two smaller ones- 
astern. The casemate inclosed the wheel, which was 
placed in a recess at the stern of the vessel. The plating 
was two and a half inches thick." 

Mr. Eads, of St. Louis, undertook to construct these 
seven vessels in sixty-five days. Mr. Boynton, from whose 

212 THE RIVER NAVY. . [Sect. VIII. 

Energy displayed in History of the United States Navy I am 
bunding them. quoting, says : " It was at this time that the 
contractor returned to St. Louis with an obligation to per- 
form what, under ordinary circumstances, would have been 
deemed by most men an impossibility. Rolling-mills, 
machine shops, founderies, forges, and saw-mills were all 
idle. The engines that were to drive this, our first iron- 
clad fleet, were yet to be built. The timber to form the 
hulls was uncut in the forest; the huge rollers and ma- 
chinery for making their iron armor were not yet con- 
structed. The rapidity with which all these various parts 
were to be supplied forbade depending on any two or 
three establishments in the country, no matter how great 
were their resources. 

" The signatures were scarcely dry upon this important 
contract before the work was actively begun through tel- 
egraphic orders issued from Washington. Special agents 
were dispatched in every direction, and saw-mills were 
simultaneously occupied in sawing the timber required 
in Kentucky, Tennessee, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Minnesota, 
and Missouri, and railroads, steam-boats, and barges en- 
gaged for its immediate transportation. Nearly all the 
largest machine shops and founderies in St. Louis, and 
many small ones, were at once set at work day and night, 
and the telegraph lines between St. Louis, and Pittsburg, 
and Cincinnati were occupied frequently for hours in 
transmitting instructions to similar establishments in 
those cities for the construction of the twenty-one steam- 
engines, and five-and-thirty steam boilers that were to pro- 
pel the fleet. Within two weeks not less than four thou- 
sand men were engaged in the various details of their 
construction. Neither the sanctity of the Sabbath nor 
the darkness of the night were permitted to interrupt it. 
On the 12th of October, 1861, the first United States iron- 
clad, with her boilers and engines on board, was launched 


in Missouri in forty-five days from the laying of her keel. 

In ten clays after the Carondelet was launch- 
pieted in e <Xe Sun- ed, and the Cincinnati, Louisville, Mound 

City, Cairo, and Pittsburg followed in rapid 
succession. An eighth vessel, larger, more powerful, and 
superior in every respect, was also undertaken before the 
hulls of the first seven had fairly assumed shape. In less 
than one hundred days one individual put in construc- 
tion and completed a powerful squadron of eight steam- 
ers, in the aggregate of five thousand tons burden, capa- 
ble of steaming nine knots an hour, each heavily armored, 
fully equipped, and all ready for their armament of one 
hundred and seven large guns." 

In the following year the Navy Department caused to 
The river monitor b e constructed vessels of light draught with 

rotating turrets. Of two of these, the Osage 
and Neosho, the turrets were six inches thick and only 
seven feet high, the floor-beams being so bent as to al- 
low the guns to be worked at a lower level, and permit- 
ting less height of turret. They drew less than four feet. 
Immediately afterward four double -turreted propellers 
were built ; each carried four eleven-inch guns, and drew 
only six feet of water. 

Besides the above, a number of vessels of less resisting 

power were provided; they were musket- 

The tin-clad class. x x i i i i " • 

proof gun-boats, and passed under the title 
of tin-clads. In addition, mortar-boats were construct- 
ed which endured without injury the severe service to 
which they were subjected. "The number of discharges 

from these heavy mortars averaged fifteen" 

The mortar-boats. ^ ° 

hundred to each vessel, and yet they were 
none of them shaken so as to leak, and at the close of 
the war they were sold for nearly as much as they had 
originally cost." 

The navy on the Western rivers steadily increased dur- 


Final strength of ing .the contest. It reached at last more 
the nver navy. than a hundred steamers, all of them fully, 
and many of them powerfully armed. 

The account of the creation of the Navy and Army 
contained in this and the preceding chapter 

Peculiarities of <• -. . -, -, -, , 

American navai may perhaps be appropriately closed by 

artillery. »/ x . x ± ± x^ j «/ 

some statements in relation to the changes 
which took place in cannon. 

American naval artillerists have preferred a heavy 
smashing shot to a smaller and swifter one. 

Up to 1860 the eight-inch gun was regarded in the 
English navy as the heaviest and most pow- 

Armament of En- n ■* . , . -1 -1 i r* 1 1 i 1 

gush and Ameri- erful that could be safely used on board a 

can ships. v n 

ship. It has been already remarked (p. 
205) that, in the war of 1812, American ships were much 
more powerfully armed than English ones of nominally 
the same rate. This principle was steadily kept in view, 
and experiments continually made under the direction of 
the government, until, in 1856, frigates were armed with 
nine, ten, and eleven inch shell guns. Some of these were 

of the form known as Columbiads; they 

Columbiad, Dahl- -, , ,-. -.. , -i i ,i 

gren, and Parrott were, however, gradually displaced by those 
invented by Dahlgren. During the war, 
both in the land and sea services, the Parrott gun was 
largely used. It consists of a casting bored out and ri- 
fled, and then strengthened by a band of wrought iron 
shrunk on the breech. These rifles have been made up 
to the size of a 300-pounder. 

The Rodman gun, which has successfully attained a 
bore of twenty inches, is cast upon peculiar 

The Kodman gun. . _^ . * . x . 

principles. I here is a core ot iron m the 
centre of the mould, and a stream of water is introduced 
from a hydrant into that core. The metal, being poured 
into the mould, is thus cooled from the interior to the 
exterior. The water is introduced to the bottom of the 


core through a pipe going down its centre, and flows off 
at the top. The process goes on during the pouring in 
and cooling of the metal. The guns made by this meth- 
od are much stronger than if made by the method of 
solid casting. 

The twenty-inch gun is fired with a charge of 200 
pounds of powder; its shot weighs 1100 pounds. Its 
range, at 25 degrees of elevation, is more than four and a 
half miles. 

The Navy Department possessed, in March, 1861, 2468 
heavy guns. Of these many were seized at 

Number of guns at ,i -\t /> n n i , n it 

the beginning of the JN orlolk navy yard, and most ot the re- 

thewar. , *> •> 7 

mamder were on board ship's scattered in 
distant seas. Mr. Boynton, to whose work already quo- 
ted I am indebted for many of these facts, affirms that 
the Navy Department had at its disposal little more than 
fifty really efficient guns when the conflict began. 

In November, 1863, the number was 2811, of the most 
Number at the end approved modern patterns. About 800 of 

them were nine-inch and eleven-inch Dahl- 
grens, 700 were heavy rifles, and 36 were of fifteen inches. 





Introductory remarks to this section. 

The Confederates intended to use the Border States as a barrier to screen them- 
selves from the attacks of the government. Their partisans in those states en- 
deavored to assume a position of ostensible neutrality. 

The Governor of Kentucky, in opposition to its Legislature, attempted to carry the 
state over to the Confederacy. 

It was found impossible to maintain neutrality. Kentucky was invaded both by 
Confederate and national troops ; by the former a blockade of the Mississippi was 
established at Columbus. • 

Several events took place in the year 1861 which, 

Hmor military af- though they can not be regarded in a mili- 
fahs of 1861. j. aY j p i n fj f view as important, or as influ- 
encing, except indirectly, the course of the war, demand, 
nevertheless, a passing notice. They occurred at a period 
of great public depression in the North, and of excitement 
in the South, and hence assumed a prominence which did 
not truly belong to them* Among them may be men- 
tioned the operations in Missouri, those in Northwestern 
Virginia, the affair at Bethel, the tragedy at Ball's Bluff. 
Doubtless they were all illustrated with many signal 
instances of military skill and daring on 

Their correct and -i • i t , , -t , i it 

subordinate char- each side, and yet they must be regarded 

acter. '••/•/ o 

as unessential parts of the grand and bloody 
drama about to be enacted. They were incidents, or 
merely personal encounters. In the brilliancy of the 


great events by which they were followed, these little 
ones become almost* invisible. 

During 1861 the government had not a just conception 
„ w . „ .... , of the form which the war must necessarily 

Relation of political < J 

and military ideas. assnme [ n order to obtain decisive results. 
Political considerations completely outweighed the mili- 
tary. This was no more than might have been expected. 
The cabinet had been drawn from civil life. It had not 
yet rejected the fallacy that the military must always be 
subordinate to the political idea. Appalling disasters 
occurred before it fully perceived how frequently that 
maxim has to be reversed. 

If it became necessary to assure the Unionists of Mis- 
„ , souri, or those of Northwestern Virginia, or 

Early war move- ' p . . ./ 

ments incorrect. ^ p ro tect the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, 
or to threaten Norfolk, expeditions were arranged for 
each purpose, and a great army frittered away. The bat- 
tle of Bull Run was fought with less than 30,000 men, 
when there would have been no difficulty in bringing 
into action 60,000. The cabinet had yet to learn that 
a great victory won at a decisive point satisfies a thou- 
sand distant political demands — it had yet to see the 
Mississippi opened by operations, not in its stream, but 
far in its rear — it had yet to see Charleston, after re- 
sisting the most powerful direct attacks, fall helplessly 
by the march of an army a hundred miles distant in the 

By degrees the correct ideas of professional military 
men forced their way, and affairs which, to the eye of in- 
experience, seemed of signal moment, dwarfed to their' 
true proportions, and stood in their proper attitude of in- 

In the three chapters of this section, I shall briefly re- late the more interesting of these military 

affairs and the political movements connect- 



[Sect. IX. 

ed with them, considering them under the titles of trans- 
actions in Kentucky, Missouri, and Virginia respectively. 
Their disconnected character and their subordinate rela- 
tion to the great and decisive campaigns will be recog- 
nized without difficulty. They form, in reality, only a 
prelude to the true war. 

The Border States consist of the most northerly tier of 
slave states. Thev are Missouri, Kentucky, 

The Border States. •.-**- itt-\t mi i 

Virginia, Maryland, Delaware. 1 hough per- 
haps not correctly, Tennessee is often numbered among 

The agricultural products of these states are such as 
Their agricultural belong to a temperate climate. The easter- 
products, jy ones p ro( j uce "breadstuffs and tobacco; 

the westerly have, in addition, hemp and live-stock. The 
value of slave labor is by no means so great in them as 
in the Gulf States, but in most of them negroes could be 
raised for sale very profitably. This gave them an iden- 
tity of interest with the cotton-growing regions at the 

and their popuia- From the census of 1860 it appears that 
the population of the Border States was as 
follows : 

Missouri .... 


Free Colored. 





Kentucky. . . . 




Virginia .... 




Maryland. . . . 




Delaware .... 




They stretch from beyond the Mississippi to the At- 

Their geographical lantic, forming a great bulwark, protecting 

the cotton region from the contact of the 

North, and are nearly divided asunder by the Free State 

Illinois, which, toward the south, being bounded by the 

Chap. XL VI.] 




Mississippi on the west and the Ohio on the east, projects 
deeply into them. At the point of confluence of those 
streams is the important position Cairo. 

It was, as we have seen (p. 95), the intention of the 
Their political posi- original seceding states to intrench them- 
tl0D ' selves behind this great natural barrier, ex- 

pecting that it would bear the burden of the war if 
any should take place, and be the scene of whatever 
devastation might ensue. In that favorable seclusion, it 
was thought that the cotton crop might be raised with- 
out molestation. To obtain access to this staple, it was 
expected that England would not hesitate to break any 
blockade that the national government might establish, 
and that a recognition of independence, and perhaps mil- 
itary aid from Western Europe, might follow. 


It was therefore important to the leaders of the secession 
ana importance to movement that the alliance of the Border 
the confederacy, gtates should be secured. To accomplish 
this, it was necessary, in accordance with the theory of 
the American political system, to obtain the direct con- 
sent of the people of those states through a Convention 
expressly called in each. The Legislatures and executive 
officers had no direct or lawful power in the matter be- 
yond that of calling such a Convention. They could 
only act in obedience to the existing Constitution whose 
agents they were. The transference of allegiance was 
not in their control. 

The inhabitants of the Border States clearly foresaw 
that their geographical position placed them in the front 
of the conflict. In addition to the fact that they were 
by nature (vol. i., p. 102) more predisposed than their 
Southern neighbors to look to the consequences of their 
acts, their vicinity to the Free States caused them to be 
brought under influences antagonistic to the slave system. 
Under such circumstances, it could not be 

Division in their iiiii it i m • 

opinions and inter- expected that they would exhibit unanim- 

ests. . 

ity ; on the contrary, they must necessarily 
be divided by clashing opinions and interests. Though 
the slaveowner miffht view a coalescence with the South- 
ern Confederacy with satisfaction, the slaveless white 
might perhaps resist any attempt to detach him from the 

The problem for the secessionist leaders to solve was 
Mode by which it therefore how to deal wdth these divided 
aiTeCi to d the se " border populations. At an early period, 
while the secession movement was a mere 
conspiracy, it was seen that the election of trustworthy 
governors must be secured. Through the governor a cer- 
tain amount of control over the Legislature could be ob- 
tained, and the vote of the Legislature was needed for 


calling a Convention of the people. Moreover, by mak- 
ing sure of these influences, it was not impossible, though 
such actions might be arbitrary, to obtain possession of 
the military resources of each of those states. 

No pains were spared to excite the slave interest by 

Their slave interests representing that the Free States had at last 

entered upon an abolition crusade, and that 

the Republican party inaugurated in Washington had 

determined on tyrannical measures toward the South. 

On the other hand, all through the summer of 1861 
„ .. . the national government used every exertion 

On their account © «/ 

IvoilelfactTon on to retain these Border States in their loyal- 
ty. It was mainly on their account that no 
hostile measures were taken against slavery. That om- 
inous subject could not fail, however, to intrude, and ac- 
cordingly it had to be dealt with by the military com- 
manders both at Fortress Monroe and in Northwestern 
Virginia, General McClellan, then in command in the 
latter, declared that he should not only abstain from in- 
terference with the slaves, but with an iron hand crush 
any attempts at insurrection on their part. Almost on 
the same day, General Butler, at Fortress Monroe, deter- 
mined to regard them as " contraband" of war, and to 
employ them at a fair compensation. 

In his message to Congress at its extra session in July, 
The effect of their President Lincoln pointed out clearly what 
neutrality. ^e e ff ec £ f the attitude of neutrality must 

necessarily be. "In the Border States so called, in fact 
the Middle States, there are those who favor a policy 
which they call ' armed neutrality ;' that is, an arming of 
these states to prevent the Union forces passing one way, 
or the disunion the other, over their soil. This would be 
disunion completed. Figuratively speaking, it would be 
building an impassable wall along the line of separation 
— and yet not quite an impassable one, for under the 


guise of neutrality it would tie the hands of the Union 
men, and freely pass^ supplies from among them to the in- 
surrectionists, which could not be done if they were open 
enemies. At a stroke it would take all trouble off the 
hands of secession except only what proceeds from the 
external blockade. It would do for the Disunionists that 
which of all things they most desire — feed them well, and 
give them disunion without a struggle of their own. It 
recognizes no fidelity to the Constitution, no obligation 
to maintain the Union." 

Armed neutrality found advocates among both the se- 
cessionists and the loyal. The former feared 

Neutrality advoca- , -i • • « tit .-, . ■■ 

ted by secessionists that it open war should ensue, their slaves, 

and loyalists. x . ' 

for the retention of whom they were willing 
to sacrifice the Union, would escape. The latter, still re- 
taining a deep attachment to the national government, 
were willing to adopt a course which they hoped would 
avoid any fatal collision with it. 

Kentucky, both in a political and military point of 
importance of view, was of the utmost importance to the 
Kentucky. Confederacy. Its slave interests were large, 
and must be protected. Columbus, a little below the 
junction of the Ohio and Mississippi, might be made to 
command the latter river and blockade it completely. 
From that point to Bowling Green there was railroad 
connection. Here, in the opinion of the Confederate en- 
gineers, must be established their outer line of defense. 
The occupation of Kentucky was correctly viewed by 
them as a military necessity. 

The Governor of Kentucky had been elected as a Dem- 
., ,. ... ocrat in 1859: he was thoroughly devoted 

Policy of its gov- " o J 

ernor - to the secession cause. He denounced the 

policy of President Lincoln, and refused the state's quota 
of troops (p. 27). 


Ail extra session of the Legislature had been summon- 
,, ed (January 18th, 1861) for the purpose of 

His message to the \ . . 

Legislature, calling a State Convention. In his message 

to it the governor declared that the people of the Unit- 
ed States are already effectively sundered, and that the 
Union exists only as an abstraction ; that, in fact, it was 
dissolving into its original integral elements; that a 
bloody revolution, already commencing in South Caro- 
lina, was inevitable. He directed attention to the suc- 
cessful establishment of the Southern Confederacy, and 
inquired in what attitude Kentucky should stand, and by 
what authority her external relations should be regu- 
,., . , „ lated. But the Legislature refused to call 

which refuses to call O 

a convention. a g£ a ^ e Convention, preferring that there 
should be a National or Peace Conference at Washington. 

The intentions of the Unionists of Kentucky were ex- 
Quaimed ipyaity of pressed at a^ meeting held in Louisville 
the unionists. (April 18th) immediately after the capture 
of Fort Sumter. It was resolved that the sympathies of 
Kentucky are with those who have an interest in the pro- 
tection of slavery, but that she acknowledges her fealty 
to the United States until its government becomes re- 
gardless of her rights in slave property. The use of co- 
ercive measures to bring back the seceded states was con- 
demned, and the Kentucky State Guard was admonished 
to remember that its fidelity was pledged equally to the 
Union and the state. 

The governor again summoned an extra session of the 
Legislature (April 28th). It refused once 

Second extra ses- • 

sion oftheLegis- more to call a Convention, or to grant him' 

lature. . . 

three millions of dollars which he had re- 
quired for arming the state. It even amended the militia 
law so as to require the State Guard to take an oath of 
allegiance to the Union. He then issued a proclamation 
of neutrality (May 20th), denouncing the war as horrid, 


and forbidding the United States and the Confederate 
States invading Kentucky. This the Legislature refused 
to indorse. The intention of the people was doubtless 
truly expressed by a resolution of their Senate, that the 
state " should not sever its connection with the national 
it inclines toward government, nor take up arms for either 
belligerent party, but arm herself for the 
preservation of peace on her borders." Her attitude was 
that of conditional Unionism. The loyalty of her people 
was shown at the election for delegates to the Peace Con- 
vention (May 4th). They gave a Union majority of fifty 
thousand votes, and the insincerity of those who would 
have forced her out of the Union was manifested by the 
fact that, though they had declared that allegiance and 
loyalty compelled them to go with their state, they did 
not consider themselves under any obligation to remain 
with their state. 

Kentucky had thus, by very large majorities, refused 
to join in the secession movement ; but her governor, 
like those of Virginia and Missouri, was not unwilling to 
make her a screen behind which the purposes of the in- 
surgents in the Cotton States could be carried on. In a 
letter to President Lincoln (August 19), he 

Letter of the gov- -,-■ ixlj.1 1 n J * x 

emor to the Pres- declared that ner people earnestly desire to 

ident. .... 

avoid being involved in the war ; that they 
have rebelled against no authority, engaged in no revolu- 
tion, and have done nothing to provoke the presence of 
a military force. He therefore urged that the national 
troops be removed. 

In his reply, setting forth the reasons which compelled 
The President's h™ to decline gratifying the governor in 
reply. j^ re q Ues ^ sm ce the troops in question con- 

sisted entirely of Kentuckians, Lincoln, in a very charac- 
teristic manner, remarks, "I most cordially sympathize 
with your excellency in the wish to preserve the peace 
of my own native state, Kentucky ; but it is with regret 


I search for and can not find in your not very short letter 
any declaration or intimation that you entertain any de- 
sire for the preservation of the Federal Union." 

In a message to the Legislature which shortly after- 
ward convened (September 3d), the gov- 

Message of the gov- . -, . -, n , . , ° 

emor to the Legis- emor again complained of the intrusive ag- 

lei CUT6. 9 — _ •^-T" "■ TT ^^ 

gression of the .North, and declared his opin- 
ion that Kentucky would never renounce her sympathy 
with her aggrieved sister Southern States ; but that body 
resolved that the neutrality of Kentucky had been vio- 
The Legislature ^ed by the Confederate forces, requested 
cTnfedliSffnva 1 - 116 the governor to call out the militia to expel 

them, and invoked the United States to give 
aid and assistance. The governor vetoed these resolu- 
tions. The Legislature at once passed them over his veto 
by very large majorities. 

The Confederate authorities perceived that it was ab- 
solutely necessary for them to take military possession of 
Kentucky, no matter what the wishes of its people might 
be. If it could not be used as a bulwark, it must be used 

The confederate as a battle-field. They therefore assigned 
General p ik. General Polk to the command of a depart- 
ment extending from the mouth of the Arkansas north- 
ward on both sides of the Mississippi. He had been the 
bishop of the Protestant Episcopal Church of the Diocese 
of Louisiana, but now, as far as it was possible for him to 
do so, had exchanged ecclesiastical for military life. Like 
some of the bishop-generals of the Middle Ages, he drew 
forth well-tried weapons from the spiritual armory, as well 
as those of a carnal kind, in his first general order, declar- 
ing that " the invasion of the South by the Federal armies 
had brought with it a contempt for constitutional liberty, 
and the withering influences of the infidelity of New En- 
gland and of Germany combined." 
II— P 


General Polk at^once occupied Columbus and fortified 
it. Hereupon General Grant, who was in 

The Confederate ir»/i ' i • in j /^ • i i 

troops occupy command 01 the national forces at Cairo, took 
possession of Paducah (September 16th), at 
the junction of the Tennessee and Ohio. It was about 
this time and in reference to these Confederate forces that 
the Legislature passed the resolution above referred to 
requiring their removal from the state. 

Simultaneously with the invasion of Kentucky by Gen- 
eral Polk on the west, General Zollikoffer 

The Confederates . i • i ,1 / i i • j i j j i • 

invade East Ken- entered it on the east, declaring that this 
step was necessary for the safety of Tennes- 
see; and to meet his forces, national troops were intro- 
duced from Indiana, Ohio, etc. 

The seizure and fortifying of Columbus by Polk block- 

BiockadeoftheMis- aded the Mississippi. The position was 
sissippiestabiished. eventually made very strong? being defend- 
ed by more than 120 heavy guns. 

Opposite Columbus, on the Missouri side of the river, 
is Belmont, a steam-boat landing, at which a small Con- 
federate force was encamped. On the 7th of November, 
Grant attacks Bei- General Grant, with 3114 men, attacked this 
force. He succeeded in destroying their 
camp and driving them down to the brink of the river. 
But, the place being commanded by Columbus, General 
Polk was able to bring several of his guns to bear on the 
national troops, and dispatched as quickly as he could a 
re-enforcement of 5000 men across the river. Discipline 
in the armies was at that time very lax. The national 
soldiers indulged themselves in plundering, the officers 
in making stump speeches glorifying the Union and 
magnifying themselves. While this was going on Polk's 
troops appeared. Grant, however, successfully cut his 
way through them, bringing off his own guns and some 
of those of the enemy. He lost 480 men in killed, wound- 
ed, and missing. Polk's loss was 642. 



In Missouri the governor and Legislature were in favor of secession ; the State Con- 
vention averse to it. 

The governor inaugurated hostilities by seizing a national arsenal. In his subse- 
quent movements he was defeated at the battle of Booneville. He then pro- 
claimed the secession of the state. 

Battle of Wilson's Creek, and death of General Lyon. 

General Fremont assigned to the command of the district. Causes of his sudden 

Battle of Pea Ridge, and march of General Curtis to Helena. 

In Missouri the separation of the people into two par- 
intemai dissensions ties at once occurred. The slaveholders 
were numerically in the minority, but their 
inferiority in that respect was compensated for by their 
social influence and wealth. They were mostly settled 
in the rich river valleys, and had no intention of yielding 
to the New Englanders and German immigrants with 
whom the chief towns were thronged. The governor was 
a supporter of the secession party, and the Legislature had 
similar inclinations. 

A State Convention was called by the Legislature. It 
The state Couven- me t February 28th. A commissioner from 
Georgia was permitted to address it. He 
was, however, respectfully dismissed with the informa- 
tion that his views were not considered acceptable, and 
that it was to be regretted that he had no plan of recon- 
ciliation to offer. The Committee of the Convention on 
Federal Relations presented its report on March 9th. It 
offered resolutions declaring that there was no adequate 
cause for Missouri to leave the Union; that she would 


it desires an ami- labor, for its perpetuation ; that the people 
adjustment. Q £ ^ a ^ s j. a ^ e earnestly desired an amicable 

adjustment of all difficulties; it suggested the Crittenden 
Compromise as a satisfactory basis, and a Convention of 
the states for the purpose of suitably amending the Con- 
stitution ; it equally denounced coercion of the seceding 
states by the government, and assaults by those states on 
the government, and entreated both not to bring on the 
nation the horrors of civil war. An amendment was add- 
ed to this report, before its adoption by the Convention, 
recommending the national government to withdraw its 
troops from the forts in the seceded states, where there 
might be danger of a collision with state troops. The 
Convention then adjourned to the following December. 

Though the Convention had thus determined against 
The governor de- secession, the governor at once proceeded to 
S^veVto^L render its action abortive. To President 
contederacy. Lincoln's requisition for troops he returned 
a refusal, and called an extra session of the Legislature 
(May 2d) to authorize the military organization of the 
state. In his message on that occasion, he declared that 
the sympathies of Missouri were with the Slave States, 
and that it was necessary for her interests to unite her 
destiny with theirs. In his views the Legislature con- 

The governor had already (April 20th) seized the 
He seizes the arse- United States Arsenal at Liberty, and had 
nai at Liberty. distributed among his friends the arms it 
contained ; he had attempted to obtain control of the city 
of St. Louis by establishing in it an armed force under the 
guise of a metropolitan police ; he had ordered the mili- 
tia to go into encampment under pretense of drilling, but, 
in reality, to be ready to secure the state. His intention 
was to seize the national arsenal at St. Louis, at that time 
in charge of Captain Lyon, who had a garrison of about 


The arms at st. 500 regulars. That officer, while the gov- 
Louis removed. emov was maturing his plans, had the arms 

secretly transferred to Springfield, in the adjoining Free 
State Illinois. Meantime permission had been received 
from Washington to raise troops, and, notwithstanding 
the refusal of the governor to comply with the President's 
requisition, several regiments had been raised by Colonel 
F. P. Blair. 

Captain Lyon, finding that the state troops encamped 
. .. in the vicinity of St. Louis were receiving 

Lyon surprises the •/ o 

secession camp. cannon, shot, and shell taken from the na- 
tional arsenal at Baton Rouge, in Louisiana, and sent up 
the Mississippi in boxes marked " marble," resolved not 
to wait for their assault on the arsenal in his charge. 
With 6000 troops, he suddenly surrounded their camp 
and compelled them to surrender. He took from them 
, , 20 cannon, 1200 new rifles, several chests 

and captures many " * 

munitions. f small-arms, and large quantities of ammu- 

nition. As the last of the prisoners w T ere leaving their 
camp, some persons from the city fired on his German 
combats between regiments, who, returning the fire, killed and 
the opponents. wounded more than twenty of their assail- 
ants. As might have been expected, the city was a scene 
of conflict between the two parties for several days sub- 

General Harney, now arriving in St. Louis, took com- 
mand of the national forces, and entered into 

Harney makes a . . T , i n . 

compact with the a compact with the governor, agreeing that 

governor. * ° ' *? ° 

no military movements should be made so 
long as the state authorities would preserve order. The" 
national government, however, disapproved of this com- 
Lyon assi-nea to P ac t, relieved Harney of his command, and 
the command. conferred it on Captain Lyon, who was com- 
missioned a brigadier general. 

But the governor did not desist from his attempt to 


force the state into the Confederacy. The 

The governor de- . *> 

S a onhe h na r tiS" Legislature had placed the whole military 
troops ' power in his hands ; it had made every able- 

bodied man subject to military duty, and had provided 
money for war purposes. He demanded of General Lyon, 
as a preliminary to pacification, that no national troops 
should be permitted to remain in Missouri, and that his 
volunteers should be disbanded. This being refused, he 
„ . . issued a proclamation calling: into service 

He issues a procla- x o 

mation, 50,000 militia for the purpose of repelling 

invasion, declaring to the people that their first allegiance 
was due to their own state ; that they were under no ob- 
ligation whatever to obey the unconstitutional edicts 
of the military despotism that had enthroned itself at 
Washington, nor to submit to the infamous and degrad- 
ing sway of its minions. He had railroad 

and commences i • i -t i i , i i , i 

warlike opera- bridges burned and telegraph wires cut, and 

commenced a civil strife for the purpose of 

forcing Missouri into the Confederacy, though so large a 

majority of the people were avowedly averse to that 


By the Kansas conflicts (vol. i., p. 416), Missouri had 
been prepared for fierce civil dissensions. 

The Legislature . ., • • i i i i t 

places funds at As not a single secessionist had been elect- 

his disposal. ° 

ed to the Convention, the governor gave up 
all hope of attaching the state to the Confederacy through 
an action^ real or ostensible, of the people, and, thoroughly 
committed to the slave interest, he carried on his opera- 
tions through the Legislature. This body had placed at 
his disposal more than $3,000,000, derived from funds 
intended for purposes altogether different, such as the 
school fund, the interest on the state debt, etc. With 
these means he proceeded to attempt the military organi- 
zation of the state, and concentrated his militia at Boone- 
ville and Lexington. 

Chap.XLVIL] political movements in missouel 231 

He endeavored at first to renew the agreement pre- 
ne expects troops viously made with General Harney, and to 
from the south, secure the removal of the national troops. 
In whatever promises he gave of neutrality, he was, how- 
ever, insincere, for he knew that a body of Texan troops 
were coming across the Southern frontier to his aid. 

General Lyon at once determined to attack the troops 
Lyon attacks him at a ^ Booneville before they were re-enforced. 
He moved with such celerity that he came 
upon them (June 17th) unprepared. In an affair of twen- 
ty minutes he totally routed them. The governor fled 
to the Southwest, to meet re-enforcements which were hur- 
rying to him from other parts of the state, and the ex- 
pected Texan troops. To prevent this junction, Colonel 
Sigel had been sent with a national force from St. Louis. 
He advanced from Rolla to beyond Carthage, but was 
too late to accomplish his purpose. After some severe 
fighting he was forced back to Springfield, where he was 
joined by Lyon. 

While things were in this condition the State Conven- 
tion reassembled at Jefferson City (July 
points uew state of- 20th\ It declared the offices of governor, 

ricers. ' 

lieutenant governor, etc., vacant, and pro- 
nounced all the anti-national legislation that had taken 
place null and void. It appointed a new governor until, 
on a subsequent day of election, the people should ex- 
press their choice. 

On his part, the governor, in retaliation, issued a dec- 
laration that, by the act of the people and 
ciares that the state government of the Northern States of the" 
late Union, the political connection of Mis- 
souri with the United States was dissolved. In conformi- 
ty with the plan elsewhere followed, he proceeded to con- 
tract an alliance with the Confederacy, turning over to it 
the military means of the state. The formal secession of 



[Sect. IX. 

Missouri was thus the act of one man, and herein is seen 
the wisdom of the original movers of secession, in hav- 
ing persons who could be relied upon for their purposes 
as governors in all the Border States. 


The month of August came, and found General Lyon 
at Springfield, hoping to receive re-enforcements ; but the 
battle of Bull Run had occurred, and rendered it hnpos- 
Fremont takes com- sible to send him aid. Major General Fre- 

mandofthedistrict. j^^ j^ ^^ appointed to tte com mand 

of the Western Department, and had reached St. Louis 
(July 25). Meantime Confederate troops were pouring 
over the southern frontier of Missouri, and Lyon, finding 
that they were advancing upon him in two columns, de- 
termined to strike before he should be overwhelmed by 
the combined Louisiana, Missouri, Arkansas, and Texas 
troops. His force did not exceed 5500, his antagonist had 
Lyon's skirmish at more than 12,000. A skirmish occurred at 
Dug Spring (August 1st), in which he had 

Dug Spring. 


the advantage ; but he could not prevent the junction of 
the two columns. Hereupon he fell back to Springfield. 
His position had now become. one of great difficulty. Po- 
litical as well as military considerations rendered it al- 
most impossible for him to retreat farther. He therefore 
determined to resume the offensive, and compensate for 
his weakness by audacity. Moving out of Springfield on 
a very dark night (August 9, 10), and having ordered 
Sigel, with 1200 men and six guns, to gain the enemy's 
rear by their right, he was ready, as soon as day broke, 
to make an attack on their front. 

But the disparity of force was too great. Sigel was 
Battle of wnsou's overwhelmed. He lost Hve out of his six 
guns, and more than half his men. The at- 
tack in front was conducted by Lyon in person with very 
great energy. His horse was shot under him; he was 
twice wounded, the second time in the head. In a final 
charge he called to the Second Kansas Regiment, whose 

colonel was at that moment severely wound- 
Death of Lyon. _ i -i • 

ed, "Come on, I will lead you, and in so do- 
ing was shot through the heart. 

After the death of Lyon the battle was still continued, 
their artillery preserving the national troops from total 
defeat. News then coming of Sigel' s disaster, a retreat 
to Springfield, distant about nine miles, was resolved on. 
It was executed without difficulty. 

In this battle of Wilson's Creek there were 223 killed, 
Results of the bat- 721 wounded, 292 missing, on the national 
side ; and, as may be inferred from the de- 
termined character of the assault, the loss of the Confed- 
erates was very great. They had been so severely han- 
dled that they made no attemj^t at pursuit, and the re- 
treat was continued by the national troops, who, on the 
19th, had fallen back to Kol]a. 

After this action, the Confederate commanders McCul- 


Quarrel of the con- l° c h and Price quarreling with each other 

federate generals. -r i i , l n ii • 

and unable to agree upon a plan tor their 
campaign, the former returned to Arkansas, the latter ad- 
vanced from Springfield toward Lexington. Here he 
found a national force of about three thousand (2780) 
under Colonel Mulligan. 

Attempts were made by General Fremont to re-enforce 
Mulligan, but they did not succeed. Meantime the assail- 
ing forces were steadily increasing in number, until they 
eventually reached 28,000, with 13 pieces of artillery. 
They surrounded the position, and cut off the beleaguer- 
ed troops from water. They made repeated assaults with- 
out success until August 20th, when they contrived a 
movable breastwork of hemp-bales, which they rolled be- 
captmeofLexiug- f° r e them as they advanced, and compelled 
Mulligan, who had been twice wounded, to 
surrender unconditionally. 

On receiving the news of this disaster, Fremont at once 

left St. Louis with the intention of attacking 

against the'confed- Price, but that general instantly retreated, 

erates. , . , . °, , J 

making his way back to the southwest cor- 
ner of the state, where he rejoined McCulloch and his 
Confederate troops. Fremont continued the pursuit, his 
army amounting to 30,000 men, of whom 5000 were cav- 
alry ; he had 86 guns. But, on reaching Tipton, he was 
overtaken by the Secretary of War, who had come from 
Washington for the purpose of having an interview with 
He is suddenly re- hi m - On November 2d an order was re- 
hevecL ceived at Springfield removing Fremont 

from his command. He was directed to turn it over to 
General Hunter, who was soon after superseded by Gen- 
eral Halleck. 

Among the avowed reasons for the removal of Fremont, 
causes of his re- thus checked in the outset of his career, were 
mova1 ' his permitting the disaster that had befallen 

Chap.XLVIL] fkemont eemoved FROM COMMAND. 235 

Colonel Mulligan, and the extravagance of his military 

preparations at St. Louis; but from his correspondence 

causes of his re- with President Lincoln it may be seen that 

moval. jj ie ^ rue reason ] a y J n j^q y[ ew ne took of 

the general policy on which the war should be conduct- 
ed. At that time the administration was extremely so- 
licitous to do nothing that might alienate the Border 
Slave States; the President, as he himself has told us, 
was not unwilling to spare slavery, if by that means the 
Union could be saved ; and McClellan, who had now the 
chief military command, was perhaps ready to go even 
farther than that. Such being the intention of the au- 
thorities at Washington, it was plain that the general or- 
der issued by Fremont immediately on taking command 
of the Western Department was incompatible therewith. 
In this he had declared that " the property, real and per-* 
sonal, of all persons in the State of Missouri who shall 
take up arms against the United States, or shall be di- 
rectly proven to have taken active part with their ene- 
mies in the field, is declared to be confiscated to the pub- 
lic use, and their slaves, if any they have, are hereby de- 
clared to be free men." 

After the removal of Fremont the national army was 
Retreat of the na- ordered to retire upon Kolla. There had, 
therefore, been two military advances from 
St. Louis across the state toward its southwest corner, the 
first under Lyon, the second under Fremont. In each 
case the subsequent retreat was followed by unhappy 
consequences, in exposing those individuals and families 
who had ventured to sustain the national cause to tHe 
vengeance of their opponents. 

On the 18th of November General Halleck arrived at 
St. Louis, and took command of the West- 

Ilalleck takes com- -p. a, ,-!•.♦ -i ^ « -. 

mand of the depart- em Department. At this time the Confed- 

ment. x . 

erates under Price were intending to ap- 


proach Kansas and destroy the Northern Railroad. But 
before Christmas Halleck had compelled him to retreat 
into Arkansas, and for a short time military operations 
closed during the severity of the winter. Price had dis- 
played no small skill in his movements, and it was be- 
lieved in Richmond that if he had been properly sup- 
ported he would have secured Missouri to the Confed- 

Price himself attributed his want of success to the fail- 
ure of McCulloch to sustain him. These 

Van Dorn takes n^ ■* -. -. . • ii ^ 

command of the officers were on such bad terms with each 

Confederates. . 

other that it became necessary to put a su- 
perior over them. Accordingly (January 29th, 1862), 
General Van Dorn was ordered to take command of the 
Mississippi District. He had his headquarters at Little 

Three days after General Halleck had taken command 
General Haiieck's °^ ^ ie "Western Department, he issued an 
slave order. order (November '21st) that no fugitive 

slaves should be permitted to enter the lines of any camp, 
nor of any forces on the march. The reason assigned for 
this measure was that such persons had conveyed to the 
enemy important information respecting the numbers and 
condition of his forces. He thus brought the slave policy 
of his department more nearly into correspondence with 
the slave policy of the administration, and corrected the 
error into which it was assumed that General Fremont 
had fallen. 

The national forces were now combined under General 
Curtis, who (February 11th) moved forward 

Curtis's advance. n x -, . -. . , . . . . ,, 

from Lebanon with the intention of operat- 
ing against Price. As he advanced the Confederates re- 
tired into Arkansas, falling back fifty miles beyond the 
Boston Mountain. This retreat, if such it could be call- 
ed, was a falling back on re-enforcements, which were 

Chap. XLVIL] 



daily increased in strength ; the national advance was at- 
tended by a continual enfeeblement. 

Under these circumstances, Curtis, foreseeing that he 
would soon be attacked at a disadvantage, 

Battle of Pea Eidge. ' , ° 1 

took post on sugar Creek. His first and 
second divisons, under General Si^el, were four miles 


southwest of Bentonville ; his third, under Colonel J. C. 
Davis, was on Pea Eidge, north of Sugar Creek; his 
fourth, under Colonel Carr, was at Cross Hollows. The 
entire force was 10,500, with 49 guns. The enemy, under 
General Van Dorn, now advancing upon him, numbered 
more than 20,000 men. 

On March 5th, a cold, snowy day, Curtis received no- 
tice that the Confederates w^ere approaching. He there- 
upon sent orders to Sigel and Carr to fall back at once 
on Sugar Creek ; the former accomplished that movement 
with considerable difficulty, but with very great skill, in- 
cessantly fighting and repelling the enemy; but, in spite 
of the weather and the dreadful condition of the roads, 


he made good his junction with Curtis on the west end 
of Pea Ridge. 

Meantime General Curtis had made preparations for 
receiving the enemy on the southwest, along the Fayette- 
ville Road. They, however, passed round to the north of 
Pea Ridge, and on the morning of the 7th Curtis found 
them prepared to attack him from that quarter ; he was 
thus compelled to make a corresponding change of front, 
his position being perilous; for, if he were defeated, the en- 
emy would occupy his line of retreat. Sigel held his left, 
Davis his centre, Carr his right. The attack commenced 
on the 7th, and was chiefly directed by the Confederates 
against Carr's division, which was forced back in the 
course of the day nearly a mile, though not disorganized. 

McCulloch, who confronted Sigel on Curtis's left, at- 
tempted, by a movement of his force to the east, to join 
Van Dorn and Price in their attack on Curtis's right. 
To arrest this, Sigel sent forward three pieces of artillery, 
with a supporting force of cavalry, but they were speed- 
ily overwhelmed and the guns captured. Sigel, however, 
being re-enforced by Davis, a desperate struggle ensued, 
which ended in a complete rout of the Confederate right, 
its generals, McCulloch and Mcintosh, being killed. 

At the close of the day Price was on the Fayetteville 
Road, in Curtis's rear. Elkhorn Tavern was Van Dorn's 
head-quarters. The national army had been defeated on 
the right ; its line of communication had been taken ; it 
was nearly without food. The Confederates had been 
defeated on their right. During the night the Confeder- 
ate forces formed a junction on the ground held by their 
left wing. The national line had also changed ; Davis 
was on the right, Carr at the centre, Sigel on the left. 
The battle was renewed at sunrise, Sigel opening a heavy 
cannonade and advancing round the enemy's right, Davis 
turning their left as Sigel advanced. The Confederates 


Defeat of the con- could not stand the cross fire to which they 
federates. were exposed, and were compelled in two 

hours to retreat through the defiles of Cross Timber Hol- 
low. The national loss was 1351. The Confederate loss 
was heavier. After the battle General Curtis fell back 
into Missouri, and Van Dorn into Arkansas. 

In this battle there appeared on the side of the Confed- 
indian ames of the erates four or Rve thousand Indians. Some 
of them assisted in taking a battery, but, 
for the most part, they were so amazed at the evolutions 
and noise of the artillery that General Van Dorn, in his 
report, does not mention that they had been of service to 
him. These Indians had been brought over to the Con- 
federacy by emissaries who had been sent among them, 
representing that the Union had been destroyed, and that, 
if they desired to retain their slaves — for many slaves 
were held by them — it was best for them to join the Con- 
federate side, with which, in that particular, they had an 
interest in common. The Creeks and Cherokees had long 
been disaffected to the Union on account of their removal 
to this region from the East ; and the vacillating military 
movements that had been taking place in Missouri for the 
establishment of the national authority, the death of Gen- 
eral Lyon, and other facts which they had learned, and 
the bearing of which they could comprehend, were used 
with success to draw many of them over to the Confeder- 
ate side. A minority, however, still remained attached to 
the Union. 

The expedition into Arkansas was shortly afterward 
The march of Curtis resumed by General Curtis. He reached 
to Helena. Batesville (see map, p. 232), on the White 

River (May Gth), where he expected to meet supplies and 
the co-operation of gun-boats coming up the river. In 
this he was disappointed, partly owing to the lowness of 
the river, and partly to the difficulty of passing the ob- 


structing batteries of the enemy. In making such an at- 
tempt, one of the boats — the Mound City — had been 
blown up. It was Curtis's intention to march to Little 
Rock, the capital of Arkansas ; but ten regiments were 
taken from him and sent to Corinth, thus occasioning the 
abandonment of the Little Rock campaign. The Confed- 
erates were in like manner weakened, their Arkansas 
troops being sent into Tennessee. Curtis remained at 
Batesville until June 26th, when he resumed his march, 
passing down between the White and the Cache Rivers 
until he reached Clarendon (July 9th). Two days pre- 
viously his advance had been attacked by some Texan 
cavalry, 1500 strong, who had been repulsed with heavy 

On reaching Clarendon, Curtis found that the gun- 
boats and transports had returned down the river the 
day before. He was therefore compelled to cross over to 
Helena, on the Mississippi. At the close of September 
he was appointed to the command of the Department of 
Missouri, with his head-quarters at St. Louis. 

The subsequent military operations in Arkansas were 
Minor military op- n °t of much moment. There were affairs at 
erations. Cross Hollows and Cane Hill, which ended 

adversely to the Confederates. A more important en- 
gagement took place at Prairie Grove (December 7th), 
by which the farther advance of the Confederate troops 
into Missouri was checked. 



Western Virginia disapproved of the secession of the state and adhered to the 

General McClellan crossed the Ohio, and conducted operations so successfully 

against the secession generals who were occupying Western Virginia that the 

Confederate government was eventually constrained to abandon the campaign in 

that region. 
General Butler, in command at Fortress Monroe, sent an expedition against the 

Confederate posts at Bethel. Failure of that expedition. 
An expedition sent toward Leesburg was enveloped by the Confederates on Ball's 

Bluff. The national troops were forced into the Potomac with very severe loss. 

The machinations of the secession conspirators in Vir- 
ginia were very far from commanding ap- 
adheres touS™' proval throughout the state. Especially 

Union. x . . . n 

was this the case with the inhabitants of 
the northwestern counties, who had but few slaves. At 
a Convention held at Wheeling, in which delegates from 
about forty counties were present, the action of the cabal 
at Richmond was repudiated, and it was determined that 
West Virginia should adhere to the Union. A governor 
and lieutenant governor were appointed. A Legislature, 
claiming to be that of loyal Virginia, assembled ; the 
western part of the state was separated from the eastern. 
Eventually Congress assented to and ratified this action. 
The view taken of these proceedings by the inhabit- 
ants of Western Virginia was that their relations with 
the Union simply remained intact; but in the eastern 
portions of the state, which were under the control of 
the secessionists of Richmond, they were regarded in the 
light of a secession from the state itself. Partly for the 



[Sect. IX. 

sake of repressing thi£, and partly from the military con- 
sideration that Northwestern Virginia, advancing with- 
in a short distance of Lake Erie, almost bisects the Free 

States, troops were without delay dispatch- 
Troops enter it from -, . . . . . n .. -.-, . . n ^ 

other parts of the ed mto it to enforce its adhesion to the Con- 
state. -. 

The Richmond authorities had seized Harper's Ferry 
immediately upon the passage of the ordinance of seces- 
sion (p. 83). Occupying it as strongly as they could, 
they cut off all communication between Western Virginia 
and Washington along the line of the Baltimore and Ohio 


No movement was made by the national government 
until after the day (May 23d) appointed for the election 
to ratify or reject the ordinance of secession, it being 
thought expedient to do nothing that might be inter- 
Mccieiian ordered preted as an interference with the Border 
to cross the Ohio, g^^ After that Section, however, Gen- 
eral George B. McClellan, who had been assigned to the 


command of the Department of the Ohio, including West- 
ern Virginia, received orders to cross the Ohio and ad- 
vance along the line of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad 
to Harper's Ferry. He issued addresses to the people 
and to his soldiers, in the former denouncing the " infa- 
mous attempt of the traitorous conspiracy dignified by 
the name of the Southern Confederacy." He then pro- 
ceeded to occupy Parkersburg, the terminus of the rail- 
road on the Ohio River. A secession force lying at Graf- 
ton, the place of junction of the two branches of the road 

to Parkersburg and to Wheeling respective- 
He forces the seces- , - n i/y»ji t ,i -i . 

sionists from the ly was iorced on the road southward to 

railroad. j^ ' . - . /->t -i i -r» 

Philippi. Here its commander, Colonel Por- 
terfield, issued an address to the people urging them not 
to allow the people of other states to govern them. 
McClellan, however, ordering an advance to Philippi, 
Porterfield had to retreat, first to Beverley, and then to 
Huttonsville, where he was joined by re-enforcements un- 
der Governor Wise, who assumed command. 

An Indiana regiment, under Colonel Lewis Wallace, 

had been directed to join General Robert 

Affair at Romney. ■- 1 . .. 

Patterson, who was in command 01 the De- 
partment of Pennsylvania, and who was preparing to at- 
tack Maryland Heights, which command Harper's Ferry. 
On approaching the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, in the 
direction of Cumberland (June 9th),Wallace learned that 
there was a force of 1200 Confederates at Romney. Mak- 
ing a march of eighty -four miles, of which forty-six were 
on foot, in twenty-four hours, he drove the Confederates 
from their post, and so alarmed General Joseph E. John- 
ston, who was holding Harper's Ferry, that he evacuated 

that place (June 15th), after having burned 

Evacuation of liar- .-, .-, -i i • i , i -r> , «-it 

per'8 rerry by the railroad bridge over the Potomac, spiked 

Johnston, *? 7 x 

the guns he could not carry away, and blown 
down rocks so as to obstruct the railroad and canal. Pat- 

244 RICH MOUNTAIN. [Sect. IX. 

terson at once crossetl the river in pursuit of hiin, but was 
speedily compelled to return, General Scott having or- 
dered him to send all his regulars and Burnside's regi- 
ment to "Washington. 

Patterson, however, renewed his attempt under instruc- 

who is pursued by tioilS fr0m Scott Q* l Y 2d )> and at Falling 

Patterson. Waters, encountering Johnston's advance 

under Stonewall Jackson, forced it back to Bunker Hill. 
On the 15th of July Patterson moved forward on that 
place, occupying it without resistance. On the 17th he 
suddenly turned to the left, and moved away from his en- 
emy toward Charlestown ; Johnston at once gave him the 
slip, and, joining Beauregard at Manassas, 

BeaSegardX won the battle of Bull Run (p. 126). Little 

BUllRUn ' 4.' 4.T. * -U- V 

suspecting the consequences of his negli- 
gence, Patterson remained at Charlestown until the 2 2d. 
A few days after he was superseded by General Banks. 
While these events were taking place on the Potomac, 

the Confederate troops were operating on 

Garnett endeavors .-, .-, n .-, -n t . • t r\i ■ ~rt m i 

to check mccm- the south ot the Baltimore and Ohio Kail- 
road, in Northwestern Virginia, their inten- 
tion being to prevent McClellan from coming through 
any of the mountain gaps into the Shenandoah Valley, 
and joining Patterson. Porterfield had been succeeded 
in his command by General Garnett, who had distin- 
guished himself in the Mexican War. 

The forces of General McClellan, who still remained at 
Affair at Eich Grafton, had increased, by the 4th of July, 
Mountain. ^ 20,000 men. As his antagonists could 

scarcely muster one third of that strength, he directed an 
advance upon them. Their main force under Garnett 
was at Laurel Hill, near Beverley, having a detachment 
under Colonel Pegram at Rich Mountain. Colonel Rose- 
crans, with 1800 men, attacked this detachment, which 
was about 900 strong, on the 11th of July. His march 


had been through mountain paths and trackless forests, 
in a heavy rain. Pegram was put to flight, and lost nearly 
half his men. McClellan now coming up with his main 
army, Garnett, who had been joined by some remnants 
of Pegram's force, and whose rear was exposed to Rose- 
crans, was compelled to abandon his camp and cannon, 
and move toward Beverley. McClellan had, however, en- 
tered that place before him, and drove him into a precip- 
itate flight northwardly. Pegram, cut off from support, 
surrender of p e - an( l without food for two days, was obliged, 
gram. with 600 men, to surrender, and Garnett, after 

throwing away every thing that could impede his flight, 
was overtaken by General Morris, who was conducting 
the pursuit, at Carrick's Ford. Here the Confederates, 
Affair at camck's ^ ne i r ammunition exhausted, were finally 
Ford - dispersed. Their General Garnett, attempt- 

ing in vain to rally them, was killed. The fugitives 
wandered over the Alleghany Mountains, and eventually 
joined Stonewall Jackson at Monterey. 
In a dispatch to the government, General McClellan 
says, " We have completely annihilated the 

McClellan's dis- . TTT . XT . . . ^ -. 

patch to the gov- enemy in Western Virginia. Our loss is 

eminent. ^ ° 

about 13 killed, and not more than 40 
wounded, while the enemy's loss is not far from 200 
killed, and the number of prisoners we have taken will 
amount to at least 1000. We have captured seven of 
the enemy's guns in all." 

Another national force was meantime advancing from 
operations on the Guyandotte up the KanawhaValley. It met 
some resistance at Scarytown, but pressed 
forward with a view of attacking General Wise. He, 
however, having learned of the disaster that had befallen 
Garnett, retreated, burning the bridge over the Gauley 
River to delay pursuit, and made his way successfully to 
Lewisburg. At this place lie was joined by General 


junction of wise Floy d,'the former Secretary of War, who, out- 
loy ' ranking him, took the command, and at once 

assumed the offensive. He surprised and routed an Ohio 
regiment at Cross Lanes, and, moving southwardly, en- 
deavored to gain the rear of the national general Cox; 
but, while attempting this, was suddenly attacked by Rose- 
crans, who had come down from Clarksburg, 

Affairs of Cross , n •/» -n / a .-.^,-i\ mi 

Lanes and camifex at Carmfex h erry (August 10th). The at- 
tack began at three o'clock in the afternoon. 
Floyd, outnumbered, acted on the defensive. He had 
ordered Wise to come up to his support, but that officer 
failing him, he was compelled to abandon his position 
during the night, retreating to Big Sewell Mountain. 

Floyd now complained to the Confederate government 
Arrival of General of what he regarded as Wise's neglect in the 
affair of Carnifex Ferry, and General Robert 
E. Lee, destined to future celebrity, who, upon the retreat 
of Garnett from Rich Mountain, had been appointed to 
succeed him, arriving with large re-enforcements, and out- 
ranking both of the disputants, took the command. 
Previously to this junction being effected, General Lee 
had attempted unsuccessfully to dislodge 

Lee's previous op- -n in i i n r^ 

erations at cheat Kosecrans s iorces, under command of Gen- 
eral Reynolds, from Cheat Mountain. The 
attack miscarried through the failure of an expected com- 
bination. This want of success brought upon Lee the 

Dissatisfaction with disapprobation of the Confederate govern- 
himatKichmond. -^ It ^ gaid - Richmond that "he 

might have achieved a glorious success, opening the whole 
Northwestern country, and enabling Floyd and Wise to 
drive Cox with ease out of the Kanawha Valley. Re- 
grets, however, are unavailing now. General Lee's plan, 
finished drawings of which were sent to the War Depart- 
ment at Richmond, was said to have been one of the best- 
laid plans that ever illustrated the rules of strategy, or 


ever went awry on account of practical failures in its ex- 

Having failed in this plan for dislodging his enemy 
from Cheat Mountain and relieving Northwestern Vir- 
ginia, Lee determined to go into the Kanawha region, and 
help Floyd and Wise. He ordered back Floyd's troops 
to a position that had been fortified by Wise, and named 
Camp Defiance, strengthening the works by a breastwork 
four miles long. He had now under his command nearly 
20,000 men. Here he lay making preparations to attack 
Eosecrans, who was in front of him. Rosecrans, however, 
suddenly retired by night, and was not pursued; and 
again a clamor rose in Richmond that " a second oppor- 
tunity for a decisive battle in Virginia had been lost." 

Some unimportant operations now took place at New 
River, Romney, Alleghany Summit, Hunt- 

The Confederates --n — i i • r n i -i • 

abandon the cam- ersville ; but winter was tast approaching, 
and the Confederate government, greatly dis- 
appointed at the course of events, determined to abandon 
the campaign. Lee was recalled, and sent to take charge 
of the coast defenses of South Carolina. Wise was or- 
dered to report at Richmond. Floyd was sent to the 

On the Confederate side, the failure of this campaign 
was attributed to the incapacitv of General 

Lee andMcClellan. . x J 

Lee ; on the national side, the success was 
ascribed to the talents of General McClellan. The for- 
mer officer was greatly blamed by the government at 
Richmond ; the latter still more greatly rewarded by that 
at Washington. How different the judgment passed upon 
these soldiers a few months subsequently, at the close of 
the Peninsular campaign ! 

In view of the scale on which it was soon found that 
insignificance of warlike operations must be carried on for 
these affairs. t ^ ^^^^ of tte Confederacy, we may 


see how insignificant were the combats of this campaign, 
and how unimportant the result. Yet, coming at a time 
when the nation was deeply depressed, the moral effect 
was great. Though McClellan had not in person com- 
manded on any of these battle-fields, he gathered the en- 
tire honor. 

In consequence of his services at Bull Run, Stonewall 
Jackson had been made a major general in the Confed- 
erate service and assigned command at Winchester. On 
the 1st of January, 1862, he marched westward, capturing 
Bath and Romney, but was obliged to return. The weath- 
er was so severe and the roads so dreadful that General 
Lander, in command of the national troops, could not 
move more than a mile and a quarter an hour ; he him- 
self suffered so much from hardship and anxiety that 
shortly afterward he died. Nevertheless, he had succeed- 
ed in clearing his department of the Confederates. 

Fortress Monroe, commanding Chesapeake Bay and 

James River, is the largest and most power- 
Fortress Monroe. — M "I • 1 IT T 

ful military work in the republic. It was 
built at a cost of two and a half millions of dollars. It 
covers an area of nearly seventy acres. 

General Butler, whose successful restoration of order in 
General Butier m Baltimore had not met with the approval 
command. Qf General g cott? k a a been ordered to the 

command of this work. Soon after his arrival (May 2 2d), 
he found himself, at the head of 12,000 troops, confronted 
by 8000 Confederates under General Magruder. He at 
once caused a reconnoissance to be made in the direction 
of Hampton, and drove the Confederates out of that town. 
On the return of the expedition some negroes joined it, 
and having informed Butler that they had been engaged 
in the building of fortifications, he declared them " con- 



origin of the term traband of war." The government subse- 
quently approving of his course, fugitive 
slaves thereafter passed in the army under the designa- 
tion of contrabands. 

The main body of the Con- 
federates under 

Magruder's force at 


His outposts at 

Magruderlay at 
Yorktown, but they had out- 
posts at Big Bethel and Little 
Bethel. With a view of ex- 
pelling them from these po- 
sitions and rendering secure 
some works which he had 
constructed at Hampton and 
Newport News, Butler direct- 
ed (June 10th) Duryea's Zou- 
aves and Townsend's Third New York to 
gain the rear of Little Bethel, while a Ver- 
mont battalion and Bendix's New York regiment were 
to attack it in front. The expedition was under the com- 
mand of General Pierce, and had with it only three guns. 
Townsend's troops moved along the road from Hampton, 
Bendix's along that from Newport News. They simulta- 
neously reached the junction of the roads before day- 
break, when Bendix, mistaking Townsend for the enemy, 
opened fire upon him, which was instantly returned by 
Townsend, who supposed he had fallen into an ambush. 
Expedition against That portion of the expedition which had 
already passed beyond the junction of the 
roads toward Little Bethel, hearing the firing, supposed 
that an attack was being made on its rear. Every thing 
was for the moment in confusion, and the Confederates in 
Little Bethel, taking alarm, at once fell back on Big Beth- 
el, where Magruder, with 1800 men, was posted. 

Thither, after destroying the abandoned camp, Pierce 


advanced. The position occupied by the Confederates 
They faii back to was strong. It had in front a branch of the 
Big Bethel. Back River, crossed by a bridge, the stream 

above and below the place of crossing widening, so as to 
form a difficult morass. On each side of the road from 
the bridge was an earthwork, and on their right, facing 
the stream, the Confederates had a line of intrenchments. 
Their works were defended by twenty guns. 

The national troops advanced at once under a heavy 

Attack by the na- fi re ? intending to rush across the stream and 
tionai troops. gtorm the ^j^ In thiSj however, they 

were checked. After a pause of two hours the attempt 

was renewed, the troops on the left crossed the morass, 

the enemy was driven out of the battery 

Its failure. Death ; 1 1 -i • n t i ,i o i i 

ofwmthropand nearest the bridge, but the nre became too 

Greble. . 

hot, and the assailants were again repulsed. 
In this affair the loss of the Confederates was insignifi- 
cant; that of the national troops was fifty-five, of whom 
sixteen were killed. Among the latter, deeply regretted, 
was Major Theodore Winthrop. He had already distin- 
guished himself in literary life, and when leading his men 
to the attack, within thirty or forty yards of one of the 
batteries, was shot through the head by a North Caro- 
lina drummer -boy. Lieutenant Greble, who had been 
in command of the three guns, was killed in attempting 
to withdraw them. He was the first officer of the regu- 
lar army who fell in the Civil War. 

" This is an ill advised and badly arranged movement. 
I am afraid no good will come of it ; and as for myself, I 
do not think I shall come off the field alive" — so Greble 
had said to one of his friends before starting. In this 
condemnation of the expedition the nation universally 

The national and Confederate forces were confronting 


The tragedy at eacn °ther on opposite sides of the Potomac, 
Bairs Blum between Washington and Harper's Ferry. 
General McClellan, about the middle of October, con- 
sidered it desirable to ascertain the strength of his an- 
tagonists in the vicinity of Dranesville, and accordingly 
caused a reconnoissance to be made by General McCall, 
on the 19th of that month. He likewise desired General 
Stone, who was at Poolesville, to keep a look-out upon 
Leesburg, and suggested that a " slight demonstration" on 
his part might have the effect of moving the enemy. He 
did not, however, contemplate making an attack upon 
them, or the crossing of the river in force by any portion 
of Stone's command. 

Hereupon Colonel Devins was ordered by Stone to 
Dews reconnois- brill g <f° flat-boats from the Chesapeake 
sance# and Ohio Canal into the river opposite Har- 

rison's Island, and ferry some troops over to it. This 
clone, Devins sent a detachment to the Virginia shore to 
make an exploration toward Leesburg, which had been 
reported to be evacuated. They discovered, as they sup- 
posed, a small camp about a mile from the town. Stone 
thereupon ordered Devins to land on Ball's Bluff, oppo- 
site the island. It is an eminence from 50 to 150 feet 
high. He was to surprise the discovered camp, destroy 
it, examine the country, and return, unless he should find 
a good place on which to establish himself, in which case 
An expedition sets re-enforcements would be sent him. He set 
out about midnight; the clayey bluff was 
very wet and slippery ; he reached the top of it by day- 
light (October 22d). Advancing within a mile of Lees- 
burg, he could find no enemy ; the reported camp proved 
to be an illusion due to openings among the trees. He 
therefore halted and sent to Stone for further orders. At 
seven o'clock, perceiving that the enemy's cavalry were 
gathering around him, he fell back toward the bluff, and 

252 BALL'S BLUFF. [Sect. IX. 

stood in an open field surrounded by woods. Here he 
it is enveloped by received orders to remain. He had about 
the confederates. QftQ men, and a re-enforcement was prom- 
ised. About noon, the Confederates, having occupied the 
woods on three sides of him, began to attack him, com 
pelling him to fall back toward the edge of the bluff. 
At length re-enforcements under Colonel Baker arrived 
They had orders either to support Devins or to with 
draw, as Baker, who outranked Devins, might judge best 
But at once it was plain that there was no option. Dev 
ins was in the act of being assaulted, and there was noth 
ing to do but to support him. Baker accordingly took 
that course. The entire national force was now about 
1900 men. They were in an open field; their assailants in 
the surrounding woods ; the bluff down which they must 
retreat was steep and slippery, and only two wretched 
scows were there to carry them across to Harrison's Island. 
n . . ■,, . . Colonel Baker, while bravely holding; his 

Colonel Baker is ' < J o 

killed. ground at the head of his troops, was killed. 

The fire was becoming momentarily more and more severe, 

and the enemy receiving re-enforcements. The national 

troops were forced over the edge of the bluff, 

The national troops -, , •■, v* n t i 1 1 • • n 

forced over the and the Confederates getting possession 01 
it, a massacre ensued among the struggling 
men below. Of the boats, one had disappeared ; the oth- 
er was quickly swamped. Some tried to reach the isl- 
and by swimming, some by floating on logs; they were de- 
liberately shot by their antagonists above. 

A massacre of them J J o 

ensues. Colonel Coggswell, who had succeeded to 

the command, tried to force his way to Edwards's Ferry, 
but was driven back by a Mississippi regiment. The loss 
was in killed, either by shooting or drowning, 300 ; in 
wounded and prisoners, more than 700. 

Stone had thrown a small force across the river at Ed- 
wards's Ferry. They advanced about three miles toward 

Chap. XL VIII.] BALL'S BLUEF. 253 

Leesburg and returned. He then threw over General 
Gorman's entire brigade. Had this been done earlier, 
the movements of the Confederates would have been 
arrested, and the tragedy at Ball's Bluff would not have 





The President issued a general War Order, directing all the armies to advance on 
the 22d of February, 1862. 

The Tennessee River was selected by General Halleck as the correct line of opera- 
tion for the armies of the central region. Under his orders, Fort Henry was 
captured by Foote, and Fort Donelson by Grant. 

The Confederate line being thus broken at its centre, Nashville was evacuated on 
its right, and Columbus on its left. Island No. 10 and Fort Pillow were sur- 
rendered, and the Mississippi opened to Memphis, the Confederate fleet at that 
place being destroyed. 

The battle of Bull Eun manifested to the Northern 
Effect of the battle people the real nature of the struggle in 
which they were engaged — that they must 
accept a wasting war, or consent to the destruction of rep- 
resentative government in the land. 

They did not delay in making their choice. It was 
evident that more vigor must be infused into their move- 
ments. Lieutenant General Scott, who was at the head 
of the army, and who thus far had directed all the mili- 
tary operations, was, in consideration of his age and great 
bodily infirmities, relieved (July 15th) from the more act- 
ive portion of his duties. A new military department, 


to be known as that of Washington and 

McClellan in com- -.-,- -, . ^ T . . . n -, -, ~ 

mand at washing- JN ortneastern V lrgmia, was lormed, and (xen- 

ton. . 

eral McClellan was placed in command of it. 
As has been already related in detail (Chapter XLIV.), 
Army of the Poto- General McClellan at once commenced the 
mac organized. organization of the great army authorized 
by Congress. His views of the military position and ap- 
propriate military conduct were, for the most part, ac- 
cepted, and such was the patriotism of the people, the 
resolution of Congress, the energy of the executive, that 
the Army of the Potomac had reached (p. 195), on Oc- 
tober 27th, a strength of nearly one hundred and seventy 
thousand men (168,318). It was the general's opinion 
that the advance upon the enemy at Manassas should not 
be postponed beyond the 25th of November. It was his 
desire that all the other armies should be stripped of their 
superfluous strength, and, as far as possible, every thing 
concentrated in the force under his command. 

On the 31st of October, General Scott, having found his 

bodily infirmities increasing, addressed a let- 
tires from com- ter to the Secretary of War requesting to be 

mand. . _ _. , P 

placed on the retired list. With every cir- 
cumstance that could indicate an appreciation of the bril- 
liant services which the aged chief had rendered the re- 
public, his desire was granted. An order was simultane- 
ously issued appointing General McClellan commander- 
in-chief under the President. 

This change in his position at once produced a change 

change in General m General McClellan's views. Hitherto he 
Mcbieiian', views, j^ undervalue(1 the importance of what 

was to be. done in the West. He had desired the West- 
ern armies to act on the defensive. Now he wished to in- 
stitute an advance on East Tennessee, and capture Nash- 
ville contemporaneously with Richmond* This, in his 
military administration, implied another long delay to 


bring up the organization of the armies of the West to an 
equality with that of the Army of the Potomac. 

In preparation for this, the Department of the West 

was reorganized. On the day following 

departments re- that of McClellan' s promotion, Fremont was 

organized. •*■ ' 

removed from his command (p. 234). His 
department was subdivided into three : (1.) New Mex- 
ico, which was assigned to Colonel Canby ; (2.) Kansas, 
to General Hunter ; (3.) Missouri, to General Halleck. 
To General Buell was assigned the Department of the 
Ohio, and to General Rosecrans that of West Virginia. 

The end of November approached, and still the Army 
immobility of the °f ^ ne Potomac had not moved. The weath- 
potomac army. er wag magnificent, the roads excellent. One 

excuse after another, was alleged. The Confederate army 
in front was magnified to thrice its actual strength. Ex- 
penses were accumulating frightfully. Winter at last 
came, and nothing had been done. 

So wore away day after day and month after month. 
The clicking telegraph in the War Office 

Commencing dis- -it , -i • , i 1 u n • x j1 

satisfaction with had nothing to sav but "all quiet on the 

McClellan. ° * ± 

rotomac. JNot alone among the people, 
who had only imperfect information, but even among 
officials in prominent positions, the inquiry became more 
and more urgent, " When will McClellan move % What 
is he going to do V- " Sir," said an eminent statesman, to 
whom Lincoln addressed that now painful interrogatory, 
" I declare to you my firm belief that to this day he has 
no plan." It seemed as if the army he had organized was 
a coat of mail he could not carry. The sword he had 
caused to be forged was too heavy for him to lift. 

Mr. Stanton had succeeded Mr. Cameron as Secretary 
stanton made sec- of War (January 13th, 1862). Hehadbeen 
retaryofwar. attorney general in the latter part of Bu- 
chanan's administration, and had acted with conspicuous 


energy in preserving Washington from seizure by the 
conspirators (p. 47). To him Lincoln spontaneously 
turned, satisfied that by him the great duties of the War 
Department would be energetically and faithfully dis- 
charged. Others, who had aspired to the position thus 
unexpectedly imposed upon Stanton, declared that he was 
unsuited to the office; that he was a man of only one 
idea. " It is true," wrote a very observant foreigner at 
that time residing in Washington, " he is a man of one 
idea, but his enemies abstain from saying that his one 
idea is the grandeur and immortality of the Republic." 

At Stanton's suggestion, the President, whose patience 
He infuses energy was completely worn out by McClellan's in- 
in the department. ac ti v ity, issued an order that on the 2 2d day 
of February a general movement of the land and naval 
forces of the United States against the insurgent states 
should take place ; that " especially the army at or about 
Fortress Monroe, the Army of the Potomac, the Army of 
Western Virginia, the army near Mumfordsville, Ken- 
tucky, the army and flotilla near Cairo, and 
general war or- the naval force in the Gulf of Mexico, be 

der. ' 

ready to move on that day. That all other 
forces, both land and naval, with their respective com- 
manders, obey existing orders for the time, and be ready 
to obey additional orders when duly given. That the 
heads of departments, and especially the Secretaries of 
War and the Navy, with all their subordinates, and the 
generals in chief, with all other commanders and subor- 
dinates of land and naval forces, will severally be held to 
their strict and full responsibilities for the prompt execu- 
tion of this order." 

A special war order was issued January 31st, " that all 
special order as to the disposable force of the Army of the Po- 
t£e Potomac Amy. tomac> a f ter providing safely for the defense 

of Washington, be formed into an expedition for the im- 
II— E 


mediate object of seizing upon the railroad southwest- 
ward of what is known as Manassas Junction ; all details 
to be in the discretion of the commander-in-chief, and the 
expedition to move before or on the 2 2d day of Febru- 
ary next." This order was, however, subsequently modi- 

These orders carried upon their face the distrust which 
the administration had conceived of General McClellan, 
a distrust fast spreading all over the country. It was 
felt not alone in the council chamber of the cabinet, but 
among all grades of society. 

With the President's order of January 27th the war 
may be said to have begun systematically. 

The rivers of Kentucky and Tennessee show by their 
commencement of course that those states present a topograph- 
1 ei ical incline to the northwest, the Cumber- 

land Mountains being its culminating ridge. Down the 
gentle slope thus afforded, the Tennessee and its affluent 
the Duck, the Cumberland, the Green, the Kentucky, the 
Big Sandy, empty into the Ohio. Beyond the ridge the 
rivers flow southward into the Gulf of Mexico. 

Political as well as military considerations, already de- 
The mst line of con- scribed (p. 219), had led the Confederate 
federate defense. officerg to establish upon this incline their 

first line of defense. Commencing at Columbus, a little 
below the junction of the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers at 
Cairo, it crossed the Tennessee and Cumberland, having 
on the former Fort Henry, on the latter Fort Donelson. 
Eastward of the latter post there was an intrenched camp 
at Bowling Green. The Confederate left, therefore, rest- 
ed on the Mississippi, their right on the intrenched camp 
at Bowling Green, which was at the junction of the Mem- 
phis and Ohio with the Louisville and Nashville Railroad. 
A railroad connection between the ends of the line gave 

Chap. XLIX.] 



facilities for military movements. The intrenched camp 
covered the city of Nashville. 

In November, 1861, General Halleck was directed to 
General Haiieck In take command of the Department of Mis- 
command. souri. It included Missouri, Iowa, Minne- 

sota, Wisconsin, Illinois, Arkansas, and Kentucky west of 
the Cumberland Mountains. He divided it into districts, 
assigning to General U. S. Grant the District of Cairo, 
which also included Paducah, in Kentucky. Cairo, at the 
junction of the Ohio and the Mississippi, is a place of 
great strategic importance. 



Halleck saw at once that the military operations which 
ins views on the had been earned on in Missouri by Gener- 

correct war-plan. ^ j^^ q^^ ^ Jj^bllt (Chapter 

XL VII.) w T ere in reality without significance, so far as 


the overthrow .of the Confederacy was concerned, and 
that the proper movement was the forcing of the Confed- 
erate line just described as reaching from the Mississippi 
to Bowling Green. He therefore, on the removal of Fre- 
h ? withdraws from mont, caused the army in Missouri to retire 

to Rolla (p. 235), his course in this respect 
meeting with much condemnation among those who only 
looked at the consequences it brought on the inhabitants 
of that country, and did not comprehend the character of 
the movement about to be put into execution. 

One evening late in December (1861), Generals Hal- 

leck, Sherman, and Cullum were conversing 

Explains his deci- 
sion as to the tnv 
line of operation. 

the true together at the Planters' Hotel, in St. Louis, 

on the proper line of invasion. They saw 
clearly that the Confederates meant to stand on the de- 
fensive, and Halleck asked, " Where is their line ?'■' Sher- 
man replied, " Why, from Bowling Green to Columbus." 
"Well, then, where is the true point of attack?" "Nat- 
urally the centre." " Then let us see what is the direc- 
tion in which it should be made." 

A map lay on the table, and, with a blue pencil, Hal- 
leck drew a line from Bowling Green to Columbus, past 
Donelson and Henry, and another perpendicular to its 
centre, which happened to coincide nearly with the Ten- 
nessee River. " There," said he, " that is the true line of 

This forcing of the Confederate line would bring the 
important states Kentucky and Tennessee 

Effect of operations ■, .. -, i i • i * i i i i • 

on the line of the under national control ; it would take in re- 
Tennessee. , , 

verse the strong works on the Mississippi, 
which could not be reduced by a mere naval attack ; it 
would open that great river; it would permit the pas- 
sage of a national army into the recesses of the Cotton 
States, and expose Georgia, South Carolina, North Caro- 
lina, and even Virginia, to attack on an unprotected flank. 


In determining the mode in which this movement 
conditions of that should be carried into execution, it was evi- 
dent that the essential point was the seiz- 
ure of the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers. This im- 
plied the reduction of the two forts Henry and Donelson, 
on which the Confederates were relying for the protection 
of those rivers. 

The Confederate line of defense had been intrusted to 
The confederate General Albert Sydney Johnston. He was 
post at coiumbu, at j ow]in g G reen, con f rontillg General Buell. 

The fortified post at Columbus, on which the left flank 
of the Confederates rested, was considered by them to be 
the Gibraltar of America. They believed that it would 
close the Mississippi until their independence was ac- 
knowledged. It was in charge of General Polk (p. 226). 
The strength of the entire force holding the line was 
about 60,000 men. 

To execute the proposed operation two national armies 
were available. One lay at Cairo, under 

TTig n 3. t ion 3.1 Armies 

at Cairo and Louis- General Grant. There was with it a naval 


force, having some iron-clad gun-boats un- 
der Commodore Foote. The second army was at Louis- 
ville. It was under command of General Buel], and was 
40,000 strong. 

It had been intended originally that Grant's force 
should operate directly on the Mississippi River, forcing 
it open, and that Buell's army should strike at the in- 
trenched camp at Bowling Green. If the force there 
were disposed of, Nashville, in its rear, must necessarily 
be abandoned. 

In Halleck's view, the operation on the line of the 
Tennessee River would accomplish all these results. If 
the army and the gun-boats could force their way up that 
stream, Columbus and Bowling Green, no matter how 
strong they might be, must both at once fall, and Nash- 
ville must share their fate. 



[Sect. X. 

Operations com- 
menced against 
Fort Henry. 

Fort Henry, on the east bank of the Tennessee, and 
Fort Donelson, on the west bank of the 
Cumberland, were bastioned earthworks, 
twelve miles apart, connected by a road. 
Immediately after the issue of the President's war order 
(January 27th, 1862) commanding a general movement, 
operations were undertaken against Fort Henry. Of the 


fleet of gun-boats employed, four were iron-clad and three 
wooden. They were under Commodore Foote. The land 
force was under General Grant. The garrison of the fort, 
commanded by General Tilghman, was 2734 strong; the 
armament was seventeen guns. 

Halleck gave the necessary orders for the expedition 
condition of that on ^ ne 30th of January, and Grant left Cairo 
work. with 17,000 men. The Confederates had 

works on both sides of the river, Fort Henry being on 
the east bank and Fort Heiman on the west, the latter 
commanding the former. The country was all under 
water, the river overflowing, the rain still falling in tor- 
rents. Though Tilghman was receiving re-enforcements 
and hastening the completion of his works, he found that 
he must withdraw from Fort Heiman and defend Fort 
Henry alone. 


It was understood between Foote and Grant that the 
^ . , . , former was to reduce the fort, the latter to 

Bombardment of " 

the fort. cu ^ ff faQ retreat of the garrison. The at- 

tack was to begin at twelve o'clock (February 6th). 
Foote thought he could reduce the work in an hour, and 
Grant, whose forces were three miles below, allowed him- 
self two hours to accomplish his march. The gun-boats 
commenced their fire at a thousand yards, approaching 
gradually within six hundred. 

Tilghman returned the fire at first very vigorously, but 
' .. , n a series of accidents in succession befell him 

Intentions of Geu- 

erai Tiighman. . __ a rifle( j 24 -pounder burst, killing and 
wounding a number of his men ; a premature discharge 
of a 42-pounder killed three of its gunners. From the 
beginning he had foreseen that he could not hold the 
place. In his report he says, " My object was to save the 
main body by delaying matters as long as possible. I 
therefore ordered Colonel Heiman to join his command 
and keep up the retreat in good order, while I would 
fight the guns as long as one was left, and sacrifice my- 
self to save the main body of my troops." He had given 
orders for the garrison to retire to Fort Donelson before 
the firing began. He worked one of the guns himself. 
At the end of little more than an hour, he, with his staff 
and sixty men, surrendered unconditionally to Foote. His 
loss in killed and wounded was twenty-one. 

As the land forces under Grant had been delayed by 
ne withdraws the ^ ne ft° & i n the roads longer than had been 
gamson, anticipated, the Confederate garrison under 

Heiman made their escape safely. On the national side, 
the chief casualty occurred on board the iron-clad Essex, 
which received a shot in her boiler, in consequence of 
which twenty-nine officers and men were scalded. 

The conduct of General Tilghman in this affair stands 
in very striking contrast with that of Floyd and Pillow 

264 FORT DONELSON. [Sect. X. 

and then surrenders at Donelson. For the sake of giving time 
the work. £ Q ' r ^-g g arr j son ^ m ake good its escape, lie 

continued his hopeless resistance, and surrendered him- 
self prisoner along with his artillerists. 

Fort Henry thus secured, General Halleck next turned 
his attention to Fort Donelson. Re-enforce- 

Preparations for at- . -, n , 1n 

tacking Fort Donei- ments were therefore rapidly brought from 

son. ± J o 

BueLTs army, and also from St. Louis, Cairo, 
Cincinnati, and Kansas. 

The Tennessee and Cumberland, as they approach the 
position of Donei- Ohio, run northward and nearly parallel to 
each other. Fort Donelson was about forty 
miles above the mouth of the Cumberland, and on its 
west bank It was a large field-work of a hundred acres, 
near the town of Dover, on a bluff rising by a gentle 
slope from the river, at the point where the stream turns 
from its westerly course. The height of the bluff is about 
100 feet. The strength of the work was directed toward 
the river, which it effectually commanded ; on the land 
side it was comparatively weak. The entire artillery, in- 
cluding light batteries, was 65 pieces. The 
strength of the eventual strength of the garrison was 21,000. 

fort ' m i • • 

The surrounding country was rugged, hilly, 
and heavily wooded. Round the works timber had been 
felled, and small trees half chopped off formed an aba- 
tis. Two creeks, flooded by the rains, formed defenses on 
the right and left. 

As soon as it became clear that the fort was about to 
be attacked from the land side, the Confederate com- 
manders exerted themselves to strengthen it. A fortified 
line two miles and a half in length, inclosing the town of 
Dover, was drawn along the commanding high grounds. 
Re-enforcements were sent from Bowling Green by the 
railroad, and the work pushed on day and night. The 
garrison of Fort Henry came in on the 7th, the command 


of Pillow arrived on the 10th 7 that of Buckner on the 
11th, that of Floyd on the 13th. Floyd, as the senior 
officer, was in command. 

Grant moved from Fort Henry upon Donelson, with 
about 15,000 men, on Wednesday, the 12th. 

Grant prepares to ' > . 

attack it. jj e k a( j }y een obliged to submit to this de- 

lay to give time for preparing the gun -boats, though 
every hour of it was strengthening the enemy. His fore- 
most brigade went by the telegraph road ; the others by 
the Dover Road. He was before the fort in the after- 
noon of that day, and spent the remaining daylight in 
bringing his troops into position. Batteries were posted 
and the movement completed in the night. It was his 
intention, if the gun-boats should arrive, to make an at- 
tack next morning. His force consisted of the division 
of McClernand, containing the four brigades of Oglesby, 
W. H. L. Wallace, McArthur, Morrison ; the division of 
C. F. Smith, containing the three brigades of Cook, Lau- 
man, and M. L. Smith. The division of Lewis Wallace 
did not arrive until the 14th. Smith's division was to 
be on the left, Lewis Wallace's at the centre, McClernand's 
on the right. He formed his first line opposite the ene- 
my's centre, his left resting on Hickman Creek, his right 
reaching not quite round to Dover. The advance was 
very difficult on account of a growth of dwarf oaks. 
Though the gun-boats had not arrived, a cannonade 

w ni ,, was opened. McClernand made an attack 

McClernand s pre- x 

mature assault. on a ^^tery commanding the ridge road 
on which Grant moved. He met with a repulse in his 
attempt to carry it. There was a bitter storm of hail 
and snow after dark, yet the troops bivouacked in line 
of battle. They had no tents and no fires; many of them 
were without blankets. The cries of the wounded call- 
ing for water were heard all that night. 

At midnight six gun-boats and fourteen transports had 


Arrival of the gnu- arrived, the latter bringing Lewis Wallace's 
division, and giving Grant a superiority of 
force. Up to this time he had not been as strong as the 
Confederates. It took longer than had been anticipated 
to get these troops into position, and the consequence 
was that the attack on Friday had to be mainly carried 
on by the boats. 

Of the gun-boats four were iron-clad, the remaining two 
wooden. The former opened their fire and advanced un- 
til they were within three hundred yards of the Confed- 
erate batteries, which, up to this time silent, were now 
vigorously worked. Their plunging fire, for they were 
elevated about thirty feet, soon told heavily on the boats. 
For an hour and a half the contest was maintained, when 
the steering apparatus of two was disabled, and they 
drifted down the stream. The others were compelled to 
"withdraw. Thev had a loss of 54 killed 

They are defeated. J 

and wounded; among the latter was Com- 
modore Foote. In the Confederate batteries no one was 
killed, and the works were uninjured. 

Thus the attack from the river, as well as McClernand's 
partial attempt from the land side, had failed, and appar- 
ently it had become necessary for the national command- 
ers to have re-enforcements. 

But Floyd had taken alarm. He had seen that heavy 

Fioyd becomes re * enforcements, Lewis Wallace's division, 

had that day arrived; he considered that, 

notwithstanding his success in beating off the gun-boats, 

there was no place within his intrenchments that could 

not be reached by the enemies' artillery fire from their 

boats or their batteries, and that there was nothing to 

prevent them from passing a column above him on the 

river, and thus cutting off his only remaining communica- 

He summons a tion — that by water — and preventing the 

council. possibility of egress. He therefore summon- 


ed a council that evening, at which it was determined to 
abandon the fort, force a way past Grant's right, and es- 
cape to Nashville. 

At that time, owing to the high water of the river, 
there was but one practicable road — Wynn's Ferry Road. 
Between it and the river lay the division of McClernand, 
the national right wing. The Confederate operation, 
it determines to therefore, was to throw their left, Pillow's 
division, against the national right flank, 
McClernand's, and, with Buckner' s division drawn from 
their right, and leaving there only a weak force, to attack 
the right of -the national centre, which w r as upon the 
Wynn's Ferry Boad. If Pillow could force back the na- 
tional right upon the centre, and Buckner take the disor- 
dered mass in flank, it was expected that the whole would 
be rolled back on the left — McClernand upon Wallace, 
and both upon Smith — and that the Wynn's Ferry Boad 
would be opened. 

On Wednesday night the air had been warm and ge- 
nial ; the sky was cloudless, the moon at full. On the 
night of Thursday the weather changed ; there w r as a 
storm of sleet and snow. On Friday night it w r as in- 
tensely cold ; the thermometer had fallen to 10° Fahr- 
enheit. Nevertheless, the Confederates got ready to ex- 
ecute their desperate undertaking on Saturday morning 
at five o'clock, an hour before day. 

At first fortune favored the boldly conceived and brave- 
it is at first sue- ly executed attempt. The Confederates' left 
forced from their position the two national 
right brigades. Meantime Buckner, who had brought 
his troops over from the Confederate right, assaulted the 
third right national brigade, at first ineffectually, but at 
length, stimulated by Pillow's results, successfully. Nev- 
The national n-ht ertheless, McClernand's troops did not ra- 
wing forced back. ^ rea ^. un ti] their ammunition was exhausted. 


At nine o'clock Grant's right wing had been completely 
pressed from its ground and the Wynn's Ferry Road 
opened. The Confederates might now have escaped. 

All this occurred during the absence of Grant. He 
had gone on board a gun-boat at 2 A.M. to consult with 
Commodore Foote, who had been wounded, and had asked 
for this consultation. Already Lewis Wallace, who was 
holding Grant's centre, had sent one of his brigades to 
the assistance of the defeated right wing, but with no 
other result than to participate in their disaster. With 
his remaining brigade, however, he presented a firm front 
at right angles to his former one, and behind this the de- 
feated troops of the right wing rallied and reformed. 

Against this the Confederates, flushed with success, but 
not altogether without confusion, advanced. They were 
received with such a fire that they instantly broke, and, 
on making a second attempt, broke again. This time 
they could not be rallied. 

Grant had now come on the field. It was about nine 
o'clock. Though the battle had lulled, ev- 

Decisiou of Grant. ° . . 

ery thing was in confusion. The troops 
were scattered in knots. At a glance he appreciated the 
disaster and took his resolve. " On riding upon the field, 
I saw that either side was ready to give way if the other 
showed a bold front. I took the opportunity, and order- 
ed an advance of the whole line." Smith, with the left 
wing, was to storm the enemy's works in his front, Wal- 
lace to recover the ground that had been lost on the 
right. A request was sent to the gun-boats to make a 
vigorous demonstration. 

The removal of Buckner from Smith's front for the 
early attack in the morning had greatly weakened the 
right of the Confederate line. Buckner, therefore, was 
how ordered back. But it was too late. The storming 
column, with Smith at its head, was steadily and irresist- 


successful assault 3% advancing. It forced its way up the 
steep hill. As Buckner's troops came on, 
they encountered such a fire as hurled them out of the 
way. The abatis was torn aside, the key-point of the fort 
was seized ; the Confederates fled into the work. Smith 
had gained possession of the high ground from which the 
entire right of the defenses of Donelson might be enfi- 

Buckner's withdrawal from the ground that had been 

conquered in the morning now weakened 

forced back into and demoralized the Confederate left. At 

the fort. , . 

this instant Wallace made his attack on that 
front. It was impossible to resist him. The Confeder- 
ates here also recoiled to their own works. The oppor- 
tunity they had won at one moment was lost. Not only 
was the line of investment renewed, but the fort had be- 
come untenable : had daylight lasted half an hour longer 
it would have been taken. The losses on each side amount- 
ed to about two thousand killed and wounded. 

Darkness fell upon Donelson. The cold was more than 
twenty degrees below the freezing point. The woods 
were covered with a sleety incrustation of ice ; they sway- 
ed and crackled in the night air. Grant fell asleep in a 
negro hut, Smith on the hard -frozen ground. On the 
battle-field there lay four thousand Americans, many of 
them dead, many freezing to death. Wallace, whose 
troops were nearest the scene of agony, employed his 
men until " far in the morning: in ministering; to our own 
wounded, but we did not forget those of the enemy." A 
piteous wail for water was heard in all directions, for the 
cannon were now silent. It smote on the ears of Floyd. 
The arms that he had scattered all over the South had 
been used ! 

He called a council of war at Pillow's head-quarters. 
It was concluded that any attempt to renew the sortie 


They horn a night' would be absolutely disastrous. Buckner 
declared that he could not hold the position 
for half an hour after daylight. In his opinion there was 
no escape from a surrender. 

" There is nothing for us but to capitulate/' exclaimed 
Fioyd determines to Floyd ; " yet I can not surrender — I can not 
escape. surrender. You know the position in which 

I stand." He asked advice of his subordinates, some of 
whom did not hesitate to express very plainly disappro- 
bation of his intention of escaping from the fort. Buck- 
ner, thinking it dishonorable not to share the fate of the 
men, said, "You must judge for yourself." "General," 
said Floyd to him, " if we put you in command, will you 
let me take away my brigade ?" 

Floyd now turned the command over to Pillow, who 
He carries off the t iirned it over to Buckner. Pillow then 

irgima troops. crosse( j t ne river in a scow. Floyd escaped 

with his Virginia brigade. By the light of lanterns they 
went on board a steam-boat at the wharf, many of the 
men half tipsily staggering under their knapsacks, all 
shivering with the cold. A crowd was cursing and hissing 
at the fugitives. But in this her hour of dire humiliation 
Virginia was not without soldiers who vindicated her 
honor. There were those who disdained to follow such 
a shameful example, who chose to remain and share the 
fate of Buckner and his men. 

At daylight Grant was ready to make the assault. He 

Grant ready for the had now 27,000 men, but only eight light 

batteries of artillery. A white flag was seen 

on Donelson, and a note was received from Buckner, to 

which Grant at once replied : 

" Sir, — Yours of this elate, proposing an armistice and appoint- 
ment of commissioners to settle terms of capitulation, is just re- 
ceived. No terms other than an unconditional and immediate sur- 
render can be accepted. I propose to move immediately on your 
works. I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 



To this Buckner replied : 

" Sir, — The distribution of the farces under my command, inci- 
Surrender of the dent to an unexpected change of commanders, and 
fort - the overwhelming force under your command, com- 

pel me, notwithstanding the brilliant success of the Confederate 
arms yesterday, to accept the ungenerous and unchivalrous terms 
which you propose. I am, sir, your very obedient servant, 

" S. B. Buckner." 

Hereupon Grant rode over to Buckner's head-quarters, 
Generous terms an d spontaneously consented that the ofli- 
given by Grant. eerg should keep their side-arms, and both 

officers and men their personal baggage. He desired to 
do nothing that might have the appearance of inflicting 

Nearly 15,000 prisoners, 17,600 small-arms, and 65 guns 

The spoils of the were taken. That such was the number of 

prisoners was shown by the fact that rations 

were issued at Cairo to 14,623. Grant's losses were 2041, 

of whom 425 were killed. 

In his congratulatory order to his troops, Grant tells 

them that " for four successive nights, with- 

tory order to his out shelter during the most inclement weath- 

troops. . r . 

er known in this latitude, they had faced 
an enemy in large force, and in a position chosen by him- 
self, and had compelled him to surrender without con- 
ditions, the victory achieved being not only great in the 
effect it must have in breaking down the rebellion, but 
also in this, that it had secured the greatest number of 
prisoners of war ever taken in any battle on this con- 

The inauguration of Davis as permanent President of 

the Confederate States occurred simultane- 
tion with pioyd ously with tlie reception of the news of the 

fall of Donelson. In a special message which 
he was constrained to send to the Confederate Congress, 


Davis characterizes the report he had received as incom- 
plete and unsatisfactory. "It is not stated that re-en- 
forcements were at any time asked for ; nor is it demon- 
strated to have been impossible to have saved the army 
by evacuating the position ; nor is it known by what 
means it was found practicable to withdraw a part of the 
garrison, leaving the remainder to surrender ; nor upon 
what authority or principles of action the senior generals 
abandoned responsibility by transferring the command to 
a junior officer." The delinquent generals were required 
to give information on the point " why they abandoned 
the command to their inferior officer instead of executing 
themselves whatever measure was deemed proper for the 
entire army, and also what were the precise means by 
which each had effected his escape from the fort, and 
what dangers were encountered in the retreat, and upon 
what principle a selection was made of particular troops, 
being certain regiments of General Floyd's brigade." 
Notwithstanding the great obligations the Confederate 

They are relieved government was under to Floyd, he and 

from command, Pillow were relieved of their commands. 
The investment of Donelson was followed by the im- 
mediate evacuation of Bowling Green ; its 

render of Donei- fall by the abandonment of Nashville, which 
was at once occupied by Buell. 
Nashville was so central and so important to the South 

The fan of Nash- that at one time it was a competitor with 
Richmond for the honor of becoming the 
metropolis of the Confederacy. A dispatch had been re- 
ceived on Saturday night by Johnston from Pillow, con- 
gratulating him on a great Confederate victory won by 
the garrison of Fort Donelson. The city was in a deliri- 
um of delight. But on Sunday morning, while the peo- 
ple were at church engaged in returning thanks, news 
came that the fort had fallen. The surrender of Nash- 

Chap. XLIX.] MILL SPEING. 273 

ville was inevitable. A scene of hideous confusion at 
once ensued. The congregations rushed into the streets. 
Every conveyance at hand was seized for the purpose of 
escaping from the place. Trunks and valuables were 
thrown from upper windows ; women in mortal, but very 
needless terror, fled away, and a mob hastened to plunder 
the abandoned Confederate stores. 

But the disaster did not end here. The Confederate 
and evacuation of General Polk had at once to evacuate Co- 
coiumbus. lumbus and fall back to Island No. 10. Co- 

lumbus — the so styled Gibraltar of the West — was occu- 
pied by national troops. 

It was not only on the west, but also on the east of 
Nashville that misfortunes befell the Con- 
federate cause. General Zollicoffer, with a 
force of about 5000 men, was encamped on the south side 
of the Cumberland, at Mill Spring, in Wayne County. In 
front of him lay General Schoepf, inactive, with a force 
of about 8000, at Somerset. General Thomas had been 
ordered to take command of this force (January 17th, 
1862), and had scarcely done so, when four regiments 
that he had near Somerset were attacked by General Crit- 
tenden, who had superseded Zollicoffer. The attack was 
made at night, and intended to be a surprise. In this, 
however, it proved a failure, Thomas having strongly 
picketed the roads between himself and the enemy. 

The pickets having been driven in, the Confederates 
made a desperate charge, and the battle was continued for 
two hours ; a bayonet charge by an Ohio regiment decided 
it, the Confederates escaping to an intrenched camp they 
had near the river, Zollicoffer being killed. The loss on 
the Confederate side was 300 killed and wounded, and 
50 prisoners; on the national; 30 killed, and 207 wound- 
ed. Pursued to their camp, the Confederates were shelled 
II.— S 

274 NEW MADRID. [Sect. X. 

until night. Schoepf s brigade coming up, it was hoped 
that their entire force would have been captured. Dur- 
ing the darkness, however, it escaped, leaving ten guns, 
1200 horses and mules, and a large quantity of clothing. 

At the time of the evacuation of Columbus, prepara- 
tions had been made to capture it by an attack from the 
river, under Commodore Foote and General W. T. Sher- 
man. On this expedition appearing before the works, it 
was ascertained that they had been abandoned, and that 
in very great haste. The cannon had been spiked and 
pushed over the bluff into the river. The garrison had 
retreated to New Madrid and Island No. 10. 

The Mississippi, approaching that island, leaves its 
southerly course, and, making a bend to the northwest, 
reaches New Madrid, which is on the Missouri bank. 
Following the course of the river, New Madrid is there- 
fore below the island. 

Strong works had been established at New Madrid. 
The position at ft was a l so defended by six gun-boats, the 
New Madrid. cann0 n of which commanded the adjacent 
country; for the river at the time was very high. 

Halleck dispatched General Pope from St. Louis to 
make an attack on New Madrid. The troops w r ere land- 
ed on the Missouri bank from transports on February 
24th, and found great difficulty in approaching the town 
March of General on account of the swampy state of the coun- 

Pope to that place. try> rj^ men dedare( J fl^ they « wade( j 

in mud, slept in mud, ate in mud, and were as completely 
surrounded by mud as St. Helena is by the ocean." They 
reached their destination, however, on the 3d of March. 
Finding the place stronger than he expected, Pope was 
obliged to send to Cairo for siege guns. To prevent the 
Confederates being re-enforced from below, he established 
a sunken battery at Point Pleasant. The siege guns were 

Chap. XLIX.] 




placed in position before the town immediately on tlieir 
arrival. Three of the Confederate gun-boats were speed- 
ily disabled, and it was soon apparent that the place must 
The confederates De evacuated. The garrison fled at mid- 
night to Island No. 10, leaving their supper 
untouched and candles burning in their tents. They aban- 
doned thirty- three cannon, several thousand stand of small- 
arms, hundreds of boxes of musket cartridges, and tents 
for an army of 10,000 men. 

276 CANAL OF ISLAND No. 10. [Sect. X. 

On the 15th of March, Commodore Foote, who had 
brought down from Cairo seven, armored gun-boats, one 
not armored, and ten mortar-boats capable of throwing 
13-inch shell, appeared before Island No. 10, and at once 
Bombardment of commenced its siege. Though the bombard- 
ment was vigorously maintained and con- 
tinued for nearly three weeks, it proved to be very inef- 
fective. Beauregard reported that the enemy's guns had 
thrown into the works three thousand shells and burned 
fifty tons of gunpowder without doing any damage to the 
batteries, and only killing one of the men. On the other 
. hand, Commodore Foote reported to his government that 
" Island No. 10 is harder to conquer than Columbus, its 
shores being lined with forts, each fort commanding the 
one above it.'' 

Pope, who was on the Missouri side of the river, could 
give but little assistance unless he should cross over to the 
Tennessee side and come upon the rear of the island. It 
» was impossible for him to do this unless some of the gun- 
boats could be brought down to New Madrid, as the op- 
posite shore was crowned with batteries. To accomplish 
this, General Schuyler Hamilton proposed 

Cutting of a canal. 7 -i-i-i-it , -r\-ii 

that a canal should be cut across Donald- 
son's Point, between Island No. 8 and New Madrid. This 
work was actually accomplished in nineteen days. The 
canal was twelve miles long ; for a part of the distance, 
however, it passed through two ponds. The width was 
about fifty feet. To make the cut, it was necessary to re- 
move about a thousand trees varying from six inches to 
three feet in diameter. They had to be sawn off by hand 
in many places four feet under water. When the river 
was admitted into the canal it flowed through with great 

By the aid of this canal, transports could be passed be- 
low the island, and Pope's troops taken across the Missis- 


The gun-boats run sippi to the Tennessee side. To cover the 
the batteries. passage when it should be made, the gun- 
boat Carondelet ran down the river, past the island, dur- 
ing a thunder-storm on the night of the 4th of April : 
she was protected on her exposed side by a barge laden 
with hay. Though the soot in her chimney caught fire as 
she approached the batteries, and, revealing her, brought 
on her a hail of cannon-shot, she escaped safely. On the 
6th, another gun -boat in like manner ran past. The 
bombardment w^as now vigorously kept up; the trans- 
ports were brought out of their concealment through the 
canal ; the Carondelet and her consort silenced the bat- 
teries at the proposed place of landing, and in a furious 
rain - storm Pope's troops accomplished the brilliant op- 
eration of a forced passage across the Mississippi. The 
w T.+ *«, n defenders of the batteries fled in confusion. 

Flight of the Con- 
federates. They w T ere pursued so vigorously by Pope 

that during the following night they were driven back 
on the swamps, and compelled to surrender before day- 
light (April 8 th). The garrison in the island, learning 
what had taken place, sent a flag of truce to Commodore 
surrender of the Foote, offering to surrender. Nearly seven 
island. thousand prisoners (6700), including three 

generals, 273 field and company officers, were taken. The 
spoils were a floating battery, 100 heavy siege-guns, 24 
pieces of field artillery, an immense quantity of ammuni- 
tion and supplies, several thousand stand of small-arms, 
and a great number of tents, horses, and wagons. The 
surrender was conducted with so much confusion that 
many important papers and documents were left; among 
others, drawings of the works of Fort Pillow. On the 
national side not a single life was lost. 

The fall of the island was like a thunderbolt in Rich- 
er , ~ * ». mond. "We have saved none of our can- 

Moral effect on the 

confederacy. non or mun iti ns ; we have lost our boats ; 

278 SURRENDER OF ISLAND No. 10. [Sect. X. 

our sick liave been abandoned ; there can be no excuse 
for the wretched mismanagement and infamous scenes 
that attended the evacuation ; our transports have been 
scattered ; the floating battery, formerly the Pelican dock 
at New Orleans, with sixteen heavy guns, has been sent 
adrift. In one of the hospital boats were a hundred 
poor wretches, half dead with disease and neglect. On 
the shore are crowds of our men wandering about, some 
trying to construct rafts with which to float down the 
river; some lost in the cane-brakes, and without food. 
No single battle-field has yet afforded to the North such 
visible fruits of victory as have been gathered at Island 
No. 10." 

The capture of Island No. 10 opened the river as far as 
rort Piiiow-its Fort Pillow. This work was a short dis- 
strength. tance above Memphis ; it had 40 heavy guns 

in position, nine gun-boats, and about 6000 troops. Gen- 
eral Pope's army of 20,000 reached its vicinity on April 
13th, and preparations were immediately made for an 
attack. Unexpectedly, however (April 17th), Pope's 
troops were withdrawn, and ordered to join Halleck's 
army, then advancing on Corinth. 

The Confederates, having a fleet, of which eight vessels 
Destruction of the were iron-clads, came out from under the 

Confederate fleet. guns pf j,^ pjjj^ Qn ^ -^ ^ ^ j^ 

of surprising some of the national mortar-boats which lay 
above. In less than an hour half the Confederate flotilla 
had been disabled or destroyed. Some had their boilers 
shot through ; others had been butted and sunk. None 
of them, however, were captured. The steam power of 
the national gun-boats was too small to stem the stream 
of the river. It was feared that if they grappled the 
disabled vessels, they might be dragged under the guns 
of the batteries. Their victory was due to the superi- 
ority of their construction — for they were more heavily 


mailed than their antagonists — and the heavier weight 
of their fire. 

Fort Pillow was, however, soon after abandoned, in 
Abandonment of consequence of the operations on the line 
of the Tennessee River. The troops were 
withdrawn to Corinth, and the remnant of the Confeder- 
ate fleet went down to Memphis. 


From its railroad connections Memphis is the most im- 
strategicai import- portant city on the Mississippi between New 
ance of Memphis, 0rle?ns and St. Louis. It is the western 

terminus of the great line communicating with the At- 
lantic cities. By its branches it connects with the Gulf 
on the south, and the Cumberland Valley and Ohio on 
the north. Along the great artery of the Memphis and 
Charleston Road the Confederacy brought supplies from 
regions drained by the affluents of the Mississippi River, 
and from Texas and Arkansas. This system of railroads 
enabled them to distribute troops and munitions of war 
in all directions. 

Considering that its proper protection was the strong 
forts on the river above and below, the Confederates had 
not fortified the town. Its only defense was its flotilla. 
On the 5th of June Commodore Davis left Fort Pil- 
Navai attack on l° w with his gun-boats and came down to 
Memphis. Memphis. The Confederate fleet was at the 

levee. It consisted of eight vessels. Four ram -boats, 
under Colonel Ellet, had joined the national squadron. 
Soon after daybreak the next morning the action began. 
In many particulars it recalled the naval combats of an- 
cient times. One of Ellet's rams, the Queen, butted a 
Confederate ram, sinking her immediately ; the Queen, in 
her turn, was struck by an antagonist and disabled ; that 
ram, in her turn, was struck by the Monarch, and instant- 
ly sunk. But among these reminiscences of old warfare 

280 FALL 0F MEMPHIS. [Sect. X. 

there were realities of a more modern kind. Hot water 
was scattered on boarders ; some of the vessels had their 
boilers shot through, and their crews scalded with steam. 
One Confederate gun-boat received a shell that set her on 
fire ; she burned to the water's edge, and then blew up. 
One was captured; and of all the Confederate flotilla, 
one only, the Van Dorn, escaped. 

There were many thousand persons on the river banks 
Destruction of the surveying the battle with intense interest. 

Confederate fleet. r\ x i? xl ;i 1 1 * *x 

Out or the dense smoke enveloping it came 
the roar of boilers exploding, the crashing of the rams, 
the bursting of shells, the rattle of musketry, the inces- 
sant thunder of the cannon. In half an hour the uproar 
ceased, and when the smoke blew aside, it was found that 
the Confederate flotilla had been destroyed, and Mem- 
phis left defenseless. 



The Confederates, forced back from their first line, established a second along the 

Memphis and Charleston Railroad, its strong point being at Corinth, where they 

concentrated their armies. 
General Halleck, using the Tennessee River as his line of attack, landed his army 

near Shiloh, and placed it under command of Grant. 
It was Halleck's intention to join the army of Buell to that of Grant, and attack 

his antagonists at Corinth. It was their intention to attack Grant before he was 

joined by Buell. They gained the initiative. 
Battle of Shiloh. The Confederates, after making a very brilliant attack, were 

compelled to retreat. The Memphis and Charleston Railroad was severed by 

Sherman and by Mitchell, the campaign closing successfully on the national part 

by the capture of Corinth. 

After Grant Lad captured Donelson, lie received a 
message from Buell asking an interview with him. Ac- 
cordingly, on the 27th of February, he went for that pur- 

Grant's visit to P ose to Nashville. In the mean time Hal- 
leck had ordered him to ascend rapidly the 
Tennessee, then in full water, and make a lodgment on the 
Memphis and Charleston Railroad about Florence or Tus- 
cumbia, or perhaps Corinth. There was a telegraph from 
Paducah to Fort Henry, but the secessionists were daily 
breaking the wires, and communication was continually 
interrupted. On the 1st of March Halleck had ordered 
Grant to fall back from the Cumberland to the Tennes- 
see, with the view of carrying his intention into effect. It 
was at this moment supposed that the Confederates had 
retreated to Chattanooga. 

Orders were likewise transmitted to Sherman to seize 
all steam-boats passing Paducah, and send them up the 
Tennessee for the transportation of Grant's army. As 


soon as Halleck heard that Grant had gone up the Cum- 
land instead of the Tennessee, he was very much displeas- 
disapproved of ed, and telegraphed to him, " Why don't you 
by Haiieck. obey my orders? Why don't you answer 
my letters? Turn over the command of the Tennessee 
expedition to General G. F. Smith, and remain yourself at 
Fort Henry." 

He also complained to McClellan at Washington that 
he could get no reports from Grant, whose troops were 
demoralized by their victory. To Grant he wrote that 
his neglect of repeated orders to report his strength had 
created great dissatisfaction and seriously interfered with 
the military plans ; that his going to Nashville when he 
should have been with his troops had been a matter of 
so much complaint at Washington that it had been con- 
sidered advisable to arrest him on his return. 

At length came Grant's answer that he had not re- 
Grant's expiaua- ceived Halleck's orders in time ; that he had 
not gone to Nashville to gratify any desire 
of his own, but for the good of the service ; that he had 
reported every day, and had written on an average more 
than once a day, and had done his best to obey orders ; 
that, instead of being worthy of censure for permitting 
his troops to maraud, he had sent the marauders to St. 
Louis. He asked to be relieved, and turned over the com- 
Generai smith put niand to General Smith, who at once com- 
m command. mence a the embarkation of the troops to the 
Upper Tennessee. 

Halleck was so far satisfied with these explanations 
that he requested the authorities at Washington to drop 
the matter. The order assigning Smith to the command 
was, however, not recalled. 

Halleck, in this perpendicular movement upon the Con- 

Advanta-es of the federate line, derived at once singular ad Van- 
Tennessee River. , g &Qm q^ Tennessee Jfr^. ft gaye 


him ready communication by his transports and gun- 
boats ; the latter, as we shall see, successfully intervened 
at the very moment of the crisis of the battle of Shiloh. 
Early in March, Sherman was ordered by Halleck to 
The expedition j 0rn the Tennessee expedition and report to 
pa^es up it. s m ith. The whole army steamed up to 

Savannah, where the depot of supplies was established. 
There were nearly seventy transports, carrying more than 
thirty thousand troops. The bands were playing, flags 
flying ; it was a splendid pageant of war. Lewis Wal- 
lace's division disembarked on the west bank of the river 
and took post on the road to Purdy. He was ordered to 
destroy the railroad bridge in the vicinity of that place. 
A train with Confederate troops narrowly escaped cap- 
ture ; it approached while the bridge was burning. An- 
other division (0. F. Smith's) occupied the town and 
country beyond ; and Sherman was ordered by Smith to 
take his own division, and the two gun-boats Tyler and 
Lexington, to proceed farther up the river, and break 
Sherman's recon- the Memphis and Charleston Railroad. It 
was now known that the Confederate army 
was concentrating at Corinth, and that it had a battery 
at Eastport, and another just above the mouth of Bear 
Creek. On passing " Pittsburg Landing," Sherman learn- 
ed that there was a road thence to Corinth. A Confed- 
erate regiment lying there had fired on the gun-boats. 
Hereupon he wrote to Smith that he thought it impor- 
tant to occupy " Pittsburg Landing." This was accord- 
ingly done, and the place became, in consequence, immor- 
tal in American history. 

Meantime Sherman passed forward on his expedition 
for cutting the railroad, but was thwarted by a deluge of 
rain ; which so flooded the country as to render it imprac- 
ticable, many men and horses being drowned in the swol- 
len streams. With great difficulty he got back to his 


boats. The time had passed to make a lodgment on the 
railroad by a dash : whatever was to be done now must 
be done deliberately and systematically. 

On the receipt of Sherman's letter, Smith reconnoitred 
occupation of Pitts- Pittsburg Landing in person, and found that 
bmg Landmg. y. wag wqYL adapted as a base for a large 

army operating inland. He therefore ordered Hurlbut's 
division to occupy it ; and then directed Sherman to 
move his division there, and take a position out from 
the river, so as to leave room for a large army behind — 
room enough, he said, " for a hundred thousand men." 

I am particular in relating these details of the manner 
in which Pittsburg Landing came to be occupied, because 
Grant has not only been criticised, but severely blamed 
for what he is supposed to have done in the matter. That 
great soldier has made no reply, justly expecting that his- 
tory would eventually vindicate him. 

The bluff at Pittsburg Landing extended about half a 
The topography mile along the river : the road to the top 
was in a ravine, at the foot of which lay four 
or five steam-boats of Hurlbut's division. As this road 
was not more than sufficient for their accommodation, 
Sherman caused two more to be cut up through the bluff, 
which was a high plateau inclining from the west, and in- 
tersected with ravines right and left. A country road led 
from the landing to Corinth. At a distance upon it of 
about two and a quarter miles stood a little log building 
embowered in trees, known as Shiloh Church. It had nei- 
ther doors nor windows, and was only half floored. When 
first visited there was a pile of corn in the husk on the 
floor. It was simply a place where Methoclist camp-meet- 
ings were occasionally held, and had of late been used as 
a Confederate picket station. The greater part of the pla- 
teau, a space of four miles by two and a half or three, 
was covered with heavy oaks, and an underbrush of hick- 

Chap.L.] posting of the troops. 285 

ory and scrub ; near to the landing, however, it was clear- 
ed. Sherman carefully reconnoitred the ground, and put 
two of his brigades on the Corinth Road, on the right and 
left of the meeting-house ; another brigade he put more 
to the right and somewhat refused, to command the Pur- 
ely Eoad at the Owl Creek Crossing, and the other (Stew- 
postingofthe art's) to cover the Lick Creek Ford. Thus 
his division, 8000 strong, was an outlying 
force to cover all the main roads leading to the landing. 
There was a short gap between his centre and right, and 
a wide one, of nearly two and a half miles, between his 
centre and left brigade (Stewart's), partially covered by 

As soon as these camps were selected, Sherman and 
McPherson examined all the country on the front and 
flanks, moving out ten miles toward Corinth as far as 
Monterey. McPherson had been sent, by order of Smith, 
to post the army as it arrived. Hurlbut's division was 
put in line to* the left of the main Corinth Road, his 
right where the Hamburg Road branches to the left, and 
Smith's own division (then commanded by General W. 
H. L. Wallace) was on Hurlbut's right. 

McPherson placed McClernand's division about a mile 
in front of W. H. L. Wallace, and Prentiss's to his left, 
Lewis Wallace's division still remaining on the road to 
Purdy. It communicated with the main army by an 
old bridge which was over Snake Creek. These dispo- 
sitions were made between the 20th of March and the 
6th of April. 

In the mean time General Smith had fallen seriously 

Death of General ^' He had received what appeared to be 

Smlth- an insignificant injury — a mere scratch on 

his leg, in stepping into a boat. Gangrene came on, and 

he died on the 25th of April. His health had been ruined 

by exposure and fatigue at Fort Donelson. 


It is to be remarked that most of the arrangements 
thus far made were not by order of Grant, 

GranTS/com- for it was not until the illness of Smith that 
Halleck restored him to command. At this 
moment the Tennessee Eiver was separating the army. 
In an hour after taking command Grant had ordered his 
forces to be concentrated. He established his head-quar- 
ters at Savannah (March 17th), where he could commu- 
nicate with Buell, who was coming from Nashville, and 
with Lewis Wallace, who was at Crump's Landing. It is 
also to be borne in mind that these movements were un- 
der the supreme direction of Halleck, who was at St. 
Louis, and whose intention was to make a lodgment on 
the Memphis and Charleston Bailroad. All the landings 
except the bluffs were at this time flooded. The first ob- 
ject was to secure positions commanding the Tennessee 
and bases for future operations. The west bank of the 
river was preferred, because it rendered unnecessary pon- 
toons and transports for crossing. 

The first line of Confederate defense having been swept 
Beauregard's army away by the capture of Fort Donelson, Beau- 
regard, who had been sent by the Bichmond 
authorities to supervise the movements in the Mississippi 
Valley, established a second along the line of the Mem- 
phis and Charleston Bailroad. The army immediately 
under his command was at Corinth, about 30 miles from 
Pittsburg Landing. His views of the measures to be re- 
sorted to for the defense of the valley were far more cor- 
rect than those hitherto adopted by the Confederate gov- 
ernment. His intention was not to divide, but to concen- 
trate all the available Confederate forces; and this he 
would have clone previously had he arrived in time to 
prevent the disaster at Donelson. 

He therefore, as rapidly as he could, withdrew the 


forces from every outlying position. He 

Concentration of • • 1 i -n n -r» i l 

the confederate was lomed by Bra^s;, ironi rensacola, by 

forces. «/ Oo' I j 

Polk, from the Mississippi, and Johnston's 
army was brought from Murfreesborough. The whole 
force was concentrated at Corinth, where the two great 
railroads connecting the Gulf of Mexico and the Missis- 
sippi Eiver with the Atlantic Ocean come together. That 
place is the key of the railroad system of Mississippi and 
Tennessee. Beauregard issued the customary and char- 
acteristic address to his troops : " Our mothers and wives, 
our sisters and children, expect us to do our duty. Our 
cause is as just and sacred as ever animated men to take 
up arms." 

Corinth was thus selected not only because of its rela- 
tion to the railroads, but also because it was necessary to 
hold it for the protection of Memphis. The national 
army, advancing on the line of the Tennessee River, would 
strike the second Confederate line perpendicularly. It had 
been Halleck's expectation to intervene between, the Ten- 
nessee army under Johnston at Murfreesborough, and the 
Mississippi army under Beauregard at Corinth. Through 
the delay that had occurred after the fall of Donelson, the 
junction of those armies had, however, taken place. 

As soon as it was discovered that Johnston had clis- 
concentration of appeared from Murfreesborough at Buell's 

the national armies, g.^ ^ ^ ^^ ^ fofm a j unction ^fa 

Beauregard, Halleck, whose command now embraced Bu- 
ell's, ordered that officer to join Grant, with a view to 
counteract the Confederate concentration at Corinth. Bu- 
ell's force was about 40,000. He accordingly at once set 
out on his march, and reached Columbia on the 20th ; but, 
though he pushed forward as quickly as he could, so bad 
were the roads and so dreadful the weather that it took 
seventeen days to accomplish the rest of the distance to 
Pittsburg Landing — about ninety miles. Nelson's divis- 


ion was in advance ; it was followed by the divisions of 
Crittenden, McCook, Wood, and Thomas. 

The concentration of the Confederate army, which Had 
begun early in March, went on with great rapidity. In 
three weeks its strength had risen from 11,000 to 45,000 
men. Van Dorn and Price were coming from Arkansas 
with 30,000 more. After the junction with Johnston 
took place, that general had assumed the chief command, 
Beauregard's plan Beauregard being second. The conception 
campaign. f £i ie ensuing movements was, however, due 
to the latter. As Halleck had intended to destroy him 
before Johnston could come to his aid, so now he proposed 
to destroy Grant before Buell could arrive. He knew 
from the country people every thing about Grant's move- 
ments, but it was little that Grant could find out from 
them about him. The question for him to decide was, 
Should he wait for Van Dorn and Price to come up, or 
strike Grant at once? At this time Breckenridge was 
on his right at Burnsville with 11,000 men ; Hardee and 
Bragg, with more than 20,000, formed his centre at Cor- 
inth ; Polk and Hindman were on his left with 10,000 
north of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad. Grant 
overthrown, Buell was next to be attacked, the victorious 
army then taking up its line of march to the north. On 
Johnston's assuming the chief command, he issued an ad- 
dress, such as was at that time customary in the Confed- 
erate armies : " You are expected to show yourselves wor- 
thy of your valor and courage, worthy of the women of 
the South, whose noble devotion in this war has never 
been exceeded in any time." 

Pittsburg Landing is a steam-boat station on the west 
bank of the Tennessee River, 219 miles dis- 

Pittsburg Landing. . . , » ., ,-, -, xxl'j. 

tant from its mouth, and near to the inter- 
section of the state lines of Alabama, Mississippi, and Ten- 
nessee. On the north of the landing, Snake Creek, and 

Chap. L.] 



on the south, another stream, Lick Creek, fall into the 
Tennessee, the former having received a branch known as 
Owl Creek. These rivulets rise near each other, beyond 
Shiloh Church, and inclose between them a plateau, about 
eighty feet high, on which took place the great battle 
now to be described. 


The two creeks formed the right and left defenses of 
the national army, obliging the enemy to make a front 
attack. When first occupied the country was flooded, 
and many of the streams impassable. In Snake Creek 
the water was so high that a horse would have to swim 
II.— T 


to reach the bridge. Lick Creek, ordinarily fordable, had 
become quite a river. Grant largely depended on these 
overflows for protection. They were among the reasons 
which induced him to throw up no defenses. 

On this platiau (Saturday, April 5th) five divisions 
position of Grant's of Grant's army were encamped in the order 
just described (p. 285). Sherman and Pren- 
tiss were therefore in front, McClernand on the left and 
rear of Sherman. Still nearer to the Landing was Hurl- 
but, with W. H. L.Wallace on his right. Lewis Wallace's 
division was at Crump's Landing, five miles below. 

Grant's army thus lay with the Tennessee River at its 
back, without available transportation to the other bank, 
and no defensive preparations on its front. The changes 
that Halleck had made in its command operated to its 
disadvantage in unsettling its purposes and impairing its 
unity of action. It was not understood at first that the 
Confederates were concentrating so rapidly at Corinth; 
on the contrary, it was supposed that they had a force 
of only about 10,000 ; and hence there was at that time 
no apprehension of being attacked. Even after it was 
known that Johnston had withdrawn from Murfreesbor- 
ough, it was expected that Buell's re-enforcements would 
join Grant in time. When the battle began, Buell's lead- 
ing division, Nelson's, was at Savannah, nine miles clown 
the river, and on its other bank, but the rear of that 
army stretched off for thirty miles beyond. 

The Confederate generals intended to fall by surprise 
Johnston marches on Grant's army, encamped thus at Pitts- 

from Corinth. burg Landing? before BueU ^ ou[d havQ 

joined it. Accordingly, on the 3d of April, their avail- 
able strength being about 40,000, they commenced their 
march. The dreadful condition of the roads, and a rain- 
storm which fell on the afternoon of the 5th, delayed the 
proposed attack. That night they had advanced within 


three quarters of a mile of the national pickets. No 
fires were allowed, though the air was cheerless and cold. 
Hardee's corps was in front ; Bragg's in a second line be- 
hind; Polk's corps formed the third, with Breckenridge's 
division on its right rear. 

On Friday, April 4th, an infantry picket belonging to 
Colonel Buckland's brigade having been captured, Sher- 
man had taken that brigade and some cavalry, and driven 
back the Confederate cavalry six miles from the front of 
the camps. On the evening of that day several cannon 

Grant expects were fired and plainly heard by the whole 
army. Grant was at this time at Sherman's 
lines. On coming back, his horse slipped over a log and 
lamed him. On the same day, Lewis Wallace reported 
eight regiments of infantry and 1200 cavalry at Purdy, 
and an equal force at Bethel. Grant gave the necessary 
orders to Lewis Wallace in case they should attack him. 

The Confederate attack was therefore not unexpected, 
and, properly speaking, there was no surprise. Prentiss 
had doubled his grand guards the. night before, and had 
pickets out one and a half miles. Sherman ordered his 
troops to breakfast early, and got them at once into line. 
Grant was perfectly aware of what had been going on. 
He was in doubt, however, from what direction the blow 
would be delivered: whether the Confederates would 
attack his main camp, or cross over Snake Creek to the 
north and west of him, falling on Lewis Wallace's division 
so as to force it back, and make a lodgment on the Ten- 
nessee below, compelling Grant either to attack them and 
drive them away, or to cross over to the east bank of the 
Tennessee and give up his boats. It was better for him 
to risk a battle on the ground on which he stood. For 
the Confederates, the attack on Wallace would have been 
the proper movement. 

For want of engineer officers, Beauregard had been un- 


able to acquire correct information of the terrain of the 
battle-field. The Richmond authorities had become alien- 
ated from him. On this, as on other points, they either 
conceded his demands reluctantly or were indisposed to 
adopt his recommendations. 

As soon as it was dawn on Sunday, April 6th, Hardee's 

The battle of corps passed silently across the ravine of the 
pebbly Lick Creek, and through the short 
distance separating it from the outlying divisions of 
Grant. The fallen leaves, soaked with rain and deprived 
of their crispness, emitted no rustling sound under the 
footsteps of the men. Grant's outposts were driven in. 
Out of a cloud of sulphury smoke with which the woods 
were instantly filled came the yell of charging regiments, 
shells crashing against the trees, and the whir of glan- 
cing bullets. It was a summons to the battle of Shiloh. 

Grant had received a request from Buell to wait for 
him at Savannah, that they might have an interview. Ac- 
cordingly, he was at that place at breakfast when the first 
guns were heard. His horse was standing ready saddled. 
He perceived at once that a serious attack was being 
made. Leaving a letter for Buell, he ordered Nelson to 
hurry up, and took a steam-boat for Pittsburg. On his 
way he stopped at Crump's Landing, giving directions to 
Lewis Wallace to follow at once — or, if the cannonading 
they heard should prove to be a feint, and the real attack 
was about to be made on him, to defend himself to the 
utmost, telling him that he should have re-enforcements 
as quickly as possible. 

Grant reached the field of Shiloh at eight o'clock. He 
saw that he had to deal with the combined Confederate 
armies, and that he must fight without Buell. At this 
moment his entire available force was 33,000. Lewis 
Wallace had 5000 more. Beauregard's force was 40,355. 

Hardee's centre and left had fallen upon Sherman, 


his right upon Prentiss, who resisted as "best he could. 
Bragg' s corps, which had been stationed immediately be- 
hind Hardee's, now came up, re-enforcing wherever was 
necessary the thinned attacking line. The steadiness of 
Sherman threw the weight on Prentiss, the assailants 
Early successes of wedging their way between the two. Be- 

the Confederates. n • i i i j_i i i /? i ~r» j_* 

tore nine o clock the}^ had forced Prentiss 
from his ground and captured and plundered his camp. 
He himself was separated from his division. It fell into 
confusion. Of his defeated troops many had no car- 
tridges. They had been organized only eleven days. 
Sherman, regarding his position as covering the roads, 
Resistance of checked the enemy long enough to enable 
the rest of the army to prepare for battle. 
McClernand, who was in his rear, had sent three regi- 
ments and three batteries to strengthen his left. To the- 
same point Hurlbut had sent four regiments. If deter- 
mination and energy could have saved the line, Sherman 
would have held his ground : he personally attended to 
the details of the moment, directed the fire of hi^ batter- 
ies, and infused his own spirit into his men. But grad- 
ually the Confederates worked their way through the in- 
terval between him and Prentiss, though suffering dread- 
fully in so doing. They had brought up re-enforcements 
from their third or Polk's line, and at length were turn- 
ing Sherman's left. A part of his division at that j)oint 
had broken and fled to the rear. Hereupon he swung 
on his right as on a pivot, and came round at a right 
angle. His right projected forward, holding so tenacious- 
ly that the Confederates could not get round it. It- was 
now ten o'clock. They had seized two of his batteries 
and had captured his camp. 

Here he made a firm resistance, and it was not until 
between two and four o'clock in the afternoon that, with 
McClernand, who had also been forced from his camp and 


lost many of Lis guns, lie moved back slowly and delib- 
erately to a better position in front of and covering the 
bridge across Snake Creek, over which they were mo- 
mentarily expecting that Lewis Wallace would come. 

It was in reference to this that General Grant wrote 
to the War Department : " Sherman held with raw troops 
the key-point of the Landing. It is no disparagement to 
any other officer to say that I do not believe there was 
another division commander on the field who had the 
skill and enterprise to have done it. To his individual 
efforts I am indebted for the success of the battle." 

At ten o'clock the battle was fiercest. It went on, 
however, with little intermission, until two. At the for- 
mer hour Grant was at Sherman's front. Finding that 
for such a desperate contest the supply of cartridges 
would be insufficient, he had organized a train of ammu- 
nition wagons from the Landing to that point. With dif- 
ficulty it forced its way through the narrow road filled 
with fugitives. Meantime Sherman, though wounded, 
was holding his ground tenaciously on the right. On 
the left Stewart's brigade was in the utmost danger, until 
The national line W. H. L. Wallace dispatched McArthur to 
his aid. Stewart was then able securely to 
fall back. His camp was taken. The Confederates were 
now ready to assail Hurlbut, and push him into the river. 
He, however, retired from the open ground on which he 
had been standing to the woods in his rear. His camp 
was captured, but then being joined by W. H. L.Wallace, 
they, from ten o'clock to three, resisted a succession of 
desperate charges. In one of these Wallace was killed. 

Grant's army had now been forced into a space of not 
more than 400 acres on the very verge of 

Grant's army push- . , . TT . .. .-, . . , 

ed to the verge of the river. He was impatiently expecting to 
hear Lewis Wallace's guns on the Confed- 
erate flank. He dispatched one messenger after another 


to hasten that general up to the critical point, but still 
he waited in vain. It subsequently appeared that Wal- 
Lewis waiiace fans l ace na( l obeyed the first orders given to 

to come up. jy^ t() ^ ^ ^^ Q j ^ army? t ut he 

had not been told that it had fallen back. He consumed 
in a fruitless march all the momentous. afternoon. 

In Grant's army all seemed to be hopeless. Five camps 
had been carried, many prisoners taken, and 

Apparently hope- - 1 / t> » - -j i ' i • 

less state bf Grant's many guns lost. Kegunents, breaking up 
into individuals, had been driven in confu- 
sion toward the Landing. There was the impassable 
river. Thousands of fugitives were fleeing through the 
woods down the bank. It was a rout of horses, and 
wagons, and demoralized men. 

But, if. Grant's army was in confusion through its de- 
feat, the Confederate army was scarcely less so by its suc- 
cess. Its organization had been broken up by the wood- 
ed nature of the ground, and by the course that had been 
followed of detaching re-enforcements indiscriminately 
from its corps or divisions wherever they were required 
at the moment. Nevertheless, about two o'clock, the 
Confederates had strong hopes that they would be able 
to turn the national left and seize the Landing. Their 
general-in-chief, Johnston, was vigorously pushing forward 
Death of General that operation, when he was struck by a rifle 
ball, and quickly bled to death — a very se- 
vere misfortune to them. The battle at once lulled. In 
the confusion, it was some time before Beauregard could 
be found, and almost two hours elapsed before he could 
get his army well in hand. The pressure on the national 
left then increased. There was no time to lose, for night 
and Buell were coming. 

Before the Confederates could reach the Landing they 
must cross a deep ravine, impassable for artillery or cav- 
alry, and very difficult for infantry. Grant had thrown 


up hastily some slight earthworks, in the form of a half 

moon, on the brow of his side of the ravine; and General 

r Grant masses Ms Webster, his chief of staff, by adding to sev- 

artiiiery. er ^ s i e g e .g Uns w hi c h were parked there the 

fragments of many light batteries, secured a semicircular 
defense of about fifty cannon. It reached nearly round 
to the Corinth Road. But with so much difficulty were 
artillerists obtained, that the services of the surgeon of 
the First Missouri Artillery were accepted, and he aid- 
ed efficiently in working the guns. The Confederate as- 
sault was made by Chalmers, Withers, Cheatham, Bug- 
gies, Anderson, Stuart, Pond, and Stevens. 

Meantime the two gun-boats, Tyler and Lexington, had 
The gun-boats come come round toward the mouth of the ravine 
in such a position as to be able to reach 
the advancing Confederates with their eight-inch shells. 
From the Confederate bank of the ravine, the view ob- 
liquely across the Tennessee River is very beautiful. The 
bank gently descends as a grassy lawn dotted with fine 
old red oaks, and presenting a park-like appearance — a 
tranquil landscape on the verge of a stormy battle-field. 

One grand effort more, and the Confederates might per- 
The fmai charges of haps reach the Landing. Down the ravine 
the confederates, they rushed ; its bottom was full of water. 
They strove to get across and force their way up the op- 
posite slippery side. But the blaze of Webster's guns 
was in their front, the Lexington and Tyler were furi- 
ously shelling their flank, and national troops, fast rally- 
ing, were pouring forth from their rifles into the battle- 
cloud and din below a sheet of fire. The Confederates 
melted away under the roar of the cannon and the vol- 
leys of musketry. The ravine had become a hell of hu- 
Grantsiiccessfuiiy man a g onv an( l passion, hidden in smoke, 

resists Wzn/ ^ gjjg^ ^^ g^ j t — g & valley of 

the shadow of death. Few gained a foothold on the op- 


posite bank, and that only for a moment. The crisis was 
soon past ; the onset of the Confederates was over. They 
gave up the struggle, and Grant was left master of the 

The firing had hardly ceased when Grant went across 
to Sherman, and had an interview with him. 

Grant arranges for a ^i -t • • • -, ~i s-* n i 

renewal of the bat- iney agreed in opinion that the Confeder- 
ate army was exhausted. Grant gave Sher- 
man orders to be ready to attack it early in the morning, 
informing him that Lewis Wallace was near at hand, and 
would cross the bridge and take post on his right ; that 
Buell's troops were arriving, and would get over the river 
during the night, and come up on the general left. Grant 
then visited every division commander, giving to each 
special directions. He slept on the ground, with his 
head against the stump of a tree, though it was raining 

Buell, who, with his staff, soon afterward came on the 
Exhausted condi- field, and had also an interview with Sher- 
tion of the armies. man ^ ] ia( j "|3 eeri unfavorably impressed by the 

sight of the broken troops near the Landing; but he 
found that, after all the losses, there must be nearly 20,000 
still left for battle, and that the Confederates had prob- 
ably not more than 25,000. They had, in fact, suffered 
quite as much as Grant's army. Bragg says that they 
were very much shattered : " In a dark, stormy night, the 
commanders found it impossible to find and assemble 
their troops, each body or fragment bivouacking where 
the night overtook them." Buell made himself acquaint- 
ed with the battle-ground by the aid of a manuscript 
map lent him by Sherman. 

Night came, and brought with it new horrors. The 
The gun-boats set gun-boats kept up an incessant cannonad- 

thc woods on the. j^ . g^ ^^ ^ ^ ^^ Qn g^ JJ^ 

the damp leaves were smouldering ; there, dried by the 


heat, they and the underbrush were bursting into flame. 
The fire crept up the bark of old trees. Wounded men, 
both those in blue and those in gray, were vainly trying 
to escape a common torment. Happily, however, the 
heavy rain that fell extinguished the flames. 

Beauregard thus reports his position on Sunday night : 
Beauregard's report " At 6 o'clock P.M. we were in possession of 
of his successes. ^\ hi s encampments between Owl and Lick 

Creeks but one. Nearly all of his field artillery, about 
thirty flags, colors, and standards, over three thousand 
prisoners, including a division commander (General Pren- 
tiss) and several brigade commanders, thousands of small- 
arms, an immense supply of subsistence, forage, and muni- 
tions of war, and a large amount of means of transporta- 
tion — all the substantial fruits of a complete victory- 
such, indeed, as rarely have followed the most successful 
battles ; for never was an army so well provided as that 
of our enemy. 

" The remnant of his army had been driven in utter 
disorder to the immediate vicinity of Pittsburg, under the 
shelter of the heavy guns of his iron-clad gun-boats, and 
we remained undisputed masters of his well-selected, ad- 
mirably provided cantonments, after over twelve hours of 
obstinate conflict with his forces, w T ho had been beaten 
from them and the contiguous covert, but only by a sus- 
tained onset of all the means we could bring into ac- 

It has been sometimes said that the arrival of Buell 
Bneii had not yet saved Grant's army. But it was not so. 
Grant, though severely pressed, was not 
beaten. General Nelson, with Buell's advance, did not 
reach the point on the Tennessee opposite the Landing 
until 5 P.M. ; it was 6^ P.M. before Ammen's brigade was 
over. The Thirty-sixth Indiana, Colonel Grose, support- 

Chap.L.] arrival of buell. 299 

ed by the Sixth Ohio, was the first to touch the enemy. 
The resistance it met with shows, however, that the ac- 
tion had really ended. Colonel Grose reported only one 
man killed in the firing, and one after he had got up two 
hundred yards in the rear of the battery ; he had also 
one man wounded. Nelson completed the crossing of 
his division at 9 P.M. Crittenden's division came up 
Bueii comes on the "by boat from Savannah after that hour; 
McCook's at five the next morning, in the 
boats sent back by Crittenden. Lewis Wallace at last 
also arrived on the extreme right, where he had been ex- 
pected for so many hours. These re-enforcements added 
to Grant's strength about 27,000 men. 

The morning of the 7th came in with a drizzling rain, 
and the Confederates showed no signs of advancing. 
Beauregard had ascertained that, from destruction, ex- 
haustion, and fatigue, he could not bring 20,000 men into 
battle on his side. It was only now that he learned that 
Buell had come on the field. Lewis Wallace, who was 
on the national right, was in action soon after daylight. 
Keuewaiofthebat- Grant ordered him to press his attack on 
tie next mommg. ^ e Confederate left, which was commanded 
by Bragg. Accordingly, Wallace and McClernand moved 
forward and recovered the ground lost the day before, 
up to McClernand's original camp on the right of the 
Corinth Road. There they waited with Sherman, who 
sat patiently on his horse, under fire, until after 10 A.M., 
by which time Buell's troops were abreast of them. 

Buell's forces constituted the centre and left of Grant's 
Bueirs troops come new l me - The divisions of Nelson and Crit- 
tenden only were ready at dawn. When 
they heard Wallace's guns on the extreme right they 
moved forward. Their artillery had not yet got up, but 
Buell sent them Mendenhall's and Terrill's, of the regu- 
lar army. Nelson moved half a mile before touching 


the Confederates. He pushed them for a while before 
him, but at length he was checked. There was then an 
artillery conflict for two hours, the Confederates event- 
The second day's ually wavering. Crittenden was on Nel- 
son's right; and when McCook got up, he 
went on the right of Crittenden, and Buell took com- 
mand. Sherman's captured camp was at this time in the 
Confederate rear, and to that as an objective the national 
line advanced, though resisted with the utmost resolu- 

Meantime Lewis Wallace was so pressing the Confed- 
erate left that Beauregard was constrained to re-enforce 
it from his right, notwithstanding that he had found 
that Grant, with Buell, was too strong for him on that 
wing. Nelson, having now less pressure upon him, be- 
gan again to move forward, though not without severe 
fighting and alternations of success. On the other wing, 
Wallace and Sherman were steadily advancing toward 
Shiloh meeting-house against a furious fire. 

McCook's division had also forced back the Confeder- 
erate centre. In front of this division Beauregard made 
his last decided stand. He had given up all hope of 
forcing the national left. Sherman describes the musket- 
ry fire arising in these movements as the severest he ever 
heard. Wallace says, " Step by step, from tree to tree, 
position to position, the rebel lines went back, never stop- 
ping again — infantry, horses, artillery, all went back. The 
firing was grand and terrific. To and fro, now in my 
front, then in Sherman's, rode General Beauregard, incit- 
ing his troops, and fighting for his fading prestige of in- 
vincibility. Far along the lines to the left the contest 
was raging with equal obstinacy. As indicated by the 
sounds, the enemy were retiring every where. 

Beauregard at last ' J t i i 

t?feS? elIedtore " Cheer after cheer rang through the woods, 
and every man felt that the day was ours." 

Chap.L.] aid kendered by buell. 301 

Beauregard now found that nothing more could be done, 
and ordered a retreat. To Breckinridge, who had com- 
mand of the rear -guard, he exclaimed, " Don't let this be 
converted into a rout." 

Grant's captured tents were recovered, but no pursuit 

The confederate could be made until the next day. The 

losses. Confederate losses in this dreadful battle 

were 1728 killed, 8012 wounded, 959 missing — total, 


As there has been much controversy respecting the 
actual share of the armies of Grant and of Buell in the 
operations of the two days (April 6th and 7th), I give 
the subjoined tables, which may enable the reader to 
form an opinion. 

In Grant's army there were six divisions. 

T^h p n Tt i on fil Irm^ps 

Their losses, in killed and wounded, were : 

. 1861 

2d, W. H. L. Wallace — loss both days . . 

. 2424 

3d, Lewis Wallace — loss second day. . . 

. 305 

. 1985 

. 2031 

6th, Prentiss (no report) — loss estimated . 

. 2000 

, 10,606 

' 1 

Of Buell's army, four divisions had inarched to Grant's 

aid. Of these three were engaged : 

2d, McCook's loss 881 

4th, Nelson's " . 693 

5th, Crittenden's " 390 

Aggregate loss 1964 

In view of all the facts, it appears that Grant was not 
now far Grant was indebted to Buell for physical aid on the 

indebted to Buell. ^ ^ . ^ j^ J^g^f re p u]sed the final 

Confederate attack, and believed that as soon as Lewis 
"Wallace joined him he could renew and win the battle. 


So obstinate was the resistance he had made, that he had 
inflicted on his antagonist as severe a loss as he had him- 
self sustained. The well-known approach of Buell doubt- 
less did give him moral assistance. In the battle of that 
day Sherman stands forth as the central figure: the in- 
comparable tenacity with which he held the national 
right against the enemy's utmost efforts, gave Grant the 
means of staying the disaster that was befalling the left. 
Not without reason, therefore, did Halleck say, "It is the 
Sherman had se- unanimous opinion here that Brigadier Gen- 

cured the victory, ^j ^ rp gh erman Save( i the fortunes of 

the day on the 6th, and contributed largely to the glori- 
ous victory of the 7th." 

Fortune had denied to Beauregard victory. He was 
Beauregard's re- compelled to retreat. An eye-witness, an 

treat to Corinth. • -\ -\T "V7 1 a T 1 1 

impressed JNew- Yorker, says: "1 made a de- 
tour from the road on which the armv was retreating, 
that I might travel faster and get ahead of the main body. 
In a ride of twelve miles alongside of the routed army I 
saw more of human agony and woe than I trust I shall 
ever be called again to witness. The retreating host 
wound along a narrow and almost impassable road, ex- 
tending some seven or eight miles in length. Here was 
a long line of wagons loaded with wounded, groaning 
and cursing, and piled in like bags of grain ; while the 
mules plunged on in mud and water belly-deep, the wa- 
ter sometimes coming into the wagons. Next came a 
straggling regiment of infantry, pressing on past the 
train ; then a stretcher borne upon the shoulders of four 
men, carrying a wounded officer; then soldiers strag- 
gling along with an arm broken and hanging down, or 
other fearful wounds which were enough to destroy life. 
And to add to the horrors of the scene, the elements of 
heaven marshaled their forces, a fitting accompaniment of 
the tempest of human desolation and passion which was 


raging. A cold drizzling rain commenced about night- 
fall, and soon came harder and faster. It turned to piti- 
less blinding hail. This storm raged with unrelenting 
violence for three hours. I passed long wagon trains fill- 
ed with wounded and dying soldiers, without even a 
blanket to shield them from the driving sleet and hail, 
which fell in stones as large as partridge eggs, until it lay 
on the ground two inches deep. 

"Three hundred men died during this awful retreat. 
Their bodies were thrown out to make room for others, 
who, although wounded, had struggled on through the 
storm, hoping to find shelter, rest, and medical care." 

Was this the triumphant invasion of the North ? Was 
it for this that Beauregard had issued forth from the for- 
tifications of Corinth % 

The following day (April 8th) Sherman was sent for- 

sherman's pursuit ward with two brigades to follow on the 
of the confederates. traceg of t]be enemy> and ascertain what they 

were doing. On reaching the Confederate hospital at the 
White House he was attacked by Forrest's cavalry, but 
repulsed it. He then learned that Beauregard had re- 
treated to Corinth. All along were evidences of the 
great discomfiture — the dead scattered on the road-sides 
unburied, the farm-houses full of wounded, abandoned 
wagons, caissons, ammunition, and tents. 

As soon as Beauregard reached Corinth, he telegraphed 
Beauregard's report to Richmond that he " had gained a great 
and glorious victory ; had taken from eight 
to ten thousand prisoners and thirty-six guns, but that 
Buell having re-enforced Grant, the Confederate army 
had retired to Corinth." He had sent a flac: of truce to 
Grant asking permission to bury his dead, but Grant in- 
formed him that that had been already done. 

The battle of Shiloh was thus a conflict in which, dur- 


character of the i n g two days, one hundred thousand men 
battle of shiioh. ■ had been enga g ec i_ en g a g e( i i n the heart of 

a forest. From that circumstance it presented no "brilliant 
military evolutions. It may be said to have been a gi- 
gantic and bloody bush-fight. The twenty thousand kill- 
ed and wounded men bore testimony to its severity. On 
the side of the Confederates it was simply a vigorous ef- 
fort to push straight down to Pittsburg Landing ; on the 
national side it was a determined effort to resist. The 
confusion into which both armies fell was the necessary 
consequence of the wooded and broken field. The brave 
Confederate General Johnston, who, in such an untimely 
manner, lost his life in the front of the battle, saw from 
the beginning that his duty was to act, not as the com- 
mander, but as the leader of his men. The mixed-up con- 
dition, the inextricable confusion into which, as related 
by Bragg, that army had fallen at the close of the first 
day, had more than its counterpart on the national side. 
In the very crisis of the battle, the guns with which Grant 
checked the last rush of the Confederates were brought 
from all quarters, and were worked by chance volunteers, 
soldiers, artillerists, and a doctor. 

In some remarks which he published on this battle, 
Sherman has pointed out how strikingly it displayed the 
characteristic qualities of the two armies. Opposed to the 
energy, vigor, vivacity of the South was the inflexible de- 
termination of the North. On the national right Sher- 
man himself had been hammered by main force from his 
camps of the morning until he had been brought to the 
bridge at Snake Creek. It was then of no use to hammer 
at him any longer ; he could be driven in no more ; the 
hammer merely rebounded from its own blows. Grant, 
.at the ravine on the national left, had not been conquered, 
but only compressed. He was certain to recoil the more 
violently in proportion as the pressure was more severe. 


This battle was made the subject of the most extraor- 
Misrepresentauons dinary misrepresentations. Reporters who 
were not upon the plateau, but on board the 
steam-boats, or down at the Landing, gathered from the 
raw troops who had fled many false statements. Thus 
Prentiss, who fought desperately until four o'clock in the 
afternoon, and was then taken prisoner, with four regi- 
ments, because he would not recede when Hurlbut and 
Wallace were forced back, was said to have been sur- 
prised in bed in the morning, and captured in his shirt ; 
Grant, whose movements from daybreak we have related, 
was said to have been absent from the army ; Buell was 
said to have purposely delayed his march out of jealousy. 
From such authorities Beauregard received credit for 
having taken Grant by surprise, and so completely over- 
thrown him that he was rescued from total ruin only by 
the arrival of Buell. 

No resolute pursuit, however, having been made by the 
national army from Shiloh, Beauregard occupied himself 
in strengthening the works of Corinth, his fortifications 
extending more than fifteen miles. He destroyed the 
roads and bridges of approach, and made every thing 
ready for the reception of Halleck, who, leaving St. Louis 
on the news of the great battle, had arrived at Pittsburg 
The national army Landing. The national army was rapidly 
re-enforced. Pope brought to it from Mis- 
souri 25,000 men; eventually it became more than 100,000 

A few days after he had reached Shiloh, Halleck or- 
dered Sherman to take some fresh troops from Buell's 
army, ascend the Tennessee to the mouth of Bear Creek, 

Sherman breaks the an( l there break the Memphis and Charles- 
great railroad. ^ Railroaclj wlLicll crosses the creek by a 

bridge of two spans and about five hundred feet of tres- 
tle-work. Accordingly, Sherman burnt that bridge on 
II— U 


the 14th of April, and effectually severed the line of com- 

Halleck, on joining the army, put Grant as " second in 
command," without any real duty. Grant had fallen un- 
der his displeasure, being blamed for the manner in which 
Haiieck reorgan- the battle of Shiloh had been fought. The 
army was now completely reorganized, and 
slowly advanced on Corinth during the month of May. 
As if to indicate the cause of the reproach that had been 
cast upon Grant, Halleck intrenched himself incessantly 
as he moved forward. As Grant had been blamed for 
want of precaution, so now Halleck was blamed for over- 
precaution. His adversaries affirmed that it took him 
six weeks to march fifteen miles. They abstained, how- 
ever, from giving weight to the fact that, though his .army 
and advances very had w r on a great battle, it was still a raw 

slowly on Corinth. V i *n i ±' n j* 

army, needing drill and time for cementing. 
In the opinion of the best officers in it, it was not fit for 
marches or for military risks. He had before him two 
grand operations which demanded great efficiency — a 
march southward for the complete opening of the Missis- 
sippi, and a march eastward for the seizure of Chattanooga. 
Halleck determined to conduct his operations against 
Corinth by regular approaches. On the 21st of May his 
nearest batteries were three miles distant from that place. 
He had become persuaded that the works were exceed- 
ingly strong, adequately garrisoned, and that an energetic 
resistance would be made. Beauregard had, however, 
concluded that it was impossible for him to resist such 
an army as that which was approaching. Accordingly, 

he commenced secretly evacuating; the place 

The fall of Corinth. J & it 

on the 26th ot May, and in three days had 
removed or destroyed every thing of value. He then re- 
treated by the southern road to Tupelo. On the morn- 
ing of the 30th the national troops entered the town. 


They found that they might have taken it long before. 
The fortifications were substantially a counterfeit ; no ad- 
equate garrison had ever been present ; in some of the 
batteries there were wooden or " Quaker" guns. Halleck 
now dispatched Pope and Buell in pursuit of the retreat- 
ing Confederates, but they were unable to overtake them. 
Beauregard left his army when at Tupelo, on the 15th 
of June, relieving himself from duty on the plea of ill 
health. He went into retirement at Mobile and Bladon 
Springs, having turned over the command temporarily to 
Beauregard unjust- General Bragg. No sooner did Davis hear 
i y disgraced. Q £ ^ g than he ordered Bragg to assume 

permanent command, passionately declaring that he would 
not reinstate Beauregard though the whole world should 
urge him to the measure. 

From the second line, thus broken, the Confederates 
had to fall back on the third, of which the strategic 
points were Vicksburg, Jackson, Meridian, and Selma. 

In view of the whole campaign, from the attack on Fort 
summary of the Henry to the occupation of Corinth, it must 
swioh campaign. be regarded as a complete success for the 

national cause. The objects originally proposed — the 
breaking through the Confederate lines of defense, the 
fall of the powerful blockading works on the Mississippi, 
the opening of that river down to Memphis, the forcing 
of the enemy from their camp at Bowling Green, the oc- 
cupation of Nashville, the severing of the Memphis and 
Charleston Road, and the capture of Corinth — all these 
objects were attained. 

Doubtless more might have been accomplished had 
there been more celerity in the advance on Corinth. Had 
Halleck acted energetically with his left, he might, per- 
haps, have crowned his triumph with the destruction of 
Beauregard's army. 

On the part of the Confederates, the rapidity of their 


concentration at Corinth, their plan of cam- 
piayed by the " pai^n, their conduct on the field of Shiloh, 

Confederates. r ° 7 , ? 

were very brilliant; and, considering how 
near he came to success with the imperfect means he had, 
Beauregard was justified in his reproaches of the Rich- 
mond authorities. He did his part of the duty fully. 
They failed in giving him support. 

At the time when Buell set out from Nashville to re- 
enforce Grant at Shiloh, he dispatched Mitch- 
Mitcheii to break ell southward to destroy, as far as might be 

the railroad. ^ ' _ ^ 

possible, the Memphis and Charleston Road, 
Negley being left in command of the reserves at Nash- 
ville. Mitchell reached Shelby ville on the 4th of April, 
and thence made forced marches to Huntsville, which he 
seized by a night attack on the 11th, getting possession 
of 17 locomotives and more than 100 passenger cars. 
From Huntsville he proceeded to destroy the road east- 
ward as far as Stevenson, and westward as far as Decatur 
and Tuscumbia, over a distance of one hundred miles. 
From the latter place he was driven by a Confederate 
force coming from Corinth, but in his retreat he burned 

His complete sue- ^ n@ bridge over the Tennessee at Decatur. 

cess - It was his intention to move eastward as 

far as Chattanooga, and destroy the railroads there, es- 
pecially that to Atlanta, and to burn the founderies and 
machine shops at Rome. 

To accomplish the destruction of the Atlanta Road, he 
sent out a secret expedition of twenty-two picked men. 
They rendezvoused at Marietta, Georgia. At Big Shan- 
ty, a short distance from Great Kenesaw Mountain, they 
surreptitiously uncoupled from a train a locomotive, with 
a few box cars, giving out that it was a powder-train for 
Beauregard's supply. Then, moving away with all speed, 
they destroyed the telegraph and pulled up the rails. 


They were, however, pursued by a Confederate train so 
closely that the brass journals of their engine melted. 

When about fifteen miles from Chattanooga they were 
compelled to jump from the cars and take refuge in the 
woods. Here they were all hunted down ; eight of them 
were hanged. Mitchell used every exertion to capture 
Chattanooga, but the force under Kirby Smith was too 
strong to permit success. 

The operations of this energetic and able general show 
what might have been done by Buell had there been 
more celerity in his march and more vigor in his pro- 
ceedings. The contrast between these commanders was 
so "striking that it was impossible for them to act in uni- 
son. The subsequent movements of Bragg would prob- 
ably have had a very different issue if Mitchell had been 
his antagonist. In an evil hour Mitchell 

His transfer to -i n, .-, r»i • l •ii* j 

south caroima and was removed irom the scene ot nis brilliant 
expedition to South Carolina, where, unhap- 
pily, he died — a loss to the nation and to science, for pre- 
viously to the war he had distinguished himself by his 
devotion to practical astronomy. 

The Memphis and Charleston Kailroad was thorough- 
ly broken by this burning of bridges and tearing up of 
rails. The Confederate communications between the At- 
lantic States and the Mississippi by this route were sev- 



In continuation of the general plan of the campaign, the army at Corinth was di- 
vided. One portion of it, under Buell, marched eastward toward Chattanooga, 
to seize that strategic point. To the other, under Grant, was assigned the duty 
of moving southward to open the Mississippi. 

The Confederate armies were greatly strengthened by conscription, and inspirited 
by their victories in Virginia. 

Grant's army was weakened to strengthen Buell. He was compelled to defer his 
southward march. The Confederate generals in front of him were tempted 
to endeavor to retake Corinth, but were not successful. 

Grant, having received re-enforcements, commenced the first campaign against 
Vicksburg, but was forced back. Sherman, having passed down the Mississippi 
with the same intention, was repulsed at Chickasaw Bayou. 

Capture of Arkansas Post. 

Beauregard had thrown the die and lost. In the for- 
Eesuits of the shi- ests of Shiloh the fate not only of the Upper 
ioh campaign. Mississippi, but also apparently that of the 
great states Kentucky and Tennessee, had been decided. 

A vast space of many thousand square miles, the entire 
northwest of the Confederacy, had been wrenched away. 

Not without reason, then, was there consternation in 
Richmond. The anger of Davis when he ordered Beau- 
regard into retirement seemed to be almost justified. 

Halleck, however, had entered Corinth, not with the 
military pomp he had expected. There had been no bril- 
liant operations, no triumphant assault. His wily antag- 
onist had simply given him the slip. 

Corinth gained, Halleck prepared to execute the re- 
The march of Bueii mainder of his plan. He had now to de- 
tach Buell eastward to Chattanooga, while 
he himself marched southward to Mobile, opening the 
Mississippi on his right as he went. Farragut had al- 


ready secured its mouth, by the capture of New Orleans 
in April. Halleck's army was more than 100,000 strong. 
He detached Buell on his eastward march to Chattanoo- 
ga on the 10th of June. 

But the terrible energy of the Richmond government 
changed the expected course of events. A 

Effects of the Con- ° _ x . . i -i , i mi 1 

federate conscrip- remorseless conscription had not only iilled 
the thinned ranks of the armies, but had 
greatly increased their strength. The conscripts had con- 
verted McClellan's peninsular campaign into an awful na- 
tional disaster. They were contemplating a march upon 

As soon as Bragg, the Confederate general, found that 
The countermarch Buell was moving toward Chattanooga, fore- 
seeing the disastrous military consequences 
which must follow the occupation of that important point 
by a national army, he set out, and, marching with the 
greatest celerity, reached Chattanooga before his adversa- 
ry, and solidly established himself in it. His army was 
now greatly re-enforced by conscription. 

Under these circumstances, the national government 
Removal of Haiieck was constrained to take Halleck from his 
victorious Western campaign, and, bringing 
him to Washington, commit to him, as commander-in- 
chief, a duty of more momentous importance — the resist- 
ing of the triumphant Confederates in their march upon 
the capital — the heart of the nation. Halleck left Cor- 
inth, and the charge of the great Western campaign fell 
to Grant, his second in command. 

But this was not all. The army whose duty it was to 

Grant's army complete the opening of the Mississippi lost 

weakened, ^^ Qn jy. ^ g g enera ] ft wag lik ew i se <J e . 

pleted of its strength. Bragg, whose strong point was at 
Chattanooga, had, as just mentioned, been greatly re-en- 
forced. Buell was compelled by him to make a rapid re- 


treat to the Ohio. It seemed as if a Confederate march 
northward, on the west flank of the Cumberland Mount- 
ains, would undo all that Halleck had done in his south- 
ward march along the Tennessee. At all hazards, Bragg 
must be checked. Troops which had now become vet- 
erans were withdrawn from Grant. They were hurried 
up the Mississippi and the Ohio to strengthen Buell, and 
Grant was left weakened in presence of his Confederate 

The expectation which had been entertained in Rich- 
mond that Bragg's march on Louisville would compel 
Grant to relax his grip on the Mississippi was doomed 
but he stm dings to disappointment. Now came into view 
to the lasissippi. one £ £k e gjjjkjjjg lineaments of that gener- 
al's character — his unconquerable tenacity. Weakened 
though he was, he stood fast, combating his opponents, 
and not yielding an inch that he could hold. He patient- 
ly waited until he was re-enforced, and then resumed his 
southward march. 

I have now to relate his temporary operations against 
his antagonists Price and Van Dorn, and his resumption 
of the march toward Vicksburg. 

After the departure of Halleck, the Shiloh army, under 
Position of Grant's command of Grant, was stationed from Mem- 
phis to Bridgeport, Tennessee, along the 
Memphis and Charleston Railroad. Grant had Mem- 
phis, Grand Junction, and Corinth as his strong posts, 
with his head-quarters at Jackson, Tennessee, a point in 
the rear, where the Central Mississippi Railroad unites 
with the Mobile and Ohio. It was necessary for him to 
hold the railroads from Corinth and Bolivar north to Co- 
lumbus, which, owing to the low water in the Tennessee, 
had been made his base of supplies. 

In front of Grant lay the Confederate forces under Price 


and Van Dorn. They could concentrate so 

His antagonists . , t , •» -, . . • . 

price ana van as to threaten any one ot his strong points. 

Encouraged by the fact that a part of his 
troops had been sent into Kentucky to aid Buell in re- 
sisting Bragg, every man who could be spared having 
been thus taken, and Grant thrown on the defensive, 
they thought that they might execute a successful ma- 
noeuvre for the recovery of Corinth. Price therefore 

moved to Iuka, seemingly with the inten- 

They attempt to . . n • : j •'■•'■ t> n l 1 

take cormth by tion ot assisting -Bragg. It was expected 

stratagem. tit t n , . 

that brant would be tempted from Corinth, 
and an opportunity thus be given to Van Dorn of seiz- 
ing it. It was the key to the military possession of Ten- 

Van Dorn being at Holly Springs and Price at Iuka, 
Grant thought it possible to destroy the latter and get 
back to Corinth before the former could interfere. He 

therefore directed Rosecrans, who was at 

Counter attempt of m t • . i ti t r\ 1 1 

Grant to destroy luscumbia, to advance on Iuka, and Ord to 


move in combination with him, attacking 
from the west and north. 

At noon (September 19th), Rosecrans, who had 9000 
men, was within seven miles of Iuka, moving slowly for- 
ward. Ord had been directed to approach the place, 
but not to attack until he heard the sound of Rose- 
crans's guns. Pie was, however, prevented 

Affair at Iuka. & ' . -. 

by a strong northwest wind from hearing 
any sound at all. Meantime Rosecrans, who was delay- 
ing beyond Grant's expectations, came up to a point with- 
in two miles of Iuka, and there, about 4 P.M., encounter- 
ed the Confederates in force. A severe conflict ensued, 
in which he lost a battery and 730 men killed and 
wounded. It was continued until dark. The men lay 
down on their arms, expecting to renew the engagement 
in the morning. 



[Sect. X. 


When morning 
came, Ord, who 
had never heard 
the sound of the 
battle, but had 
learned from some 
negroes that it 
had taken place, 
moved into Iuka, 
and found that 
the Confederates 
had abandoned 
it. They had es- 
caped by the Fulton Road, which Rose- 
crans was to have occupied. Rosecrans pur- 
sued, but could not overtake them. They had checked 
him on one road while they had escaped by the other. 
Their loss, however, had been 1438. In these operations, 
Grant was very far from being satisfied with what Rose- 
crans had done. 

The two Confederate generals, finding that their at- 
tempt to get possession of Corinth by strat- 
agem had failed, determined to take it by 
force. They therefore concentrated at Ripley. Rosecrans 
was in command at Corinth with a force of about 20,000 
men. Ord was at Bolivar, and Grant at Jackson. 

Escape of Price 
to Van Dorn. 

Attempt to take 
Corinth by force. 

Chap.LL] attack on coeinth. 315 

On the 2d of October, Van Dorn moved from Chewalla 
toward Corinth. Its defenses had been much changed 
since Beauregard had originally fortified it. Halleck had 
constructed works inside of those of Beauregard, and 
Grant, who had been eight weeks in the place, had made 
others inside of those of Halleck. Corinth now required 
a much smaller force for its defense. 

Learning of the Confederate advance, Rosecrans was at 

first in doubt whether the real attack was to be made on 

himself, or on Grant, or Ord. At first he suspected that 

the movement upon him was nothing more than a feint. 

But early on the morning of the 3d Van 

Assault on Corinth. m i t • m 

Dorn assailed him strongly. The engage- 
ment soon became very warm, and General McArthur, 
who had been sent to the front and presently afterward 
re-enforced, w r as compelled to fall back, with the loss of 
two guns. 

Rosecrans, now perceiving the enemy's intention, made 
suitable preparations to receive him. Hamilton's divis- 
ion held the right, Davies the centre, McKean the left. 
Stanley was in echelon with McKean and nearer to Cor- 
inth. Just before dark the pressure upon Davies w 7 as so 
severe that he was compelled to give ground. 

On the Confederate side, their left, under Price, was 
upon the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, north of Corinth ; 
then came Van Dorn, more westwardly, on the Chewalla 
Road, their right being held by Lovell. The attack was 
therefore made on the northwest side of Corinth, on 
which Van Dorn had been informed by a female -spy 
that it was weakest. But the works which Grant had 
constructed, consisting of four redoubts, had materially 
changed the condition of things. These works command- 
ed the roads along which the Confederates must now 

Some cannonading occurred early in the morning (Oc- 


Gaiiant conduct of tober 4th). At half past nine Price's col- 
the confederates. umn ^qyq down on Rosecrans's centre with a 

force so overpowering as to compel it to yield and fall 
back. The column advanced in the form of a wedge, and 
was received by the fire of the batteries, which tore it 
through and through. It was swept by a direct, cross, 
and enfilading fire. Undismayed, as it came on it opened 
out like two great wings right and left, " the men bend- 
ing their necks downward, with their faces averted like 
those who strive to protect themselves against a driving 
storm of hail." Davies's division, on which it was com- 
ing, began to give way, but was rallied by Rosecrans in 
person. The storming columns carried Fort Richardson, 
and even captured Rosecrans's head-quarters. The fort 
was, however, almost immediately retaken, and, Hamil- 
ton's division on the right now advancing, Price's column 
was irretrievably broken, and fled. 

Van Dorn should have made his attack on Rosecrans 
simultaneously with that of Price, but he was delayed 
by the difficulties of the ground,, About twenty min- 
utes after Price's attack he advanced in four columns, 
their line of march being under the guns of two forts, 
Williams and Robinette. With an audacity that extort- 
ed the admiration of the national troops, the Texas and 
Mississippi soldiers came forward. They advanced until 
they were within fifty yards of Fort Robinette, receiving 
Failure of their at- without flinching a shower of grape and 
canister, when " the Ohio brigade arose and 
gave them such a murderous fire of musketry that they 
reeled and fell back to the woods. They, however, gal- 
lantly re-formed and advanced again to the charge, led by 
Colonel Rogers, of the Second Texas. This time they 
reached the edge of the ditch, but the deadly musketry 
fire of the Ohio brigade again broke them ; and at the 
word " Charge !" the Eleventh Missouri and Twenty-sev- 


entli Ohio sprang up and forward at them, chasing their 
broken fragments back to the woods." The desperation 
of their attack was shown by the fact that the Ohio Six- 
ty-third lost one half of its number, killed and wounded, 
in resisting them. The guns of Robinette, double shot- 
ted, poured forth a fire-storm on the fugitives, and by 
noon the battle was over. 

The Texan Colonel Rogers, who was killed at the edge 
of the ditch, was carefully buried by his victorious and 
admiring enemies. They neatly rounded off the little 
mound that marked his grave. 

The assault on Corinth was very sanguinary, and en- 
tailed on the Confederates a heavy loss. 

In an order issued to his troops, October 25th, Rose- 

Rosecrans's account cr &ns says : The enemy " numbered, accord- 
of the battle. ing tQ tteir own aut h or i t i eS7 nea rly 40,000 

men — almost double your own numbers. You fought 
them in the position we desired on the 3d, punishing 
them terribly, and on the 4th, in three hours after the in- 
fantry entered into action, they were beaten. You killed 
and buried one thousand four hundred and twenty-four 
officers and men. Their wounded, at the usual rate, must 
exceed five thousand. You took, two thousand two hun- 
dred and sixty-eight prisoners, among whom are one hun- 
dred and thirty-seven field officers, captains, and subal- 
terns, representing fifty-three regiments of infantry, six- 
teen regiments of cavalry, thirteen batteries of artillery, 
and seven battalions, making sixty-nine regiments, thir- 
teen batteries, seven battalions, besides several companies. 
You captured three thousand three hundred and fifty 
stand of small-arms, fourteen stand of colors, two pieces 
of artillery, and a large quantity of equipments. You 
pursued his retreating columns forty miles in force with 
infantry, and sixty miles with cavalry." 

The national loss in the battle and pursuit was 315 
killed, 1812 wounded, and 232 taken prisoners. 


Grant was greatly dissatisfied that Rosecrans did not 
press the pursuit with energy, believing that if he had 
done so, Van Dorn might have been destroyed ; but the 
opportunity was lost. 

Grant now prepared to carry out the original intention 
The first vicksburg of the campaign inaugurated at Donelson, 
campaign. j^ ^j^ jj a( j }) eeil brought into abeyance 

by the abstraction of troops from him, and by the trans- 
fer of Halleck to his higher command at Washington. 
His plan was to move along the Mississippi Central and 
reduce Vicksburg, the chief obstacle to the reopening of 
the river. He had 72,000 men at his disposal, of whom 
18,000 were at Memphis; but he commenced 
the march south- his southward march with only 30,000. He 

ward. ". ' 

summoned Sherman, who was at Memphis, 
to meet him at Columbus, Kentucky, and in the interview 
which there took place gave him the necessary orders. 

In the mean time, General Pemberton, who had been 
sent from Richmond to command the Confederate forces, 
took post behind the Tallahatchie to prevent Grant from 
moving south along the Central Mississippi Railroad. 
But in November he did move down that road to Holly 
Springs, Sherman by his orders marching out of Memphis 
to Tchulahoma, and forming his right. Grant simultane- 
ously ordered General Washburne, with a small force of 
infantry and cavalry, to move from Helena, Arkansas, east- 
ward, so as to strike the Central Mississippi about Gre- 
nada, in the rear of Pemberton. As soon as Pemberton 
pemberton recedes felt this force to hastily abandoned his 
before him. strong position behind the Tallahatchie, the 

national forces concentrating and forming a junction near 
Oxford, Mississippi. 

Vicksburg was now the next step. Grant's cavalry 
pushed as far as Coffeeville, and there ascertained that 


Pemberton had halted at Grenada, and adopted the Yal- 
abusha as his line for defense. At Oxford, on Decem- 
ber 8th, Grant, in an interview with Sherman, gave him 
his final orders, which were to leave three 

Sherman ordered to . n -, . n i • i i iiii 

pass down the Mis- out oi nis tour brigades and march back to 
Memphis, distant about one hundred miles, 
and there organize, as quickly as he could, some new 
troops which had come from the North, and proceed to 
attack Vicksburg by way of the river. Sherman was au- 
thorized to take from the force at Helena as many men 
as could be spared. Accordingly, he obtained there about 
6000, under General Steele. He had already organized 
three divisions at Memphis, under A. J. Smith, Morgan, 
and M. L. Smith. These four divisions, embarking about 
the middle of December, were convoyed by the gun-boat 
fleet under Admiral Porter, and proceeded straight for 

Grant's plan was, that while Sherman moved rapidly 
by the river against Vicksburg, he would himself attack 
Pemberton very vigorously and advance to the rear of 
the city by land — or, while he was holding the enemy, 
Sherman might seize the place. At that date no army 
had cast loose from a river or railroad as a base of sup- 
ply, and Grant intended to make use of the Central Mis- 
sissippi, which had been repaired up to Oxford. Holly 
Springs was therefore retained as a grand depot and hos- 
pital. While Sherman was moving down the river, Van 
Dorn, with the Confederate cavalry, executed a brilliant 
operation, which proved fatal to the expedition of Grant. 
He passed round Grant to the east, and sud- 
desfero 8 !^ 88 uenly captured Holly Springs (December 
20th), then guarded only by a single regi- 
ment commanded by Colonel Murphy. " The surprised 
camp surrendered 1800 men and 150 officers, who were 
immediately paroled. The extensive buildings of the 


Mississippi Central Depot, the station-house, the engine- 
house, and immense store-houses filled with supplies of 
clothing and commissary stores, were burned. Up town, 
the court-house and public buildings, livery-stables, and 
all capacious establishments, were filled ceiling-high with 
medical and ordnance stores. These were all fired, and 
the explosion of one of the buildings, in which was stored 
one hundred barrels of powder, knocked down nearly all 
the houses on the south side of the square." The value 
of the property destroyed was more than two millions of 
dollars. Grant had warned Murphy by telegraph that 
he was about to be attacked, and had dispatched re-en- 
forcements to him. In an order issued December 23d, 
Grant says, " It is with pain and mortification that the 
general commanding reflects upon the disgraceful surren- 
der of this place, with all the valuable stores it contained, 
on the 20th instant, and that without any resistance, ex- 
cept by a few men who form an honorable exception; 
and this, too, after warning had been given of the advance 
of the enemy northward the evening previous. With all 
the cotton, public stores, and substantial buildings about 
the depot, it would have been perfectly practicable to 
have made, in a few hours, defenses sufficient to resist 
with a small garrison all the cavalry brought against 
them, until the re-enforcements which the commanding 
officer was notified were marching to his relief could have 
reached him." 

This serious loss compelled Grant to restore his com- 
munications and to send to Memphis for 

His march south- t /-i it r\ i m .i 

ward at once ar- new supplies. Concluding that, with the 
Confederates superior to him in cavalry, and 
the country full of hostile people, he could not rely safely 
on the railroad, he determined to give up that line of at- 
tack, and move his whole army to Vicksburg down the 
Mississippi River. 

Chap. LI.] 



Sherman, in the mean time, ignorant of what had trans- 
siierman reaches piped at Holly Springs and Oxford, had 
the Yazoo River. p US ] ie( j on an( ^ landed, up the Yazoo River, 

and had made an attack at Chickasaw Bayou, on the 
bluffs between Vicksburg and Haines's Bluff. 

The high range of land lying between the Big Black 

and the Yazoo is known as Walnut Hills. These are 

about two hundred feet above the average height of the 

river. The Mississippi impinges against them, making 

The topography a steep bluff at Vicksburg, and for about 

near vicksbmg. ^ wo miles above and several below on the 

east bank; but all the ground on the west is alluvium. 

h# >****«*tt*W* 

ft w iiiii'.v.Hii:!::iiiiiiiiii;;iv:iVj^:iiiiii:i',v.V i V i :i::::i 



The present Yazoo leaves the hills at a point about twen- 
ty-three miles above its existing mouth, at a place known 
as Haines's Bluff. That mouth is about ten miles above 
II.— X 


Vicksburg, so that an irregular triangle of alluvium lies 
between the Yazoo and the Walnut Hills. The Yazoo in 
old times evidently clung to these hills, and has left old 
channels or bayous of deep stagnant water or mud, and 
the whole triangle is cut into every imaginable form by 
these bayous. The present river and the old bayous are 
all leveed against high water, and the lands are very fer- 
tile. The levees vary in height from four to fourteen feet; 
their shape is the same as that of a military parapet ; in- 
terior slope 45°, superior slope from twelve to fourteen 
feet for a roadway, exterior slope about one in four. 
These levees entered largely into the Confederate system 
of defenses. 

Where the levee is continuous, as along the Mississippi 
River, and along the bayou from Vicksburg to Haines's 
Bluff, a separate roadway is made behind it. Along such 
a road masses of infantry and artillery could move per- 
fectly under cover. 

The face of the hills between Vicksburg and Haines's 
Bluff is very abrupt, and cut up by numerous valleys and 
ravines. On the ridge behind, out of sight, is a road, 
with numerous paths cut down to it. Every hill-top had 
its telegraph station, and signal corps could be seen tele- 
graphing the movements of the boats and troops. 

The Chickasaw Bayou is a small stream flowing be- 
The Chickasaw tween the bluffs and the river. These clay 
Bayou. bluffs, which are here more than two hun- 

dred feet high, are very steep; the alluvial swamp be- 
tween them and the river, with its quicksands and boggy 
bayous, is covered with cottonwood, cypress, and a dense 
growth of tangled vines. 

On reconnoitring the ground, Sherman found that im- 
mediately in his front was the bayou, passable only at 
two points, on a narrow levee and on a sand-bar, com- 
manded by the enemy's sharp-shooters on the opposite 


bank. Behind this was an irregular strip of beach, or 
table-land, on which were rifle-pits and batteries, and be- 
hind that a high, abrupt range of hills, scarred with rifle- 
trenches and crowned with heavy batteries. The coun* 
try road from Vicksburg to Yazoo City ran along the foot 
of these hills, and served the enemy as a covered way 
along which he moved his artillery and infantry prompt- 
ly, to meet the national forces at any point where they 
might try to cross the bayou. 

The attack was rendered exceedingly difficult by the 
The difficulties of sw^ampy nature of the country. A fortified 
shermau s attempt, j.^. fifteen miles in length, had been con- 
structed by the Confederates. Through this it was Sher- 
man's intention to pierce. He determined to make the 
real attempt at the head of Chickasaw Bayou, and at 
another place where the bayou is barely passable by in- 
fantry in single file ; but, at the same time, feints were to 
be made at Haines's Bluff, Vicksburg, and as many inter- 
mediate points as possible. Morgan's division moved 
The battle of chick- along the line of Chickasaw Bayou, M. L. 

asawBayon. g^^ ^ ^^ ft mile t() j^ ^^ ^ j 

Smith still farther to the right, and Steele on the north, 
or farther side of the bayou ; but before the real assault 
Steele had reported that it was absolutely impossible for 
him to reach the foot of the bluff, by reason of the swamp 
and submerged ground. He was therefore recalled, and 
sent to re- enforce Morgan. 

As soon as Steele's leading brigade (F. P. Blair's) had 
reached the ground, Morgan being ready, the assault was 
ordered. Under a severe fire from the enemy, Blair's 
brigade and De Courcy's of Morgan's division crossed the 
bayou, drove the Confederates from their first rifle-pits, 
and pushed to the country road that runs along the base 
of the hills. There, being unsupported, they were sub- 
jected to a heavy cross-fire from batteries on the hill, and 


the enemy, rallying, attacked in turn, and captured many 
prisoners. Had Morgan energetically supported his lead- 
ing brigades, he might have secured a lodgment and oc- 
cupied the face of the hill. At that moment Sherman 
was superintending the movement at the other point of 
real attack, where M. L. Smith's division was to cross. 
There the water was so deep that the men could only 
cross in single file at great hazard, as the enemy occupied 
the levee on the opposite side. The Sixth Missouri, how- 
ever, did cross and get so close under the bank that they 
were comparatively safe, but they could not get up it. 
By the time Sherman could reach Morgan, the broken 
fragments of Blair's and De Courcy's brigades had come 
back. The enemy had detected the real points of attack, 
and had rallied to them. 

The ground was very blind and difficult on the na- 
tional side, but the Confederates could look 

Failure in forcing -, n . , . -. ■, ™ i i i . i 

the confederate down ironi their blun, and detect every 

line. -i i i 

movement. Though the attempt had thus 
been most resolutely made, it failed. The enemy's line 
had not been forced. 

The national loss was 191 killed, 982 wounded, 756 
missing. Total, 1929. Of the missing a majority were 
probably taken prisoners. 

Sherman now ordered all the positions to be strength- 
sherman prepares ened, and, in an interview with Admiral 
to renew the attack. p orter? arrailge a to embark Steele's divis- 

ion, to make a strong attack on Haines's Bluff, while he 
should renew the attack at Chickasaw, and effect a lodg- 
ment. The movement was intended for night. Steele's 
troops were accordingly all embarked, but so heavy a 
fog settled that, just before daylight, Porter sent a mes- 
sage that he could not see to steer the boats, and, as the 
movement would have to be made by daylight, he doubt- 
ed its success. 

Chap. LI.] ARKANSAS POST. 325 

The Confederates were now fast receiving re-enforce- 
ments. Not without reason did they triumph in their 
double success. They had forced Grant back, and had 
defeated Sherman. Trains of cars could be heard coming 
in almost every hour, and fresh troops could be seen on 
the bluffs. It was plain that they were either from 
Haines's Bluff or from Pemberton's army. 

At this time, notwithstanding every precaution, the na- 
tional camp was full of spies. From these Pemberton 
had heard of Sherman's movements and of Grant's change 
of plan. He* was enabled by his railroads to throw into 
Vicksburg a force too great to be overcome. Sherman 
had just concluded that he could not break the enemy's 
lines when General McClernand arrived. To him, as the 
senior officer, Sherman reported at the mouth of the Yazoo, 
explaining the state of affairs, and receiving a confirma- 
tion of his order for abandoning the attempt 
on Vicksburg. McClernand brought down 
the river the first authentic news of Grant's abandon- 
ment of the other line of attack, and the return to Mem- 
phis of the advance of his army. It happened that Sher- 
man had left Memphis in so much haste that he had not 
a full supply of ammunition suited to his guns. It had 
been sent down the Mississippi after him on a boat, which 
was captured by the Confederates as it passed by the 
mouth of the Arkansas River. This circumstance satis- 
fied Sherman that before operations could be conducted 
against Vicksburg by the Mississippi River it would be 
necessary to reduce Arkansas Post (Fort Hindman), a 
well-constructed fort forty miles up the Arkansas, behind 
which the Confederates kept several steam-boats for the 
purpose of sallying forth from that river and molesting 
the line of supply. The fort was on the site of an old 
French settlement of 1685. Sherman represented the 
matter to McClernand, who was then in command, in the 


presence of Admiral Porter, and, with great difficulty, pre- 
vailed on him to consent to the expedition. On the 10th 
of January the gun-boats shelled the Confederate sharp- 
shooters out of their rifle-pits, and, under their fire, the 
troops pushed up through the half-frozen, miry swamps. 
In the cold wintry night, without fires, they made ready 
for an assault the next day, when, encountering a heavy 
fire and suffering severely, the troops advanced within 
musket range of the defenses. The guns of the fort had 
been silenced, and, as the men were moving to the as- 
The capture of Ar- sault, a white flag was hoisted on the place, 
and it was surrendered. Sherman himself 
was the second person to ride over the parapet. 5000 
prisoners, 17 guns, 3000 small-arms, and a large quantity 
of stores were taken. The national loss was 977 men. 
The expedition then dropped back to Milliken's Bend, 
where Grant joined it, and from that time till July 4th 
he commanded the army in person. The Mississippi thus 
became the great artery of his supply until the final cam- 



The national government determined on a naval expedition for the capture of New 
Orleans, and assigned Farragut to its command. An auxiliary land force was 
placed under the command of Butler. 

Farragut, with a fleet of wooden ships, forced his way past the forts defending New 
Orleans. He destroyed the Confederate fleet, which had several armored ships, 
and captured the city. 

He then sent a squadron up the Mississippi, reducing the chief towns upon it. He 
subjected Vicksburg to an ineffectual bombardment, forced his way past its bat- 
teries, and made a junction with the fleet from Cairo. 

Again passing the batteries, he descended the river and reduced the chief places on 
the Texan coast. 

The government of New Orleans as administered by Butler. 

Whoever is strong enough to hold New Orleans is 
master of the Mississippi Valley. 

New Orleans was not only the largest, but also the 
most important city of the Confederacy. The charge of 
it was at first committed to General Twiggs, as a reward 
for his having surrendered the United States army under 
his command in Texas (vol. i., p. 544). But a more ener- 
getic officer being required, General Lovell had been ap- 
pointed in his stead. 

In the autumn of 1861, the national government re- 
solved upon the capture and occupation of 

Preparations for the ,. . x .-. -, -.. 

capture of New or- this city, it was considered expedient not 

leans. , » * 

to wait for the progress of the military com- 
binations then in preparation for a forcible passage down 
the river, but to accomplish the object by a special naval 
expedition fitted out from the Atlantic ports. 

The command of this expedition was assigned to Cap- 


The fleet under com- tain D. G. Farragut, an officer of great skill 

mand of Farragut. md daring# 

In addition to the squadron employed in enforcing the 
blockade on the western portions of the Gulf, a large 
fleet of armed steamers and a bomb flotilla was ordered 
to join the expedition. This flotilla of mortar vessels, 
twenty-one in number, and capable of throwing 13-inch 
shells, was under the orders of Commander Porter. 

Though General McClellan admitted that the capture 
of New Orleans would be followed by important results, 
he would not permit troops to be taken from his already 
unmanageable Army of the Potomac. A force was, how- 
ever, sent to Ship Island before the close of 1861, but it 
was not until Stanton was appointed to the War Depart- 
ment that vigor was infused into the undertaking. An 
The land force unr army of eighteen thousand men was then 
furnished. Major General Butler was as- 
signed to its command. He was to assist the expedition, 
and hold New Orleans after it was taken. On the 25th 
of February, 1862, Butler sailed from Hampton Roads. 
Farragut had already (February 20th) reached Ship Isl- 
and, in Mississippi Sound. 

The Mississippi River, continuing the w r ork in which it 
Topography of the h as been engaged for many thousand years, 
Mississippi, j g steadily encroaching on the waters of the 

Gulf. Its long watery arm, gauntleted in swamps and 
mud, spreads out, as it were, into a grasping hand, of which 
the fingers are the Pass a 1' Outre, Northeast Pass, South- 
east Pass, South Pass, Southwest Pass. At a bend about 
thirty miles up, where the river flows eastwardly, the 
United States had formerly built two powerful works, 
Fort Jackson on the south bank, and Fort St. Philip on 
and defenses of New the north. These barred the approach to 
the city from the Gulf, and had been armed 
by the Confederates with 126 guns of long range and large 

Chap. LIL] 





calibre. At this point, too, a chain had been stretched 
across the river ; it was sustained upon eight hulks, the 
intervals between them permitting driftwood to pass. 
From each hulk a spar trailed astern, so that boats could 
not easily pass from one to another. A fleet of thirteen 
armed steamers, the steam-battery Louisiana, of sixteen 
guns, and the ram Manassas, constituted the chief defense 
afloat ; but, in addition, several rafts and fire-ships had 
been provided. Lovell had applied to the governor of 
the state for a re-enforcement of 10,000 men, but it was 
found impossible to spare him more than 3000 in addi- 
tion to those he had, so many having been sent to the 
armies in the Border States. 

On the 8th of April the national fleet, consisting of four 
sloops of war, seventeen gun -boats, twenty -one bomb- 



[Sect. X. 

schooners, and two sailing-vessels, but having no iron- 
clads, had, after great labor, been carried over the bar. 
The Brooklyn had been forcibly dragged through the 
mud of the Southwest Pass. Since the blockade the wa- 
ter had been becoming shoaler because of the non-pas- 
sage of vessels, and at this time there were but fifteen 
feet at the shallowest part of the channel. 

The intended plan of operations was for Porter to bom- 

Farragut's plan of bard the forts, and if he failed to reduce 

them, Farragut was to attempt to run past 

them. That succeeding, Butler was to land his troops in 

the rear of St. Philip, and carry it by assault. 

^s=sS3a BATTERY 


For eight miles below Fort Jackson the south bank of 
the river has a skirt of woods, the trees being thickly in- 
terlaced with vines. Through this an opening had been 
cut by the Confederates to permit their guns to have 

Amusement of the range on ascending vessels. Under the 
mortar ve^is. ' gcr( , en of tliege woods fourteen of the mortar 

vessels were placed, the remainder being on the other side 
of the river. It being found, however, that the latter 
were too much exposed, they also were brought over un- 
der the covert of the woods. For more effectual conceal- 
ment, the masts of all the vessels were dressed with leafy 

Chap.LIL] bomb akdment OF THE FORTS. 331 

branches. Careful surveys were made, so that the bombs 
might be thrown with accuracy, though the forts could not 
be seen. The chief uncertainty then arose from the varia- 
ble pressure of the wind on the projectiles in their flight. 
On the 17th of April the Confederates sent down a 
fire-raft with the intention of burning the ships, which 
lay about four miles below. This and others which fol 
lowed were, however, easily towed by the national sail 
ors out of the way, and did no harm. On the follow 
Bombardment of mg morning the. bombardment commenced 
the forts. During that day 1400 shells were thrown 

This was continued with but slight interruption during 
six days and nights. Notwithstanding the assurances 
of the commandant that " God was certainly protecting 
them," the garrisons became very much demoralized. In 
Fort Jackson the barracks had been set on fire soon after 
the bombardment opened. Its guns were repeatedly si- 
lenced. As many of the shells burst in the air, owing to 
the badness of the fuses, the fuses were put in full length, 
to delay the explosion until the shells had entered the 
ground. They " penetrated into it eighteen or twenty 
feet, and, exploding after a time, lifted the earth up, and 
let it fall back into its place again, demoralizing the men, 
who knew not what the consequences were going to be 
The effect was like that of an earthquake." The return 
fire from the forts was, however, at times, very severe 
sho.t and rifle shell came crashing through the woods, tear 
ing trees up by the roots. The bombardment went stead 
ily on, fifteen hundred bombs being thrown at the forts ev 
ery twenty-four hours. " Overcome with fatigue, the com 
manders and crews of the bomb-vessels might be seen ly 
ing fast asleep on deck, with a mortar on board the vessel 
next to them thundering away. The windows were bro- 
ken at the Balize, thirty miles distant." Fish, stunned 
by the explosions, were floating about in all directions. 


On the third day of the bombardment Farragut held a 
Farragut resolves council. He determined to cut the barricade, 
and carry the fleet past the forts to New 
Orleans. Two gun-boats went up in the darkness of the 
ensuing night to break the obstruction. One of them at- 
tempted, but unsuccessfully, to blow up a hulk by means 
cutting of the cham of a petard. The other, more successful, 
boarded the central hulk. A rocket from 
Fort Jackson revealed what was going forward, and fire 
was opened on them, but, with a cold chisel and hammer, 
the chain was cut. The current at once swept aside the 
gun-boat and the hulk, which had been lashed together. 
After much difficulty the former was extricated, and, fa- 
vored by the darkness, returned with her consort safely 
to the fleet. 

Preparations for the passage were now made. Five 
ships and twelve gun-boats, carrying nearly 

The order of battle. ° ° ■ 

300 guns, were arranged in two columns : 


1st Division of Ships. 


2d Division of Gun-boats. 








2d Division of Ships. 


1st Division of Gun-boats. 







The ships of the left column, led by Farragut, were to 
attack Fort Jackson ; the second division of gun-boats in 
that column was to keep the middle of the river, disre- 
gard the forts, and attack the Confederate fleet above. 
The right column, under Bailey, was to attack Fort St. 
Philip. Six small steamers, belonging to Porter's flotilla, 


were to silence the water battery below Fort Jackson, but 
not to pass it. 

Each ship was got ready for battle. The chain cables 
The ships prepared were looped over the sides in two layers, to 
give an iron-clad protection. The decks and 
gun-carriages of some were whitewashed — an expedient 
that was found to be of very great service in making 
things visible at night. Bags of sand, coal, and other 
suitable materials were so placed as to protect the en- 

At five minutes before two o'clock in the morning of 
signal for the at- the 24th of April two red lights were hung, 
out. It was the signal to go into action. In 
little more than an hour the fleet was all fairly under 
way. Porter's mortar -boats redoubled their fire, and 
made the air alive with shells. Care had been previ- 
ously taken to get accurate range for them. They kept 
up their work with unceasing vigor until after the last 
vessels of Farragut's columns were in the heat of the bat- 
tle. The night was very close, hazy, and dark ; the smoke 
of the cannonading lay heavily on the river. A rain of 
bombs was falling into the forts. 

Dark as it was, every ship, spar, and rope soon became 
visible — visible through the smoke in the red light of the 
battle. The waning crescent of the moon rose just at the 
time that Farragut was going into action. 

Struggling against the current of the river, Farragut 
passa-e of Farragut carried his ship, the Hartford, safely through 
m hVnag-shV ° t}ie broken c h am> Both the forts were firing 

on him. He reserved his guns for fifteen minutes, until 
he could bear fairly on Fort Jackson ; then he poured 
forth such broadsides of grape and canister that nothing 
living could stand before them. The cannoniers in the 
fort fled from their guns. The Confederate ram Manas- 
sas, which had been hidden from sight by the smoke, 


pushed a fire-raft upon hirn. The Hartford was soon in 
flames half way up to her tops. In the struggle she was 
forced ashore. But while she was on fire her cannonading 
never ceased. Her crew extinguished the flames; she 
w^as backed off, and again headed up the stream. A 
Confederate steamer rushed at her with the intention of 
boarding her. One shell from the Hartford blew her up. 
Farragut was now passing St. Philip. He gave it such 
broadsides as he had given Fort Jackson, and silenced it. 
Half an hour more carried him through the fiery storm of 
iron, and his part of the work was thoroughly done. 
In passing the barricade, the Brooklyn, whose place 
passage of the was astern of the Hartford, missed the open- 
Brookiyn. ing, grated on a hulk, and became entangled. 

She received the fire of St. Philip. The iron-clad Manas- 
sas, when within ten feet of her, gave her a shot at her 
steam-drum, and then attempted to butt her ; but the dis- 
tance between them being only a few feet, speed could 
not be got up, and the blow was ineffectual. While 
under the fire of Fort Jackson this ship encountered an- 
other steamer. " Our port broadside (11 9-inch shells), 
at the short distance of fifty or sixty yards, completely 
finished her, setting her on fire almost instantaneously." 
As the Brooklyn, enveloped in a black cloud of smoke 
from a fire-raft, passed St. Philip in only thirteen feet of 
water, her grape and canister drove the men from their 
guns, and for a time completely silenced the fort. The 
Brooklyn was under fire an hour and a half. 

In the same manner, Bailey, who headed the right col- 
Passage of the right umn, went in the Cayuga through the bar- 
ricade, both forts opening upon him and 
striking him repeatedly. He gave his fire of grape and 
canister at short range as he passed St. Philip, and found 
himself, owing to the speed of his ship, ahead of his 
friends, and alone in the midst of the Confederate fleet. 


He beat off two that tried to board him. In the quaint 
phraseology of a sailor, he says that "an 11-inch Dahl- 
gren, at thirty yards, quieted a third, who thereupon 
shoved off for shore, ran aground, and burned himself 
up." The Cayuga was struck forty -two times. Boggs, in 
the Varuna, following her, " got into a nest of rebel steam- 
ers." He "worked both his sides, loaded with grape," 
on his antagonists ; exploded the boiler of one of them — 
she drifted ashore. Three others were driven after her 
in flames. The Varuna was now raked by the fire of an 
iron-clad, which killed four and wounded nine of her 
men. The iron-clad then butted her twice ; but, while 
she was so doing, Boggs " managed to get into her three 
8 -inch shell and several shot from his rifle, thereby dis- 
abling her." Again another iron-clad twice butted him, 
but, happening to go ahead after the concussion, he was 
able to put through her unarmored stern five 8-inch shells, 
" that settled her, and she went ashore in flames." The 
side of the Varuna had been crushed, but she kept up 
her fire until the water was over her gun-trucks. In fif- 
smkmgoftheva- "teen minutes from the time she was butted 
she sank, her top-gallant forecastle only be- 
ing out of the water. She went to the bottom as she 
" settled" her antagonist. 

The Mississippi, one of the ships of this column, was 
shot through and through eight times ; her mizzen-mast 
was shattered. The ram Manassas struck her on the 
port quarters, making a hole seven feet long and four 
inches wide. 

Through the same fiery ordeal the other steam-ships 
The fleet forces its an( l gun-boats passed, three only excepted — 
way past the forts. the. Itasca, wMch had been shot in her boil- 
er ; the Kennebec, caught in the chain ; and the Winona, 
The confederate flo- forced back. The Confederate flotilla was 

tilla destroyed. ^^ destroyei J^ chief re i; ance? ^ 


iron-clad Manassas, had been run ashore, and riddled by 
the broadsides of the Mississippi. Her crew escaped to 
the land ; she was boarded, set on fire, drifted down the 
river, and blew np. Twelve of the Confederate flotilla 
had been sunk or burned. 

Commander Porter, who kept up the mortar fire while 
Farragut was forcing his way, says of the conclusion of 
the battle : " It was reported to me that the celebrated 
ram Manassas was coming out to attack us, and, sure 
enough, there she was, apparently steaming along shore, 
ready to pounce upon the defenseless mortar vessels ; but 
I soon discovered that she could harm no one again. 
She was beginning to emit smoke from her ports or holes ; 
she was on fire, and sinking. Her pipes were twisted and 
riddled with shot ; her hull was well cut *up. She had 
evidently been used up by the squadron as they passed 
along. I tried to save her as a curiosity by getting a 
hawser round her and securing her to the 

Explosion of the ar- , -, , . -. . i p • , i 

mored ram Manas- bank, but lust atter doing so she faintly ex- 


ploded. Her only gun went off, and, emit- 
ting flames through her bow-port, like some huge animal, 
she gave a plunge and disappeared under the water. 
" Next came a steamer on fire ; after her two others, 

burning and floating down the stream. 

Awful appearance -r^. -i;i • tit ,-, , 

of the river before Jb ires seemed to be raging; all along the ' up 

daybreak. . _ © £> » JT 

river, and we supposed that our squadron 
was burning and destroying the vessels as they passed 
along. The sight of this night attack was awfully grand. 
The river was lit up by rafts filled with pine knots, and 
the ships seemed to be literally fighting among flames 
and smoke." 

At Hye o'clock the Cayuga discovered the encampment 

of the Chalmette regiment on the right bank 

Passage of the fleet a tl . ■, 1 1 i • i i i 

toward New or- ol the river, and compelled it to surrender. 

leans. ' m x 

The telegraph wires ahead were cut, the fleet 


proceeding up toward New Orleans, encountering cotton- 
loaded ships on fire. Three miles below the city, the 
Chalmette batteries, mounting twenty guns, were reached. 
The Cayuga, leading, sustained their cross-fire for some 
time alone ; but the Hartford, Pensacola, Brooklyn, and 
other ships coming up, gave the batteries such a storm 
of shells, shrapnel, and grape as drove the men from their 
guns. "The forts were silenced, and those who could 
run were running in every direction." 

Farragut reports that, " owing to the slowness of some 
of the vessels, and our want of knowledge 

The Confederates •> , -1 • tt , iii -n t l 

set fire to their cot- oi the river, we did not reach the H;n2:lisn 

ton and ships. ' ., , .-»«- ■ , 

Turn until about 10.30 A.M. on the 25th, 
but all the morning I had seen abundant evidence of the 
panic which had seized the people in New Orleans. Cot- 
ton-loaded ships on fire came floating down, and" working 
instruments of every kind, such as are used in ship-yards. 
The destruction of property was awful. The levee in 
New Orleans was one scene of desolation. Ships, steam- 
ers, cotton, coal, were all in one common blaze, and our 
ingenuity was much taxed to avoid the floating confla- 

Lovell, seeing what had taken place at the forts, gal- 
loped to New Orleans. He ordered the land defenses to 
resist to the utmost ; but the water in the river was so 
high that the ships could command all the earth-works. 
After a brief and angry consultation with the terror-strick- 
en municipality, he sent off his munitions, disbanded his 
troops, and turned the city over to the mayor. 

In the midst of a thunder-storm, Farragut anchored his 
The squadron anch- squadron off New Orleans at 1 P.M. The 
populace, who had believed that the defenses 
of the city were impregnable, were astounded, and in an 
impotent frenzy. The sailors in the national ships were 
cheering, the crowd ashore was cursing. Some were 
II.— Y 


clamoring for the blood of the commandant of the forts; 
some were invoking vengeance on Lovell ; some, ragged 
and raging, but with nothing to lose, insisted that the city 
should be burned. 

A demand was now made by Farragut for a surrender, 
Parragut demands an( l the display of the United States flag on 
the public buildings. So suddenly and so 
unexpectedly had the blow fallen on them that the may- 
or and municipal authorities hardly knew what to do. 
On one side they had an unreflecting and turbulent pop- 
ulace to deal with; on the other, a clement conqueror. 
Farragut, as merciful in victory as he was brave in action, 
appreciated their hour of bitterness, and listened with 
generosity to the mayor's querulous protestations. 

Upon his arrival before the city, Farragut had sent 
Captain Bailey, his second in command, to the mayor with 
the demand for the surrender, and to inform that func- 
tionary that no flag but that of the United States would 
be permitted to fly in presence of the national fleet. 

To this the mayor replied, "transmitting the answer 

which the universal sentiment of my COn- 
Reply of the mayor. J 

stituency, no less than the promptings ot 
my own heart dictate to me on this sad and solemn oc- 
casion." It was to the effect that the city was utterly 
defenseless ; that he was no military man ; that he knew 
neither how to command an army nor to surrender an 
undefended place. " As to the hoisting of any flag than 
the flag of our own adoption and allegiance, let me say 
to you that the man lives not in our midst whose hand 
and heart would not be palsied by the mere thought of 
such an act ; nor could I find in my entire constituency 
so wretched and desperate a renegade as would dare to 
profane with his hand the sacred emblem of our aspira- 
tions. Sir, you have manifested sentiments which would 
become one engaged in a better cause than that to which 


you have devoted your sword. I doubt not that they 
spring from a noble though deluded nature, and I know 
how to appreciate the motives that inspire them. You 
will have a gallant people to administer — a people sen- 
sitive of all that can in the least aifect its dignity and 

In this refusal of the mayor to hoist the United States 

flag on the national buildings — the Custom- 

the public bund- house, Post-office, Mint — the Common Coun- 

iugs. ■ ■ ' ' 

cil of the city united. Hereupon Farragut 
sent a party 'on shore to perform that duty. "They 
were insulted in the grossest manner, and the flag that 

had been hoisted by his orders on the Mint 

It is insulted. •'-._._ 

was pulled down and dragged through the 
streets." He therefore notified the mayor to remove the 
women and children from the city within forty-eight 
hours, as the fire of the fleet might be drawn upon it, and 
an amount of distress ensue to the innocent population 
which he had heretofore declared that he desired by all 
means to avoid. 

To this the mayor replied, addressing his communica- 
The mayor express- tion to " Mr. Farragut," as he ventured to 
right's 0? blifigeS 6 designate the United States officer, that the 
interference of the United States forces while 
negotiations were pending between him and the con- 
queror " could not be viewed by him otherwise than as a 
flagrant violation of those courtesies, if not of the absolute 
rights which prevail between belligerents under such cir- 
cumstances," and that his " views and sentiments in rela- 
tion to such conduct remain unchanged ;" that the notifi- 
cation to remove the women and children was an "utter 
inanity." " They can not escape from your shells if it be 
your pleasure to murder them on a question of mere eti- 
quette. Even if they could, there are but few among them 
who would consent to desert their families, and homes, 


and the graves of their relatives in so awful a moment. 
They would bravely stand the sight of your shells rolling 
over the bones of those who were once dear to them, and 
would deem that they had not died ingloriously by the 
side of the tombs erected by their piety to the memory 
of departed relatives." 

Farragut now raised the United States flag upon the 
Custom-house, and sent a letter to the mayor requiring 
him to " see that it was respected with all the civil pow- 
er of the city." 

History may be searched in vain for another such cor- 
respondence as this between a city taken by 

Singular character -.. ' ,i n i n • 

of this correspond- storm and its conqueror in the nusli ot vic- 

ence. . x . 

tory. It is impossible not to see that the 
recalcitrant civic authorities w T ere implicitly putting their 
trust in the forbearance of that Great and Clement Power 
which they w T ere ostensibly defying. They knew that it 
would do them no wrong. 

General Butler, who had witnessed the passage of the 
forts by Farragut, now proceeded to execute his part of 
the duty. He brought his forces into the rear of St. 
Philip, Porter keeping up a bombardment. On the 27th 
of April the garrison had become so demoralized as to 
surrender of the refuse to fight any longer. The forts were 
therefore surrendered on the next day. 
While the terms were being adjusted, the officers of the 
Confederate ram Louisiana towed her out into the cur- 
rent and set her on fire, with her guns all shotted, ex- 
pecting that she would drift down and explode in the 
midst of Porter's fleet. For this they were sent close 
prisoners to the North. 

On the 1st of May New Orleans was formally occu- 
pied by United States troops. 

The loss on the national side in achieving this great 
victory was 40 killed and 177 wounded. It was not 

Chap.LIL] baton rouge. 341 

alone the capture of the city that was accomplished, but 
the destruction of iron-clads which would shortly have 
become very formidable. 

Bailey, the captain who had led the right column, truly 
described the battle: "It was a contest between iron 
hearts in wooden vessels and. iron-clads with iron beaks, 
and the iron hearts won." 

Among naval authorities, the battle of the Mississip- 
pi caused, if not a reversal, at least a suspen- 

The value of wood- . n . -. .. n -, p ,, 

en against iron sion oi the opinions formed rrom the corn- 
ships. x 

bats of the Merrimack in Hampton Roads. 
Farragut, an officer equal to Nelson in audacity, without 
hesitation took all odds. He fought walls of stone and 
a fleet of iron-clads with a wooden fleet, and actually won 
the battle. 

New Orleans having thus been occupied, a part of the 

The fleet moves up fl ee ^ was sen ^ by Farragut up the Missis- 
the Mississippi. s Jppi ? capturing without resistance Baton 

Rouge, the capital of the state. On taking possession a 
correspondence ensued with the mayor, the counterpart 
of that which had taken place with the Mayor of New 
The Mayor of Baton Orleans. That officer declared that his city 
Kouge ' would not be surrendered voluntarily to any 

power on earth, and declined to " offend the sensibilities 
of his people by hoisting the flag of the United States." 
Captain Palmer, the commander of the Iroquois, hoisted 
over the arsenal the flag, and, in reply to the mayor, re- 
marked that " war is a sad calamity, and often inflicts se- 
verer wounds than those upon the sensibilities." In a 
letter reporting the state of affairs to Farragut he said, 
" Here is the capital of a state, with 7000 inhabitants, ac- 
knowledging itself defenseless, and yet assuming an arro- 
gant tone, trusting to our forbearance. I was determined 
to submit to no such nonsense, and accordingly weighed 
anchor and steamed up abreast the arsenal, landed a 


force, and took possession of the public property of the 
United States, and hoisted over it our flag. No resist- 
ance was offered." 

The Iroquois left Baton Eouge (May 13), and, pro- 

captureof ceeding up to Natchez, took possession of 

Natchez - that city. 

On the 18th of May the advance steamers of the 
squadron had reached Vicksburg. A de- 

Demand for the n ^ -. -, „ ., .' . ' , , 

surrender of vicks- mand lor the surrender ot that city was at 

burg. * 

once made, to which the military governor 
replied, " I have to state that Mississippians don't know 
and refuse to learn how to surrender to an enemy. If 
Commodore Farragut or Brigadier General Butler can 
teach them, let them come and try." 

Porter's mortar -boats had to be towed up to Vicks- 
burg. It was not until the 28th of June, when sixteen 
of them had arrived, that Farragut was ready. The ac- 
tion commenced at 4 P.M. by a bombardment. Farra- 
Farragut attacks gut's flag-ship, the Hartford, with six other 
vessels, then passed the batteries. She was 
under fire about one hour and a half, going at her slow- 
est speed, and even stopping to silence a battery as she 
passed. The loss in all the ships was 15 killed and 30 
wounded. A junction was made with the forces which 
had come down the river from Cairo. The United States 
flag had been carried in triumph throughout the whole 
length of the Mississippi. 

Further operations against Vicksburg having been for 
the time abandoned under orders from Wash- 

Operations against ., .-> •> rv» • i i ~i p i 

vicksburg aban- m^ton, there berns; no sumcient land lorce to 

cloned. ° © . , , 

co - operate, and the ships being unable to 
make any impression on the Confederate works, Farragut 
once more steamed past the batteries, and, as the river 
was now falling fast, went down to New Orleans (July 
28), and thence to Pensacola; the latter place, having 


been evacuated by the Confederates, had been made the 
depot of the Western Gulf squadron, its advantages be- 
ing superior to those of Ship Island. 

While a part of the squadron lay off Baton Rouge, an 
attack was made by the Confederates on the 

Confederate attack 1 n r> i -vtt'-i-i* • 

on General wn- command oi General Williams, occupying; 

liams's troops. . ' x " ° 

that place. In the action that officer was 
killed. The gun-boats could not be brought into posi- 
tion until late in the day, when they compelled the Con- 
federate left wing to make a precipitate retreat. A Con- 
federate ram, the Arkansas, which was to have taken part 
in the engagement, remained a short distance above. 
Next morning the Essex encountered her, and, after a 
short engagement, blew her up. 

During September, detachments sent by Admiral Far- 
captureofGai- ragut took possession of Corpus Christi and 

Sabine City; and in October, the defenses 
of the harbor and city of Galveston were captured, there 
having been only a feeble resistance. 

General Butler now entered on the difficult task of 
The mie of Butier governing New Orleans. Its population, 
though greatly 'diminished to strengthen 
the Confederate armies in the Border States — a cause 
of bitter complaint to the inhabitants — still numbered 
about 140,000. Almost one half of it was of foreign 
birth. Perhaps no city in the world had in its lower 
classes a more dangerous and desperate population. 
There was a widespread hope that a French force would 
soon come to their help. 

By firmness, strict yet considerate, he controlled the 
municipal authorities ; by severity he put down the mob. 
He was a terror to tricky tradesmen, a benefactor to the 
starving poor. He cleaned the streets, enforced sanitary 
regulations, and kept out yellow fever. He put an ef- 

344 THE WOMAN ORDER. [Sect.X. 

fectual stop to tlie operations of Confederate agents, who 
were illicitly obtaining supplies for their cause. New Or- 
leans found that " Butler was no sham, but a most thor- 
ough proconsular reality." 

He arrested Mumford, the person who hadiauled down 

Execution of the national flag at the Mint, brought him 

before a military commission, convicted and 

executed him. On this the Confederate President issued 

the following proclamation (December 23d, 1862) : 

"I, Jefferson Davis, President of the Confederate States ofAmer- 
Butier proclaimed a * ca > m their name, do pronounce and declare the 
felon by Davis. said Benjamin F. Butler a felon deserving capital 
punishment. I do order that he be no longer considered or. treat- 
ed simply as a public enemy of the Confederate States of America, 
but as an outlaw and common enemy of mankind; and that, in 
the event of his capture, the officer in command of the capturing 
force do cause him to be immediately executed by hanging ; and I 
do further order that no commissioned officer of the United States 
taken captive shall be released on parole before exchange until the 
said Butler shall have met with due punishment for his crimes. 
All commissioned officers in the command of the said Benjamin F. 
Butler are declared not entitled to be considered as soldiers en- 
gaged in honorable warfare, but as robbers and criminals deserving 
death, and that they and each of them be, whenever captured, re- 
served for execution." 

Some women of New Orleans, relying on the immunity 
National officers in- of their sex, gratified their animosity by in- 
suited by women. S11 ltlng national officers in public places. 
One of them ventured so far as to spit in the face of an 
officer who was quietly walking in the street. Hereupon 
was issued 

"General Order No. 28. — As the officers and soldiers of the 
United States have been subjected to repeated in- 
sults from the women (calling themselves ladies) of 
New Orleans, in return for the most scrupulous non-interference and 
courtesy on our part, it is ordered that hereafter, when any female 
shall, by word, gesture, or movement, insult or show contempt for 
any officer or soldier of the United States, she shall be regarded and 


held liable to be treated as a woman of the town plying her avoca- 

Finding that it was impossible to co-ordinate the na- 
tional authority, of which he was the repre- 

Butler suspends the , . . . , -1 . T . . -• tl ... 

municipal authori- sentative, with the municipal authorities, 


who openly sustained the Confederate cause, 
he suspended them. A French war ship, supposed to be 
the precursor of a French fleet, having come into the riv- 
er, and the Common Council having presumed to offer 
the hospitalities of the port, Butler, considering the dis- 
ease of the French position which the French government had 
warship. manifested to intermeddle in American af- 

fairs, ordered the Council to revise its action, and gave it 
to understand that the United States authorities were 
the only ones in New Orleans capable of dealing with 
foreign nations. 

His dealings with the numerous and insubordinate 
Accusations against foreign population of New Orleans brought 
the French consul. y m into collision with the foreign* consuls. 
" Count Mejan" (the French consul), Butler declared," has 
connived at the delivery of clothing for the Confederate 
army since the occupation of New Orleans by the Federal 
forces ; he has taken away nearly half a million of specie 
to aid the Confederates. His flag has been made to cov- 
er all manner of illegal and hostile transactions, and the 
booty arising therefrom." 

The feeling of personal hatred to Butler grew daily 
counter-accusations more and more intense. He was accused 
of improper tampering with the banks, spec- 
ulating in sequestrated property, and, through the agency 
of his brother, carrying on illegal but profitable transac- 
tions in sugar and cotton — in short, prostituting his office 
for personal gain. In South Carolina a reward of $10,000 
had been offered for his assassination. Throughout the 
Confederacy he received an ignominious surname, and 


was known as " Butler the Beast." The government felt 
investigation of ws constrained to send a commissioner to New 
Orleans to investigate his tran sactions. Its 
conclusion was that he had evidently acted " under a mis- 
apprehension, to be referred to the patriotic zeal which 
governs him, to the circumstances encircling his command 
at the time, so well calculated to excite suspicion, and to 
an earnest desire to punish, to the extent of his supposed 
power, all who had contributed, or were contributing, to 
the aid of a rebellion the most unjustifiable and wicked 
that insane or bad men were ever engaged in." 

The French government recalled its consul ; the Amer- 
The French consul ican recalled Butler, General Banks arriving 
mfve B d U from r New in New Orleans (December 14th) to take 
Orleans. y g p] ace> j n a f arewe n address to the peo- 

ple of that city, General Butler said : 

" Commanding the Army of the Gulf, I found you cap- 
Butier's fareweii tured, but not surrendered; conquered, but 
address. no ^ or( Jerly; relieved from the pressure of an 

army, but incapable of taking care of yourselves. I re- 
stored order, punished crime, opened commerce, brought 
provisions to your starving people, reformed your curren- 
cy, and gave you protection such as you had 

He states what he . -, n TTT1 , 

had done for the not enioyed lor many years. Whoever has 

people. ' 

quietly remained about his business, afford- 
ing neither aid nor comfort to the enemies of the United 
States, has never been interfered with by the soldiers of 
the United States. 

" Some of your women flouted at the presence of those 

who came to protect them. By a simple 

He defends his con- -, tiit it n ,i • 

duct to their wom- order,! called upon every soldier 01 this 

army to treat the women of New Orleans as 

gentlemen should deal with the sex, with such effect that 

and appeals to their 1 now cal1 u P on the just-minded ladies of 
just-mmdedhuhes. ^ ew Orleans to say whether they ever en- 


joyed so complete protection and calm quiet for them- 
selves and their families as since the advent of the Unit- 
ed States troops. 

" I hold that rebellion is treason, and that rebellion 
Theprincipiesofhis persisted in is death, and any punishment 
administration. short of that due to a traitor gives so much 
clear gain to him from the clemency of the government. 
Upon this thesis have I administered the authority of the 
United States. I might have regaled you with the amen- 
ities of British civilization, and yet been within the sup- 
posed rules of 'civilized warfare. Your property could 
have been turned over to indiscriminate " loot," like the 
palace of the Emperor of China; works of art which 
adorned your buildings might have been sent away like 
the paintings of the Vatican ; your sons might have been 
blown from the mouths of cannon like the Sepoys of 
Delhi, and yet all this would have been 

He has abstained 
from authoi 

within the rules of civilized warfare as prac- 

ticed by the most polished and the most 
hypocritical nations of Europe. But I have not so con- 
ducted. On the contrary, the worst punishment inflicted, 
except for criminal acts, punishable by every law, has 
been banishment, with labor, to a barren island where I 
encamped my own soldiers before marching here." 

" I have levied upon the wealthy rebels and paid out 
, . , , + , nearly half a million of dollars to feed 40,000 

and has fed the J > 

starving poor. £ j-j^ starving poor of all nations assembled 
here, made so by this war. I saw that this rebellion was 
a war of the aristocrats against the middling men — of the 
rich against the poor — a war of the landowner against 
the laborer ; that it was a struggle for the retention of 
power in the hands of the few against the many, and I 
found no conclusion to it save in the subjugation of the 
few and disenthralment of the many. I therefore felt no 
hesitation in taking the substance of the wealthy, who 


had caused the war, to feed the innocent poor who suf- 
fered by it ; and I shall now leave you with the proud 
consciousness that I carry with me the blessings of the 
humble and loyal under the roof of the cottage and in 
the cabin of the slave, and so am quite content to incur 
the sneers of the salon or the curses of the rich. 

" I found you trembling at the terror of servile insur- 
rection ; all danger of this I have prevented 

He has shown that , . . ., ■, .1,11-1 

slaves may be gov- by so treating the slave that he had no 

erned by kindness, ^ *? 

cause to rebel. I found the dungeon, the 
chain, and the lash your only means of enforcing obedi- 
ence on your servants. I leave them peaceful, laborious, 
controlled by the laws of kindness and justice. 

" I have demonstrated that the pestilence can be kept 
from your borders ; I have added a million 

and that pestilence r»i-n , i ; -1 • i i r» n 

may be kept out of oi dollars to your wealth 111 the form of new 

the city. , 

land from the batture of the Mississippi. 
I have cleansed and improved your streets, canals, and 
public squares, and opened new avenues to unoccupied 
land. I have given you freedom of election greater than 

you ever enjoyed before. I have caused 

He has adminis- .,• , ^ i • • j i • j • in 

tered impartial -justice to be administered so impartially 


that your own advocates have unanimously 
complimented the judges of my appointment. 

" You have seen, therefore, the benefits of the laws and 

He appeals to the justice of the government against which you 

people ' have rebelled. Why, then, will you not all 

return to your allegiance to that government, not with 

lip service, but with that of the heart ? 

" There is but one thing that at this hour stands be- 
tween you and the government, and that is slavery. The 
institution, cursed of God, which has taken its last refuge 
here, in His providence will be rooted out as the tares 
from the wheat, although the wheat be torn up with it. 
" I came among you by teachings, by habit of mind, by 


. , > political position, by social affinity, inclined 

imploring them to r ± ? J J 7 

abandon slavery, -j- sus t a in your domestic laws, if by possibil- 
ity it could be done with safety to the Union. Months 
of experience and observation have forced the conclusion 
on me that the existence of slavery is incompatible with 
the safety either of yourselves or of the Union. As the 
system has gradually grown to its present huge dimen- 
sions, it were best if it could be gradually removed ; but 
it is better, far better that it should be taken out at once, 
than that it should vitiate the social, political, and family 
relations of your country. I am speaking with no phil- 
anthropic views as regards the slave, but simply of the ef- 
fect of slavery on the master. See for yourselves ; look 
around you, and say whether this saddening, deadening 
influence has not all but destroyed the very frame-work 
of your society. I am speaking the farewell words of 
one who has shown his devotion to his country at the 
peril of his life and fortune, who in these words can have 
neither hope nor interest save the good of those whom 
he addresses. 

" Come, then, to the unconditional support of the gov- 
andretnm to their ernmeni Take into your own hands your 
allegiance. own institutions. Remodel them according 

to the laws of nations and of God, and thus attain that 
great prosperity assured to you by geographical position, 
only a portion of which was heretofore yours." 



Encouraged by its successes in Virginia, the Confederate government ordered Gen- 
eral Bragg to advance from Chattanooga northward. 

He executed his orders, compelling Buell to retreat to the Ohio. He then attempt- 
ed to establish a Confederate government in Kentucky. 

Buell was re-enforced ; the Battle of Perryville was fought ; and Bragg, car- 
rying away immense plunder, retreated. Rosecrans was ordered to take com- 
mand of Buell's army. 

Bragg, marching northward again, was overthrown by Rosecrans at the Battle of 
Murfreesborough ; and the Confederates, giving up all hope of crossing the 
Ohio, retired to Tullahoma. The sortie of Bragg had failed. 

The Civil War had already assumed its characteristic 
aspect. The Confederate States were completely belea- 
guered and besieged. 

They were encircled by the blockade of the sea-coast, 
by hostile armies on the north of Virginia 

The military condi- -,, , . ,. n ,i r\t • 1 

tion of the confed- and along the entire line ot the Ohio, by 

eracy. ° . . 

a patrol of national gun-boats on the Mis- 
sissippi as far as Memphis, and by Farragut's ships from 
New Orleans to Vicksburg. 

I have now to relate how they made convulsive efforts 
to break through this line of investment, the stringency 
of which was daily increasing. The campaigns of Bragg 
and of Lee stand in the attitude of gigantic sorties — 
gigantic, yet only in proportion .to the vastness of the 

The Confederate government was not without causes 
of encouragement. Conscription had re-enforced its ar- 
mies; victory had rewarded its efforts. McClellan had 


■ * 

been driven from Richmond; his peninsular campaign 
had totally failed. 

It seemed as if the time had now come for gratifying 
Determination to the clamor so importunately raised through- 

make offensive war. ^ ^ g^^ ^ ^ ^ ^^ nQ -^ 

gerbe carried on defensively, but that vigorous offensive 
operations should be instituted in the Free States. The 
demand had become irresistible — "Carry the war into 
the enemy's country, and relieve us from its intolerable 

Accordingly, as the proper initiatory steps, Lee was di- 
The sorties of Bragg rected to move into Maryland and Bragg 
into Kentucky. It was supposed that those 
slaveholding states, thus far lost to the Confederacy, 
would be easily reclaimed; that from them the North 
might be invaded, and peace wrung from it in one of its 
great cities. 

Lee's movement to the North we shall have to consider 
in a subsequent chapter. In this we have to speak of 
Bragg' s. 

Bragg was at Chattanooga. In his march to it from 
Tupelo he had outstripped the tardy Buell, who, as we 
have seen (p. 311), had been dispatched by Halleck on 
the 10th of June. 

It was clear that very great incidental advantages 

would arise from the march of Bragg' s army 

Bragg's northward northward from Chattanooga alone; the west 

march. ° , ° 

flank of the Cumberland Mountains, for not 
only might he recover the two states Tennessee and Ken- 
tucky, and threaten Louisville and Cincinnati, but he 
might compel the detachment of a large part of the force 
from the army of Grant near Corinth. The projected 
march of that general southward toward New Orleans 
might be half paralyzed by the march of Bragg north- 
ward to Louisville. The event more than justified these 




H I 



expectations, for Buell himself was at once thrown from 
the confines of Alabama to the Ohio Kiver, a distance of 
three hundred miles. 

The Confederate authorities had considered it expe- 
An ostensible mo- dient to h ave an ostensible as well as a real 
motive for the Northern campaign in which 

tive assigned. 

Chap.LIIL] the confederates march northward. 353 

Bragg was about to engage. While their real objects 
were such as have been just described, they gave out that 
they were undertaking a foray into Kentucky. It was 
affirmed that in that state there were more provisions 
and live-stock than in all the rest of the South. Bragg 
might fail in destroying the national forces, in driving 
them north of the Ohio, in capturing Louisville and Cin- 
cinnati, in detaching the Northwest from the Union, in 
arresting Grant's march to the South, but it was hardly 
possible for him to fail in securing a vast supply of pro- 
visions ; and it was supposed that the Southern people, 
expecting no more, would be content with that. 

The conscription had raised Bragg' s army to 50,000 
Bragg commences men - It was organized in three corps. 
hisnfarch. Those of Hardee and Polk were with him 

at Chattanooga ; that of Kirby Smith was at Knoxville. 
With the former Bragg commenced moving northward 
from Chattanooga, having his antagonist Buell on his left 
flank. He directed his march toward the Louisville and 
Nashville Kailroad, and reached it at Mumfordsville, en- 
countering there a national force, which he compelled to 

Meantime Kirby Smith left Knoxville with the inten- 
Kirby smith com- tion of joining Bragg, and marched as rapid- 
menceshis march. ly ag ^ C(mlcl through Big Creek Gap. At 

Bichmond, Kentucky, he routed a national force under 
Brigadier General Manson, their loss being, according to 
his statement, 1000 killed and wounded, 5000 prisoners, 
9 guns, 10,000 small-arms, and a large quantity of pro- 
visions and ammunition. He then passed through Lex- 
ington, and advanced northward as for as Cynthiana. 

On his part, Buell, forestalled in the occupation of 
Bueii is obliged to Chattanooga, was depending on Louisville 
^11 hack. £ or SU pplies, and hence had to guard near- 

ly 300 miles of railroad. As Bragg inarched northward, 
II.— Z 


Buell was compelled to execute a parallel march, and fall 
back upon Nashville. 

From Mumfordsville Bragg moved to Frankfort, and 
Bragg ana smith a ^ that place Kirby Smith, coming down 
from Cynthiana, made a junction with him. 
He had been pretending to attack Nashville while his 
colleague Smith had been pretending to attack Cincin- 
nati. Buell had, however, detected, from dispatches he 
had intercepted, that their true object was Louisville. 
Their movements had been too slow. It had taken Bragg 
six weeks to march from Chattanooga to Frankfort ; and 
Buell, leaving a garrison for the protection of Nashville, 
reached Louisville first (September 25th). He found the 
Bueii forced north- city in & panic. Had it not been that Bragg 
was detained by a burnt bridge near Bards- 
town, the Confederates would have captured the place. 

At Louisville Buell was powerfully re -enforced, not 
He is re-enforced at onr y by new levies and by his junction with 
General Nelson, but also by veteran troops 
sent up the Mississippi and Ohio from the army of Grant. 
Buell's estimated force was 100,000 men. But the gov- 
ernment, fearing, from what had occurred on his march 
from Corinth toward Chattanooga, that he would conduct 
the campaign on the principles that had guided McClel- 
lan, transmitted an order to Louisville relieving him from 
command. This was, however, revoked at the urgent re- 
quest of General Thomas, who had been appointed in his 

Bragg now commenced carrying out his orders for re- 
organizing Kentucky on Confederate prin- 

Bragg commences & © J ... 

SnizSn of ate or " ciples. He issued a proclamation in which 
Kentucky. ^ s ^ e( j ^ objects of his expedition. 

" Kentuckians, we have come with joyful hopes. Let us 
not depart in sorrow, as we shall if we find you wedded 
in your choice to your present lot. If you prefer Federal 


rule, show it by your frowns, and we shall return whence 
we came. If you choose rather to come within the folds 
of our brotherhood, then cheer us with the smiles of your 
women, and lend your willing hands to secure yourselves 
in your heritage of liberty. Women of Kentucky ! your 
persecutions and heroic bearing have reached our ear." 
" Let your enthusiasm have free rein. Buckle on the ar- 
mor of your kindred, your husbands, sons, and brothers, 
and scoff to shame him who would prove recreant in his 
duty to you, his country, and his God." He also gave it 
to be understood that the object of his expedition was to 
secure peace, and the abandonment by the United States 
of their pretensions to govern a people who had never 
been their subjects, and who preferred self-government 
to union with them. He declared that the Confederate 
government would guarantee the free navigation of all 
the Western rivers, and that the Northwest and the South 
have a common interest, and can not exist in separation ; 
that it was from the meddlesome, grasping, and fanatical 
disposition of the people of the East that all the trouble 
had come. 

The Eichmond authorities had been indulging in a 

day-dream. They had fallen into the belief 

alliance with the that the Northwestern Free States mi^ht be 

Northwest. , . . , / ~ v ° 

induced to join them. On the same day 
that Bragg issued his proclamation, the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs made a majority and a minority report 
to the Confederate Congress respecting the propriety of 
a proclamation with a view of influencing the Northwest- 
ern States : this was to touch on the free navigation of 
the Mississippi and its tributaries, and the opening of the 
markets of the South to the inhabitants of the Northwest- 
ern States. On the one hand there were thus induce- 
ments held out, and on the other there was the threaten- 
ing presence of Bragg with his G0,000 men. The people 


of the Northwest had, however, already definitively made 
up their minds. Denying the right of any one to obstruct 
the great rivers, they had no intention of accepting their 
free navigation as a boon, either from the Confederate 
government or any other power. They had determined 
to force open those streams, and whoever attempted an 
obstruction must do it at his peril. 

As a part of the political movement, Bragg and Kirby 
Smith, while at Frankfort (October 4th), 

Bragg inaugurates . . -, . . -, r> ji 

a governor of Ken- inaugurated a provisional governor 01 the 

tucky. o l © 

But, while this was being done, Bragg was not un- 
mindful of the ostensible object which had 
n/ainoljectwm brought him thus far into Northern Ken- 


tucky. His guerrillas and foraging parties 

were scouring every portion of the country to which they 

could find access, and carrying off live-stock, bacon, bread- 

„ , stuffs. Shops and stores were broken open ; 

he collects sup- 1 x ' 

plies. every thing that was wanted was taken 

away and paid for in Confederate money; and as the state 
was now assumed to be part of the Confederacy, the Con- 
scription Act was enforced, and men compelled to join the 

As soon as Bragg found that Buell had anticipated him 

He commences his m the occupation of Louisville, and that the 
retreat ' main object of the campaign was lost, he pre- 

pared to retreat with the booty he had collected. On the 
1st of October, Buell, having re-enforced and reorganized 
his army, set out from Louisville to take the offensive 
and pursue his antagonist. He directed his march upon 
Bardstown. While he had been lingering in Louisville, 

is pursued by bu- the Confederates had been devastating the 

eii-s troops, country. Though he moved only ten miles 

a day, he reached Bardstown just as they left it, for Bragg 
was retreating as slowly as possible, to give time for his 



trains to escape. Finding, however (October 7th), that 
Buell's leading corps, under McCook and Gilbert, who 
formed the left and the centre respectively, had out- 
marched Crittenden, whose corps formed Buell's right, he 
and turns upon turned fiercely upon his pursuers, in hopes 
of defeating them before Crittenden could 
get up ; then he might fall upon Crittenden, or retreat be- 
fore his arrival. 

Gilbert's corps first overtook Bragg, but McCook came 
The battle of Per- U P about 11 A.M. (October 8th), having suf- 
ryyi e " fered much on the march for want of water. 

He took post on Gilbert's left. Soon afterward, in the 
early part of the afternoon, Bragg assailed them furiously. 
The shock fell on McCook's corps, and for several hours 
he had to sustain it alone. General Jackson, one of the 
division commanders, was killed at the first fire. He was 
struck by a fragment of shell on the breast. Terrill's bri- 
gade was panic-stricken, and he himself killed. McCook's 
left was thus driven back. Meantime, on his right, Rous- 
seau had also been forced back. It was late in the day 
before any re-enforcements were sent them. Colonel 
Gooding was at length ordered by Gilbert, with the thir- 
tieth brigade, to the extreme left. He maintained a des- 
perate encounter for two hours; his horse was shot under 
him, and he was made prisoner. This brigade, out of 
1923 men, lost 549. McCook's corps had thus been as- 
saulted on both flanks, and nearly overwhelmed. This 
had brought the Confederates on the left flank of Gil- 
bert's, the centre corps. There, however, they were not 
only successfully resisted, but driven back by Generals 
R. B. Mitchell and Philip II. Sheridan, through Perry ville, 
as night came on. Bragg, knowing that Crittenden 
would now come up, took advantage of the darkness and 
retreated. He had lost in the battle 2500. Buell's losses, 
as reported by himself, were 91 G killed, 2943 wounded, 


489 missing, and 10 guns taken. Bragg left behind him 
more than 1000 wounded, and eight of the captured guns. 
continued retreat He withdrew to Harrodsburg, and thence, 
of Bragg. with Kirby Smith, to Camp Dick Robinson. 

They then hastened back to Chattanooga through Cum- 
berland Gap. Buell followed them as far as London, but 
at that point gave up the pursuit and returned to Bowl- 
ing Green. His movements had been so languid that 
the government, dissatisfied with the very inadequate use 
Bueii is removed ne na( l made of his large army, removed him 
from command. (October 30fch) from its command, and as- 
signed Rosecrans to it in his stead. 

So far as gaining a firm foothold in Kentucky was con- 
cerned, the Confederate expedition had proved a failure. 
In the other particular, the gathering of supplies, its suc- 
cess had been better. The Richmond newspapers boast- 
The supplies ob- e( l that " the wagon-train of supplies brought 

tained by Bragg. ^ q{ Kentucky by Kirby gmifll wag forty 

miles long. It brought a million yards of jeans, with a 
large amount of clothing, boots and shoes, and 200 wag- 
on-loads of bacon, 6000 barrels of pork, 1500 mules and 
horses, 8000 beeves, and a large lot of swine." 

Bragg had thus retreated from Kentucky, his main ob- 
FaiiureofBragg's j ec ^ unaccomplished. He had gained no 
operations. ' brilliant victory ; he had not taken either 
Louisville or Cincinnati; the Northwestern States had not 
sought an alliance with the Confederacy ; but few Ken- 
tuckians had voluntarily joined his army. The number of 
those whom he had seized by conscription was exceeded 
by those he had lost through desertion. Persons of sub- 
stance throughout the state not only felt outraged by the 
seizure of their property paid for in Confederate money, 
but indignant at the needless destruction and devastation 
he had committed. Instead of able-bodied volunteers, 
crowds of refugees accompanied his retreat, carrying with 

Chap.liii.] he is ordered to renew his attempt. 359 

them their negroes, whose emancipation they foresaw was 
at hand. 

Bragg's expedition into Kentucky had, however, occa- 
Evacuationofcum- sioned the evacuation of Cumberland Gap 
by the national forces under General Mor- 
gan. His supplies were cut off. On September 17th he 
blew up the magazine, burnt his tents, wagons, gun-car- 
riages, and whatever he could not withdraw. He then 
retreated 250 miles to the Ohio, incessantly skirmishing 
with the enemy, foraging on the country, and often suf- 
fering for want -of water. He reached the Ohio on Octo- 
ber 4th. The force which he had brought from the Gap 
was more than 10,000, with 20 pieces of artillery and 400 

The Confederate government was greatly disappointed 
Bra<r g ordered to" with the issue of Bragg's campaign. Scarce- 
renewhis attempt. ly had he reaclied Chattanooga when he was 

ordered to move northward again. 

Rosecrans, on assuming the command of Buell's army, 

Rosecrans succeeds now known as the 14th Army Corps, found 
Bueii in command, y. {n fi very dilapidated con dition ; but, re- 
ceiving large re-enforcements from the new levy of 600,000 
men called out by the government, he reorganized it rap- 
idly, and, having repaired the railroad from Louisville to 
Nashville, which had been greatly injured, he concentrat- 
ed his forces at Nashville, and there accumulated large 
supplies. This was necessary to be done before he could 
safely move southward to confront Bragg, 

He re-enforces and n i i i i i ,1 , i . i 

reorganizes the for he could not rely on the country which 

army. " 

had been wasted by the movements of two 
armies, and the Confederate cavalry could easily sever 
the railroad in his rear. 

Bragg had already reached Murfreesborough on his 
second northward march from Chattanooga. Rosecrans 


Bragg returns to had given out that it was his intention to 
oroug . ^. a ^ e ^ -^ w j n ^- er q Uar ters at Nashville, 

and Bragg, supposing that this would be the case, sent 
out strong detachments of cavalry under Morgan and For- 
rest, the former being ordered to break Rosecrans's com- 
munications. As it was about the season of Christmas, 
winter festivities Murfreesborough was the scene of much 
gayety. Davis, the President of the Con- 
federacy, had come from Richmond to counsel — perhaps 
to invigorate — Bragg. There were wedding festivities, at 
one of which the Bishop-general Polk officiated, and the 
giddy Confederates danced on floors carpeted with the 
American flag. 

Suddenly, on the 26th of December, Rosecrans moved. 
Eosecrans suddenly His march commenced in a heavy rain. The 
moves on Bragg. Confederate outposts retired before his ad- 
vance, the pressure upon them being so vigorous that 
they had not time to destroy the bridges on the Jefferson 
and Murfreesborough turnpikes. On the 30th, Bragg, 
finding he was about to be assailed, had concentrated his 
army a couple of miles in front of Murfreesborough. 

The position of the national army, which was 43,000 
position of Eose- strong on the evening of that day, was on 

crans'sarmy. ' ^ wegt ^ q{ g tone jjj^ ft g^gg^ 

stream fringed with cedar brakes, and here flowing in a 
north-northwesterly course. The line ranged nearly north 
and south, and was three or four miles in length. Crit- 
tenden was on its left, with three divisions, Wood, Van- 
cleve, Palmer ; Thomas in the centre, with two divisions, 
Negley and Rousseau, the latter in reserve ; McCook on 
the right, with three, Sheridan, Davis, Johnson. The left 
wing touched the river, the right stretched a little be- 
yond the Franklin Road. 

Bragg's army, 62,000 strong, stood between Rosecrans 
and Murfreesborough, ranged, for the most part, parallel 




position of the con- to the national line; his right, however, 

federate army. faced ^^ ^^ Breckinridge's division 

formed his right ; in his centre, under Polk, were two di- 
visions, those of Withers and Cheatham; on his left, un- 
der Hardee, two divisions, Cleburne and McCown. The 
river separated Breckinridge from the rest of the Confed- 
erate army. 

Bosecrans had concentrated two thirds of his force on 
Ropecrans's plan of his left. His intention was that his right 
wing, standing on the defensive, should sim- 
ply hold its ground; but his extreme left, the divisions 
of Wood and Vancleve, crossing Stone River, should as- 


sail Breckinridge's division, exposed there, and seize the 
heights, from which an artillery fire would not only take 
in reverse the works in front of the enemy's centre, but 
also enable the national centre, with the remainder of the 
left wing, to overthrow it. Meantime the assailing divi- 
sions of the left would swing into Murfreesborough, and, 
continuing their movement, come round to the Franklin 
Boad, thereby forcing the Confederates from their line of 
retreat. It was a disadvantage to the national general 
that in this movement the river must be crossed. 

On his part, also, Bragg had determined to take the of- 
Bragg'spianofthe fensive, and with his left to strike Bose- 
crans's right. There was thus a similar in- 
tention on the two sides, and not a dissimilar disposi- 
tion of force. Both intended to strike with the left, and 
therefore both massed their force on that wing. Bragg's 
plan was to wheel his attacking force on Polk's extreme 
right, as on a pivot, and, pressing his antagonist back to 
Stone Eiver, seize the turnpike and railroad to Nashville, 
his lines of communication in the rear. 

In the dawn of the last day of the year (1862), while 
The battle of Mur- Bosecrans's left was rapidly crossing Stone 
freesborough. River to make its expected attack, Bragg, 
with his left, had already anticipated him. Coming out 
of a fog which had settled on the battle-field, he fell furi- 
ously upon Johnson's division, and so unexpectedly that 
two of its batteries were taken before a gun could be 
Bra^g obtains the fired. The Confederate success was de- 
mitiative. cisive. Johnson's division, which was on 

the extreme national right, was instantly swept away. 
Davis, who stood next, was assailed in front and on his 
uncovered fiank. He made a stout resistance, but the 
Eosecrans's right is shock was too great; he was compelled to 
overthrown. ^ yQ w&y 9 with the loss of many guns. And 

now the triumphant Confederate left, the centre also com- 


ing into play, rushed upon the next division — but that 
was commanded by Sheridan. 

Eosecrans's aggressive movement was already para- 
_ . . . , lyzed ; nay, more, it had to be abandoned. 

He has to abandon J j J 1 7 

his movement. jj e j^ £ withdraw his left for the purpose 
of saving his right and defending his communications. 
He must establish a new line. 

The possibility of doing this — the fate of the battle — 
rested on Sheridan. He was furiously as- 

The Confederates .-,-,. n -. -. .~ n -, -,... 

checked by sheri- sailed m front by the Confederate division 
of Withers ; on his flank, uncovered by the 
overthrow of Johnson and Davis, he was attacked by 
their victors, McCown and Cleburne. The front attack 
he received with such an artillery and musketry fire that 
the Confederates were not only checked and broken, but 
were pursued across the field to their intrenchments. 
Then, by retiring his right and reserves, he swung his line 
round so as to -come perpendicularly to its former direc- 
tion. He faced now south instead of east, and stood par- 
allel to the "Wilkinson Turnpike. The Confederate di- 
visions in front of him, and greatly overlapping him in 
this his new position, were at once held in check. Before 
they could advance to the Nashville roads, and so seize 
Eosecrans's communications, Sheridan must be put out 
of the way. 

But it took an hour to do that. As his antagonists 
pressed on his flank, he changed his front 

compelled to in again. Pivoting on the right flank of Neg- 

back. " Z> <~> o 

ley's division, he wheeled round his line so 
as to face to the west, thereby covering the rear of Neg- 
ley's line. With Negley he was now forming a wedge- 
shaped mass, with his batteries at the point of the wedge. 
Here he withstood an impetuous attack of Cheatham's 
division and of other heavy masses. All three of his 
brigade commanders had been killed, his ammunition 


train Lad been captured ; lie could not resist much lon- 
ger, for the cartridge-boxes of his men were empty. The 
time had come when even Sheridan must fall back. But, 
if he had not powder, he had steel. The fixed bayo- 
nets of his reserve brigade covered him, and he retired, 
unconquered and unshaken, out of the cedar thicket to- 
ward the Nashville Road. In this memorable and most 
glorious resistance he had lost 1630 men. "Here's all 
that are left," he said to Rosecrans, whom he had saved 
and now met. 

After Sheridan had been pushed back, there was noth- 
Resistance of Neg- ing for Negley but to follow. He did so, 
ley and Rousseau. gecur j n g ^g wa y a g am st all resistance. In 

vain had Thomas sent his other division under Rousseau 
to the front of the battle. It too, after a desperate strug- 
gle, was forced out of the cedar grove. 

Meantime, on a knoll in the plain to which these di- 
Rosecrans estab- visions had receded, Rosecrans had massed 

lishesanewline. j^ ^1^ He wag f ormmg a new lufe, 

in which the army would face southwestwardly, with the 
Nashville Turnpike on its rear. In the critical moment 
of establishing this new formation, every thing depended 
on the resistance of Hazen's brigade, which was on the 
left of Palmer's division. Of that division the two right 
brigades had been forced away, but Hazen stood firm, de- 
livering such a fire as to sweep his assailants back, though 
losing one third of his numbers. While thus he held 
firm, Rosecrans had adjusted his new front, and was ready 
for the final Confederate charge. 

On that new line the gray-coated Confederates came 
Final charge of the forth from the cedar thickets they had won, 
advancing over the plain, a magnificent col- 
umn of attack. Their advance was but for a moment. In- 
stantly in front of them sprang up a cloud- wall of sul- 
phury smoke that shut out Rosecrans's line from their 


view. There burst forth from the cannon hidden in it 
a double-shotted iron-fire, from the musketry a sirocco of 
lead. Four times the Southern soldiers tried to face the 
tempest. A horrible slaughter ensued. The momentum 
of the fire hurled them back into the dark green shade 
of the cedars. One of Cleburne's brigades was in an in- 
stant almost destroyed. 

It was all over in front ; but Bragg, unwilling to be 
foiled, now brought Breckinridge, who had hitherto been 
untouched, across the river to make a final attempt on 
Rosecrans's left flank with 7000 fresh men. His first at- 
tack was repulsed ; he made a second ; it shared the same 

So stood affairs when night came — a clear and beauti- 
ful starlight night — the closing night of 1862. On New 
Year's Day nothing was done ; the two armies, breathless 
with their death-struggle, stood looking at each other. 
Eosecrans holds ws On January 2d Rosecrans was found, not 
retreating, but busily engaged in trying to 
carry out his original plan. He had made his position 
impregnable ; he had thrown a force across Stone River, 
and, as he at first intended, was getting ready to crown 
with artillery the heights beyond the east bank. Here- 

Renewaiofthe upon Bragg brought Breckinridge back to 
his old position, ordering him to drive the 
enemy across the river — a task which that officer brave- 
ly tried, but only imperfectly accomplished, for the artil- 
lery on the opposite bank tore his division to pieces. In 
twenty minutes he lost two thousand men. 

A violent storm prevented the renewal of the battle on 
Bragg retreats to ^ ne 3d. On that night Bragg, despairing of 
success, withdrew from Murfreesborough, re- 
treating to Tullahoma, and Rosecrans at last grasped his 
blood-clotted prize, so crippled, however, that it was im- 
possible for him to make any pursuit. 


In these dreadful battles the Confederates lost 14,700 
Losses m the men. On the national side there were kill- 
ed 1553, wounded more than 7000, prison- 
ers more than 3000 ; more than one third of its artillery 
and a large portion of its train were taken. The losses 
were about one fourth of each army. Henceforth the 
Confederates abandoned all thought of crossing the Ohio 
River. Two desperate but unsuccessful attempts had 
convinced them that they could not break through the 
line of investment between the Cumberland Mountains 
and the Free States. 





The national government undertook a campaign for the capture of Richmond. 

It was based on incorrect principles, and carried out with irresolution by General 

The movement of the army was so much procrastinated that the government was 

constrained to order an advance. Scarcely had the expedition departed for the 

Peninsula when it was found that Washington had been left unprotected. 
General McClellan besieged Yorktown, captured it, and slowly advanced up the 

The battles of Fair Oaks and Seven Pines. 

From the West we have now to turn to the East — from 
the Mississippi Valley to the Atlantic border. 

If in the West there was a popular war-object univer- 
sally adopted — the opening of the Missis- 

The war-cry of the • • ~r%* • t -n i t ' t 

East was the capture sippi Kiver, in the .Last there was a war-ob- 

of Richmond. , x ' , . 

ject not less distinctly accepted — the cap- 
ture of Richmond. " On to Richmond" became a war-cry. 

This was not because Richmond was a source of 
strength to the Confederacy; not because it offered any 
historical recollections; not because it was the emblem 
of a nationality, but because in the eyes of the loyal 
Americans it was a token of defiance to the republic. 

We have already seen (p. 143) that the strength of the 

Confederacy lay not in the possession of any 

Richmond cam- locality, but in its armies, and hence, in a 

paign. . . . . 

military point of view, campaigns directed 
to the capture of Richmond were not based upon a cor- 


rect principle. The operations now to be described, dis- 
astrous to the nation, but glorious to the Confederacy, 
were not decisive of the contest, nor would they have 
been so had their result been reversed. 

Military operations having the city of Richmond for 
their objective once determined upon, the 

The problem of the . . -, , -. 

Richmond cam- question arose m what manner they ought 

paign. x •/ o 

to be conducted. 

In solving that problem there was a special condition 
to be steadfastly borne in mind. 

a paramount con- No movement was admissible which 
would risk the capture of Washington by 
the enemy. 

That condition accepted, it implied an adequate force 
covering Washington, and if to act offensively, acting on 
the direct line between that city and Richmond. 

Military authorities declare that the fewer the lines' of 
Effect of many imes operation the better. It is better to have 
two lines of operation than live; better one 
than two. 

The more numerous the lines of operation, the more 
must the force for disposal upon them be divided, and 
therefore the weaker it must be on each. Such lines are 
exterior to an enemy holding a central position, and there- 
fore at his choice able to deliver overwhelming blows in 
succession against each. 

Still more dangerous is this division if the lines are 
not purely military, but naval and military 

Effect of mixed . -. m, . . -1 . • a t • • i 

imes, naval and mixed. I he introduction oi shipping brings 

military. . rr , 

an extraneous, perhaps an independent com- 
mand; precision and punctuality of movement are endan- 
gered, for even since the introduction of steam naval op- 
erations are greatly controlled by the weather. In such 
a mixed movement a general must necessarily feel that 
his army is not in hand. 


However, at this epoch, of the war, and by the advice 
course determined °f General McClellan, though, as we shall 
upon by Mccieiian. g ^ a g a i ns £ ^ e judgment of the President, 

two lines of operation were determined on for the pro- 
posed campaign. The primary line was from the sea- 
coast to Eichmond ; it was the offensive. The secondary 
line was from Washington to Richmond ; it was the de- 

The offensive line presented the serious inconveniences 
imperfection of his ^ na ^ have been mentioned as appertaining 
to combined naval and military operations. 
It involved necessarily a prodigious expense. Military 
critics have shown that, considering the Atlantic region 
as being divided into two portions, an east and a wesf, 
operations conducted in the former against Richmond 
could not be decisive against the Confederates. In the 
latter they might be. 

Such considerations, arising from the general topog- 
raphy of the country, were, however, disregarded ; the re- 
sult being that 100,000 men, with their material, were 
transported 180 miles by water at a cost of nineteen days 
of time and an enormous expenditure of money, to avoid 
one day's march by land ; for they had already marched 
to Centre ville, were thence marched back to Alexandria, 
and had subsequently to march the entire length of the 

In one week the Confederates could march from the 
front of McClellan at Washington to confront him again 
in the Peninsula. President Lincoln was therefore justi- 
fied in his remark that, by the Peninsular movement, 
" nothing had been gained, but much had been lost ; that 
the difficulty had been shifted, not surmounted." 

Moreover, the great Army of the Potomac was by this 
determination brought into a narrow peninsula, where 
it might be obstructed by a comparatively insignificant 

II.— A A 


force. It could hardly hope that flanking Op- 
Topographical diffl- . . -i -i n • i i • , , 

cuitiesofthePenin- erations would be possible; its movements 


must be executed by attacks in front. Espe- 
cially must this be the case, as the lateral waters were 
sealed — that on the south by the armored ship Merri- 
mack, that on the north by the works of Yorktown. The 
topography of the Peninsula seemed to deny the oppor- 
tunity of getting at the enemy's communications. 

If, under such circumstances, success was to be obtain- 
ed, it could only be by rapidity of movement and resolu- 
tion in attack; any sluggishness, any wavering, would 
render the case hopeless. 

1 In the preceding paragraphs I have reproduced pro- 
spectively the criticisms which have been made on the 
Peninsular campaign by military writers subsequently to 
its disastrous issue. The reader, in possession of these 
principles, has a guide in the study of the actual details, 
and on the many interesting questions arising can form 
for himself a correct opinion. 

Should that opinion be adverse to General McClellan's 
decision of the plan of the campaign, it must 

How far the govern- , „ , , . , ° 

ment was responsi- not be forgotten that the mistake was very 

ble for the error. ° . m J 

largely concurred in by the government it- 
self. For, though the President gave a most reluctant 
consent to the Peninsular campaign, he did not object to 
other movements the principle of which was equally in- 
correct. It has just been stated that there were two 
lines of operation against Richmond, meaning by that 
two under the more immediate contemplation of McClel- 
lan; but, in fact, there were not fewer than five; for 
Banks was operating on a third in the Shenandoah Val- 
ley, Fremont on a fourth in the Alleghanies, and Burn- 
side on a fifth at Roanoke. It was the misfortune of 
operations conducted in the proximity of Washington 


that they were under political influences. Lincoln, in 
Effect of political a letter to McClellan, declares that he had 
been unable to resist such influences: he 
was alluding to his having detached Blenker's division. 
No more striking confirmation of this need be given than 
the fact that, in the very crisis of the war, General Meade 
was appointed to command the army marching to Get- 
tysburg, not because he was a good soldier, but because 
he was a Pennsylvanian. However, he won that immor- 
tal victory, not because he was a Pennsylvanian, but be- 
cause he was a good soldier. 

These influences were less felt in the campaigns con- 
ducted between the Alleghanies and the Mississippi. Af- 
fairs were intrusted to professional generals, not to polit- 
ical aspirants. Eventually it was found absolutely nec- 
essary to bring those professional generals into the At- 
lantic region, and there they made an end of the war. 

In the winter of 1861-2, the epoch with which this 
position of the two chapter begins, the Confederate army, still 
inspirited by its victory of the preceding 
summer at Bull Run, lay round Manassas, in front of the 
great Army of the Potomac, which, under General McClel- 
lan, lay at Washington. 

Tired of the inactivity which McClellan displayed, the 

Mccieiian's mac- government was perpetually urging upon 

him the necessity of doing something with 

the great army that had been placed under his command. 

For some time after his promotion to his high position, 
McClellan undoubtedly contemplated vigorous opera- 
tions — " a crushing defeat of the rebel army at Manas- 
sas, not to be postponed beyond the 25th of November, 
if possible to avoid it." 

By degrees it became apparent that his movements 
were guided not only by military, but also by political 


Effect ofpoiiticai in- considerations. In the latter respect he look- 
ed with favor on the views of the peace sec- 
tion of the Democratic party (p. 36), becoming eventu- 
ally its candidate for the Presidency. In common with 
many other good men, he hoped that the extremities of 
war might be avoided by some compromise with the 
leaders of the South — a benevolent sentiment truly, but 
inappropriate in an officer who had been appointed to 
wield the armed force of the nation. He was unwilling 
to do any thing which might jeopardize the institution 
of slavery, 

McClellan, as we have seen, had been appointed, July, 
strength of the two 1861, to the command of the Army of the 

1 K Potomac. On the 1st of November he was 

appointed to the chief command of the armies of the 
United States. At the latter date the Potomac Army 
had an effective strength of 134,285 men, with nearly 
300 guns. The Confederate force in front of him did not 
exceed 55,000. On the 1st of February the aggregate 
strength of his army had risen to 222,196; present for 
duty, 190,806 (p. 195). 

The autumn and the winter passed by, and brought 
Mccieiian's excuses nothing but excuses for inaction. It was 

for not moving. ^ j^ Qr ^ ^ . ^^ were iQQ many 

leaves on the trees, or the roads too miry. In reality, 
however, up to Christmas, the weather had been superb ; 
not once in twenty years had the roads been in as good 
a condition at that season. 

Expenses were accumulating. The public was begin- 
ning to be alarmed. Newspaper correspondents and pri- 
vate letter- writers at Washington were spreading not only 
dissatisfaction, but consternation. They said 
anc?S™e n dis- that the ao;ed General Scott, stretched upon 

satisfied o ■ ' -*■ 

his sofa, had commanded to better purpose ; 
that the army was as much organized in October as it 


ever would be, or as it needed to be ; that it was en- 
camped in shameful inactivity; that imposing reviews 
were given for the gratification of women, but not a recon- 
noissance was made to disturb the enemy ; that the gen- 
eral could now find nothing better to do than to send to 
the War Department the project of a splendid uniform 
for himself and staff; that he was enveloped in an omi- 
nous reserve ; that cabinet ministers had waited in his an- 
techambers ; and that even the President of the United 
States had been detained there unnoticed. 

Non-military- men, not without some show of reason, 
criticised and censured the prevailing military ideas. A 
rebellion, they said, can never be put down by standing on 
the defensive; the Confederacy can not be overthrown 
by building fortifications at Washington. There were 
officers who were acting as though they supposed that 
nothing more would be requisite; some who affirmed, 
with General Scott, that railroads would exert but little 
influence, and, like that veteran — unconscious of a coming 
Sheridan — declared that cavalry would be of no use. 
There were some who expected that the war would be 
nothing more than an artillery duel. 

During the dreary winter that followed, Washington 

Washington block- was an insulted city. The Baltimore and 
aded and msuited. Qfa R a il roac [ was broken on one side, the 

Potomac blockaded by batteries on the other ; the Con- 
federate flag was flying in actual sight of the Capitol. 
The heart of the nation was sinking. Every thing that 
the young general had asked for had not only been grant- 
ed, but lavishly given — and there was nothing in return 
but reviews, and parades, and procrastination. 

Perhaps without duly considering the effect which 
might be produced in the sentiments of the 

French princes Emperor of the French, the proffered serv- 

accepted. , n , /r ^ . 

ices of the Orleans princes were accepted. 


They were received into General McClellan's confidence. 
The Prince de Joinville, defending the general's course, 
has since that time imparted some interesting explana- 
tions. He says : " We have the right, we 
vine explains think, to say that McClellan never intend- 

McClellan's course. ' J 

ed to advance upon Centreville. His long- 
determined purpose was to make Washington safe by 
means of a strong garrison, and then to use the great nav- 
igable waters and immense naval resources of the North 
to transport the army by sea to a point near Richmond. 
For weeks, perhaps for months, this plan had been secret- 
ly maturing. Secrecy, as well as promptness, it will be 
understood, was indispensable here to success. To keep 
the secret it had been necessary to confine it to few per- 
sons, and hence had arisen the long ill feeling to the un- 
communicative general. 

" Be this as it may, as the day of action' drew near, 
those who suspected the general's project and were angry 
at not being informed of it, those whom his promotion 
had excited to envy, his political enemies (who is without 
them in America ?) — in short, all those beneath or beside 
him who wished him ill, broke out intQ a chorus of accu- 
sations of slowness, inaction, incapacity. McClellan, with 
a patriotic courage which I have always admired, dis- 
dained these accusations and made no reply. He satis- 
fied himself with pursuing his preparations in laborious 
silence. But the moment came in which, notwithstand- 
ing the loyal support given him by the President, that 
functionary could no longer resist the tempest. A coun- 
cil of war of all the divisional generals was held ; a plan 
of campaign, not that of McClellan, was proposed and dis- 
cussed. McClellan was then forced to explain his pro- 
jects, and the next day they were known to the enemy. 
Informed, no doubt, by one of those female spies who keep 
up his communications in the domestic circles of the Fed- 


eral enemy, Johnston evacuated Manassas at once. This 
was a skillful manoeuvre. Incapable of assuming the 
offensive, threatened with attack either at Centreville, 
where defense would be useless if successful, or at Rich- 
mond, the loss of which would be a great check, and un- 
able to cover both positions at once, Johnston threw his 
whole force before the latter of the two." 

The mere rumor that McClellan was about to move led 
to the instant evacuation of Manassas (March 
evacuate Manas- 9th). On the ensuing morning McClellan 
put- the Army of the Potomac in motion, 
advancing toward the deserted position. His object in 
doing this was stated to be "to verify the evacuation, 
to take the chance of cutting off the enemy's rear-guard, 
to deceive him, if possible, as to the general's real inten- 
tions, and to gain the opportunity of cutting 

The Army of the , n -nil i j • 

Potomac vermes loose ironi all useless baggage, and to give 

the evacuation. °° . ° . . ° 

the troops a few days experience m bivouac 
and on the march." Not without surprise and mortifica- 
tion did the soldiers of that great army see the insignifi- 
cant earthworks and Quaker guns — logs of wood shaped 
in the form of cannon — by which an enemy not much 
more than one fourth of their number had held them so 
long at bay. 

There can be no doubt that by these events the Presi- 
corps commanders dent's confidence in McClellan had been 
appointed. yer y ser } ous ]y affected. It had become ob- 

vious that the administration must be in more reliable 
contact with the army. The President therefore issued 
(March 8th) a general war-order, directing the organiza- 
tion of the Army of the Potomac into four corps, to be 
commanded by Generals McDowell, Sumner, Heintzel- 
man, and Keyes respectively; a fifth corps was under the 
command of General Banks, formed from his own and 
General Shields's divisions. This establishment of "army 


corps" was very much, in opposition to the wishes of 
McClellan; not but that he recognized the necessity of 
having a higher unit in an army of 200,000 men than the 
" division;" his objection, as stated by the Prince de Join- 
ville, being rather against the time than the princijDle : 
it "would throw into subaltern positions some young 
generals of division who had his personal confidence." 
Doubtless it was in part to reach this very object that 
the change was insisted on by the government. 

On the return of the army from its promenade to Ma- 
nassas (March 11th), the President issued 

McClellan restricted , -. -,. - . ■*,*■ n , -,-, n -. 

to the Potomac de- another order, relieving McClellan irom the 

partment. ' • . . 

command of all the military departments 
except that of the Potomac. The ostensible cause of this 
was the consideration that the campaign on which the 
Potomac Army was about to enter would require all the 
resources and all the attention of its commander ; the 
real cause was a decline of confidence in his ability. If, 
as current events were apparently showing, the army un- 
der his immediate charge was more than he could wield, 
it was out of the question to add to it many other armies 
operating at distances of many hundred miles. 

A movement determined upon, the question had next 

arisen, In what direction should it be % So 

Difference between -■ 

the President and long as McClellan adhered to an advance 

McClellan. & . 

upon the enemy in such a manner as not to 
uncover Washington and thereby risk its capture, he was 
in accord with the President ; but when it appeared that 
his plan was to attack Richmond by way either of Ur- 
bana or Fortress Monroe, there was a serious difference 
between* them. 

McClellan seems not to have appreciated distinctly the 

momentous consequences of the capture of 

that wasinn-ton Washington by the Confederates, the expul- 

6hall be secure. . . . 

sion of the national government, the seizure 


of the public edifices and archives of the nation. It 
would have instantly brought, though it would not have 
justified, European recognition of the Confederate power, 
and that, perhaps, not only as a Southern, but as the na- 
tional government. The President clearly perceived that 
the capture of Richmond, no matter with what brilliant 
military operations it might be attended, could not bal- 
ance for a moment that dreadful catastrophe. He there- 
fore correctly and firmly took the ground that, whatever 
the movements of the Army of the Potomac might be, 
the city of Washington must be left absolutely secure. 

And now appeared that incidental advantage of the 
opinions of the appointment of corps commanders to which 

corps commanders, ^fo^ hag j ugt been mada Tq McCM- 

lan and to them the President referred the question. In 
the conference which accordingly took place they con- 
sented to the movement by the Peninsula, among other 
conditions, however, expressly stipulating unanimously 
" that the forces to be left to cover Washington shall be 
such as to give an entire feeling of security for its safety 
from menace." Keyes, Heintzelman, and McDowell agreed 
" that, with the forts on the right bank of the Potomac 
fully garrisoned, and those on the left bank occupied, a 
covering force in front of the Virginia line of 25,000 men 
would suffice." In Sumner's opinion, " a total force of 
40,000 men for the defense of the city would suffice." 

Hereupon the Secretary of War addressed the follow- 

"War Department, March 13th, 18G2. 
"To Major General George B. McClellan : 
" The President, having considered the plan of operations agreed 
Orders to General upon by yourself and the commanders of army 
Mccieiian. corps, makes no objection to the same, but gives the 

following directions as to its execution : 

" 1st. Leave such a force at Manassas Junction as shall make it 
entirely certain that the enemy shall not repossess himself of that 
position and line of communication. 


" 2d. Leave Washington entirely secure. 

" 3d. Move the remainder of the force down the Potomac, choos- 
ing a new base at Fortress Monroe, or any where between here and 
there ; or, at all events, move such remainder of the army at once 
in pursuit of the enemy by some route. 

"Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War." 

The movement by Fortress Monroe being determined 
The peninsular upon, there were chartered 113 steamers, 188 
expedition sails. gc ] looners? 33 b ar g es? w ith which, in 37 days, 

there were transported to Fortress Monroe 121,500 men, 
14,592 animals, 1150 wagons, 44 batteries, 74 ambulances, 
besides a vast quantity of equipage. 

Scarcely had McClellan set out from Washington when 

McDowell's corps it was discovered that the entire force about 

to be left for the protection of that city was 

only 1 9,02 2 men. The President was therefore constrained 

to withhold McDowell's army corps from the force under 

McClellan, and detain it for the security of the capital. 

Against this detention McClellan earnestly protested. 
Mccieiian protests He seemed to have forgotten that the pro- 

against that deten- . .. n TTr -. . , i i i n 

tfon. tection oi Washington had been made an 

imperative part of his duty, and that all his 
calculations must be on that condition. A letter written 
to him at the time by the President not only justifies 
completely the course that had been taken, but also ex- 
hibits Mr. Lincoln's firmness and courteous forbearance, 
his views respecting the campaign now undertaken, to 
which he had given a most reluctant consent, and his ap- 
prehension that, instead of action, there would be an in- 
vention of new delays. 

"Washington, April 9th, 1862. 
" Major General McClellan : 

" My dear Sir, — Your dispatches, complaining that you are not 
The President's let- properly sustained, while they do not offend me, do 
tertohhn. p a j n me ver y much. Blenker's division was with- 

drawn from you before you left here, and you know the pressure 


under which I did it (p. 371), and, as I thought, acquiesced in it — 
certainly not without reluctance. After you left I ascertained that 
less than 20,000 unorganized men, without a single field battery, 
were all you designed to be left for the defense of Washington and 
Manassas Junction, and part of this even was to go to General 
Hooker's old position. General Banks's corps, once designed for 
Manassas Junction, was diverted and tied up on the line of Win- 
chester and Strasburg, and could not leave it without again expos- 
ing the Upper Potomac and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. This 
presented (or would present when McDowell and Sumner should be 
gone) a great temptation to the enemy to turn back from the Rap- 
pahannock and sack Washington. My explicit order that Washing- 
ton should, by the judgment of all the commanders of the army 
corps, be left entirely secure, had been neglected. It was precisely 
this that drove me to detain McDowell. 

" I do not forget that I was satisfied with your arrangement to 
leave Banks at Manassas Junction ; but when that arrangement was 
broken up, and nothing was substituted for it, of course I was con- 
strained to substitute something for it myself; and allow me to ask, 
Do you really think I should permit the line from Richmond via 
Manassas Junction to this city to be entirely open, except what re- 
sistance could be presented by less than 20,000 unorganized troops? 
This is a question which the country will not allow me to evade — 

"And once more let me tell you it is indispensable to you that 
you strike a blow. Jam powerless to help this. You will do me 
the justice to remember I always insisted that going down the Bay 
in search of a field instead of fighting at or near Manassas was only 
shifting, and not surmounting a difficulty — that we should find the 
same enemy and the same or equal intrenchments at either place. 
The country will not fail to note— is now noting — that the present 
hesitation to move upon an intrenched enemy is but the story of 
Manassas repeated. 

" I beg to assure you that I have never written to you or spoken 
to you in greater kindness of feeling than now, nor with a fuller 
purpose to sustain you so far as in my most anxious judgment I 
consistently can. But you must act. Yours very truly, 

" A. Lincoln." 

The Army of the Potomac was now fairly landed on 
siege of TorktoTm * e Peninsula, and there lay before it, under" 
commences. General Magruder, a Confederate force of 

8000 men, defending a line of thirteen miles from York- 


town across the Peninsula. " To my litter surprise,," says 
that general, " he (McClellan) permitted day after day to 
elapse without an assault. In a few days the object of 
his delay was apparent. In every direction in front of 
our lines, through the intervening woods and in the open 
fields, earthworks began to appear." The whole month 
of April was consumed in these operations. The troops 
were not triumphantly marching on Richmond, but, unac- 
climated, were busily digging their own graves. A re- 
quest was sent to Washington to have siege-guns taken 
out of the works of that city and brought to Yorktown ; 
miles of corduroy road were constructed; miles of trench- 
es and batteries were made. It was expected that on the 
morning of May 6th fire would be opened. Two days 
previously, however, the Confederates quiet- 

T^Ti p O o v\ f p rl p i* 1 1 p s 

abandon the ly abandoned their works and retired up 

place. " . A 

the Peninsula. " With 5000 men," says Ma- 
gruder, " exclusive of the garrisons, we had stopped and 
held in check over 100,000 of the enemy." Disease, con- 
tracted in the swamps and trenches of Yorktown, had 
taken a fearful hold on the army, as its chief engineer re- 
ported, and " toil and hardship, unredeemed by the excite- 
ment of combat, had impaired its morale." 

As soon as it was discovered that the Confederates had 
The battle of wu- withdrawn, a column was sent in pursuit, 
liamsburg. j£ came U p with "the retreating rear-guard 

at Williamsburg, now re-enforced from Johnston's army. 
Longstreet's division, which had already passed beyond 
the town, retraced its steps to aid in resisting the attack, 
and for nine hours Hooker's division alone made head 
against the whole Confederate force. That general says, 
"History will not be believed when it is told that the noble 
officers and men of my division were permitted to carry 
on this unequal struggle from morning until night, unaid- 
ed, in the presence of more than 30,000 of their comrades 

Chap. LIV.] 




with arms in their hands ; nevertheless, it is true." The 
entire loss during the day was 2228, of whom 456 were 

General Hooker was justified in this bitter complaint. 
It has been reported that he was relieved 

Hooker complains -, . -. . -. -, -i TT -, -. . 

that he was not by a bayonet charge made by Hancock ; but 

sustained. J t i • i • 

there must have been an error in this asser- 
tion. The troops by whom it was said to have been 
made first encountered the enemy about 4 P.M. of the 
preceding afternoon. It was a drizzly day, and the men 
marched forward in no small confusion, over leaves in the 
woods, slippery with the rain, over fallen trees, and across 
ravines, so that it was impossible to preserve an align- 
ment of a company, much more of a brigade. The night 
came on pitch-dark; the 43d New York fired by mis- 
chance into a Pennsylvania regiment. Next day the for- 


mer had to be withdrawn and another New York and a 
Maine regiment put in its stead. All the morning heavy 
firing was heard. It was that which Hooker was encoun- 
tering. Hancock's troops lay in line of battle from 1 P.M. 
to 4 P.M., when they receded before a front attack of a 
North Carolina regiment, aided by a flank attack of the 
Twenty-fourth Virginia. There was no bayonet charge. 

At ten o'clock at night McClellan sent a dispatch to 
Washington that Johnston was in front of him with 
a force very much greater than the national, and very 
strongly intrenched ; that it was the intention of the en- 
continued retreat of emy to dispute every step to Richmond. 
On the ensuing morning, however, it was 
found that Williamsburg was evacuated, and the enemy 

From Williamsburg to Richmond the distance is about 
fifty miles. The national army resumed its march on the 
8th of May, but in a manner so dilatory that it might al- 
most be characterized as disastrous. Not less than eleven 
days were consumed in what ought to have been accom- 
plished in three — a lingering, a fatal delay. It was not 
thus that Csesar and Napoleon trod the path to victory. 

While thus the national army showed hesitation and in- 
Their admirable decision, its antagonist displayed good gen- 
eralship. If the maintenance of a bold front 
by Magruder at Yorktown elicits our admiration — for he 
stood his ground against prodigious odds — not with less 
praise can we speak of his timely evacuation and perfect- 
ly-conducted retreat. The manner in which the Confed- 
erate rear-guard turned upon its pursuers at Williams- 
burg, and gave them a bloody check, will ever exact the 
applause of military critics. 

The movement of the national army up the Peninsula 
surrender of Nor- led a ^ once to the withdrawal of the Con- 
federate force from Norfolk, the surrender 


of that place, the destruction of the iron-clad frigate Mer- 
rimack, and the opening of James River. An expedi- 
tion under General Wool set out from Fortress Monroe 
(May 10th), and found that Norfolk was abandoned by 
the enemy. It was surrendered by its mayor. The Con- 
federates had destroyed the navy yard as completely as 
Destruction of the they could, and on the morning of May 1 1th 
blew up the Merrimack. So much dissatis- 
faction was expressed in the Confederacy respecting this 
latter act that a court of inquiry was ordered. It was 
decided that her destruction had been unnecessary. 
These events left James River open to General McClel- 
lan, and upon its bank, had he pleased, he might have 
established his base of supply. He preferred, disastrous- 
ly, as will be eventually seen, to have it on the York 

Meantime Franklin's division had passed up York Riv- 
er from Yorktown to West Point. Communication was 
opened with him. The advance had reached White 
House on the 15 th. At this place the railroad from 
West Point to Richmond crossed the Pamunkey River. 
Locomotives and cars were at once put on the track, it 
The new base of being intended to make this the line for fur- 
nishing the army supplies. On the 22d 
the army began to cross the Chickahominy at Bottom's 
Bridge. The next day the advance was within seven 
miles of Richmond. 

General Fitz John Porter was now (May 24) ordered 
Affair at Hanover to move to Hanover Court-house to facili- 
court-house. tate ^ j unct j on ^^ McDowell's corps, 

expected from Fredericksburg. He was attacked near 
that place by the Confederates, but defeated them, their 
loss being about 1000, his being nearly 400. He cap- 
tured and destroyed their camp. But McDowell was 
withheld, and not only did the two armies not unite, but 



[Sect. XI. 

orders came from Washington to burn the bridges that 
had been seized. The principal bridge burnt was that 
over the South Anna. On the 29th Porter returned to 
his original camp. 

The national army, advancing toward Richmond, found 
crossing of the that the bridges over the Chickahominy had 
cnickahommy. been destroyed by the Confederates in their 
retreat. The stream flows through a swampy and wood- 
ed country, liable to be overflowed when freshets occur. 
Keyes's corps crossed it about the 24th of May, having re- 
paired Bottom's Bridge. Casey's division of this corps 
advanced as far as Fair Oaks Station; Couch's lay at 
Seven Pines ; and Heintzelman's corps, following Keyes's 
over the river, took up a position in its rear. His left 
rested on Whiteoak Swamp. The strength of these two 
corps was about 30,000 men. Sumner's corps was on 
the other side of the Chickahominy. 

At this moment McClellan's army was in a most dan- 
Dangerous position gerous position. One of its wings was on 
the right, the other on the left of the creek 

of the army. 



— creek it could hardly be called, for it was about to be 
swollen to the dimensions of a river. The only availa- 
ble connection was at Bottom's Bridge. The position of 
the army was like the letter V, Bottom's Bridge being at 
the point. The left wing, in four divisions, lay in eche- 
lon along the York River Railroad. It answered to the 
left branch of the V. The right wing, consisting of five 
divisions, and the reserves, answered to the other branch. 
From the extremity of one wing to that of the other, by 
way of Bottom's Bridge, was a distance of more than 
twelve miles, though by an air-line they were not very far 
apart. Through the midst of the V flowed the Chicka- 
hominy. The outposts of the left wing were, as just 
stated, at Fair Oaks Station, on the York River Railroad, 
and at Seven Pines, on the Williamsburg Road. Under 
such circumstances, the Confederates could of course as- 
sail one of the two wings separately. As we are now to 
see, they accordingly attacked the left wing, the action 
being known as the battle of Fair Oaks. 

A heavy rain, described as being like a tropical deluge, 
occurred round Richmond on the nis:ht of 

The thunder-storm. . ° 

May 30th, and, foreseeing that the Chicka- 
hominy would rise, and that Keyes's corps, which was on 
the Richmond side of the stream, would be isolated from 
the rest of McClellan's army, Johnston, who commanded 
the Confederates, determined to attempt to destroy it. 
He seems not to have known that Heintzelman had 
The confederate a l so crossed. He therefore (May 31st) di- 
rected Longstreet and D. H. Hill to attack 
it in front upon the Williamsburg Road, Huger to gain 
its left flank by passing down the Charles City Road, 
and Gustavus Smith its right flank by the New Bridge 
and Nine-mile Roads. He expected to overwhelm the 
isolated corps — two fifths of the force of his adver- 

II.— B B 


sary — by throwing upon it the whole Confederate 

As the country was all under water with the rains — 
in some places a couple of feet deep — Ca- 

Battle of Fair Oaks. i • • • • i • i /» ' • 

sey s division, which was m the front, w r as 
altogether unprepared for an attack, except by such indi- 
cations as the sound of the running of railroad cars all 
night from Eichmond. Casey resisted the Confederate 
shock, which occurred at about 1 P.M., very resolutely. 
The day was dark and gloomy, and from an air-balloon 
it was seen that the entire Confederate army was ad- 

Casey was outnumbered and overwhelmed. He was 

driven back, after a three-hours' struggle, 

Defeat of Casey. > • . Yi • 

more than a mile ; he lost six guns, and his 
camp was taken. He was compelled to retire upon 

Couch, who had been sending forward regiments to 
Battle of seven ^ ne support of Casey, fiercely attempted to 
maintain himself at Seven Pines, Heintzel- 
man coming up to his help. The battle had now been 
going on from 1 P.M. to 4 \ P.M., Longstreet not only 
pressing the line in front, but also on its right and left 

McClellan, who was ill in bed at New Bridge, on the 
other side of the Chickahominy,. ordered 

Sumner's advance. • . . 

Sumner to send relief across the river to 
the hard-pressed troops. Sedgwick's division of Sum- 
ner's corps crossed the swollen stream over the upper one 
of two tottering bridges that he had constructed about 
half way down the V. Tottering as it was, it proved to 
be the salvation of the national army. Sumner, listening 
as he went through the woods, guided his march by the 
roar of the battle. 

The Confederates had found that they could not turn 



the left of the national left wing, for it rested on the 
Whiteoak Swamp. In the most determined manner 
they were trying to pass down "between the right of 
that wing and the Chickahominy, and force their way to 
Bottom's Bridge. If this could be done, nothing remain- 
ed for the entire left wing but to surrender. It had no 

Steadily the Confederates forced their way. The even- 
ing was coming on dark and gloomy — dark and gloomy 
was the prospect for Heintzelman and Keyes. 

Sumner had got Sedgwick's division across the rickety 
He checks the con- bridge, and with it had dragged over a bat- 
tery of twenty-four Napoleon guns, which 
he had planted in a clearing of the woods. The Con- 
federate column, pressing on victoriously for Bottom's 
Bridge, must show its flank to this battery. The flanker 
was outflanked. 

No man could pass the fire-storm from this battery. 
The South Carolina troops rushed at it in vain ; the 
march of the Confederate column was checked — it wa- 
vered. Volleys of musketry were poured into it. Ter- 
ror-stricken, and with fearful slaughter, it w T as hurled 
back upon Fair Oaks -Station. 

About sunset, General Johnston, the Confederate com- 

wounding of mancler, was severely wounded by a frag- 
ment of a shell, and General Smith took 
the command. 

What now — asks the Prince de Joinville, who was an 
Mismanagement of eye-witness of the battle — what now would 
the national troops. haye happened if, instead of fifteen thou- 
sand men whom Sumner had brought over, the whole 
right wing — fifty thousand — had crossed ? 

It was not until seven o'clock that evening that the 
The flood in the id ea of throwing bridges across the stream 
chickanominy. an( j tossing ^he whole army was entertain- 


ed. It was then too late — the water was fast rising ; in 
the course of the night it flooded Sumner's bridges, and 
by morning filled the entire valley. 

In the morning the Confederates renewed the attack 
Repulse of the bravely, but without order. The wounding 

confederates. f Johnston was a serious mischance to them. 
They were finally repulsed about noon, and recoiled in in- 
extricable confusion. They carried off as trophies the 
spoils of the camps of Casey and Couch, which they had 
captured; but McClellan made no attempt to follow them. 
Importunately and incessantly he had called on the gov- 
ernment for more troops — here, at this critical moment, he 
had thirty-five thousand men doing nothing. 

It is now known that the fugitives might have been 

Losses m the followed into Richmond, so great was the 
disorganization and dismay following this 
Confederate repulse. Their loss in the battle had been 
4233 ; the national, 5739, of whom 890 were killed. 

McClellan recovered shortly after, without resistance, 
the posts of Fair Oaks and Seven Pines, the two armies 
resuming substantially their former positions. 

On the second day after the battle of Fair Oaks Gen- 
eral Hooker advanced within four miles of 

Advance of Hooker. . • 

Kichmond, but was ordered to withdraw 
by McClellan, to whom the government dispatched a di- 
vision from McDowell's corps and whatever re-enforce- 
ments they could collect. Still, however, the telegraph 
brought the staple excuses — the dreadful state of the 
roads, the weather, the overwhelming number of the ene- 
my in front — still the same cry for re-enforcements. Day 
after day the great army lay idle and chafing at its lot. 
It heard with amazement and indignation that the Con- 
stuart rides round federate General J. E. B. Stuart, with 1500 
cavalry, had ridden round its right flank 
(June 12, 13) and gained its rear without resistance, de- 


stroying forage and supplies, capturing prisoners, and re- 
turning with impunity to Richmond. The middle of 
June (14th) came. It brought nothing but the telegram 
" All quiet in every direction." McClellan's force was 
now 156,838, of whom 115,102 were present for duty. 
General Johnston having been disabled at Fair Oaks, 
the command of the Confederate army had 

Lee assigned to the -. -, -it /~i t tV i ' "Y ' -ri ^x 

confederate com- been devolved on (General Robert hi. Lee. 


He had been appointed in March general in 
chief, an office specially created for him. His plan was 
to construct fortifications for Richmond, so that the city 
might be defended by a minimum of men, and then, tak- 
ing the mass of the army, to operate with it on the north 
of the Chickahominy, and break McClellan's communica- 
tions with York River. He therefore began at once to 
strengthen his army in front of Richmond by rapidly 
drawing to it all the forces within reach. He intended 
t Lee's plan of to strike a decisive blow against the dilato- 
campaign. ^y an( j k e g^ a ^ n g McClellaii. For this pur- 
pose, among other re-enforcements, Stonewall Jackson was 
brought from the Valley, every means being used to de- 
ceive McClellan as to what was going on, and with so 
much success that he was led to believe that the move- 
ment was in the other direction, and that re-enforcements 
were being sent from Richmond to Jackson. It was not 
until June 24th that McClellan discovered the truth — 
Jackson being then close upon him, making ready to at- 
Mccieiian's ground- tack his rear. At once McClellan took 

alarm, telegraphing to Washington that he 
was about to be assailed by 200,000 men — that if his 
army should be destroyed by such overwhelming num- 
bers, it was his purpose to die with it and share its fate. 
But, in truth, the force of his antagonist was but little 
more than half his own : it amounted to about 80,000 



StonewallJackson, after throwing the North into consternation by a brilliant offens- 
ive movement in the Shenandoah Valley, made good his junction with the army 
of Lee in front of Richmond. 

The Confederates, taking the initiative, compelled McClellan to change his base. 
He retreated, during a week of fighting, to James River. 

The Peninsular campaign ended in a complete triumph for the Confederacy. The 
national government withdrew the Army of the Potomac to the front of Wash- 

For a clear comprehension of the second period of the 
stonewaiuackson's Peninsular campaign, it is necessary to re- 
campaign. j a ^ e ^ Q p era tions of Stonewall Jackson in 

the Shenandoah Valley : they constitute a brilliant por- 
tion of the military annals of the Confederacy. 

In the autumn of 1861, after the battle of Bull Run, 
Jackson had been assigned to the command of the Con- 
federate forces in the Shenandoah Valley. 

Two days (February 24th, 1862) after the time desig- 
nated by the President's order for the simul- 

Banks's movement . . « . -, . . -, 

on the confederate taneous movement oi the national armies, 


Banks took possession of Harper's Ferry, 
partly with a view to the reconstruction of the Baltimore 
and Ohio Railroad, and partly for the purpose of threat- 
ening the Confederate left flank. This movement, togeth- 
er with advices received from female spies in Washington 
that McClellan was about to advance on Richmond, led 
to the evacuation of Manassas, Johnston, who commanded 
the Confederate forces there, falling back toward Rich- 

Under these circumstances, Jackson also retired up the 


T . .. Valley, so as to be in easy communication 

Jackson retires up •/ 7 J 

the vaiiey. with Johnston ; he evacuated Winchester on 

the 11th of March. Learning, however, that Shields, of 
Banks's corps, who was following him, had been weak- 
ened by the withdrawal of a part of his force, he deter- 
mined to turn upon him. Shields feigned to retreat, and 
concealed his true strength. In an action which took 
place (March 23d) at Winchester, the Confederates ac- 
cordingly suffered a severe defeat. They were compelled 
to resume their retreat up the Valley, and remained in 
communication with Johnston until he went to the Pen- 
insula to confront McClellan. At that time Ewell's di- 
vision was sent to Jackson, increasing his force by about 
10,000 men. 

The purpose of the Confederate government in retain- 
ing this large force in the Valley was to threaten Wash- 
ington and embarrass the movements of McClellan in the 

Jackson was therefore now confronting three national 
„ .;. ... armies — that of Fremont, on his left; that of 

Position of the na- ' * 

tionai armies. Banks, before him ; that of McDowell, on his 

Fremont had been ordered by the President to come 
Jackson checks down to Franklin and Harrisonburg, con- 
Fremont, verging toward Banks. Jackson, learning 
this, determined to strike at them in succession. Leav- 
ing Ewell to confront Banks, he himself rapidly moved 
against Fremont's advance, compelling it to retreat to 
Franklin. Then, quickly crossing the Shenandoah Mount- 
ains, he rejoined Ewell at Newmarket, and, moving up 
the Valley between the Blue Ridge and the Masanutten 
range to Front Royal, he accomplished a double object; 
he created a panic in Washington, and, indeed, as we shall 
and attacks Kcniy see > a11 throughout the North, and fell in 
at Front Royai. overwhelming force on Colonel Kenly, who 



[Sect. XI. 


was at Front Koyal, capturing many prisoners and guns, 
and a large amount of stores. This was on the 23d of 

About a week "before this time (May 17th), the nation- 
al government, desirous of re-enforcing McClellan in the 

Chap.LV.] the eetreat of banks. 393 

n , . , , Peninsula, had ordered Shields to leave 

Detachments sent ' 

toMccieiian. Banks's corps and join that of McDowell, 
which was on its march to McClellan, Banks being or- 
dered to fall back to Strasburg and there fortify himself. 
He was thus left with about 6000 men to defend the 

Banks heard of the disaster at Front Royal on the 

evening of its occurrence. He saw his peril. 

attacked by jack' 1 He retreated instantlv from Strasburg; (Mav 

son, J o \ «/ 

24th), the Confederate advance already ap- 
pearing. His losses in this forced march were great, but 
he gained Winchester by midnight. He was unable to 
rest there more than a couple of hours, for Jackson was 
fast enveloping him. He resumed his flight, turning upon 
his pursuers whenever he could, in order to give time for 
his trains to escape. As he passed through Winchester, 
the women threw from the windows hot water and mis- 
siles of every description on his troops. In the course of 

the afternoon he reached Martinsburg, a 

and, caused to re- -. „ »» .-. -, .. i • n , 

treat precipi- march oi 22 miles, and, resting his footsore 
troops only two hours and a half, marched 
again twelve miles, and gained the Potomac opposite Wil- 
liamsport the same night. 

In this pursuit Jackson captured two guns, more than 
9000 small-arms, and more than 3000 prisoners. Banks's 
loss in killed and wounded was about 200. " Never," 
says that general — not a very soldierly confession — " were 
there more grateful hearts in the same number of men 
than when at midday, on the 26th, we stood on the oppo- 
site shore" of the Potomaa 

" The scene on the river when the rear-guard arrived 
escapes across the was °f the most animated and exciting de- 
scription. A thousand camp-fires were burn- 
ing on the hill-side, a thousand carriages of all sorts were 
crowded upon the banks of the broad stream between 


the exhausted troops and their coveted rest. The ford 
was too deep for the teams to cross in regular succession ; 
only the strongest horses, after a few experiments, were 
allowed to essay the passage over before morning. The 
single ferry was occupied by the ammunition trains, the 
ford by the wagons. The cavalry was secure ; the troops 
only had no transportation. No enemy appeared in sight. 
Fortunately, there were several boats belonging to the 
pontoon train brought from Strasburg, which were launch- 
ed and devoted exclusively to the soldiers." 

A rush like that of Stonewall Jackson through the Val- 
ley in pursuit of Banks was what the nation expected of 
McClellan when Magruder attempted to stop him in the 

The attack at Front Eoyal and on Strasburg produced 
consternation in consternation in Washington. McDowell 
Washington. wag ^ once ordered to fall back; he was 

within fifteen miles of Hanover Court-house, and on the 

point of making a junction with McClellan. In letters to 

the Secretary of War and to the President 

McClellan's re-en- , -, , . . ,' , . , 

forcements ordered Jie expressed his regret in a soldierly man- 
ner. He at once proceeded to execute his 
orders, which were to aid in intercepting Jackson and 
cut off his retreat in the Valley. On the same day (May 
24) Fremont was ordered by telegraph to march instant- 
ly in aid of the same attempt. By the route he was or- 
dered to take he might have intercepted Jackson, but he 
assumed the responsibility of going by another, which 
permitted Jackson to escape. It had been hoped that, 
between McDowell and Fremont, Jackson's retreat would 
be stopped. 

In the consternation of the moment, in addition to 
these military orders, dispatches were sent 
Northern gov- to the governors of the Northern States. 
They were of the following tenor : 



" Washington, May 25th, 1862. 
"To the Governor of Massachusetts : 

" Intelligence from various quarters leaves no doubt that the en- 
emy in great force are marching on Washington. You will please 
organize and forward immediately all the militia and volunteer 
force in your state. 

" Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War." 

On the same day (May 25th) the President took mili- 
The government tary possession of all the railroads in the 
seizes the railroads. United g tates? or( iering their officers and 

servants to hold themselves in readiness for the trans- 
portation of troops and munitions of war, to the exclu- 
sion of all other business. 

It was now high time for Stonewall Jackson to retreat 
from the front of Harper's Ferry. Accord- 
son from Harp- ingly he did so (May 29), leaving; Ewell as 

er's Ferry. fe J \ on i 

a rear-guard. I hat officer made some ener- 
getic demonstrations on the night of the 30th. " The 
night was intensely dark; the hills around were alive 
with signal lights ; the rain descended in torrents ; vivid 
flashes of lightning illuminated at intervals the green and 
magnificent scenery, while the crash of the thunder echo- 
ing among the mountains threw into comparative insig- 
nificance the roar of the artillery." Next morning it was 
found that Ewell had disappeared. To overtake Jackson, 
he marched thirty-four miles on that day ! 

We have seen that Fremont changed his jDrescribed 
line of march. He did this with a view of finding a 
readier passage over the Shenandoah Mountains from 
Franklin, where he had concentrated. He went north- 
ward forty miles to Moorfield ; then, crossing the ridge — 
though he had stripped his men even of their knapsacks, 
and marched as expeditiously as he could over roads 
made almost impassable by the incessant rain — he reach- 
Faiiufe of Fremont e( ^ Strasburg (June 1st) just after Jackson 

to intercept him. j^ ^^j fl^gj, ft ^{^ W llO WES 


moving along the South Fork of the Shenandoah, on the 
east of the Masanutten range, while Fremont was thus 
moving on the west, attempted to intercept Jackson far- 
ther south. But that general retarded the pursuit of 
Fremont and delayed Shields by burning the bridges as 
he j3assed them. Marching rapidly through Harrisonburg, 
he made his way through the South Fork of the Shenan- 
doah at Port Republic, repulsing (June 5) an attack of the 
national cavalry on his rear, but losing in the combat Gen- 
eral Ashby, a very brave officer, who was in command of 
Affair at Port his cavalry. At Port Republic the river di- 
Eepubhc. vides ; the larger of its branches is crossed 

by a wooden bridge, the smaller by a ford. Here Fre- 
mont at length brought him to bay (June 8), near a ham- 
let known as Cross Keys, but in vain, for he repulsed the 

While he was thus engaged with Fremont, who had 
come down from the northwest, Shields was converging 
upon him from the northeast. The advance cavalry and 
artillery of that officer dashed into Port Republic, expect- 
ing to seize Jackson's train, but in a few minutes they 
were driven out and compelled to fall back on their ad- 
vancing infantry. The infantry, in its turn, was over- 
whelmed. A battery was captured and recaptured. Jack- 
son, in his report, says, " Three times was this battery lost 
and won in the desperate efforts to capture and recover 
Jackson makes ft." After a determined contest, Jackson 
good his retreat. f orce( j "b ac ]^ j^g assailants, pursuing them 

nearly five miles, making good his retreat across the riv- 
er, and setting fire to the bridge. He had lost a thou- 
sand men (1167) and one gun since he left Winchester, 
and had captured about a thousand men (975) and sev- 
en guns. 

Jackson had thus dexterously slipped between McDow- 
ell on one side, and Fremont on the other, at Strasburg. 


The results he had He had been pursued in vain by three major 
generals, and, turning upon his pursuers at 
every opportunity, had made good his retreat. He had 
diverted large re-enforcements from McClellan, had neu- 
tralized a national force of 60,000 men, and given to the 
Southern armies the prestige of victory. He was now 
ready to join the army in front of Richmond opposing 
McClellan's advance. 

The battle of Fair Oaks was fought on the 31st of May, 
inactivity of the po- an d for almost a month General McClellan's 

tomac Army. 1 • j_" *jl ' \l* j.1 

army lay inactive m its position on .the 
banks of the Chickahominy. Richmond gradually re- 
covered from its terror, and the Confederate army from 
its repulse. Opportunity was given, in the welcome res- 
pite thus afforded, to obtain re-enforcements through the 
Conscription Act, to bring detachments from the West, 
to reorganize under General Lee, the new commander, 
and to enable Jackson, after his brilliant campaign in the 
Valley, to take part in the contemplated proceedings. 

During the long period of mortal inactivity — mortal 
so far as the peninsular campaign of the Potomac Army 
was concerned — McClellan had fortified himself strongly 
on the Chickahominy. His left wing was on the south 
of that stream, between Whiteoak Swamp and New 
Bridge; the roads toward Richmond were commanded 
by heavy guns. His right wing was north of the Chicka- 
hominy, extending beyond Mechanicsville. He had sol- 
idly constructed several bridges over the stream, thereby 
bringing the two wings of his army into easier communi- 
cation. The reason he assigned for delay in his move- 
ments was the state of the roads and the want of these 

Meantime, as has been mentioned (p. 388), General J. 
E. B. Stuart, with 1500 Confederate cavalry, had shown 


stuart rides round how easily McClellan's communications with 
his base of supplies at White House might 
be severed. He defeated two squadrons of national cav- 
alry at Hanover Old Church, then rode round the army 
by way of Tunstall's Station, capturing supplies and pris- 
oners. He rested three hours at Talleysville, crossed the 
Chickahominy near Long Bridge, and returned next morn- 
ing to Richmond unassailed — an ominous warning by 
which the national general would have done well to 

At length, on the 25th of June, the army, having 115,102 
it is at length order- present for duty, learned with transport that 
it was to come forth from the pestilential 
swamps in which it had been spell-bound. Hooker had 
received orders to advance beyond Fair Oaks on the road 
to Richmond. After a sharp struggle, he secured the 
ground which he had been ordered to occupy. 

That very night, however, the unwelcome tidings ar- 
rived that the same apparition which had scared Banks 
from Strasburg w T as approaching the national communi- 
cations with the York River. Stonewall Jackson had 
come out of the Shenandoah Valley, and was at Hanover 

Hooker was at once recalled. The advance on Rich- 
The advance coun- niond was abandoned. For the army on 
the Chickahominy there was something else 
to do than to march in triumph to the. Confederate cap- 

A Confederate council of war was held on the same 
day (25th) in Richmond. The defensive 

The Confederates . . 

resolve on offensive lines round the city were now complete ; it 

operations. it' n i 

was thought that a small part of the army 
would be sufficient to hold them. Jackson had been 
brought out of the Valley to aid in the proposed move- 
ment. It was concluded that the time had come for the] its perilous position. 399 

mass of the army to cross to the north of the Chicka- 
hominy, to sweep down the river on that side, and threat- 
en McClellan's communications with York River. It was 
perceived that he must either retreat, or give battle out 
of his intrenchments. 

McClellan had now to determine what he would do. 

position of Mcciei- The peninsular campaign had culminated in 

the withdrawal of Hooker from his advance. 

The bridges over the Chickahominy gave opportunity to 

throw either wing to the assistance of the other. 

But it was very clear that the communications with 

He resolves on a White House could no longer be safely held, 
change of base/ and gince t]be &ptme of Norfolk and the de- 

struction of the Merrimack, James River had been opened. 
Some transports had already found their way to City 

If McClellan concentrated on the north bank of the 
Chickahominy, it was a public abandonment of the cap- 
ture of Richmond; it implied a disastrous and unsup- 
ported retreat to Yorktown. If he concentrated on the 
south bank, he lost his communications with White 
House, and must execute the perilous operation of a 
change of base by a flank movement. It was seventeen 
miles from Fair Oaks to James River; there was only 
one road on which the movement could be executed, 
and that was exposed to many roads radiating from 

The movement to James River being determined upon, 
the mode of its execution admitted of little 

Mode in which it •, . m, . , . tl P . -, . -, 

was to be accom- choice. I he right wing, on the iarther side 

plished. . & ° 7 

of the Chickahominy, must oppose the best 
resistance it could to the enemy ; its trains must be sent 
over the bridges across that stream. It was not to be ex- 
pected that that wing should gain a victory ; all that it 
was called upon to do was to resist stoutly. The trains, 


once over and well on their way on the opposite — the 
south — side toward James River, the right wing must 
slowly follow them, passing the bridges, which then must 
be destroyed. The only bridges in possession of the Con- 
federates were ten miles above, at Mechanics ville ; they 
therefore would have to make a long march to go round 
by that way. With the start so secured, the national 
army might retreat securely to James River, and there 
come under shelter of the gun-boats which had already 
reached Harrison's Landing. 

Military critics have regarded the execution of this 
movement — for, as we are now to see, it was executed — as 
a very brilliant operation. But the historian can not for- 
get that it was not for the purpose of exhibiting the spec- 
tacle of a retreat, no matter how splendid it might be, 
that the Army of the Potomac had advanced to the 

The campaign now instituted by Lee against McClel- 

The seven da s' ^ an mSi J ^ e conveniently divided according 
campaign. ' to ^ays. xhey are as follows : 

1st Day, Thursday, 26th of June — Mechanicsville. 

2d " Friday, 27th " — The Chickahominy, Gaines's 

Mill, or Cold Harbor. 

3d " Saturday, 28th " —The Retreat. 

4th " Sunday, 29th " —Savage's Station. 

5th " Monday, 30th " — Frazier's Farm. 

6th " Tuesday, 1st of July— Malvern Hill. 

7th " Wednesday, 2d " — Retreat to Harrison's Land- 


The first Day, Thursday, Jane 26t7i. Mechanicsville. 
Assamt at Mecaan- — TIie Confederate General A. P. Hill was 
icsviiie. ordered to cross to the north side of the 

Chickahominy and move on Mechanicsville. Longstreet 
and D. H. Hill were to support him. It was expected 
that Jackson would arrive in time to join them. They 



were to sweep down to the York Eiver Kailroad. Hill 
waited for Jackson until nearly three o'clock in the after- 
noon, and then determined to act without him. The na- 
tional advance retired to a stronger position about a mile 
distant, across Beaver Dam Creek. As it was very for- 
midable in front, the Confederates attempted to turn it 
first on the right, then on the left, but at both points met 
with a disastrous repulse, their loss being about 1500. 

The second Day, Friday, June 27th. Battle of the 
Battle of the chick- Chickahominy. — At daybreak Jackson was 
ahominy. crossing Beaver Dam Creek, some distance 

up that stream, and coming down toward the national 
right. The bridges at Mechanicsville were soon repaired, 
and the Confederate troops, finding their enemy gone, fol- 
lowed after them. D. H. Hill bore to the left to unite 
with Jackson ; A. P. Hill and Longstreet kept near the 

On the national side, McClellan was withdrawing his 
trains to the south bank of the Chickahominy. Before 
daybreak he had sent as many guns and wagons as pos- 
sible over that river, and prepared to retire the troops to 
a position on its north bank stretching round the bridges, 
so that their flanks would be secure. In his opinion it 
was not advisable to bring them across, as that would 
have enabled Jackson to interrupt the proposed retreat by 
passing the Chickahominy at some of the lower bridges 
before the national army, with its trains, could reach Mal- 
vern. Porter's train crossed successfully over the bridges, 
and had joined the trains of the troops on the south side 
in their movement to James River. The upper bridge, 
New Bridge, had been destroyed. Stoneman had been 
sent with a column of cavalry to evacuate the depot at 
White House, and to destroy there, and along the York 
River Railroad, whatever could- not be removed. The 
greater part of the heavy guns and wagons having thus 
II.— C c 



been removed, the delicate operation of withdrawing the 
troops which had been engaged at Mechanicsville was 
commenced about dawn. They were retired about five 
miles, to Gaines's Mill. 

The new position occupied by Porter was an arc of a 
position of the na- circle, covering the approaches to the bridges 
which connected the right wing with the 
troops on the opposite side of the river. The troops 
were arranged in two parallel lines, those which had been 
engaged on the day before being in the rear of the first. 
They were all in, position by noon. They were to defend 
the bridges in their rear, to cross them in the evening, and 
then to destroy them. 

Shortly after noon the Confederates were discovered 
Advance of the con- approaching in force under A.P.Hill, and 
very soon the firing became heavy. The 
ground over which they were advancing was an open 
field, about a quarter of a mile wide, traversed by a 
stream, the sides of which were morasses. Hill crossed 
the plain and the swamp, but was repulsed when he at- 
tempted to ascend the hill beyond, on which the national 
troops were posted. At 2 P.M. Porter asked for re-en- 
forcements, and Slocum's division was sent across the riv- 
er to him. At 3 the engagement became so severe that 
the second line and reserves had to be moved forward 
to sustain the first against repeated and desperate as- 

The contest on the left was for a strip of woods run- 
ning almost at right angles to the Chickahominy. The 
Confederates charged up to this wood several times, but 
were driven back with heavy loss, notwithstanding that 
Longstreet had advanced to the aid of Hill. The na- 
tional loss also was very great, and the troops, most of 
whom had been under arms more than two days, were be- 
coming exhausted. 


Though Slocuin's division had increased Porter's 
strength to 35,000, the national line was strongly pressed 
in several points. 

About 4 P.M. Jackson had reached the ground, and 
the Confederates then made a general assault. It was 
commenced by an attack on the national right by D. H. 
Hill. He pushed up the slope in front, but was forced 
back. Ewell attempted the same movement, and met 
with a like repulse. The battle swayed doubtfully as 
the whole line became involved, attack after attack being 
repeatedly repelled. Of the assailants large numbers 
were conscripts who had never been under lire until the 
day before. They soon showed what kind of soldiers 
they were. With a shrill yell they forced their way 
across the intervening swamp, and came up to the very 
muzzles of Porter's guns. Under the fire they received 
they went down like grass before the scythe. At 5 
o'clock Porter reported his position as critical. His as- 
sailants had now double his strength. The brigades of 
French and Meagher were therefore ordered to cross the 
Chickahominy to his support. They got up just in time 

The national lines to prevent a total rout, for the Confederates, 
broken. ^^ o ^ 0Y an jj our an( j a j^jf jj a( i "been mak- 

ing the most desperate charges, had finally carried the 
woods on the left. This reverse, aided by the confusion 
which followed an unsuccessful charge by four compa- 
nies of national cavalry, caused a general retreat toward 
the bridges. 

French's and Meagher's brigades advanced boldly, 
dashing to the front through a crowd of fugitives who 
were rushing to the bridges over the sw^anrp and river. 
The hurrahs with which these brigades were greeted 
warned the Confederates that re-enforcements had ar- 
rived. Under a canopy of smoke, through which the set- 
ting sun, crimson in color, sent his diminished rays, the 

Chap.LV.] results of the battle. 405 

national troops rallied. The Confederates paused, and 
did not follow up the advantage they had gained. 

Porter had thus accomplished the object of this des- 
perate struggle. He had held the front of the bridges, 
and given time for the operation of retreat on the other 
bank. When night came he crossed, and then destroy- 
.: / '. . ed them. The Confederate loss had been 

Losses in the battle. 

very great. In Jackson's corps alone 589 
were killed and 2671 wounded. McClellan had lost about 
9000 men and 22 guns. 

But, heavy as were their losses, the Confederates 
thought they had cheaply purchased the advantages they 
supposed they had gained. They believed that McClel- 
lan was cut off from his communications and isolated, 
and that his supplies at White House would fall an un- 
resisting prey. Not without bitter disappointment did 
they learn, on the following afternoon, that White House 
had been evacuated, and the stores which could not be 
Mccieiian's actual carried away destroyed ; that McClellan, in- 
conoition. stead of being cut off, had concentrated his 

troops on the other side of the Chickahominy, and with 
five thousand wagons, a siege train, a herd of twenty-five 
hundred oxen, and vast quantities of material in advance 
of him, had actually, in their faces, accomplished a change 
of base, and was marching to a junction with the nation- 
al fleet at James River. 

In a dispatch to the Secretary of War (June 28), 
McClellan declared that his soldiers had 

Ilis accusations , -, -, -, -, . -, . 

against the govern- been overwhelmed bv vastlv superior num- 
bers, but that even how, with 10,000 addi- 
tional men, he could take Richmond to-morrow; that, 
however, as it was, he should be glad to cover his retreat 
and save the personnel of his army. Witli truth he de- 
clared that no one need blush for the Army of the Poto- 
mac. Asserting that the government had not sustained 

406 THE RETREAT. [Sect. XI. 

him, lie so far forgot himself as to say to the Secretary of 
War, " If I save this army now, I tell you plainly that I 
owe no thanks to you or to any other persons in Wash- 
ington. You have done your best to sacrifice this army." 

The third Day, Saturday, June 28th. The Retreat. — 

The retreat to Immediately after the battle of the Chicka- 
hominy, McClellan assembled his corps com- 
manders. He seemed even at this moment to be vacil- 
lating, and 'half inclined to cross to the north side of the 
Chickahominy and renew the contest. Heintzelman ad- 
vised him against that step. Then he finally determined 
on a change of base, and informed his generals of his 
method of executing it. Ominous whispers were already 
passing through the ranks that the campaign had failed, 
and that a retreat was in prospect. When, during the 
night, the bridges were blown up, the officers tried to 
close their eyes to what they perceived but too plainly 
was about to come to pass. A few hours more, and the 
fact could no longer be concealed. * 

Malvern was distant a dozen or fifteen miles. There 
Topography of the was no enemy in front to obstruct the march. 
The chief difficulty lay in the country. The 
Whiteoak Creek, a branch of the Chickahominy, passes 
through the midst of a swamp, which stretches in a north- 
westerly direction toward Richmond for about eight miles. 
Near Richmond the swamp is about four miles wide. At 
its more distant extremity it narrows down to a few hun- 
dred yards. This swamp McClellan had to cross in his 

Southward of the Richmond and York River Railway 
four roads diverge from Richmond toward the east ; they 
are : (1.) The Williamsburg Road ; (2.) the Charles City 
Road ; (3.) the Central Road ; (4.) the Newmarket Road. 
The first runs in a general manner parallel to the rail- 
way; the other three cross almost perpendicularly the] the eetreat. . 407 

Quaker Road which comes from the swamp down to- 
ward Malvern Hill. Through the swamp and down the 
Quaker Road was the line of McClellan' s retreat. 

On the morning of the 28th, Lee was in doubt as to 
Movements of tiie the course McClellan had taken. Cavalry 
reconnoissances, however, satisfied him that 
he was not crossing the lower bridges of the Chickahom- 
iny with an intention of passing down the peninsula, but 
was on his way to James River. Thereupon Lee deter- 
mined by forced marches to intercept him. Longstreet 
and A. P. Hill crossed the Chickahominy at New Bridge, 
which had been already repaired. They were to -move 
past Richmond and then along the Central Road. Ma- 
gruder was on the Williamsburg, and Huger marched 
along the Charles City Road. These movements would 
bring them on the flank of McClellan's retreat. Jackson, 
crossing the Chickahominy at the Grapevine Bridge, was 
to follow the retreating columns and press upon their 

McClellan ordered Keyes to move his corps across 
and of the na- Whiteoak Creek and seize strong positions 
tionai troops. Qn ^ Q opposite side, to cover the troops 

and trains, and guard their retreat. Franklin and Porter 
followed by the same route. Heintzelman and Sumner 
were to fall back to Savage's Station from the works in 
front, and then cross the swamp and unite with the rest 
of the army. The rear-guard of the retreating column 
was to keep a bold front toward its pursuers, and special 
directions were given to guard against flank attacks on 
the three roads radiating from Richmond. 

The day was hot and stifling. The vast caravan, 
with less confusion than might have been anticipated, 
pursued its dusty way. At 1 1 A.M. the telegraph wires 
to White House ceased to work; the enemy had cut 
them. Whatever munitions or supplies could not be car- 


ried away were destroyed. Under the bushes in the 
woods by the roadside many a sick and wounded man 
was left, casting imploring looks on the receding column 
as it passed by. 

The fourth Day, Sunday, June 29th. Savage's Station. 
— The morning was suffocating and hot. Magruder, mov- 
ing along the Williamsburg Road, found the works at Fair 
sumner at sav- Oaks abandoned. Sumner and Heintzelman 
were retiring toward Savage's Station, which 
they reached in the afternoon. Their orders were to hold 
that point until night, but, through some misunderstand- 
ing, Heintzelman retired before the appointed time, and 
crossed the swamp, having first destroyed the stores and 
ammunition which could not be carried away. A loco- 
motive, with a train of cars heaped up with supplies and 
shells, was turned loose on the railroad, and sent headlong 
over the broken bridge into the Chickahominy. The 
train had been set on fire before it started, and the shells 
were exploding as it went. 

Magruder made an attack on Sumner's corps about 
half past 5 P.M. It was still in front of Savage's Sta- 
tion. The action continued until dark, Sumner maintain- 
ing his ground. During the night he passed into the 
Abandonment of Whiteoak Swamp, leaving 2500 sick and 
the hospitals. woun a e d in the hospital at the station. Ma- 
gruder now received orders to leave the Williamsburg 
Road and cross over to the Newmarket. Before sunrise 
the national troops had passed Whiteoak Bridge, which 
was then destroyed. ■ 

The fifth Day , Monday, Jane 30th. Frazier r s Farm. 
— The day was exceedingly hot, but the Confederate 
general vigorously pursued McClellan's retreating army. 
Longstreet and A. P. Hill had crossed the Chickahominy 
at New Bridge, and, having moved round the head of the 
swamp, marched rapidly down the Central Road, in ex- 


pectation of striking McClellan's flank. They hoped to 

Battle of Fnfeter'B pierce his line and throw the rear of his COl- 
Farm, or Glcndale. ^^ j^ upon J ac k son an( J J), H. Hill, who 

had crossed over Grapevine Bridge, and were approach- 
ing on his track. On all sides Jackson encountered a 
vast wreck of military stores. Blue overcoats in count- 
less numbers had been thrown into the bushes or trod- 
den under foot in the decaying leaves or in the dust of 
the roads. 

To aid in piercing McClellan's line, which was more 
than eight miles "long, Magruder and Huger were now 
marching parallel to Longstreet. A brigade was - also 
brought over the James River from Fort Darling. It 
was expected that 80,000 men would be brought to bear 
on the national line. Jefferson Davis came from Rich- 
mond to witness the apparently inevitable national ca- 

Longstreet and Hill encountered the retreating line 
vigor of the con- about 4 P.M. at Frazier's Farm. It was 
federate attack. McCal p s division which happened to be 

passing their front. They threw upon it brigade after 
brigade, and tried to break and pierce through it. McCall, 
in his report of this portion of the battle, says, " Randall's 
battery was charged upon by the enemy in great force, 
with a reckless impetuosity I never saw equaled. They 
advanced at a run over six hundred yards of open ground. 
The guns of the battery mowed them down, yet they nev- 
er paused. A volley of musketry was poured into them 
at a short distance by the Fourth Regiment, in support 
of this battery, but it did not check them for an instant ; 
they dashed on, and pistoled and bayoneted the cannon- 
iers at their guns." 

Notwithstanding these determined efforts, the attack 
The national coi- failed; the national line was not pierced. 

uma unbroken. Magruder an( J IIuger JJJ not get up . ^ 


troops from Fort Darling were driven back by shells from 
the gun-boats. 

Jackson, who was to have attacked the rear-guard of 
Jackson in check at the retreating army, reached Whiteoak 

Whiteoak Bridge, g^ ^^ ^^ He found ^ j^^ 

over it destroyed, and Franklin barring his passage. In 
spite of his utmost efforts, he was kept at bay the whole 

The contest continued until after dark; the advance 
of the Confederates was checked ; the national army se- 
curely fell back during the night to Malvern Hill. The 
rear of the supply trains and the reserve artillery had 
reached that point on the previous afternoon. 

Of McCall's division, nearly one fourth had been killed 
or wounded. He himself, riding; out after 

Losses in the battle. , . ° 

nightfall to reconnoitre, was taken prisoner. 
General Meade had been severely wounded. On the part 
of the Confederates, the losses had been awful; for in- 
stance, General Pry or, of the fifth brigade of Longstreet's 
corps, speaking of the Fourteenth Alabama, says it was 
nearly annihilated. He adds : " I crossed the Chickahom- 
iny on the 26th with 1400 men ; in the fights that fol- 
lowed I suffered a loss of 849 killed and wounded, and 
11 missing. 

Sixth Day ', Tuesday, July 1st. Malvern Hill. — Mal- 
■ Battle of Mai- verii Hill, to which the national army had 
now retreated, and on which it prepared to 
make a stand against its pursuers, is " an elevated plateau, 
cleared of timber, about a mile and a half long by three 
fourths of a mile wide, with several converging roads run- 
ning over it. In front are numerous defensible ravines, 
the ground sloping gradually toward the north and east 
Topography of to the woodland, giving clear ranges for ar- 
tillery in those directions. Toward the 
northwest the plateau falls off more abruptly to a ravine, 


which extends to James River. From the position of the 
enemy, his most obvious lines of attack were from the di- 
rection of Richmond and Whiteoak Swamp, and would 
almost of necessity strike the national army on its left 
wing. Here, therefore, the lines were strengthened by 
massing the troops and collecting the principal part of 
the artillery." 

On this formidable position McClellan's wayworn 
position of the na- troops, weary with marching by night and 
aimy " fighting by day, overwhelmed with the mid- 

summer heat, and -sickened with the pestiferous miasma, 
were at last concentrated. Both flanks of the army rest- 
ed on James River, under the protection of the gun-boats. 
The order in which the troops lay, from their left to their 
right, was, Porter, Heintzelman, Sumner, Franklin, Keyes. 
The approaches to the position were commanded by about 
seventy guns, several of them heavy siege cannon. 

As soon as Franklin had withdrawn from the White- 
oak Creek, Jackson crossed over, following the retreating 
columns to Malvern. Between 9 and 10 A.M., the Con- 
federates commenced feeling along the national left wing 
with artillery and skirmishers. Their fire, however, soon 
died away. They perceived the difficulties before them. 
There were crouching cannon waiting for them, and 
strength of the ready to defend all the approaches. Shel- 
position. tered by fences, ditches, ravines, were swarms 

of infantry. There were horsemen picturesquely career- 
ing over the noontide and sun-seared field. Tier after 
tier of batteries were grimly visible upon the slope, which 
rose in the form of an amphitheatre. With a fan-shaped 
sheet of fire they could sweep the incline, a sort of natu- 
ral glacis up which the assailants must advance. A 
crown of cannon was on the brow of the hill. The first 
line of batteries could only be reached by traversing an 
open space of from three to four hundred yards, exposed 


to grape and canister from the artillery, and musketry 
from the infantry. If that were carried, another, and still 
another more difficult remained in the rear. 

Not without reason did Hill express to Lee his disap- 
The confederates P rova l °f the attack about to be made ; nev- 
orderedto carry it. er theless, Lee ordered the position to be car- 

During the afternoon the Confederate artillery opened, 
but it was only in feeble force and in detail. It was at 
once silenced by the national guns. Magruder had come 
up, and was ordered to take post on the right of Hill, who 
was on the right of their line. 

At six o'clock the enemy suddenly opened with the 
whole strength of his artillery, and at once began pushing 
forward columns of attack. "Brigade after brigade," 
says McClellan in his report, " formed under cover of the 
woods, started at a run to cross the open space and 
charge our batteries, but the heavy fire of our guns, with 
the cool and steady volleys of our infantry, in every case 
sent them reeling back to shelter, and covered the ground 
with their dead and wounded. In several instances our 
infantry withheld their fire until the attacking columns, 
which rushed through the storm of canister and shell 
from our artillery, had reached within a few yards of our 
lines. They then poured in a single volley and dashed 
forward with the bayonet, capturing prisoners and colors, 
and driving the routed columns in confusion from the 

Lee, who was momentarily expecting that his batteries 
would break the national lines, had ordered his division 
commanders to advance as soon as they should hear Ar- 
mistead, who was in position to see the effect of the fire, 
charging with a yell. Hill thought he heard the signal 
Failure of their as- about an hour and a half before sunset, and 
at once advanced, but soon found that he 


could not stand before the tempest. Magruder, on his 
right, was making a desperate attack. It was the noise 
of his advance that was mistaken by Hill for the signal 
yell. Magruder also found that it was utterly impossi- 
ble to rush through the sheet of fire. No impression 
whatever could be made. Malvern Hill absolutely quiv- 
ered under the concussions of the cannonade. Shells from 
the gun-boats in the river were bursting overhead. The 
Confederate general was uselessly and unjustifiably send- 
ing his men to be massacred. Until dark he persisted 
in his efforts to seize the position, but every one of his 
attacks was repulsed with horrible loss. Not until after 
nine o'clock did he give up his attempt, and the artillery 
cease its fire. 

The battle was followed by a dark and stormy night, 

AwM night after hiding the agony of thousands who lay on 

the battle. the bloo( i. s tained slopes of Malvern Hill, 

and in the copses and woodlands beyond. The rain 

came clown in torrents. 

Neither Jackson, nor Longstreet, nor A. P. Hill had 
taken part in this attack. It was made by D. H. Hill 
and Magruder. Some of their men slept through the 
tempestuous night within one hundred yards of the na- 
tional batteries. With inexpressible astonishment, when 
day broke, they cast their eyes on the hill from which 
they had been so fearfully repulsed. Their enemy had 
vanished — the volcano was silent. 

Among the Confederates every thing was in the most 
dreadful confusion. One of their generals says : " The 
next morning, by dawn, I went off to ask for orders, when 
I found the whole army in the utmost disorder. Thou- 
sands of straggling men were asking every passer-by for 
their regiments ; ambulances, wagons, and artillery ob- 
structing every road, and all together in a drenching rain, 
presenting a scene of the most woeful and heart-rending 


Seventh Day, Wednesday, July 2d. The Retreat to 

Harrison's Landing. — Not even in the awful night that 

followed this awful battle was rest allotted 

McClellan retreats . 

^Harrison's Land- to the national army. In less than two hours 
after the roar of the conflict had ceased, or- 
ders were given to resume the retreat, and march to Har- 
rison's Landing. At midnight the utterly exhausted sol- 
diers were groping their staggering way along a road de- 
scribed as desperate, in all the confusion of a fleeing and 
routed army. There was but one narrow pass through 
which the army could retreat, and though the distance was 
only seven miles, it was not until the middle of the next 
day that Harrison's Landing was reached. The mud was 
actually ankle-deep all over the ground. The last of the 
wagons did not reach the selected site until after dark 
on the 3d of July. The rear-guard then moved into their 
camp, and every thing was secure. The paralyzed Con- 
federates made a feeble pursuit, and on the 8th went 
back to Richmond. 

Not without profound reluctance was the order to 
indication m the continue the retreat to Harrison's Landing 
national army. obey ed General Kearny, than whom there 

was not a more noble soldier in the whole army, ex- 
claimed, in a group of indignant officers, " I, Philip Kear- 
ny, an old soldier, enter my solemn protest against this 
order to retreat. We ought, instead of retreating, to 
follow up the enemy and take Richmond. And, in full 
view of all the responsibility of such a declaration, I say 
to you all that such an order can only be prompted by 
cowardice or treason." 

The French princes left the army early the next morn- 
The French princes i n g- I^ s condition was, to all appearances, 
abandon the army, desperatet They went on board a steamer, 

and soon after departed for the North. 

The Committee of Congress on the Conduct of the War, 


referring to these events,. declare, " The re- 

Perilous condition . , n ,i n nr 1 j tt • 

of the national treat oi the army irom Malvern to Ham- 


son's Bar was very precipitate. The troops, 
upon their arrival there, were huddled together in great 
confusion, the entire army being collected within a space 
of about three miles along the river. No orders were 
given the first day for occupying the heights which com- 
manded the position, nor were the troops so placed as to 
be able to resist an attack in force by the enemy, and 
nothing but a heavy rain, thereby preventing the enemy 
from bringing up their artillery, saved the army from de- 

There had been sent to the Peninsula about one hun- 
dred and sixty thousand men (159,500). 

Its condition at the ^ .-, ~ -, n T -• n . ,-.. . -it 

dose of.the cam- On the 3d oi July, alter this great army had 
reached the protection of the gun-boats at 
Harrison's Landing, McClellan telegraphed to the Secre- 
tary of War that he presumed he had not " over 50,000 
men left with their colors." Hereupon President Lin- 
coln (July 7) went to Harrison's Landing, and found 
that there were about 86,000 men there. 

Lee, in his report, says : " The siege of Richmond was 
raised, and the object of a campaign, which 

Lee's report of the -i-it , -, n , tie* 

confederate ui- nad been prosecuted alter months of prep- 

umph. x A x 

aration, at an enormous expenditure of men 
and money, -completely frustrated. More than 10,000 
prisoners, including officers of rank, 52 pieces of artillery, 
and upward of 35,000 stand of small -arms, were cap- 
tured. The stores and supplies of every description which 
fell into our hands were great in amount and value, but 
small in comparison with those destroyed by the enemy. 
His losses in battle exceeded our own, as attested by the 
thousands of dead and wounded left on every field, while 
his subsequent inaction shows in what condition the sur- 
vivors reached the protection to which they fled." 


General McClellan remained at Harrison's Landing 
until the 4th of August, when he received 

Withdrawal of the -, . . . -. -, , . . A 

national army from an order to withdraw his army to Acquia 

the Peninsula. . _ , *> x 

Creek, to aid in repelling the Confederate 
movement toward Washington. Most reluctantly did he 
comply with this order. The bulk of the army moved by 
land to Fortress Monroe. The general left that place on 
the 23d of August, and reached Acquia Creek the next 

Thus ended the great, the ill-starred, the melancholy 

Peninsular expedition. It had no presiding 

Total failure of . ~ ,, . • -i mi 

the Peninsular genius, no controlling mind. Ihere was an 

campaign. ° ' . ° . 

incredible sluggishness m the advance; it 
actually gave the Confederates time to pass their con- 
scription law and bring their conscripts into the .field. 
The magnificent army, which had been organized with so 
much pageantry at Washington, and moved down Ches- 
apeake Bay with so much pomp, had sickened in the 
dismal trenches of Yorktown, and left thousands upon 
thousands in the dark glades and gloomy marshes of the 
blood-stained Chickahominy. It is the testimony of the 
corps commanders that they were left as best they might 
to conduct the fatal retreat. The general was importu- 
nately demanding of the government more troops — never 
using all that he had. Countless millions of money had 
been wasted, tens of thousands of men had been de- 

From the inception of the campaign to its end, milita- 
ry audacity was pitted against military timidity, prompt- 
ness against procrastination, and the result could not be 
other than it was. The Confederates at Centreville, in 
inferior numbers and in contemptible works, held McClel- 
lan at bay. They did the same at Yorktown, though he 
had much more than ten times their strength. Their au- 
dacity culminated in their march to the north bank of the 

Chap.LV.] close of THE PENINSULAK CAMPAIGN. 41f 

Chickahominy, when they actually divided their army in 
his presence, putting the mass of it on the more distant 
side of a river which he might have rendered impassable, 
and leaving nothing between him and Richmond but a 
body of troops which he might have overwhelmed with- 
out difficulty. 
II.— D D 



The steam frigate Merrimack was converted by the Confederates into an armored 

Coming out of Norfolk, she destroyed the wooden war-ships Cumberland and Con- 

Ericsson's armored turret-ship, the Monitor, built expressly for the purpose, ob- 
tained a victory over her, and disabled her. 

Importance of this battle to naval powers. 

When the navy yard at Norfolk was seized by Vir- 
ginia, among the ships partly destroyed was 

The Merrimack con- ,, , n * • nr • t n r* , 

verted into an iron- the steam irigate Merrimack, 01 iorty gnns 

(p. 84). She was one of the finest vessels in 
the navy, and was worth, when equipped, nearly a million 
and a quarter of dollars. 

She had been set on fire, and also scuttled by the offi- 
cers who had charge of the yard. Her upper works 
alone, therefore, had suffered. Her hull and machinery 
were comparatively uninjured. 

The Confederate government caused her to be raised 

Particulars of her ail( ^ turned i n ^° an extemporaneous iron- 
construction. c ] a( j # ^ s m entioned (p. 207), her hull was 

cut down, and a stout timber roof built upon it. This 
was then strongly plated with three layers of iron, each 
one inch and a quarter thick, the first layer being placed 
horizontally, the second obliquely, the third perpendicu- 
larly. The armature reached two feet below the water- 
line, and rose ten feet above. The ends were constructed 
in the same manner. A false bow was added for the pur- 
pose of dividing the water, and beyond it projected an 
iron beak. Outwardly she presented the appearance of 



Her armament. 

an iron roof or ark. It was expected that, from her slop- 
ing armature, shots striking would glance away. Her 
armament consisted of eight 11 -inch guns, 
four on each side, and a 100 -pound rifled 
Armstrong gun at each end. 

As the fact of her construction could not be concealed, 
the Confederate authorities purposely circulated rumors 
to her disadvantage. It was said that her iron was so 
heavy that she could hardly float ; that her hull had been 
seriously injured, and that she could not be steered. Of 
course they could- have no certain knowledge of her capa- 
bilities as a weapon of war, and, as was the case .with 
many officers of the national navy, perhaps they held her 
in light esteem. 

About midday on Saturday, March 8th, she came down 
she comes out from the Elizabeth River, under the command of 
Franklin Buchanan, an officer who had aban- 
doned the national navy. She was attended by two 
armed steam -boats, and was afterward joined by two 



others. Passing the sailing frigate Congress, and receiv- 
ing from her her fire, she made her way to the sloop of 
war Cumberland, of 24 gnns and 376 men. This ship 
had been placed across the channel to bring her broad- 
side to bear, and, as the Merrimack approached, she re- 
ceived her with a rapid fire. At once one of the prob- 
lems presented by the Merrimack's construction was 
solved ; the shot of the Cumberland, from thirteen 9 and 
10 inch guns, glanced from her armature 

She attacks and , nM „ . -. . . ', ,, 

sinks the cum- "like so many peas. Advancing with all 

berland, *L x , . p 

the speed she had, and receiving six or eight 
broadsides while so doing, she struck her antagonist with 
her iron beak just forward of the main chains, and instant- 
ly opened her fire of shells from every gun she could bring 
to bear. The battle was already decided. Through the 
hole she had made, large enough for a man to enter, the 
water poured in. In vain Lieutenant Morris, who com- 
manded the Cumberland, worked the pumps to keep her 
afloat a few moments more, hoping that a lucky shot 
might find some weaker place. He only abandoned his 
guns as one after another the settling of the sinking ship 
swamped them in the water. The last shot was fired by 
Matthew Tenney, from a gun on a level with the water. 
That brave man then attempted to escape through the 
port-hole, but was borne back by the incoming rush, and 
went down with the ship. With him went down nearly 
100 dead, sick, wounded, and those who, like him, could 
not extricate themselves. The Cumberland sank in 54 
feet of water. The commander of her assailant saw the 
flag of the unconquered but sunken ship still flying above 
the surface. He was not a Virginian, but a Marylander 
by birth, and had served under that flag for thirty-five 

The sailing frigate Congress, which had fired at the 
Merrimack as she passed, and exchanged shots with the 

chap.lyi.] the congeess desteoyed. 421 

armed steam-boats, Lad been run aground by her com- 
mander with the assistance of a tug. The Merrimack 
now came up, and, taking a position about 150 yards 
ana sets the con- from her stern, fired shell into her. One 
gressonnre. shell killed 17 men at one of the guns. Of 
the only two guns with which she could reply, one was 
quickly dismounted, and the muzzle of the other knock- 
ed off. The Merrimack ranged slowly backward and for- 
ward at less than 100 yards. In her helpless condition, 
the Congress took fire in several places, and nearly half 
her crew were killed or wounded. Among the former 
was her commander. The flag was therefore hauled 
down, and a tug came alongside to take possession of 
her. But fire being opened upon the tug by some sol- 
diers on shore, the Merrimack recommenced shelling, do- 
ing the same again later in the day, after the crew of the 
Congress had abandoned her. The Congress was set 
thoroughly on fire. About midnight she blew up. Out 
of her crew of 434 men, only 218 survived. In little 
more than two hours Buchanan had killed or drowned 
more than 300 of his old comrades. 

When the Merrimack first came out, the commander 
of the steam frigate Minnesota got his ship under way, 
intending to butt the iron-clad and run her down. As 
he passed Sewall's Point, he received the fire of a rifle 
battery there, and had his mainmast injured. It was ebb 
tide; the Minnesota drew 23 feet water; at one part of 
the channel the depth was less, but, as the bottom was 
soft, it was hoped that the ship could be forced over. 
She, however, took the ground, and, in spite 

She commences an n . • -, . -. n ,-,-,-, 

attack on the Mm- oi every exertion, became immovable. Ihe 
Merrimack, having destroyed the Cumber- 
land and Congress, now came down upon the Minneso- 
ta. Her draft, however, pre vented her coming nearer to 
her intended victim than a mile, and the fire on both 


sides was comparatively ineffective. But the armed 
steam-boats ventured nearer, and, with their rifled guns, 
killed and wounded several men on board the Minneso- 
ta. On her part, she sent a shot through the boiler of 
but retires as night one of them. Night was coming on; the 
Merrimack did not venture to lie out in the 
Roads ; so, expecting another easy victory in the morn- 
ing, she retired at 7 P.M., with her consorts, behind Sew- 
all's Point. 

The Minnesota still lay fast on the mud-bank. The re- 
•coil of her own firing had forced her harder 

Night attempts to . Jxl'li-'J 1 

release the Minue- on. Attempts were made at high tide, and, 
indeed, all through the night, to get her off, 
but in vain. The steam frigate Roanoke, disabled some 
months previously by the breaking of her shaft, and 
the sailing frigate St. Lawrence, had both likewise been 
aground, but had now gone down the Roads. 

At nine o'clock that night Ericsson's new iron-clad tur- 
\rrivaiofthetur- ret-ship, the Monitor, reached Fortress Mon- 

ret-ship Monitor. ^ ^^ New y^ j, eiertion had 

been made by her inventor to get her out in time to meet 
the Merrimack ; and the Confederates, finding from their 
spies in New York that she would probably be ready, 
put a double force on their frigate, and worked night and 
day. It is said that this extra labor gained that one day 
in which the Merrimack destroyed the Cumberland and 
the Congress. 

The Monitor was commanded by Lieutenant John L. 
Her dreadful sea- Worden. A dreadful passage of three days 
voyage. j^ gj^Qgjj worn ou t her crew. The sea 

had swept over her decks ; the turret was often the only 
part above water. The tiller-rope was at one time thrown 
off the wheel. The draft-pipe had been choked by the 
pouring down of the waves. The men were half suf- 
focated. The fires had been repeatedly extinguished. 


Ventilation had, however, been obtained through the tur- 
ret. Throughout the previous afternoon Worden had 
heard the sound of the cannonading. He delayed but a 
few minutes at the Fortress, and soon after midnight had 
anchored the Monitor alongside the Minnesota (March 9). 
Day broke — a clear and beautiful Sunday. The flag 
The Memmack re- *>f the Cumberland was still flying; the 
sumes her attack. cor p Ses f ^ ev defenders were floating about 

on the water. The Merrimack approached to renew her 
attack. She ran down toward the Fortress, and then 
came up the channel through which the Minnesota had 
passed. Worden at once took his station at the peep- 
holes of his pilot-house, laid the Monitor before her ene- 
she is assailed by my, and gave the fire of his two 11-inch 

the Monitor. ^^ rj^ ^ q{ ^ ^ ^g ^^^ 

weight. Catesby Jones, who had taken command of the 
Merrimack, Buchanan having been wounded the previ- 
ous day, saw at once that he had on his hands a very dif- 
ferent antagonist from those of yesterday. The turret 
was but a very small mark to fire at, nine feet by twenty ; 
the shot that struck it glanced off. One bolt only from 
a rifle-gun struck squarely, penetrating into the iron ; " it 
then broke short off, and left its head sticking in." For 
the most part, the shot flew over the low deck, missing 
their aim. 

Five times the Merrimack tried to run the Monitor 
Attempts to run the down, and at each time received, at a few 

Monitor down. ' ^ ^^ ^ fire of ^ H-inch gUllS. 

In her movements at one moment she got aground, and 
the light-drawing Monitor, steaming round her, tried at 
every promising point to get a shot into her. Her ar- 
mor at last began to start and bend. 

Unable to shake off the Monitor or to do her any in- 
ner conflict with j ur y> the Merrimack now renewed her at- 
the Minnesota. ^ on ^ e ft j gatfi Minnesota, receiving 


from her a whole broadside which struck squarely. " It 
was enough," said Captain Van Brunt, who commanded 
the frigate, " to have blown out of the water any wooden 
ship in the world." In her turn, she sent from her rifled 
bow -gun a shell through the Minnesota's side: it ex- 
ploded within her, tearing four of her rooms into one, and 
setting her on fire. Another shell burst the boiler of the 
tug-boat Dragon, which lay alongside the Minnesota. The 
frigate was firing on the iron-clad solid shot as fast as 
she could. 

Once more the Monitor intervened between them, com- 
pelling her antagonist to change position, in doing which 
the Merrimack again grounded, and again received a 
whole broadside from the Minnesota. The blows she 
was receiving were beginning to tell upon her. As soon 

she retreats pursued as s ^ e could get clear, she ran down the bay, 
by the Monitor. followed by tte Monitor. Suddenly she 

turned round, and attempted to run her tormentor down. 
Her beak grated on the Monitor's deck, and was wrench- 
ed. The turret -ship stood unharmed a blow like that 
which had sent the Cumberland to the bottom ; she mere- 
ly glided out from under her antagonist, and in the act 
of so doing gave her a shot while almost in contact. It 
seemed to crush in her armor. 

The Monitor now hauled off for the purpose of hoist- 
The Monitor gains i n g more shot into her turret. Catesby 
the victory. Jones thought he had silenced her, and that 

he might make another attempt on the Minnesota. He, 
however, changed his course as the Monitor steamed up, 
and it was seen that the Merrimack was sagging down 
at her stern. She made the best of her way to Craney 
Island. The battle was over ; the turreted Monitor had 
driven her from the field and won the victory. 

The Minnesota had fired 247 solid shot, 282 shells, and 
more than ten tons of powder. The Monitor fired 41 

Chap.LVL] the monitor gains the victory. 425 

The last shot shot, and was struck 22 times. The last shell 

wounds Worden. g^j by ^ Merrimack ftt her gtmck her 

pilot-house opposite the peep-hole, through which Wor- 
den at that moment was looking. He was knocked down 
senseless, and blinded by the explosion. When conscious- 
ness returned, the first question this brave officer asked 
was, " Did we save the Minnesota V 

The shattering ©f the pilot-house was the greatest in- 
injuries received by jury that the Monitor received. One of the 
iron logs, nine inches by twelve inches thick, 
was broken in two. 

On board the Merrimack two were killed and nineteen 
injuries of the wounded. She lost her iron prow, her star- 
board anchor, and all her boats; her armor 
was dislocated and damaged; she leaked considerably; 
her steam-pipe and smoke-stack were riddled; the muz- 
zles of two of her guns were shot away ; the woodwork 
round one of the ports was set on fire at every discharge. 
In his report on the battle, Buchanan states that in 
fifteen minutes after the action began he 

Buchanan's report. , -. , ~ , , , -. . ' ° 

had run the Cumberland down ; that he dis- 
tinctly heard the crash when she was struck, and that 
the fire his ship received did her some injury; that there 
was great difficulty in managing the Merrimack when 
she was near the mud, and that this was particularly 
the case in getting into position to attack the Congress. 
It was while firing the red-hot shot and incendiary 
shell by which that ship was burnt that he was him- 
self wounded. 

This engagement excited the most profound interest 

important results throughout the civilized world. It seemed 

as if the day of wooden navies w^as over. 

Nor was it alone the superiority of iron as against wood 

that was settled by this combat ; it showed that a 

monitor was a better construction than a mailed broad- 


side ship, and that inclined armor was inferior to a 

On the invasion of the Peninsula by McClellan, the 

Destruction of the Confederate government determined on the 

Memmack. abandonment of Norfolk (p. 383), and the 

Merrimack was blown up by them (May 11th). A few 

days subsequently, the Monitor, with the Galena and 

Naugatuck, made an ineffectual attack on Fort Darling, 

At>ack on Fort Ibnt it was found that the turret guns could 

ar mg " not be elevated sufficiently to be of advan- 

tage. Toward the close of the year she was ordered to 
Beaufort, South Carolina, and foundered in a storm off 
Cape Hatteras. 



General Pope was placed in command of an army concentrating in front of Wash- 

The Confederate government, flushed with its overthrow of McClellan, and its ar- 
mies being greatly strengthened by the conscription, resolved on a sortie under 
Lee, the counterpart of that under Bragg. It hoped to capture Philadelphia, and 
there dictate peace. 

The first portion of these operations was completely successful. Pope was forced 
into the fortifications of Washington, and the way through Maryland opened by 
the Confederates. 

Military events showed that it was necessary to cor- 
rect the false distribution of the forces in the vicinity of 
Washington. The armies that had been under the com- 
mand of Generals Fremont, Banks, and McDowell were 
consolidated into one, which was designated 

Formation of the -, A ptt* • • n i • i ,i 

national Army of the Army ot Virginia, ot which those armies 

Virginia. \ . 

formed the First, Second, and Third Corps 

respectively. Major General Pope was called from the 

pope placed in West, and, by order of the President, took 

command. commanc i (J une 26, 1862). Fremont was 

shortly after relieved at his own request, and the com- 
mand of his corps given to Sigel. In addition, Burnside 
was brought from Eoanoke Island to Alexandria. 

At this time McClellan was occupying a position on 
both sides of the Chickahominy. It was hoped that his 
long-delayed operations against Richmond might be fa- 
cilitated by the vigorous use of the newly-consolidated 
iie proposes to arm y- For this purpose, Pope intended to 
aidfac&eiian. a( j yance by way of Charlottesville upon 


James River, above Richmond, thereby compelling Lee 
to detach a part of his army from the front of Richmond, 
and thus enable McClellan to complete his movement 
successfully. Scarcely, however, had the march begun, 
when McClellan commenced his disastrous retreat to 
Harrison's Landing. That changed at once the whole 
plan of the campaign. A meeting of the cabinet was 
held, and Pope called before it. It was plain that some- 
thing must be done for the relief of the Potomac Army, 
by a direct march all( l that speedily. Pope offered to march 
upon Richmond. f rom Fredericksburg direct upon Richmond 

with his whole force — notwithstanding that Lee would 
be between him and McClellan, and could strike in suc- 
cession at both — on condition that peremptory orders 
should be sent to McClellan, and such measures taken in 
advance that it would not be possible for him to evade 
on any pretext making a vigorous attack upon the enemy 
with his whole army the moment he heard that Pope was 
engaged. At this time Pope's force was forty-three thou- 
sand men. 

On assuming command, Pope issued an order to his 
army, in which there occurred certain expressions sup- 
posed to cast reflections on McClellan : 

" I have come to you from the West, where we have 
pope's offensive always seen the backs of our enemies — from 
an army whose business it has been to seek 
the adversary, and to beat him when found — whose poli- 
cy has been attack, and not defense. I desire you to dis- 
miss from your minds certain phrases which I am sorry 
to find much in vogue among you. I hear constantly of 
taking strong positions, and holding them — of lines of re- 
treat, and bases of supplies. Let us discard such ideas. 
The strongest position a soldier should desire to occupy 
is one from which he can most easily advance against the 
enemy. Let us study the probable lines of retreat of our 


opponents, and leave our own to take care of themselves. 
Let ns look before, and not behind." 

If the appointment of Pope to his new command was 
its unhappy con- distasteful to McClellan and his military 
sequences. entourage, such insinuations could not fail 

to engender a bitter animosity. With reluctance does the 
historian allude to these personal differences, and find 
himself constrained to draw his reader's attention to 
them, since there is reason to suppose that they had an 
influence in producing the disasters of the ensuing cam- 

It was the desire of the government (1) that JPope 
Duties assigned to should cover Washington; (2), that he 
Pope ' should assure the safety of the Valley of 

the Shenandoah; (3), that he should so operate as to 
draw a part of Lee's army from Richmond, and thereby 
facilitate McClellan's movements. It seemed to Pope 
that the security of the Shenandoah Valley was not best 
obtained by posting troops in the Valley itself, but by 
concentrating his forces at some point from which, if any 
attempt were made to enter the Valley, he should be able 
to interpose and cut off the retreat of the force making 
such attempt. 

Accordingly, he gave orders to that effect. But, while 

the movements were in progress, McClellan 

Mccieiian's re- retreated to Harrison's Landing. When it 

treat. . ° . 

was first known in Washington that this re- 
treat was contemplated, Pope suggested to the President 
its impolicy, and urged that orders should be sent to 
McClellan to mass his whole force on the north side of 
the Chickahominy, and endeavor to make his way in the 
direction of Hanover Court-house. He added that to 
retreat to James River was to go away from re-enforce- 
ments, so far as his army was concerned, and to give the 
enemy the privilege and power of exchanging Richmond 


for Washington; that to them the loss of Kichniond 
would be trifling, while the loss of Washington would be 
conclusive, or nearly so, in its results upon the war. 
Deeply impressed with these views, he addressed a letter 
to McClellan at Harrison's Landing, earnestly asking his 
views and offering him co-operation. To this he received 
a lukewarm reply. It became apparent that, considering 
the situation in which the Army of the Potomac and the 
Army of Virginia were placed in relation to each other, 
and the absolute necessity of harmonious and prompt 
co-operation between them, some military superior, both 
of McClellan and Pope, ought to be called 

Necessity of ap- , ^ TT -i • , i i -i • i 

pointing Haiieck to Washington and placed in general com- 

general in chief. ° - 1 - V 

mand. It was under these circumstances 
that Halleck was brought from the West and appointed 
general in chief. Pope, now believing that the interests 
of the nation would be best subserved by his so doing, 
requested to be relieved from the command of the Army 
of Virginia, and to be returned to the West. But this 
was not complied with. 

Encouraged by the extraordinary good fortune that 

had befallen it in the complete failure of 

tion of -the con- McClellan' s campaign, the Confederate £ov- 

federates. ,* & 7 . & . 

ernment determined on resorting to offensive 
operations. The conscription had so greatly re-enforced 
its armies, they had become so invigorated by victory, that 
nothing seemed impossible. The troops before whom the 
Peninsular expedition had recoiled might well expect to 
force their way through all resistance, and break every 
investing iine. A triumphant march through Maryland 
would be followed by the fall of Washington, and the in- 
dependence of the Confederacy might be secured by a 
treaty of peace exacted in Philadelphia. 

A sortie through Maryland was therefore resolved 


They resolve upon u P on - Sucn was tta military strength, de- 
a sortie rived froin the conscription that a simulta- 

neous movement with a similar object was ordered on 
the other side of the Alleghanies. Bragg was to force his 
way to Louisville and Cincinnati, Lee to Philadelphia. 
In Chapter LIIL we have described the fortune that 
befell Bragg' s sortie ; in this and the suc- 
ceeding chapter we have to consider that 

corresponding to 
the soi 


of Lee. 

Early in August the divisions of Ewell, Hill, and Jack- 
Their advance to son -had advanced to the Rapidan, and the 

national government, having ascertained the 
intention of its antagonist, made preparation for resist- 
ance. All farther thoughts of an advance against Rich- 
mond were abandoned ; it was determined to accomplish 
the junction of McClellan's forces with those of Pope on 
the Rappahannock by bringing them to Acquia Creek. 
McClellan earnestly entreated that the order for the with- 
drawal of the Potomac Army might be rescinded, and 
even took the responsibility of delaying the evacuation 
of Harrison's Landing for several days. On the 14th of 
August the movement was commenced. As the corps 

reached Alexandria and Acquia Creek, they 

The Potomac Army * , -, -, .. . , in 

brought to Acquia were to be placed under the command 01 

Creek. x 

Pope. The forces heretofore in Western 
Virginia were also drawn toward Washington, and an or- 
der was issued by the President calling for 300,000 men 
by draft (August 4th, 1862). 

The principles upon which Pope proj)osed to conduct 
pope's principles the campaign were in strong contrast with 

of the campaign! ^^ ^ j^ ^ fofctv^ by McClellail. 

Among other things, he ordered his troops to subsist on 
the country, giving vouchers for the supplies they took ; 
contributions for the subsistence of the cavalry were to 
be laid on villages and neighborhoods; the inhabitants 


along railroad and telegraph lines were held responsible 
for damages done to them otherwise than by the Confed- 
erate army ; if a soldier was fired at from a house, the 
house was to be razed to the ground. Disloyal citizens 
were to be arrested, and, if they refused to give security 
for good conduct, were to be sent South, beyond the ex- 
treme pickets ; should they return, they were to be treat- 
ed as spies. As the Confederate army largely counted 
on the aid it expected to receive from the inhabitants of 
the country through which it intended to pass, these or- 
ders were received with indignation at Richmond. A 
retaliatory order was issued, declaring that 

Retaliatory meas- -^ -, -, . • • i rY» i 

urea of the con- rope and nis commissioned omcers were not 

federates. . 

entitled to be considered as soldiers ; that, 
in the event of his capture, he should be placed in close 
confinement. His officers were to be dealt with in the 
same manner; and if any Confederate citizen was exe- 
cuted under his order, a prisoner selected from the na- 
tional commissioned officers should in retaliation be hung. 

In a letter from Lee to Halleck (August 2d) in rela- 
tion to these retaliations, the former so far forgot himself 
as to extort from Halleck the rebuke, " As these letters 
are couched in language exceedingly insulting to the gov- 
ernment of the United States, I must respectfully decline 
to receive them. They are returned herewith." 

As a guide to the reader through what he might other- 
Generai sketch of wise find confusing and perhaps unintelligi- 

Lee's campaign. ^ fofafi^ ft may be gtate( J tfiat, at the Ollt- 

set of the campaign, Pope's front was perpendicular to the 
Potomac, his left wing resting against that river. Writers 
on military affairs insist that, when an army points thus 
with one wing against an insurmountable object, the other 
wing being " in the air," it is always to be attacked on this 
last wing and pressed against the obstacle, when it will 
be forced to surrender. The Confederate general accord- 


ingly followed that precept. It was his intention to have 
defeated Pope before the Potomac Army could come to his 
support, but delays taking place rendered that impracti- 
cable ; he then proceeded to turn the right wing of the 
national army by sending Jackson through Thoroughfare 
Gap, and afterward again he outflanked it at Centreville. 
This brought Pope into the fortifications of Washington. 
Not that these movements were executed without er- 
Miiitary mistakes ror - "When Lee divided his army in front 
of his antagonist, he committed a serious 
mistake. He gaye Pope an opportunity of dealing him 
a fatal blow. On the other hand, it was a grave mistake 
that Pope was not sufficiently re-enforced to take advan- 
tage of that opportunity, and the persistence with which 
the left wing of his army retained its position was also a 
serious fault. Burnside ought to have been brought from 
Fredericksburg. For these things, however, Pope can 
hardly be held responsible, since he was under injunc- 
tions from Washington — injunctions arising from reasons 
connected with the movements of the Potomac Army. 

The first contact of the opposing armies took place 
The affair at cedar (August 9th) at Cedar Mountain, half a doz- 
en miles south of Culpepper Court-house, 
where Pope had established his head-quarters, and was 
threatening Gordonsville with a view to facilitate the 
withdrawal of the army from the Peninsula. A contest 
ensued between the divisions of Ewell and Jackson on 
the Confederate side, and the corps of Banks on the na- 
tional. After a severe struggle the latter was defeated. 
Jackson held his position on the mountain for the two 
following days, and then, finding that his communications 
were endangered, retired across the Bapidan. 

From an autograph letter of Lee which fell into Pope's 
hands (August 10th), it was ascertained that that com- 
II— E E 



mander was moving by forced marches, with the whole 
Confederate army, to attack Pope before a junction could 
be formed between him and the Potomac Army, and to 
outnumber and destroy him. Under instructions from 
pope retires from Halleck, Pope therefore abstained from cross- 

the Eapidan. • ±1 T> ' 1 l 1 • • »t i 

mg the Kapidan, and, retiring, took post 
behind the North Fork of the Eappahannock (August 
19th). On the same day, Lee, with a large force, crossed 
the Eapidan. 

Finding himself about to be overmatched, and yet or- 
dered to maintain his communications with Fredericks- 
burg, Pope telegraphed again and again to Washington 
that he must either be re-enforced or retreat ; that the en- 
emy was moving toward his right, and that it was impos- 
sible for him to extend his lines to resist it without aban- 
doning Fredericksburg. He was instructed to hold his 
ground for two days longer, when he should be re-en- 
forced: he did so for four days, and had then only re- 
ceived about 7000 men. On the night of the 22d the Con- 
federate General Stuart, having the previous day crossed 
the river at Waterloo Bridge with some cavalry, sur- 
his heaa-quarters prised Pope's head-quarters at Catlett's Sta- 
captured. ^- on ^^g j^e c l ar k; ness f a violent storm, 

Pope himself being at the time near Rappahannock Sta- 
tion. Stuart captured his personal baggage, with his dis- 
patch-book, and destroyed several wagons. 

It was not Lee's intention to force a passage of the 
Lee turns Pope's river. His object was, by a flank movement, 
nght * to turn Pope's right, get in his rear, and cut 

off his supplies from Washington, and place the Confed- 
erate army in such a position that it could either move 
upon that city or through Leesburg into Maryland. 

While Jackson was executing this movement on the 
national right, Longstreet was operating on Pope's front 
to engage his attention. Jackson passed through Thor- 

436 P0PE FALLS BACK. [Sect. XL 

oughfare Gap, reaching (August 26th) Bristow's Station 
on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad. 

Jackson passes -rxr* , i xJI 1 - ± Tj.1 x. 1 

through Thor- Without delay he sent a detachment under 

oughfare Gap. n r t 

Stuart to Manassas Junction, and captured 
it that night, taking 8 guns, 10 locomotives, 7 trains, and 
immense quantities of quartermaster and commissary 

Pope was thus attempting to hold at bay the entire 
pope waiting for Confederate army, anxiously expecting the 
the Potomac Army. p rom } se( j re- enforcements from the Army 

of the Potomac. He had assigned those troops as they 
should come up to suitable positions, directing, among 
other things, that the first division which should reach 
Manassas Junction should take post in the works of that 
place, and that its cavalry should be pushed forward to 
watch Thoroughfare Gap. 

On the day following the capture of Manassas Junc- 
tion, an attempt was made by some troops stationed on 
the other side of Bull Bun to recover it ; but they were 
unsuccessful, and the Confederate cavalry, passing the 
Run, advanced beyond Fairfax Station. Jackson had 
now brought up from Bristow his own and Hill's divis- 
ions ; but, finding that Pope's army was converging upon 
him, he abandoned Manassas? having de- 

Jacksou destroys . ni ,•,' r» t -i p -n 

supplies at Ma- stroyecl large quantities of supplies, and fell 


back toward Longstreet, who was to come 
through Thoroughfare Gap. 

When Pope discovered the Confederate movement on 
pope again fails his right flank, and found that he was dis- 
appointed in the re-enforcements from the 
Potomac Army, he fell back, in three columns, from War- 
renton and Warrenton Junction. His force, as estimated 
by himself, was at this moment about forty thousand, 
that of the Confederates at least eighty thousand. He 
was, however, now joined by Heintzelman's corps of ten 

Chap.lvii.] pope and jackson. 437 

thousand, but it came without artillery wagons, or horses 
for the field and general officers. Porter's division ar- 
rived broken down with fatigue. Under such circum- 
stances, it was not possible for Pope to maintain his front 
after a suitable body had been detached to defeat Jack- 
son on his flank. In his report he says : " The movement 
of General Jackson in the direction of Thoroughfare Gap, 
while the main body of the enemy confronted me at Sul- 
phur Springs and Waterloo Bridge, was well known to 
is stiii expecting re* me, but I had relied confidently upon the 

forces which I had been assured would be 
sent from Alexandria, and one strong division of which 
I had ordered to take post on the works at Manassas 
Junction. I was entirely under the belief that ' these 
would be there, and it was not until I found my com- 
munication intercepted that I was undeceived. I knew 
that this movement was no raid, and that it was made 
by not less than 25,000 men." 

Of Pope's retreating columns, that under Hooker en- 
Hoofcer defeats countered the Confederates, under Ewell, on 

the 27th, driving him from the field with 
considerable loss. Hooker's division went into this ac- 
tion with only forty rounds of ammunition, and when the 
work was done had only five rounds to each man left. It 
was this defeat of Ewell that compelled Jackson to evac- 
uate Manassas. His position had become perilous. If 
Pope could have blocked Thoroughfare Gap, and pre- 
vented the passage of Longstreet, he might have fallen 
with an overwhelming force on Jackson. To aid in this 
movement, Pope sent explicit orders to Porter, but they 
were not executed. 

Jackson, seeing his danger, fell back from Manassas, 
jackson retires n °t by the route through which he had 

from Manassas, ^^ ^^ ^^ j^ ^g^. J^ ^^ 

McDowell and Sigel, who were west of him, but across 


Bull Run by Centreville. Pope reached Manassas about 
midday on the 28th, in less than an hour after Jackson 
ana is followed by i n person had left it. He pushed forward 
Hooker, Kearny, and Reno upon Centreville, 
ordering Porter to come to the Junction, and McDowell 
to move upon Centreville. McDowell had detached Rick- 
etts's division toward Thoroughfare Gap, so that it was 
no longer available in this movement. 

In the evening of the 28th Kearny drove the enemy's 
rear-guard out of Centreville. One portion of it took the 
road to Sudley's Spring, the other the "Warrenton Turnpike 
toward Gainesville, destroying the bridges over Bull Run 
and Cub Run. The corps of McDowell and Sigel, with 
Reynolds's division, now marching toward Centreville, 
encountered the advance of Jackson's force, retreating to- 
ward Thoroughfare Gap, about six o'clock that evening. 
An action took place which was indecisive, and was ter- 
minated by the darkness. On learning this, Pope, who 
was now at Centreville, felt that there was 

Expectation that T 1 . _ . 

Jackson would be no escape tor Jackson. Accordingly, he 

enveloped. x " " ' 

sent orders to McDowell to hold his ground 
at all hazards, and prevent the retreat of Jackson to the 
West. He intended that at daylight the entire national 
forces from Centreville and Manassas should attack the 
enemy, who must be crushed between them. He sent 
orders to Kearny to move cautiously, after midnight, 
from Centreville along the Warrenton Turnpike, to keep 
close to the enemy, and at daylight to assault him vigor- 
ously with his right advance. Hooker and Reno would 
support him very soon after dawn. He ordered Porter, 
who he supposed was at Manassas Junction, to move 
upon Centreville as soon as it was light. 

Pope's forces were therefore so disposed that McDowell, 

pope's arrangements Sigel, and Reynolds, whose conjoint strength 

ia purpose, wag 25^000, were immediately west of Jack- 


son, between him and Thoroughfare Gap, while Kearny, 
Hooker, Keno, and Porter, of the same strength, were to 
fall on him from the east at daylight. Longstreet was 
so far off that, by using the whole force vigorously, Pope 
could crush Jackson before Longstreet could possibly ar- 

Before daylight, however, Pope learned that King's 
Longstreet passes division, which had been attempting to bar 
Through aie Gap. Lcmggtreet's wa y? na( i fallen back from Thor- 
oughfare Gap toward Manassas Junction. The passage 
through the Gap was now open. New dispositions had 
become necessary. 

Pope therefore at once sent orders to Sigel, supported 

pope adopts new ^J Reynolds, to attack the enemy vigorous- 
dispositions, jy ag goon ag y. wag 2ight enough to see, and 

bring him to a stand. He ordered Heintzelman to push 
forward from Centreville toward Gainesville at the same 
time with the divisions of Hooker and Kearny. Reno 
was directed to follow them closely. As soon as they 
came up with Jackson, they w^ere to attack him with the 
utmost vigor. Pope also ordered Porter, then at Manas- 
sas, to move with the greatest rapidity on Gainesville, 
and turn Jackson's flank at the point where the "Warren- 
ton Turnpike is intersected by the road from Manassas 
Junction to Gainesville. 

Accordingly, Sigel attacked Jackson at daylight on 
the 29th, a mile or two east of Groveton. 

Battle of Gaines- TT -* -1 T7 - . -, -, . 

vine, or second Buii Hooker and Kearny quickly coming up, 
Jackson fell back some distance, but he was 
so closely pressed that at length he was compelled to 
make a stand. He accordingly took up a position with 
his left in the neighborhood of Sudley's Spring, his right 
a little to the south of Warrenton Turnpike, and his line 
covered by an old railroad grade which leads from Gaines- 
ville in the direction of Leesburg. His batteries, which 



[Sect. XL 

/3 s 


were numerous, and some of them of heavy calibre, were 
posted behind ridges in the open ground on both sides 
of Warrenton Turnpike, while the mass of his troops 
was sheltered in dense woods behind the railroad em- 
bankment. Pope arrived from Centreville about noon, 
pope's report of the an( l found both armies much cut up by the 
action in which they had been already en- 
gaged. Heintzelman was on the right of the line; Sigel 
on his left, extending a short distance south of the War- 
renton Turnpike. The extreme left was occupied by 
Reynolds. Of Reno's corps, part had gone into action, 
and part was in reserve in the rear of the centre. Pope 
now informed the different commanders that Porter and 
McDowell were coming up from Manassas Junction, and 
would soon be in position to fall upon Jackson's right 
flank, and probably upon his rear. From twelve till four 
o'clock .very severe skirmishes constantly occurred when- 
ever Jackson showed a disposition to retreat. About 
two o'clock firing was heard in the direction of Jackson's 


right. Pope now supposed that Porter and McDowell 
had reached their position, and were coming into action. 
The firing, however, soon ceased. Information then came 
that McDowell would be up in a couple of hours. Pope 
then sent peremptory orders to Porter to attack the ene- 
my's right, and, if possible, turn his rear. When a suffi- 
cient time had elapsed for this to be done, he ordered 
Heintzelman and Eeno to attack in front. Accordingly, 
they did so, forcing back Jackson's left toward his centre, 
and driving it from that part of the field. In this attack, 
Grover's brigade, of Hooker's division, was particularly 
distinguished by a bayonet charge it made, breaking two 
of the enemy's lines, and penetrating to the third before 
it could be checked. McDowell had now arrived on the 
field and joined in the battle, but Porter never came. 
At sunset Longstreet's troops from the Gap were fast 
Arrival of Lono-. coming up to the re-enforcement of Jackson, 

street on thefigld. ^ ^ ^^ ^ ^j^ ^^j Qn ^ fid ^ 

each having lost about 7000 men. 

In his report Pope says : " About 8 P.M. the greater 
pope's accusations portion of the field of battle was occupied 
against Porter. ^y Qur SLYm j^ Nothing was heard of Gen- 
eral Porter up to that time, and his forces took no part 
whatever in the action, but were suffered by him to lie 
idle on their arms, within sight and sound of the battle, 
during the whole day. So far as I know, he made no ef- 
fort whatever to comply with my orders or to take any 
part in the action. I do not hesitate to say that, if he had 
discharged his duty as became a soldier under the circum- 
stances, and had made a vigorous attack on the enemy, 
as he was expected and directed to do, at any time up to 
eight o'clock that night, we should have utterly crushed 
and captured the larger portion of Jackson's force before 
he could have been by any possibility sufficiently re-en- 
forced to have made an effective resistance. I did not 


myself feel for a moment that it was necessary for me, 
having given General Porter an order to march toward 
the enemy in a particular direction, to send him, in addi- 
tion, specific orders to attack ; it being his clear duty, and 
in accordance with every military precept, to have brought 
his forces into action whenever he encountered the enemy, 
when a furious battle with that enemy was raging during 
the whole day in his immediate presence. I believe — in 
fact, I am positive — that, at five o'clock on the afternoon 
of the 29th, General Porter had in his front no consider- 
able body of the enemy. I believed then, as I am very 
sure now, that it was easily practicable for him to have 
turned the right flank of Jackson and to have fallen upon 
his rear ; that, if he had done so, we should have gained 
a decisive victory over the army under Jackson before he 
could have been joined by any of the forces under Long- 
street, and that the army of General Lee would have been 
so crippled and checked by the destruction of this large 
force as to have been no longer in condition to prosecute 
farther operations of an aggressive character." 

On the next morning (30th) the battle was renewed, 
but it was now too late. Pope's horses had been in har- 
ness for ten days — two days they had been without for- 
age. To his urgent appeals for re-enforcements, McClel- 

ne could not ob- l an ? who was now at Alexandria, had re- 
tain aid. plied on t]ie 27th, "I do not see that we 

have force enough in hand to form a connection with 
Pope, whose exact position we do not know." To his 
entreaty for rations on the 28th, the same officer had an- 
swered that he should have them " as soon as he would 
send in a cavalry escort to Alexandria as a guard to the 
trains." In his report Pope says, " I do not see what 
service cavalry could have rendered in guarding railroad 
trains. It was not until I received this letter that I began 
to feel* discouraged and nearly hopeless of any successful 


issue to the operations with which I was charged." To 
his request on the 30th for more ammunition, he was an- 
swered, " I know nothing of the calibres of Pope's artille- 
ry." In a telegram to President Lincoln on the afternoon 
of August 29 th, at the very moment when Pope was hero 
ically engaged with Jackson, and momentarily expecting 
the arrival of Longstreet, General McClellan suggested 
that among the courses that might be adopted there was 
one — " to leave Pope to get out of his scrape, and at once 
use all our means to make the capital perfectly safe." 
It is said that when President Lincoln read this dispatch 
he was so horror-stricken that he fell back in his chair. 

Pope's report of the transactions of the 30th is as fol- 
lows : " The enemy's heavy re-enforcements having reach- 
ed him on Friday afternoon and night, he began to mass 
on his right for the purpose of crushing our left, and oc- 
cupying the road to Centreville in our rear. His heavi- 
est assault was made about five o'clock in the afternoon, 
.when, after overwhelming Fitz John Porter and driving 
his forces back on the centre and left, mass after mass of 
his forces was pushed against our left. A terrible con- 
test, with great slaughter, was carried on for several hours, 
our men behaving with firmness and gallantry, under the 
immediate command of General McDowell. When night 
closed our left had been forced back about half a mile, 
but still remained firm and unshaken, while our right 
held its ground. General Franklin, with his corps, ar- 
rived after dark at' Centreville, six miles in our rear, while 
Sumner was four miles behind Franklin. I could have 
brought up these corps in the morning in time to have 
renewed the action, but starvation stared both men and 
horses in the face, and, broken and exhausted as they 

is compelled to re- were, they were in no condition to bear hun- 
tiretoceniareviiie. ^ QY a | ga j accorc [ m g]y re tired to Centre- 
ville that night in perfect order." 

444 CHANTILLY. [Sect. XI. 

On the 31st Lee sent Jackson northward for the pur- 
pose of again turning Pope's right. Pope, supposing that 
this attempt would be made, had prepared to resist it, 
and on the evening; of the following; day a 

Battle of Chan tilly. ™ mi • i . i 

conflict occurred near Chantilly, in the midst 
of a terrible thunder-storm. In this General Stevens and 
General Kearny were killed, but the attack was checked. 
Pope, now forced back to the works of Washington, re- 
signed his command, and was succeeded by McClellan. 
Losses of the His losses in the campaign were probably 
campaign. nQt legs tbti 3 o ? oOO men, 30 guns, 20,000 

small-arms, and vast quantities of munitions and supplies. 
Lee's loss during these operations was probably about 
15,000 men. 

Justice has not yet been rendered to General Pope for 

pope's conduct in his conduct in this campaign. He had a 
the campaign. mogt difficult task to acC omplish, and had to 

depend on very unreliable means. Though there never 
was purer patriotism than that which animated the sol- 
diers of the Army of the Potomac, that army had been 
brought, through the influence of officers who surround- 
conditionofthe e( l General McClellan, into a most danger- 
potomacArmy. oug con( jiti on — dangerous to the best in- 
terests of the nation — of having a wish of its own, and 
that wish in opposition to the convictions of the govern- 
ment. In armies it is but a very short step from the pos- 
session of a wish to the expression of a will. Perhaps at 
no period of the war were thoughtful men more deeply 
alarmed for the future of the nation than when they 
heard of the restoration of McClellan to the command, 
and recognized the unmistakable constraint under which 
the government had acted. It was in vain for well-inean- 
ing persons to affirm that the general had never been re- 
lieved, and that what had now taken place was no more 


than an ordinary proceeding : the Peninsular disaster was 
too recent, the complaints and asseverations of Pope of 
disobedience to his orders among the higher officers too 
loud for the real state of affairs to be concealed. 

" Leave Pope to get out of his scrape !■" What had 

Pope done to merit inevitable destruction ? 

been energetically He had gone down to the Rapidan in obe- 

sustained, ° x 

dience to orders to compel the enemy to re- 
lease his hold on the army in the Peninsula. He was 
keeping at bay in the best manner he could — : nay, more, 
he was desperately assailing Lee's ablest lieutenants. For 
more than a fortnight he was fighting battle after battle 
against overwhelming forces, first, to prevent the junction 
of his antagonists, and then to resist their whole mass. 
He might have been indiscreet in his reflections on the 
generalship of his predecessor, but, had he been ten times 
more so, this was not the moment of retaliation for such 
offenses. Was he not now the soldier of the republic, at 
the head of her forlorn hope in the very breach ? When, 
from the midst of the fire converging upon him, he cried 
out for more ammunition to enable him to keep his foot- 
hold, how was he answered ? "I know nothing of the 
calibres of Pope's artillery." 

The operations of Pope with the Army of Virginia 

but he received were based entirely on the expected junc- 
vaim support, ^ on o £ re . en f orcemen t s f rom the Army of 

the Potomac. Not without indignation does he say in 
his report, "Twenty thousand Hve hundred men were 
all of the ninety-one thousand veteran troops from Har- 
rison's Landing who ever drew trigger under my com- 
mand, or in any way took part in this campaign." " The 
complete overthrow of Lee's army, or at least the entire 
frustration of his movement toward the Potomac, was 
defeated by the failure of the Army of the Potomac to 
effect a junction in time with the Army of Virginia on 


the line of the Rappahannock, or even so far back as 
the line of Ball Run." 

In his report to the Secretary of War, the general in 
chief, Halleck, referring to these events, says, " Some of 
the corps (from the Peninsula) moved with becoming 
activity, but the delays of others were neither creditable 
nor excusable." "Most of the troops actually engaged in 
these battles fought with great bravery, but some of them 
could not be brought into action at all. Many thousands 
straggled away from their commands ; and it is said that 
not a few voluntarily surrendered to the enemy, so as to 
be paroled prisoners of war." 

From the tenor of Pope's -complaints, the reader can 
n .,. , ... e not fail to discern that the national s;overn- 

Critical position of O 

the government. men t was at this time passing through a 
serious crisis. The triumphant Confederate army threat- 
ening Washington was by no means the only formidable 
object before the republic. Individual grievances are of 
little moment in the eye of history save when they are 
connected with national interests- — they become of su- 
preme, importance when they presage public perils. 
Enough has been said to enable the reader to perceive 
that at this momentous period the government was act- 
ing under constraint. 

General McClellan himself has told us what were Mr. 

Lincoln's impressions as to the army at that 
pioresM S ccienan time. " The President informed me that he 

had reason to believe that the Army of the 
Potomac was not cheerfully co-operating with and sup- 
porting General Pope, and now asked me, as a special 
favor, to use my influence in correcting this state of 
things. The President, who was much moved, asked me 
to telegraph to ' Fitz John Porter, or some other of my 
friends,' and try to do away with any feeling that might 


exist, adding that I could rectify the evil, and that no 
one else could." 

In consequence of this urgent appeal to him, McClellan 

Mccieiian sends a sen ^ ^° ^ z J° nn Porter his dispatch of Sep- 
dispatch to Porter. Member 1st : "I ask of you, for my sake, that 

of the country, and the old Army of the Potomac, that 
you and all of my friends will lend the fullest and most 
cordial co-operation to General Pope in all the operations 
now going on," etc. 

Lincoln was ostensibly reconciled to the reinstating of 
McClellan by the circumstance that he, of 

Lincoln reconciled -,-. .-. . n .,. . , , 

to Mccieiian's re- all the generals, w r as most familiar with the 

restatement. ° ' 

defenses of Washington. What with fa- 
tigue, disappointment, and anxiety, Halleck's health was 
almost broken down. 

Military critics will doubtless point out professional 
position of anxiety mistakes in Pope's campaign. Injustice, 
of Lincoln. however, they must bear in mind his disap- 

pointed expectations of support. Well might Lincoln, 
who, notwithstanding his general buoyancy, was subject 
to paroxysms of deep depression, almost despair when he 
saw so much gallantry wasted. Well might his heart 
sink within him when he was now sardonically told, in 
allusion to his former solicitude for the seat of govern- 
ment at the outset of the Peninsular campaign, " at once 
to use all our means to make the capital perfectly safe." 
And well was it for him that he had a cool and coura- 
geous Secretary of War, who looked beyond the shame- 
and disasters of the passing moment ; who, in their many 
weary watches together through the night-hours at the 
War Department, could sustain him in his anxieties, and 
organize for him victory at last. 

All things looked auspiciously for the Confederacy. 
Lee's sortie thus far The national army had been thrust from its 

completely sue- -■ 1 1 i m pti 1 , 

cessfui. ground, and had, alter awful losses, sought 


shelter in the defenses of Washington. The sortie of Lee 
seemed to be a "brilliant success. There was nothing now 
to prevent him passing into Maryland — apparently noth- 
ing to prevent his proposed march to the North. Joy 
was diffused throughout every Southern state ; peace and 
independence seemed to be close at hand. 



The Confederate general, entering Maryland, could not induce the people to join 

He was followed in his march by McClellan from Washington, and ventured on 
dividing his army in presence of that general, detaching one portion of it to cap- 
ture Harper's Ferry, in which he succeeded. 

At the same time, McClellan attacked another portion on South Mountain, and 
drove it before him. 

Battle of Antietam. The Confederate sortie was repulsed, and Lee forced back 
again into Virginia. 

McClellan, failing to press vigorously on the Confederates, was removed by the gov- 
ernment from command, Burnside succeeding him. 

Battle of Fredericksburg. The Confederates repulsed the national army. 
Hooker was assigned to command in Burnside's stead. 

The Confederate army had driven its antagonist into 
the fortifications of Washington, and had opened for it- 
self a way to the North. 

On the same day (September 5th) that Bragg, on a 
invasion of Mary- similar duty, entered Kentucky, Lee, cross- 
land by Lee. j n g ^ e Potomac near Point of Rocks, enter- 
ed Maryland, and marched toward Frederick. 

The general plan for the Kentucky and Maryland 

campaigns, as conceived in Richmond, rest- 

tucky andMary- ed on the great military strength which the 

land sorties. ..,-,. T 

conscription had given. It proposed the 
reorganization of the governments of those states on Con- 
federate principles, and a march to the North for the ex- 
action of a treaty of peace. 

Lee had no intention of making a direct attack on 
Washington. He knew that if a successful issue should 

II.— F F 


crown his campaign, the land conmiunica- 
washmgton not tions between the North and that city be- 

intended. *> 

ing cut off, it must necessarily fall of itself. 
On the 8th of Septernber he issued at Frederick an ad- 
Lee's address to dress to the people of Maryland. He de- 

theMarylanders. ^^ ^ ^ ^^ q£ ^ Confederate 

States had marked with the deepest sympathy the 
wrongs and outrages that had been inflicted on Mary- 
land — the illegal imprisonment of its citizens, the usurpa- 
tion of the government of Baltimore, the arbitrary disso- 
lution of the Legislature, the suppression of the freedom 
of speech and of the press. Believing that the people of 
Maryland had too lofty a spirit to submit to a govern- 
ment guilty of such wrongs, and to aid them in throw- 
ing off its foreign yoke, he had brought his army among 
them to assist them in regaining the rights of which 
they had been unjustly despoiled. 

The Confederate general had supposed that large re- 
Th© y decline enforcements would flock to him, but in this 
jommg him. k e ^ g ^gftj^d to disappointment. It turn- 
ed out, as it did with the corresponding movement of 
Bragg in Kentucky, that the number of volunteers did 
not compensate for the deserters. It did not amount to 
five hundred men. At this the whole South was bitterly 
chagrined. Its popular sentiment had displayed toward 
this state the most affectionate sympathy. "Maryland, 
my Maryland," was the burden of the most beautiful lyric 
composed in the South during the war. It was sung with 
patriotic rapture, and nowhere more so than at the fire- 
sides of Virginia. 

In this lukewarmness of the Marylanders Lee saw at 
it defeats the once the failure of his enterprise. He could 
campaign. no ^ comm ^ j^g arm y to an invasion of Penn- 
sylvania with Maryland doubtful or hostile at his back. 
Conscription, though it makes numerous brave, makes also 


numerous unwilling soldiers. It is one thing to defend 
one's own fireside, another to engage in a distant, perhaps 
a Quixotic expedition. Lee saw very plainly the true in- 
terpretation of the daily increasing desertions from his 

Bragg, in his sortie, had an advantage over Lee. An 
ostensible object ostensible object had been assigned, and that 

was satisfactorily and successfully present 
ed when it was clear that there would be a failure in ob 
taining the true result. Fortune, however, was not un 
mindful of Lee. She threw into his way the brilliant in 
cident of the capture of the garrison of Harper's Ferrj 
At once that was put forth as the real object of the whole 
movement. In truth, however, it was too insignificant a 
temptation to induce so important a step, and it was im 
possible that any such expectation could have been enter 
tained at the outset, since the probabilities were that the 
post would be evacuated long before the Confederates 
could reach it. It was an accidental stroke of luck, which 
was made to answer the purpose of covering a deep disap- 

The Confederate advance into Maryland was the signal 
Alarm in Pennsyi- f° r an intense excitement in the adjoining 

state, Pennsylvania, and, indeed, throughout 
the North. The governor notified the mayor of Philadel- 
phia that he had reliable information of a movement of 
the Confederate army on Harrisburg, and called upon 
him to " send 20,000 men to-morrow." On its part, the 
Confederate army, justly transported with delight at the 

Boast of the con- results of the Virginia campaign, so glorious 
federate soldier* to ^ Qpenly avowed its expectation of dic- 
tating a peace in Philadelphia. The same hall which had 
witnessed the signing of the Declaration of Independence 
of the United States was to witness the signing of a 
treaty acknowledging the independence of the South. 


New York and Boston were to "be visited with dire pun- 
ishment for their misdeeds, and submit to a dread altern- 
ative — the choice between a ransom and the torch. 

But in Maryland the Confederate soldiers conducted 
Their conduct in themselves with marked moderation. So 
Maryland. ^ v f rom m olesting any one, they tried to in- 

gratiate themselves Math the people. It was true that 
vast droves of cattle and lines of wagons might be seen 
crossing the Potomac into Virginia, but it was asserted 
that every thing had been paid for at the option of the 
seller, either in Confederate or in national money. 

As soon as it was ascertained with certainty that Lee 
Mccieiian ordered h a( i passed into Maryland, orders were given 
to follow Lee. McClellan to follow him with all the troops 
not needed for the defense of Washington. On the 12th 
of September McClellan reached Frederick, which had 
just been evacuated by the Confederates, and in that 
place obtained a copy of Lee's order of march. From 
this it appeared that it was his intention to capture the 
garrison of Harper's Ferry. To this end he had sent 
25,000 men under Jackson across the Potomac, thus di- 
viding his army in the very face of McClellan, who had 
it in his power, on the 14th, to have overwhelmed the di- 
vision of the Confederate General McLaws and relieved 
Harper's Ferry. Instead of doing this, however, he fol- 
lowed the main body of the Confederates toward the 
South Mountain, for they lingered in their march to give 
time for the reduction of Harper's Ferry. His advance 
overtook their rear just beyond Middletown, eight miles 
from Frederick, early that morning. The turnpike to 
Hagerstown goes through Turner's Gap ; the road from 
Jefferson to Rohrersville through Crampton's Gap. 

The battle of South Mountain was opened by an at- 
The battle of south tempt of the Confederates, under D. H. Hill, 
Mountain. ^ Q reQ ^ ^ p assa g e 0V er Catoctin Creek. 

Chap. LVIIL] 




In this they were not successful. They then retired to a 
stronger position up the mountain toward Turner's Gap. 
Eight and left of the main road are country roads. It 
was upon these that the action chiefly took place. The 
Confederates had artillery bearing on all the approaches. 

At 8 A.M. (September 14th), Cox's division of Reno's 
corps of Burn side's column moved up the 
left country road and carried the crest in 
their front. Re- enforcements were received by the Con- 
federates, and, Cox's position becoming critical, he too was 
re-enforced. A very severe conflict was maintained all 
day, General Reno being killed. Cox, however, held the 
ground at dark. 

At 3 P.M., Hooker's corps of Burnside's column moved 

Forcing of Tur- 
ner's Gap. 


up the right country road. Meade carried the eminence 
on one side of that road ; Patrick, supported by Double- 
day and Phelps, the other. Ricketts's division pressed up 
the mountain about 5 P.M., arriving at the crest in time 
to participate in the engagement. 

Thus Hooker carried the mountain sides on the right 
of the Gap, and Reno those on the left, notwithstanding 
the extreme steepness and difficulty. 

About 4 P.M. Longstreet came up from Hagerstown 
with re-enforcements for Hill, and, outranking him, took 

It remained now for the national forces to move up the 
main or central road. Late in the afternoon Burnside 
ordered Gibbon's brigade to advance along that road 
upon the Confederate central position. Though stub- 
bornly resisted, it forced its way, pressing the enemy be- 
fore it. After dark it was relieved by one of Sedgwick's 

The Confederates, being now outflanked right and left, 
abandoned their position during the night, leaving also 
their dead. On the quiet valley — and it is one of the 
most beautiful valleys in Atlantic America — the morning 
sun once more shed his welcome beams. Seen from the 
heights which the national soldiers had w r on, the Catoc- 
tin lay like a silver thread in the meadows. The turn- 
pike was crowded with an advancing line of troops and 
artillery; the green fields in the distance were dotted 
with white army wagons. 

Crampton's Gap, six miles to the south of Turner's 
Forcing of cramp- Gap, held by the Confederates under How- 
ton's Gap. e ^ (Jq^ was simultaneously carried by 

Franklin. He drove them from their position at the base 
of the mountain, where they were protected by a stone 
wall, steadily forced them back up the slope, and, after 
an action of three hours, gained the crest. The Confed- 


erates hastily fled down the mountain on the other 

The national loss at Turner's Gap was 328 killed, 
1463 wounded and missing. The loss at Crampton's 
Gap was 115 killed, and 418 wounded and missing. Lee 
object of Lee in had ventured on this resistance merely to 
gain time for the completion of his enter- 
prise at Harper's Ferry; and though in the actual en- 
gagement the victory was with the national side, the suc- 
cess of the whole operation was with the Confederates. 

For Jackson appeared at Harper's Ferry on the morn: 
Harper's Fen T cap- m g of the 13th, the post being in charge of 
tmed by Jackson. (j i one i Miles, who, though he had been or- 
dered to fortify Maryland Heights, had neglected to do 
so. Those heights and Loudon Heights were speedily 
occupied by the Confederates, and Harper's Ferry was at 
their mercy. Miles had with him at this time about 
14,000 men, of w T hom 2500 were cavalry; the latter cut 
their way through the enemy's lines on the night of the 
14th. On the morning of the 15th Miles surrendered 
11,583 men, 73 guns, 13,000 small-arms, 200 wagons, and 
large quantities of supplies. 

His object thus accomplished, Jackson did not delay 
„ . . , . to receive the surrender. He left that to 

He hastens to An- 

tietam. Hill; and, hurrying across the pontoon 

bridge into Maryland, marched without stopping until 
he joined Lee in time to assist him at the battle of An- 
tietam, which was fought on the 17th of September. 

McClellan had pushed forward his right wing and cen- 
Lee'sarm at An- ^ re m pursuit of the Confederates, and had 
tietam - found them on the 15th, along the western 

bank of Antietam Creek, a sluggish stream entering the 
Potomac eight miles above Harper's Ferry. The creek 
was on their front, the Potomac on their rear, behind 
them and near the midst of their line the little town of 


Sharpsburg. It is about a mile from the creek. A 
road leads from it to the Shepherdstown ford of the Po- 

At this moment Lee's army was divided. A part of 
his force, under Jackson, McLaws, and Walker, was op- 
erating at Harper's Ferry. The post surrendered, how- 
ever, on the morning of that day, and Jackson, as we have 
seen, with all speed hastened his march to Sharpsburg. 
It had become clear that the detaching of Maryland from 
the Union, and the projected invasion of Pennsylvania, 
were destined to failure. Forced out of the passes of 
South Mountain, Lee's hope of escaping the consequences 
of dividing his army rested on one thing only — the dila- 
toriness of his antagonist. But he remembered the Pen- 
insula, and took courage. 

Lee was constrained, not by military, but by political 
„ . [ . ' reasons, to fisvht the battle of Antietam. The 

He is constrained / o 

to fight. South would never be satisfied with the bar- 

ren laurels acquired from Pope; nor was it possible to 
give up the expedition to the North without a struggle. 
And yet he did not do well in fighting a merely defensive 
battle, especially in fighting with a river at his back. 

On the 16th McClellan's army had for the most part 
position of the na- arrived, and the day was spent in prepara- 
tionai troops. ^ on f or confronting the enemy. Hooker's 

and Sumner's corps were placed on the right, Porter's in 
the centre, Burnside's on the left. 

On the Confederate side, Longstreet was on the right, 
Position of the con- w ^ n tis right flank resting on a curve of 
federal troops. ° t ^ e Antietam; D. H. Hill was on the left; 

but one of Longstreet' s divisions (Hood's) was on the left 
of that. In a general manner, their line stood north and 
south; but the last-named division made an angle with 
the rest, and, facing northward, stood across the Hagers- 
town Road. Upon the west side of that road, half a 

Chap. LVIIL] 



Topography of An- m ^ e or thereabout from the rear of the Con- 
federate left was a meeting-house known 
as the Dunker Church. It was enveloped in a skirt of 
woods, which, extending in a rudely circular form north- 
ward, inclosed a cultivated area, across which, like a di- 
ameter, the Hagerstown Road passed. In the woods, near 
the church, were ledges of limestone, affording an excel- 
lent breastwork — a rocky citadel. The middle part of 
the area was a corn-field; its eastern side had been re- 
cently plowed. This area, encircled by woods, was the 
focus of the battle of Antietam. 

Three stone bridges here 
cross the Antietam. One, 
in front of the national 
left, was therefore opposite 
Burnside; a second, in front 
of the centre, was opposite 
Porter; a third, on the 
right, was opposite Hook- 
er : near this there was 
also a ford. 
plan for the impending en- 
gagement was to attack the 
enemy's left with the corps 
of Hooker and Mansfield, 
supported by Sumner's, and, if necessary, by Franklin's; 
and as soon as matters looked favorably there, to move 
the corps of Burnside against the enemy's extreme right, 
upon the ridge running to the south and rear of Sharps- 
burg, and, having carried that position, to press along 
the crest toward their left, and, whenever either of these 
flank movements should be successful, to advance his cen- 
tre with all the forces then disposable. 

On the afternoon of the lGth Hooker accordingly cross- 

McClellan's plan 
of battle. 



Approach of the na- e( l the Antietani, and, advancing southwest- 
tionai nght wmg. war ^y ? came to the eastern edge of what 

has been described as the battle-area. He. lay there 
in the woods that night, for the Confederates had sent 
two brigades across from the Dunker Church, and they 
were just in front of him. Mansfield's corps had followed 
Hooker, and lay a little in his rear. Sumner was ready 
to follow them at daybreak. On the Confederate side, 
during the night, Hood's division had k been relieved by a 
part of Jackson's corps. 

As soon as he could see, Hooker made so furious an 
The battle of attack, supported by batteries on the east 
side of the Antietam, that Jackson's brigades 
could not retain their hold, but were expelled with severe 
loss across the corn-field of the battle-area, over the Ha- 
gerstown Road, and into the woods beyond the Dunker 
Church, in which were their reserves. These, issuing 
forth, after an infuriated struggle, succeeded in checking 
Hooker's advance. The antagonists, fighting in a cloud 
of sulphury smoke, almost exterminated each other. Jack- 
son says : "The carnage on both sides was terrific — more 
than half the brigades of Lawton and Hays were either 
killed or wounded, and more than a third 

tional right and of Trimble' s ; all their regimental command- 
confederate left. ? • I -I Ml 1 

ers, except two, were either killed or wound- 
ed." It was necessary to withdraw the wreck of regi- 
ments to the rear, and replace it by Hood's division. On 
the other side, Hooker's corps was nearly destroyed. 

Mansfield's corps had now (7^ A.M.) reached the field, 
and had made its way down to the Hagerstown Road, 
where it was met by the division of D. H. Hill, which 
had come out of the woods at the Dunker Church. An- 
other furious encounter ensued : the valley was filled 
with smoke. Out of the battle-din — the yells of the Con- 
federate, the cheers of the national troops — down in the 


corn-field, came forth a ghastly procession of wounded 

men. Mansfield's troops were driven back to the woods 

Death of Mans- fr° m which they had emerged. Mansfield 

was killed, and Hooker shot through the 

In its turn, Sumner's corps had arrived. It was nine 
o'clock. The Confederates now could neither advance 
nor hold their position. Their officers saw that to re- 
main where they were was only useless butchery. Sum- 
ner's right division, Sedgwick's, followed the retiring but 
still desperately resisting Confederates across the blood- 
stained area, forcing their way into the woods beyond 
the Hunker Church. At that moment the divisions of 

McLaws and Walker, which had just come 

Repeater! charges n TT , -^ n . n ,, 

andcouuter- up troiii Harpers .terry, confronted them. 

charges. A x " 

These troops had taken post among the 
rocky ledges, which formed stone bulwarks waist high. 
They leaped forth and compelled their antagonists to re- 
treat, expelling them from the Hunker woods, through the 
corn-field, and into the woods beyond. But, in their turn, 
they were driven back by Franklin, who now came up, 
and compelled them to make the bloody passage to the 
Hunker Church again. The corn-field was now finally 
held by the national troops. 

Though dreadfully exhausted, the Confederates did not 
give up their attempt. While Sumner's right was thus 
engaged with McLaws, his left divisions had advanced 
halfway from the Antietam to Sharpsburg. A desperate 
attack was made on the left flank of his left division, but 
it was foiled. The Confederates then tried to force their 
way between that and his centre division, but were re- 
pulsed. His line succeeded eventually in holding the 
ground it had won. 

Such were the events on McClellan's right. A battle- 
wave of blood pulsated back and forth over the contest- 


ed area. Alternately the national troops advanced, alter- 
Bumstde's attack lately the Confederates. On his left, Burn- 
side received orders at 8 A.M. to force the 
lower stone bridge and gain the opposite heights. The 
approach to the bridge formed a kind of defile, which was 
swept by the enemy's artillery. Delay occurred. It was 
not until one o'clock that Burnsicle made the passage. 
Had this been clone earlier in the day, it would have 
weakened the resistance that Lee was making at the 
Hunker Church, and probably have given McClellan the 
victory. It was done too late for that, and, indeed, too 
late altogether, for by the time it was accom- 

His success ; but he -,. -, t a -r* ttmi i i n tt 

is at last forced plished A. _r. Hill had come up from Harp- 
back, f . . -i 

er's Ferry, and, falling on Burnside's left 

flank, forced him back to the bridge. 

Porter's corps, which constituted the national centre, 
was in reserve, and had taken no direct part in the bat- 
tle. It had been reduced by the sending of detachments 
to other portions of the field to 4000 men. 

The battle of Antietam thus closed without those well- 
marked results which might have been ex- 

Close of the battle. -in i -P - 

pected irom the preponderance of the na- 
tional force. The Confederates had made a most gallant 
defense in their perilous position. The error on McClel- 
lan's part was characteristic. He had used his troops 
too much in driblets and detail instead of in an over- 
whelming mass. His total strength was 87,164, of which 
4320 were cavalry. His losses were 2010 killed, 9416 

wounded, 1043 missing ; that is, nearly 

Losses in the battle. „ . 7 ni _ , ' D 7 _ , ' J 

13,000 in all (12,469). Lee's force was 
about 45,000 at the beginning of the battle, but during 
the day it was increased to 70,000; of these, 2700 were 
buried by McClellan, others having been buried by the 
Confederates themselves. His total loss was about 13,533. 
As an offset to their success at Harper's Ferry, McClellan 


says, "13 guns, 39 colors, upward of 15,000 stand of 
small-arms, and more than 6000 prisoners, were the tro- 
phies which attest the success of our arms in the battles 
of South Mountain, Turner's Gap, and Antietam. Not a 
single gun or color was lost by our army during these 

Not long after the battle of Antietam I visited the 
The battie-fieid on field, and was an eye-witness of some of 
the next day. those scenes which Captain Noyes has so 
well described. That officer says: "Through torn -up 
corn-fields, robbed of their tasseled grain by hungry 
horses and hungry men, past farm-houses, barns, and out- 
houses crowded with the wounded, I came to a quiet lit- 
tle grove near the roadside, and here I found my' train. 
How charming to my jaded senses appeared the scene. 
At a camp-fire sat the teamsters, cooking their noontide 
meal of mutton, potatoes, and coffee. The horses stood 
half asleep, tethered to the wagons. It was a sudden 
and quick transition from the battle-field, with its con- 
stant strain of excitement, to a picnic in peaceful woods. 

" My route carried me over the late battle-field, and I 
Devastation m the spent much of the afternoon, part of the 
time in company with a friend, in visiting 
some of the most severely contested points, to be awe- 
struck, sickened, almost benumbed with its sights of hor- 
ror. Within this space of little more than a mile square 
— this spot, once beautiful with handsome residences and 
well-cultivated farms, isolated, hedged in with verdure, 
sacred to quiet, calm content, the hottest fury of man's 
hottest wrath had expended itself, burning residences 
and well-filled barns, plowing fields of ripened grain with 
artillery, scattering every where, through corn-field, wood, 
and valley, the most awful illustrations of war. Not a 
building about us which was not deserted by its occu- 
pants, and rent and torn by shot and shell ; not a field 


which had not witnessed the fierce and bloody encoun- 
ter of armed and desperate men. 

" Let us first turn off to the left of the Hagerstown 
The dead in the Turnpike ; but we must ride very slowly and 
carefully, for lying all through this corn-field 
are the victims of the hardest contest of our division. 
Can it be that these are the bodies of our late antago- 
nists ? Their faces are so absolutely black that I said to 
myself at first, This must have been a negro regiment. 
Their eyes are protruding from the sockets ; their heads, 
hands, and limbs are swollen to twice the natural size. 
"Passing through this corn-field, with the dead lying 
and in the fields ai l through its aisles, out into an unculti- 
beyond. vated field beyond, I saw bodies attired 

mainly in rebel gray, lying in ranks so regular that Death, 
the Reaper, must have mowed them down in swaths. Our 
burying parties were already busily engaged, and had 
put away to rest many of our own men — still here, as 
every where, I saw them scattered over the fields. The 
ground was strewn with muskets, knapsacks, cartridge- 
boxes, and article-s of clothing ; the carcasses of horses, 
and thousands of shot and shell. And so it was on the 
other side of the turnpike, nay, in the turnpike itself. 
Ride where we may, through corn-field, wood, or ravine, 
and our ride will be among the dead, until the heart 
grows sick and faint with horror. Here, close to the road, 
were the haystacks near which our general and staff 
paused for a while when the division was farthest ad- 
vanced, and here, at the corner of the barn, lay one of our 
men, killed by a shell, which had well-nigh proved fatal 
to them also. 

" Just in front of these haystacks was the only pleasing 
picture on this battle-field — a fine horse, struck with 
death at the instant when, cut down by his wound, he 
was attempting to rise from the ground. His head was 

Ghap.lviilj battle-field of antietam. 453 

half lifted; his neck proudly arched ; every muscle seemed 
replete with animal life. The wound which killed him 
was wholly concealed from view, so that I had to ride 
close up before I could believe him dead. Hundreds of 
his kind lay upon the field, but all were repulsive save 
himself, and he was the admired of every passer-by. Two 
weeks afterward I found myself pausing to gaze upon 
him, and always with the wish that some sculptor would 
immortalize in stone this magnificent animal, in the exact 
pose of his death-hour. One would like to see some- 
thing from a battle-field not wholly terrible. 

" Over this grave-yard of the unburied dead we reach- 
The Dunker e( l a wood, every tree pierced with shot or 
cut with bullets, and came to the little brick 
Dunker Church on the turnpike. This must have been 
a focal point in the battle, for a hundred round shot have 
pierced its walls, while bullets by thousands have scarred 
and battered it. A little crowd of soldiers was stand- 
ing about it, and within a few severely-wounded rebels 
were stretched on the benches, one of whom was raving 
in his agony. Surgical aid and proper attendance had 
already been furnished, and we did not join the throng 
of curious visitors within. Out in the grove behind the 
little church the dead had been collected in groups wait- 
ing for burial, some of them wearing our own uniform, 
but the large majority dressed in gray. No matter in 
what direction we turned, it was all the same shocking 
picture, awakening awe rather than pity, benumbing the 
senses rather than touching the heart, glazing the eye 
with horror rather than filling it with tears. 

" I had, however, seen many a poor fellow during my 
ride, something in whose position or appear- 
ance had caused me to pause ; and here, ly- 
ing side by side with three others, I saw a young rebel 
officer, his face less discolored than the rest, whose feat- 


ures and expression called forth my earnest sympathy, 
not so much for him as for those who in his Southern 
home shall see him no more forever. No one among the 
burying-party knew his name, and before night he was 
laid in a trench with the rest — no head-stone to mark 
his resting-place — one of the three thousand rebel dead 
who fill nameless graves upon this battle-field. So ends 
the brief madness which sent him hither to fight against 
a government he knew only by its blessings — against his 
Northern brothers who never desired to encroach upon a 
single right or institution of his, who were willing that 
he should hug to his breast forever the Nessus shirt of 
slavery, asking only that he should not insist upon for- 
cing its poison folds over their shoulders also. So dis- 
appears the beloved of some sad hearts — another victim 
of that implacable Nemesis, who thus avenges upon the 
white man the wrongs of the black, and smiles with hor- 
rid satisfaction as this fearful game of war goes on. 

" Very slowly, as men move through the burial-places 
of the dead, we rode through the woods at the back of 
the church, and reached the rocky citadel behind which 
crouched the enemy to receive our charging battalions, 
sweeping their ranks with destruction and compelling 
their retreat. I was astonished to see how cunningly 
Nature had laid up this long series of rocky ledges breast 
high for the protection of the rebel lines. In front of 
The dead in front of this breastwork we found a majority of the 

the rock ledges. dea( j dregsed Jn ty Ue . At this point also 

commenced a long barricade of fence-rails, piled closely 
to protect the rebel lines, and stretching off toward the 
north. Here is one more evidence of the use to which 
the rebel generals put every spare moment of time, and 
of their admirable choice of position. 

" One more scene in this battle-picture must be seen, 
and with a visit to it our ride may end. It is a narrow 

Chap.LVIIL] expected eenewal of the attack. 4(55 

country lane, hollowed out somewhat be- 

The lane of death. ±1 n i i j* n i j j i 

tween the fields, partially shaded, and now 
literally crowded with rebel corpses. Here they stood in 
line of battle, and here, in the length of five hundred 
feet, I counted more than two hundred of their dead. In 
every attitude conceivable — some piled in groups of four 
or six ; some grasping their muskets as if in the act of 
discharging them ; some, evidently officers, killed while 
encouraging their men ; some lying in the position of calm 
repose, all black, and swollen, and ghastly with wounds. 
This battalion of the dead filled the lane with horror. 
As we rode beside it — we could not ride in it — I saw the 
field all about me black with corpses, and they told me 
that the corn-field beyond was equally crowded. It was 
a place to see once, to glance at, and then to ride hurried- 
ly away, for, strong-hearted as was then my mood, I had 
gazed upon as much horror as I was able to bear." 

I have quoted in detail Captain Noyes's description of 
the battle-field of Antietam, partly because of its intrinsic 
merit, and partly because of the special interest it pre- 
sents to me. It was within the shell-torn 
walls of the Dunker Church that those gen- 
eral intentions to which I have alluded in my Preface 
took the form of a final resolve to write this book. I 
leaned, in the melancholy and rainy morning, against the 
rocky ledges once the breastworks of Confederate sol- 
diers, and walked through the lane of death, in every 
panel of the fences of which there was then a grave. 

Long before the next day broke, the national troops, 
rising from their rest on the bare ground, " made ready 
their coffee, and, eating their simple breakfast, prepared 
The amy expects to f° r a renewal of the battle," They believed 
that Lee had no escape. The river was at 
his back. A re-enforcement of 14,000 men had joined 
II— G a 


them. Their strength was far greater than his. The end 
of the war was at hand. But the sun rose, the morning 
passed, the sun declined, and evening came — still there 
was no order for attack. Some, who had been in the 
Peninsula, related to their comrades the dilatory move- 
ments of those times ; some recalled that it had taken 
in this campaign seven days to march a distance of forty 
miles ; some wondered at the generalship which had been 
sending driblets of troops successively toward the Dun- 
ker Church, not to carry the position, for they were too 
soldiers' criticisms weak for that, but to a certain massacre. 
There were veterans sunning themselves on 
the ground, who were telling that, if they had been con- 
sulted, they should have thrown the right wing of the 
army in one irresistible mass on the enemy, and, by work- 
ing the left wing, would have given Lee other occupation 
than to concentrate his whole strength at the Dunker 
Church. It is the privilege of veterans to criticise their 
generals — sometimes they do it very sagaciously — and to 
demonstrate to their raw comrades how battles that have 
been lost might easily have been won. 

A second wearisome night ushered in another morning, 
and then there was news. Lee had given McClellan the 
passage of the po- slip. He had actually crossed the Potomac 
tomac by Lee. unmolested, and escaped into Virginia. The 
soldiers' hearts sank within them. Was this all that had 
come from the horrible carnage of that day ? What if 
Lee had abandoned 3000 dead, and 2000 too severely 
wounded to be removed, he had compensated for the loss 
of a victory by executing a brilliant retreat from the bat- 
tle-field under the very eye of his antagonist, and had 
converted the Potomac, from an apparently insuperable 
obstacle, into a line of defense. 

In his report, General McClellan states the considera- 
tions which led him to determine on inactivity. They 


Mccieiian fails to were the fatigue and exhaustion of his 
troops; the absence of the supply trains; 
the losses of the army, and demoralization of some of 
the corps ; the want of ammunition. President Lincoln, 
thankful for the expulsion of Lee, but dissatisfied that he 
Lincoln visits the was not pursued, visited the army on the 
the army. -^ o ^ October, and remained with it several 

days. Porter made a reconnoissance in force beyond the 
Potomac on the 20th, but was driven back. Lee delib- 
erately retired toward Winchester. A portion of his cav- 
alry, under Stuart, however, recrossed the river on the 
10th of October, at once insulting the national army, and 
making good the boast of the Confederates by a raid into 
stuart's raid into Pennsylvania. He captured Chambersburg 
Pennsylvania. « n jfc^ g^ate, and there destroyed a large 

quantity of supplies. He burned machine shops, trains 
of cars, and other property. He made a complete circuit 
round McClellan's army, and returned into Virginia by 
crossing the Potomac below him. The Confederates 
might truly boast that they had at length carried the 
war into the Free States. 

So ended Lee's sortie. It had cost him nearly 30,000 
Failure of Lee's men ? an( i, notwithstanding the capture of 
expedition. Harper's Ferry, had been a signal failure. 
Day after day passed on. The Confederates were be- 
ing re-enforced and reorganized. The government was 
incessantly urging McClellan to advance. He, on his 
part, was standing still, and importunately demanding re- 
enforcements, clothing, shoes, horses. His army became 
at length 150,000 strong. On October 6th Halleck tel- 
egraphed to him: "The President directs 
eiSSt for McciS- that you cross the Potomac and give battle 

1 111 *fi 9.(1 Villi CO ^^ 

to the enemy, or drive him South. Your 
army must move now, while the roads are good." An- 
other fortnight elapsed (October 21), and still there was 


no forward movement. Halleck telegraphed again : a The 

President does not expect impossibilities, bnt he is very 

anxions that all this good weather shonld not be wasted 

ms repeated pro- m inactivity." McClellan now fixed upon 

cremations. ^yen^ lst as t]ie earliest date at which 

he shonld be ready, and about that time crossed the Po- 
tomac, moving leisurely down the east side of the Blue 
Eidge, Lee moving parallel to him in the valley on the 
other side. McClellan's direction w T as toward Gordons- 
ville. Lee, therefore, to prevent the Confederate com- 
munications being severed, marched directly and rapidly 
to that place. It became evident that McClellan's rela- 
tions with the government were operating very disad- 
vantageously. On the 7th of November a heavy snow- 
storm set in; the approach of winter was betokened. 
He is removed from Lincoln's forbearance at last gave way. At 
midnight of that day orders arrived from 
Washington directing McClellan to turn over the com- 

Bumside succeeds niand of the army to General Burnside. 

him * McClellan at this time had reached Rector- 


A portion of the Army of the Potomac was now reor- 
ganized in grand divisions. Burnside, believing that the 
true line of operations against Richmond was the direct 
Burnside resolves to one, resolved on moving the army to Fred- 
S^SeSls- ericksburg, masking his intention by a pre- 
bmg ' tended advance on Gordonsville. Lee, how T - 

ever, discovered what the real movement was to be, and 
while Burnside marched along the north bank of the 
Rappahannock to Falmouth, he marched along the south 
bank to Fredericksburg. The two armies thus stood 
confronting each other on the opposite sides of the river. 

Burnside had hoped to cross the Rappahannock before 
Lee could resist him successfully. On reaching Falmouth 


he found, however, that the passage across the river to 
Fredericksburg was checked. The bridges had been 
burned, and the pontoons expected from Washington had 
not arrived — a delay which gave Lee the opportunity of 
fortifying the heights behind the town. 

The national army thus lay on the range of hills on 
The armies con- the north side of the Rappahannock, the 

fronting each other. Confederates on tte range p^- Ifllfl On the 

south side. Between them was Fredericksburg. The 
plain on which the city stood was completely commanded 
by the guns of both sides. Whichever entered it must 
be destroyed. The national troops, as we are now to see, 
ventured, and met wdth a bloody repulse. The Confed- 
erates did not dare to pursue them. It was not until the 
night of December 10th that things were ready for throw- 
ing the pontoons across the river, and in the interval the 
Confederate cavalry had made an excursion as far as 
Dumfries, in Burnside's rear. 

There was a sharp struggle in completing the pontoon 
The laying of the opposite the city, daylight having come 
pontoons. before it was finished; the sharp-shooters, 

from their rifle-pits and from the houses on the edge 
of the river, made it impossible to continue the work. 
Through the fog which hung over the city columns of 
smoke were seen here and there ascending from houses 
set on fire by the furious bombardment with which Burn- 
side hoped to drive off the Confederate riflemen. The 
cannonading was in vain, except as a cover to one hun- 
dred volunteers who daringly crossed over in boats, and 
expelled the Confederates from the houses and rifle-pits 
with the bayonet. The bridge was now (4 P.M.) fin- 
ished, and troops thrown across. 

A second pontoon, lower down the river, was laid with- 
passageofthe ou ^ interruption, the plain in front of it 
being commanded by the national artillery, 



and the opposite bank having thus been secured, others 
were added without delay, and the passage of the Bappa- 
hannock completed. Sumner's grand division and a sec- 
tion of Hooker's crossed before dark at the upper bridge ; 
that of Franklin, consisting of the corps of Eeynolds and 
Smith, at the lower. The movement was continued on 
the morning of the next day (12th) without intermission. 
The fortified position of the Confederates on the heights 
in the rear of Fredericksburg consisted of 

The Confederate , -.. p ■% , i ' • it* ,i •, 

army at Preder- two lines ot batteries overlooking; the city. 

icksburg. . ° , . 

iheir army, about 80,000 strong, lay m a 
semicircle from a point a mile above Fredericksburg to 
one about four miles below. Stonewall Jackson com- 
manded on their right, Longstreet on their left. On the 
national side, Franklin was on the left, Hooker occupied 
the centre, and Sumner the right. 

Behind Fredericksburg, the plain, gradually ascending, 
presents many inequalities of surface, and the bounding 
heights, trending toward the river, not only command the 
space in front, but also flank it. The Confederates had 
planted batteries in every available position to sweep 
this plain. There was a narrow road, skirted by a stone 
wall about four feet high, which ran along the foot of the 

Burnside had learned from a prisoner that the Confed- 
erates had cut another road in the rear of the line of 
heights, by means of which they connected the two wings 
of their army, and avoided a long detour through a diffi- 
cult country. 

His object, therefore, was to obtain possession of this 
road by making a powerful attack with his 

Plan of the battle. . * / _ OJ - 

leit, and, as soon as that had succeeded, to 
assault the position with his right. He then intended to 
advance his centre against their front and drive them out 
of their works. These operations would therefore bring 




successively into action Franklin, who was on the left, 
Sumner on the right, and Hooker at the centre. Frank- 
lin's force was strengthened by two of Hooker's best di- 
visions, and was from 55,000 to 60,000 strong. 

By some alleged misunderstanding, Franklin, instead 
of making a vigorous — the main — attack, limited his op- 
erations to a mere reconnoissance, and, as we are now to 
see, the direct attacks of Sumner and Hooker-, being un- 
supported, failed. 

The battle of Fred 

A dense fog had covered the valley of the Rappahan- 
nock on the morning of the 13 th of Decem- 
ber, but before eleven o'clock it had been 
dispersed by the rays of the sun. Concealed in its 
cloudy veil, the Confederate General Longstreet had per- 
sonally come so near the national lines that he could hear 
their officers' commands. He found that an attack was 
to be made on Jackson, and notified him of it. 


The attack on the left by Franklin's grand division 
was made "by General Meade with about 

Franklin's attack. -f T 11 .. - T ^ „ _ 

4500 men. He broke through the Lonied- 
erate lines, reached the heights they had occupied, and 
got into the presence of their reserves, but the divisions 
which were to have sustained him failed to do so, and 
he was driven back. If he could have held his ground, 
the evacuation of the works in the rear of Fredericksburg 
must have taken place. He lost more than one third of 
his force in this attempt. 

Sumner, on the right, had been making ready to storm 
the fortifications on Marye's Heights in his 

Snmner's attack on n . TT 111,-1,1 r»-r^ i 

the confederate front. He had selected the corps of Jb rench 

batteries. x 

and Hancock for that purpose, and had How- 
ard's division in readiness to support them. A little be- 
fore noon, French's corps, preceded by skirmishers, was 
seen, as a long black line, deploying in the rear of the 
city, and steadily advancing to the assault. Behind it 
followed another black line. It was Hancock's corps. 
The Confederate batteries were silent until their enemy 
was half way across the plain, when, in an instant, from 
the front, the right, the left, they poured forth a tempest 
of fire. Longstreet says that the gaps made by the artil- 
lery could be seen half a mile off. The thin line moved 
through the focus of death, quivering but still advancing, 
its own batteries in the distance giving it what help they 
might — a canopy of iron. The line grew thinner and 
thinner ; becoming too weak to hold together, it halted, 
and was dispersed. 

Another attempt was made. The line moved through 
the rain of grape and canister, and, closing the gaps 
torn through it, it seemed as if Fortune, unable to re- 
sist such daring, was about to smile on it. Two thirds 
of the plain were passed ; a few steps more, and the flam- 
ing hill itself would give some protection — one moment 

Hooker's attack. 


for taking breath, then a bayonet charge up the heights, 
and the Confederates would be hurled out of their forti- 

In front was the gray stone wall. The Confederates 

Attack on the na< i artillery that raked it right and left. 
In an instant it was fringed with fire and 
hidden in smoke. Enfiladed by the batteries, confronted 
by a mile of rifles, which were securely discharged behind 
its protecting cover, the surviving assailants were forced 
back to the shelter of a ravine, within musket-shot of the 
enemy. Here a line of assault was once more formecl, 
and a bayonet charge made on the Confederate artillery. 
Thrice was that attack made — thrice vainly. The storm- 
ing party, almost annihilated, was compelled to retire. 

Such was the fate of Sumner's attack on the right. 
That of Hooker on the centre fared no bet- 
ter. He says : " I proceeded against the bar- 
rier as I would against a fortification, and endeavored to 
breach a hole sufficiently large for a i forlorn hope' to en- 
ter. Before that, the attack along the line, it seemed to 
me, had been too general — not sufficiently concentrated. 
I had two batteries posted on the left of the road, within 
four hundred yards of the position upon which the attack 
was to be made, and I had other parts of batteries posted 
on the right of the road, at the distance of five hundred 
or six hundred yards. I had all these batteries playing 
with great vigor until sunset upon that point, but with 
no apparent effect upon the rebels or upon their works. 

" During the last part of the cannonading I had given 
directions to General Humphreys's division to form, un- 
der the shelter which a small hill afforded, in column for 
assault. When the fire of the artillery ceased, I gave di- 
rections for the enemy's works to be assaulted. General 
Humphreys's men took off their knapsacks, overcoats, and 
haversacks. They were ordered to make the assault with 


empty muskets, for there was no time then to load and 
fire. When the word was given the men moved forward 
with great impetuosity. They ran and hurraed, and I was 
encouraged by the great good feeling that pervaded them. 
The head of General Humphreys's column advanced to 
within perhaps fifteen or twenty yards of the stone wall, 
which was the advanced position held by the rebels, and 
then they were thrown back as quickly as they had ad- 
vanced. Probably the whole of the advance and the re- 
tiring did not occupy fifteen minutes. They left behind, 
as was reported to me, 1760 of their number out of 

In this battle of Fredericksburg the national losses 
were 13,771 ; the Confederate loss was about 

Losses in the battle. ' ' 


It was Burnside's intention to renew the struggle on the 
Bumside proposes nex ^ morning, but finding, upon consulta- 
another movement. t i on> t t a t his. chief officers regarded the en- 
emy's lines as impregnable, he countermanded the order. 

On the night of the 1 5th of December, Burnside vaca- 
But he repasses ted Fredericksburg, retiring to his former 
position. He felt that the position in front 
could not be carried, and that it was a military necessity 
either to attack or retire. Another repulse would have 
been disastrous. The army was withdrawn in the night, 
without the knowledge of the enemy, and without loss 
either of property or men. 

A fortnight subsequently (December 30th) Burnside 
made preparations for another advance upon Richmond, 
when he was suddenly called to Washington by the Presi- 
dent. He there discovered that representations had been 
surreptitiously made by certain of his subordinate officers 
to the effect that the temper of the army would not justi- 
fy the movement, and that it would inevitably end in a 
great disaster. He soon ascertained that the secessionists 


in Washington had obtained intelligence of the character 
of his proposed movement, and was therefore compelled 
to substitute another for it. The attempt to carry this 
into effect was, however, arrested by a severe sleet-storm, 
which turned the roads into quagmires, and rendered 
movement impossible. The march, scarcely begun, was 
necessarily abandoned, and the troops were ordered 
back to their old camps. Discovering that the malign 
Dissatisfaction influence which had before paralyzed the 
m the army. Army of the Potomac was again at work, he 
had prepared a general order dismissing from the service 
certain officers, but, before issuing it, he submitted it to 
the President. It was decided, in view of public necessi- 
ties, that General Burnside himself should be relieved 
from command, and that the order should take the form 
that this was at his own request. Against this he remon- 
strated as unjust, urging that his resignation should be 
Burnside's nobie accepted instead ; but, with a patriotism that 
might have been an example to all the of- 
ficers of that army, he nobly consented at last that any 
order whatever might be published respecting him per- 
sonally, if it were considered conducive to the welfare of 
the republic, and that, instead of resigning, he would 
serve wherever he was required. In the same order Ma- 
jor General Franklin was relieved from duty in the Army 
of the Potomac, as was also Major General Sumner — the 
latter at his own request. Major General 

Hooker assigned to -p-r -, -, -1 • r>i 

command in Bum- Hooker was assigned to command in Gen- 
side's stead. , ° . 

eral Burnside s stead. 
I can not close this history of Lee's sortie more in- 
structively than by presenting the following 

Condition of the . In , , , •,, i m .i 

confederate extract oi a statement written while the 


Confederate army lay at Winchester (Sep- 
tember 2Gth), after the retreat from Maryland. Certainly 
nothing can depict more eloquently the military virtues 

Its battles and 


of the Southern soldier. It is an appeal to the people of 
the Confederacy for contributions for the relief of the 

In this appeal, the sufferings of that army since it left 
the banks of James River are likened to 
those endured by the French in their dis- 
astrous retreat from Mospow. It is not only a plea 
for help, but an apology for those who had left their 

" This army proceeded directly to the line of the Rap- 
pahannock, and, moving out from that river, it fought its 
way to the Potomac, crossed the stream, and moved on 
to Frederick and Hagerstown, had a heavy engagement 
at Boonesborough (Turner's Gap), and another at Cramp- 
ton's Gap below, fought the greatest pitched battle of the 
war at Sharpsburg (Antietam), and then recrossed the 
Potomac back into Virginia. During all this time, cover- 
ing the full space of a month, the troops rested but four 
days. And let it be always remembered to their honor, 
that of the men who performed this wonderful feat, one 
fifth were barefooted, one half in rags, and the whole half 
famished. The country from the Rappahannock to the 
Potomac had been visited by the enemy with fire and 
sword, and our transportation was insufficient to keep the 
army supplied from so distant a base as Gordon sville, and 
when provision trains did overtake the army, so pressing 
were the exigencies of their position that the men seldom 
had time to cook. Their difficulties were increased by 
the fact that cooking utensils in many cases had been left 
behind, as well as every thing else that would impede 
their movements. It was not unusual to see a company 
of starving men have a barrel of flour distributed to them 
which it was utterly impossible for them to convert into 
bread with the means and in the time allowed them. 

" Do you wonder, then, that there should have been 


stragglers from the army? that brave and 

Its great privations. , °° , -1 -1 i p n , n 1 

true men should have fallen out ironi sheer 
exhaustion, or in their efforts to obtain a mouthful to eat 
along the roadsides? or that many seasoned veterans — 
the conquerors in the Valley, at Richmond, and at Manas- 
sas— should have succumbed to disease, and been forced 
back to the hospital? I look to hear a great -outcry 
against the stragglers. Already lazy cavalrymen and 
dainty staff officers and quartermasters, who are mounted 
and can forage the country for something to eat, are con- 
demning the weary private, who, notwithstanding his 
body may be covered with dust and perspiration, and his 
feet with stone-bruises, is expected to trudge along under 
his knapsack and cartridge-box, on an empty stomach, 
and never turn aside for a morsel of food to sustain his 
sinking limbs. Out upon such monstrous injustice ! That 
there has been unnecessary straggling is readily admitted, 
but in a large majority of cases the men have only to 
point to their bleeding feet, tattered garments, and gaunt 
frames for an answer to the unjust charge. No army on 
this continent has ever accomplished as much or suffered 
as much as the Army of Northern Virginia within the 
last three months. At no period during the first Revo- 
lutionary War, not even at Valley Forge, did our fore- 
fathers in arms encounter greater hardships or endure 
them more uncomplainingly. 

" But, great as have been the trials to which the army 
The necessity of h as been subjected, they are hardly worthy 
to be named in comparison with the suffer- 
ings in store for it this winter, unless the people of the 
Confederate States every where, and in whatever circum- 
stances, come to its immediate relief. The men must 
have clothing and shoes this winter. They must have 
something to cover themselves when sleeping, and to pro- 
tect themselves from the driving sleet and snow-storms 


when on duty. This must be done, though our friends 
at home should have to wear cotton and sit by the fire. 
The Army of Virginia stands guard this day, as it will 
stand guard this winter, over every hearthstone through- 
out the South. The ragged sentinel who may pace his 
weary rounds this winter on the bleak spurs of the Blue 
Ridge, or along the frozen valleys of the Shenandoah and 
Rappahannock, will be your sentinel, my friends, at home. 
It will be for you and your household that he encounters 
the wrath of the tempest and the dangers of the night. 
He suffers, and toils, and fights for you too, brave, true- 
hearted w^omen of the South. Will you not clothe his 
nakedness, then ? Will you not put shoes and stockings 
on his feet ? Is it not enough that he has written down 
his patriotism in crimson characters from the Rappahan- 
nock to the Potomac \ And must his bleeding feet also 
impress the mark of fidelity upon the snows of the com- 
ing winter ? 

" It was hoped at one time that we might obtain win- 
its disappointment ter supplies in Maryland. This hope was 
m Maryland, born after the army left Richmond, and has 
now miserably perished. The government is unable to 
furnish the supplies, for they are not to be had in the 

In truth, the condition of the retreating Confederate 
army was now to the last degree deplorable. It was 
ragged, barefoot, hatless, and winter was coming on. It 
had not gathered the expected plunder of Philadelphia, 
and reduction by ^or touched the ransom of New York. De- 
sertion went on without a parallel. The 
President and other officers of the Confederate and state 
governments were constrained to appeal to the women 
to frown on the deserters, and secure their apprehen- 
sion. In this the Southern press earnestly joined. It 
was affirmed that half the soldiers from certain por- 


tkms of the states had escaped to their homes without 

Brave as they were, the Confederate troops had failed 
The end of Lee's to break through the investing line. Their 
sortie had culminated at Antietam. Win- 
ter found them on the southern side of the Kappahan- 






On the establishment of the blockade, it was found necessary to have a Southern 
naval station for the supply and repair of the ships. Port Royal, in South Caro- 
lina, was therefore seized for that purpose. 

From Port Royal an expedition was sent out, which reduced Port Pulaski and 
completed the blockade of Georgia. Another expedition, which was also suc- 
cessful, was dispatched to the coast of Florida. 

From Fortress Monroe expeditions were sent to the North Carolina coast. One, 
under Butler, occupied Hatteras ; another, under Burnside, occupied Roanoke 
Island and places in its vicinity. 

The Confederate government commissioned privateers. 

Very soon after the inauguration of Lincoln the proc- 
lamation of a blockade of the Southern ports was issued 
(p. 27). In the opinion of foreign nations this blockade 
was effectually maintained. 

On its part, the Confederacy resorted to the authoriza- 
tion of privateers. Some of these sailed from American, 
some from English ports. 

A consideration of this portion of the naval transac- 
ciassiflcation of tions is therefore, perhaps, best conducted 
by grouping the various events under two 
heads: 1st, those in relation to the blockade; 2d, those 
in relation to privateers. Respecting the former, it is ex- 
pedient not to relate them in their strict order of occur- 
rence, but rather, viewing them in the aggregate, to give 



precedence to the more important facts, arranging the 
others so that their mutual connection may be perceived. 
The privateering operations may "be more appropriately 
considered in the next volume. 


The blockade once established, it was found necessary, 
for its effective maintenance, to have a large 

Necessity of a , . . , 

southern navai naval station at some point near the centre 

station. . . . -. . 

of the line. For the first time in history, a 
great fleet of steam-ships had been employed for blockad- 
ing purposes, and, to enable it to keep the sea without 
long voyages for supplies and repairs, docks and machine 
shops near at hand were required. All kinds of stores 
were demanded — munitions of war, powder, shot, shell, 
provisions, medicines, coal, fresh meats, ice, fresh water. 
Supply - ships, in a continuous line, were passing from 
II. — II ii 


point to j)oiiit. Their task would be rendered less oner- 
ous by the establishment of a central depot. The seizure 
of Hatteras, which, as we shall presently see, had been 
made, did not meet these requisitions. It merely shut 
a gate to exclude the blockade adventurer, but was not 
the acquisition of a commodious harbor. 

It was therefore determined, in the autumn of 1861, to 
Expedition to occupy Port Royal, in South Carolina — a har- 
port Royai. ^ or situated between Charleston and Savan- 
nah, and the best upon the Southern Atlantic coast. The 
fleet assigned for this purpose was the most powerful that 
had yet been fitted out in America ; it consisted of the 
frigate Wabash, 14 gun-boats, 34 steamers, and 26 sailing 
vessels. It was under the command of Commodore Du- 
pont, and carried more than 15,000 troops, under Major 
General Thomas W. Sherman. Soon after leaving Hamp- 
ton Roads it encountered a violent storm, by which the 
ships were dispersed and several of the transports lost. 
On the morning of November 4th, however, Dupont reach- 
ed his destination, with difficulty getting his flag-ship, the 
Wabash, over the bar; but he was soon after joined by 
his fleet. On Hilton Head there was a strong earthwork, 
Fort Walker, mounting 23 guns, with an outwork on the 
sea-front having a rifled gun. The plan of Fort Walk- 
Defenses of er was such that its principal guns were 
port Royai. m0 unted on two water-faces so nearly in 
line as to admit of an enfilading fire from a certain point ; 
the flanks were much weaker. On the opposite side of 
the channel, on Phillip's Island, at a distance of 2 J miles, 
was another earthwork, Fort Beauregard, mounting 20 
guns, several of them heavy rifles. It had an outwork 
mounting ^ve. Two miles above, at the junction of Beau- 
fort and Broad Rivers, the Confederate Commodore Tatt- 
nall had a fleet of five or six gun-boats. The works were 
manned by about 1700 South Carolina troops. 



HlLTO N Hea dM O C "& A.15 . 


" It was determined to direct the weight of the attack 
Dtipont's attack fi rs ^ upon Fort Walker, and then turn to 
on the forts. Fort Beauregard. The plan was for the 
fleet to pass up midway "between the forts and engage 
both at long range, and, when the line reached a point 2 \ 
miles north of the forts, to turn to the south round by 
the west, and come into close action with Fort Walker, 
attacking on the weakest flank, while at the same time 
the shot would enfilade the two water-faces." The ships 
were to pass the forts at a distance of 800 yards when 
moving southward; but, when they made the second 
circuit, they were to come nearer, sighting their guns 
for 550 yards, so that the gunners in the fort had not 
only to fire at a moving object, but the ships were some 
300 yards nearer than when they passed at first. Of 
course the range would be lost, and but little damage in- 
flicted. Each vessel, as it came down, was to send enfi- 
lading shot from its pivot-guns, and then give the whole 


starboard broadside. On its return upward it was to 
give its port broadside. 

The necessary preparations having been made, the flag- 
ship Wabash, followed by the other war- 
it is successful. ,. -. , . , n , , , 

ships, passed up the midst ot the channel. 
Sailing in the designated elliptical track, they delivered 
their fire as they neared the forts. They made the cir- 
cuit three times. Meanwhile some of the smaller vessels 
had taken stations where they could not only prevent the 
Confederate fleet from giving any assistance, but also 
maintain a fire upon the left flank of Fort Walker. In 
the course of three hours the fort was disabled, and its gar- 
rison had taken to flight, leaving even watches and other 
valuables behind. Simultaneously Fort Beauregard was 
abandoned. The loss on the national side was, in killed 
and wounded, 31 ; the Confederate loss was probably 
much more. In the forts were found 49 cannon and 
large quantities of ammunition. The town of Beaufort 
and the adjoining islands were soon afterward taken pos- 
session of, and troops were landed on Hilton Head, which 
was strongly fortified. 

Port Royal, thus secured, was made a base of operations 
against South Carolina and Georgia. It became a great 
depot for munitions and stores of every kind. 

Savannah, which is situated about fifteen miles from 
the mouth of the Savannah River and on 

Expedition for the . , , ... • 1 -i /* i -i 1 

blockade of sa- its southern bank, is mainly defended by a 

vannah. ' , *> ^ . 

strong casemated brick work, Fort Pulaski, 
on Cockspur Island. There is also a smaller work, Fort 
Jackson, nearer to the city. 

Between Fort Pulaski and Fort Jackson is Jones's 
Island. It is of a triangular shape, being bounded by 
Wright River on the east, by Mud River on the north, 
and by the Savannah itself on the southwest. It is 


about five miles long, and two or three broad. Point 
Venus is on the face of it, fronting the Savannah River. 
Jones's Island is separated from Turtle Island by Wright 
River. The mouth of this river is about two miles above 
Fort Pulaski. 

Information had been given by some negroes that there 
secret passages exists a Passage connecting Calibogue Sound 
explored. with the Savannah River, through which 

gun-boats might pass out of reach of Fort Pulaski, and 
cut off communication between that work and Savan- 
nah. A reconnoissance of boats with muffled oars success- 
fully eluded the Confederate pickets, the exploring party 
hiding themselves in the reeds during the day and con- 
tinuing their work in the night. They found that 
through an artificial passage, about 200 yards in length, 
known as Wall's Cut, access might readily be had to 
Wright River. This passage or channel was obstructed 
by three rows of piles, and by a sunken brig. At high 
water, however, they were able to get over these obsta- 
cles. They ascertained that gun-boats often feet draught 
Reconnoissance of could make # their way without difficulty. 
Jones's island. The reconnoitring party passed within hear- 
ing of the sentinels on Pulaski, and proceeded beyond 
Point Venus up to the mouth of Mud River. Through 
that river there was no available passage, the water being 
too shallow. 

An expedition was therefore sent out to remove the 
obstructions in Wall's Cut. The piles were sawn off, 
the brig turned lengthwise so as to open the passage. 
The work lasted for three weeks, and was brought to its 
conclusion without detection. A few runaway negroes, 
who were hiding in the marsh, and sportsmen shooting 
wild ducks, were seized. 

Information was in like manner obtained from some 
negroes of a similar neglected passage, known as Wil- 



[Sect. XII. 


Isolation of Fort 

mington Narrows, on the opposite side of the Savannah. 
Reconnoissances along it were accordingly made, and it 
was determined that operations should be commenced 
here simultaneously with those at Wall's Cut. 

Access round Fort Pulaski having thus been obtained, 
a road was made from Wall's Cut over the 
marshes of Jones's Island to Point Venus, 
where a battery was constructed. Another battery was 
placed on the extremity of Long Island, and a third on 
floats at the mouth of Mud River. These cut off commu- 
nication between Savannah and the fort, and kept the 
Confederate gun-boats at a distance. 

For the reduction of Fort Pulaski, eleven batteries were 
established on the northwest face of Tybee 
Island, confronting the fort. Every thing 
being in readiness (April 10th, 1862), the fort was sum- 
moned to surrender. Its commandant refused. Fire was 
therefore opened upon it ; in fifteen hours it was so much 
injured, and its magazine in so much danger of being 
reached by the shells, that it surrendered. The posses- 
sion of this fort completed the blockade of Savannah. 

There were some interesting incidents connected with 
the reduction of Fort Pulaski. Jones's Island is a mere 

Its bombardment. 


marsh, covered witli rank grass, and flooded at high wa- 
Difficuities in its ter. Over this, on a rude corduroy road, 
reduction. ^ Q soldiers dragged cannon weighing three 

tons each. The wintry nights were dark and stormy. 
The men had frequently to work waist-deep in the slushy 
morass ; the guns slipped off the track, sank in the mire, 
and had to be dragged back again. On Tybee Island 
the work was even more severe; ten-inch Columbiads 
had to be dragged two miles through the sand by hand. 
Up to this time it had been supposed that walls such 
as those of Fort Pulaski could not be breached at dis- 
tances greater than 800 yards. 

The guns used were 8 and 10 inch Columbiads, rifles 

from 24 to 42 pounders, and 10 and 13 inch mortars. 

The nearest batteries were almost a mile 

G<TG£it clisttincGS of 

the breaching bat- from the fort, the more distant two miles. 

teries. ' 

Though the walls were seven and a half feet 
thick, they could not withstand the guns. The rifles per- 
forated them deeply, honeycombing them completely; and 
the 10-inch solid shot, striking with less velocity, but with 
what was designated by eye-witnesses as a trip-hammer 
blow, shook the damaged masonry down. At 1650 yards, 
which was the distance of the nearest rifles, the shot pen- 
etrated to a depth of from twenty to twenty-six inches — 
an effect so unexpected that General Gillmore, who con- 
ducted the operation, subsequently reported that, had he 
been aware of what he now had learned, he might have 
shortened his preparations from eight weeks to one, and 
increased the distance of his nearest batteries to even 
2500 yards. 

An expedition was dispatched from Port Royal (Feb- 

Expeciition to Fcr- ruary 28th, 1862) to the coast of Florida. 

One portion of it approached Fernandina, 

which is near the Atlantic terminus of the Cedar Keys 



[Sect. XII. 

and Fernandina Railroad, through Cumberland Sound, 
with a view of turning the Confederate works ; the re- 
mainder went down outside of Cumberland Island. On 
the approach of the ships the Confederates abandoned 
Repossession of the post. The town of Fernandina was oc- 
cupied. Fort Clinch was repossessed, and 
the works garrisoned with national troops. The easy 
success of this expedition appears to have turned on the 
previous withdrawal of the Florida troops for service in 
the Confederate army. In like manner, possession was 
Expeditions on the taken (March 7th) of Brunswick, the At- 
lantic terminus of the Brunswick and Pen- 

Florida coast. 


sacola Kailroad. It alst) had been abandoned, as was the 
case with Darien, on the Altamaha River, whence 1500 
troops had been withdrawn. But one white man and 
one old negro were found in the place. Jacksonville, on 
the St. John's River, was occupied without resistance 
(March 11th), and St. Augustine soon after. With it 
Fort Marion was taken. 


Florida, out of a white population of 77,778, had fur- 
nished nearly 10,000 men to the Confederate army. 
Thus stripped, she was unable to make any resistance, or 
to protect the works and towns upon her coast. Com- 
modore Dupont, referring in his report to the condition 
sentiments of the of St. Augustine, says : " I believe there are 
many citizens who are earnestly attached to 
the Union, a large number who are silently opposed to 
it, and a still larger number who care very little about 
the matter. There is much violent and pestilent feeling 
among the women. They have a theatrical desire to fig- 
ure as heroines. Their minds have doubtless been filled 
with the falsehoods so industriously circulated in regard 
to the lust and hatred of our troops. On the night be- 
fore our arrival, a party of them assembled in front of the 
barracks, and cut down the flag-staff, in order that it 
might not be used to support the old flag. The men 
seemed anxious to conciliate in every way." 

The operations on the coast of North Carolina were 
conducted by expeditions organized at Fort- 

Objects of the North ~m T mi -, . n . , -, n 

Carolina expedi- ress Monroe, lney were chiefly intended 

tions. ■ 

for the enforcement of the blockade and the 
stoppage of privateers going to sea. Subsequently the 
possession or destruction of the Weldon Railroad was 
contemplated, but not forcibly attempted. In fact, when 
the correct plan of the war came to be understood, it was 
perceived that these expeditions, except in so far as they 
aided the blockading fleet, were of no use. The forces of 
one of them (Burnside's) were eventually withdrawn, and 
brought on a more correct line of operations. 

The expeditions now to be referred to are two : (1.) 
Butler's expedition to Hatteras ; (2.) Burnside's Roanoke 



[Sect. XII. 


The expedition 
to Hatteras. 

The waters of Pamlico and Albemarle Sounds are con- 
nected with the interior of North Carolina 
by canal, rivers, and railroads, giving singu- 
lar facilities to blockade runners to carry on their opera- 
tions. Through these, muskets, cannon, and large quanti- 
ties of munitions of war were introduced into the Con- 
federacy, and cotton carried out. To guard the main 
channel of this commerce, two forts had been built on the 

Chap.LIX.] the hatteras expedition. 491 

southwest point of Hatteras Island, which is between 
Oregon and Hatteras Inlets — Fort Clark, a small water 
battery, mounting five guns, and Fort Hatteras, a stronger 
work, covering about 1^ acres, and having ten guns. The 
island itself is a mere sand-spit, on which here and there 
are scattered clumps of dwarf-oaks : the sea-spray dashes 
all over it. A miserable population of five hundred per- 
sons finds occupation in piloting, wrecking, fishing. In 
the salt marshes, concealed by a rank grass, are swarms 
of musquitoes. 

With a view of arresting the traffic through these 
sounds and enforcing the blockade, an expedition, under 
General Butler and Commodore Stringham, sailed from 
Fortress Monroe (August 26, 1861), its immediate object 
being the capture of the two forts. It consisted of three 
its navai and powerful frigates and half a dozen smaller 
military force, vessels, carrying in the aggregate 158 guns 
and about 900 soldiers. It passed through Hatteras Inlet 
into Pamlico Sound. Much difficulty was experienced in 
landing the troops through the heavy surf rolling on the 
beach. One third of the force, 300 men, was, however, 
got on shore, but without either provisions, water, or am- 
munition. A bombardment was opened by the shipping 
upon the smaller work, which replied with but little ef- 
fect, the vessels keeping in continual motion, each steam- 
ing round on a different circle, so that the range of none 
Bombardment of them could be got. On their part, they 
threw their shells with so much accuracy as 
to compel its defenders to abandon Fort Clark in the 
course of a couple of hours. A rainy and tempestuous 
night set in, adding not a little to the discomfort of the 
troops which had been landed; but, as soon as it was day, 
fire was resumed on the larger fort, Hatteras, and it. was 
speedily reduced. The Confederates, though re-enforced 
during the operations, found themselves completely over- 


They are sur- matched, and were compelled to surrender. 

Among those who were thus taken prisoners 
was Barron, who had, at Lincoln's accession, nearly been 
surreptitiously appointed to one of the most confidential 
posts in the United States Navy Department (p. 55). 
There were captured more than 700 prisoners, 25 cannon, 
and 1000 small-arms. The force left in charge of the posi- 
tion subsequently undertook an expedition to Chickami- 

comico, about 20 miles distant, but was 
chickamicomico compelled to retire, pursued by the Confed- 

expedition. x ' \ *> 

erates : it destroyed its tents and stores, and 
lost about 50 prisoners. But one of the light-draught 
vessels, coming to the .rescue, put the pursuers to flight 
with shells, inflicting on them a considerable loss as they 
passed along the flat sand-bank, which afforded them no 
cover or protection. 

The seizure of these forts was an important step in the 
Eesuits of these enforcement of the 'blockade. It gave access 

operations. ^ ^ ^ jj^ 0^]^ mun ^ and threat . 

ened the power of the Confederates in these interior Wa- 

Boanoke Island, lying behind Bodie's Island, the sand- 
Bumside's expedi- b ar that shuts off Upper North Carolina 

tion to Koanoke. from ^ J^^ Q^^ Q ff em gome Q f fag 

most interesting souvenirs of early American history. It 
was (vol. i., p. 147) the scene of Sir Walter Baleigh's col- 
onizing expedition. 

As stated by General Wise, to whom its defense was 
Military value of intrusted by the Confederate government, it' 

Eoanoke Island. ^ ^ ^ ^ ^j ^ ^ defenses of ^^ 

folk. It unlocked two sounds, eight rivers, four canals, 
two railroads. It guarded more than four fifths of the 
supplies of Norfolk. The seizure of it endangered the 
subsistence of the Confederate army there, threatened the 



navy yard, interrupted the communication between Nor- 
folk and Richmond, and intervened between both and 
the South. " It lodges an enemy in a safe harbor from 
the storms of Hatteras, gives him a rendezvous, and a 
large, rich range of supplies. It commands the sea-board 
from Oregon Inlet to Cape Henry." 

After the capture of Hatteras Inlet in August, 1861, 
light-draught steamers, armed with a rifle gun, often 
stealthily came out of these waters to prey upon com- 
merce. In the interior, shipping, and even iron-clads, were 


The expedition of General Butler, as has been stated 
(p. 491), had reduced the defensive works at Hatteras In- 
let and opened Pamlico Sound. The Confederates had 
retired to Roanoke Island, which, intervening between 
Pamlico and Albemarle Sounds, commands the passage to 
the latter. The channel on the east of the island is shal- 
low; that on the west, known as Croatan 
Sound, was defended by three earth-works 

Defenses of the 


on the island, one at Pork Point, one at Weir's Point, and 
a smaller work, Fort Blanchard, between. The larger 
works were armed with twenty-two guns, some of them 
100-pound rifles. On the main land, at Redstone Point, 
there was another battery Across the channel, near Pork 
Point, obstructions of piles and sunken vessels had been 
placed. On the island itself there were other works, one 
giving protection toward Nag's Head, on the bar, and an- 
other near the centre of the island — a redoubt, with a 
pond on its front and flanks, commanding the road that 
comes from the south. 

An expedition for operating on this part of the North 
Carolina coast was placed under command of General 
Burnside, who was ordered (January 7th, 1862) to unite 
with Flag-officer Goldsborough, in command of the fleet, 
at Fortress Monroe, capture Newbern, seize the Weldon 
Railroad, and reduce Fort Macon. 

The force consisted of 31 steam gun-boats, some of 
them carrying heavy guns; 11,500 troops, 

Naval and military 1 . . l_ . . n , n -,-, 

strength of the ex- conveyed in 47 transports; a fleet of small 
vessels for the transportation of sixty days' 

It left Hampton Roads on the night of January 11th, 
T . . , . . and arrived off Hatteras in two days, as a 

Its misfortunes at ^ «/ ' 

the outset. storm was coming on. The commander found 

with dismay that the draught of several of his ships was 
too great to permit them to enter. There were not more 
than 7i feet of water on the bar. Some dishonest ship- 
sellers in New York had, by misrepresentation, palmed 
off on the government unsuitable transport vessels, of 
which several were lost in that tempestuous sea. The 
crowded ships were in each other's way. The steamer 
City of New York, with a cargo valued at nearly a quar- 
ter of a million of dollars, went to pieces. The clouds 
seemed to dip down to the vessels' masts ; so violent were 


the waves that no one could keep the deck. It was only 
by the greatest exertion and perseverance, and not until 
a whole fortnight had elapsed, that the entrance to Pam- 
lico Sound was completed. The villainy that led to this 
delay gave the Confederates ample time for preparation. 
Not until the end of another week (February 7th) had 
the reorganized expedition gained the entrance to Croa- 
tan Sound, and worked through its shallow, marshy pass- 
es. The weather was beautiful by day; there was a 
bright moonshine at night. The gun-boats found a Con- 
federate fleet drawn up behind the obstructions, across 
Attack commenced the channel, near Pork Point. They open- 
by the fleet. e d 'fire on the fort at that point. It was 

returned both from the works and the shipping. Mean- 
time troops were being landed at Ashby's, a small force, 
which was attempting to resist them, being driven off by 
the fire of the ships. The debarkation went on, though 
it was raining heavily and night had set in. It was con- 
tinued until 10,000 men had been landed on the marsh. 
Before dark, however, the work at Pork Point had been 
silenced, and the Confederate fleet had retired to Weir's 
Point. Their flag-ship, the Curlew, had been set on fire 
by a 100-pound shell. 

When day broke Burnside commenced forcing his way 
up the island. He moved in three columns, the central 
one, preceded by a howitzer battery, upon the only road, 
the right and left through the woods. The battery 
The troops carry that obstructed this road was soon carried, 
the batteries. ^ though not without resistance. The men 
had to wade waist-deep in the water of the pond that 
protected it. Finding it impossible to flank it, as had 
been intended, they charged it in front. It was here that 
Captain Wise, the son of the Confederate commander, 
was mortally wounded. General Wise himself lay sick 
at Nag's Head. It added not a little to the bitterness 


of this needless sacrifice that he had protested in vain to 
the Richmond authorities against what was doing at Ro- 
anoke Island, and had told them what the result must 
inevitably be ; but the Secretary of War, Benjamin, turn- 
ed a deaf ear to him. Toward Nag's Head the Confed- 
erate force, expelled from the captured work, attempted 
to retreat. They were, however, overtaken, and the rest 
of the command on the north of the island, 2500 strong, 
was compelled to surrender. 

The Confederate fleet was pursued to Elizabeth City, 
capture of Eden- whither it had fled, and there destroyed. A 
large part of the town was burned. A por- 
tion of the national fleet went into the* harbor of Eden- 
ton, and captured that town. Winton, on the Chowan 
River, shared the same fate. 

Burnside next made an attack (March 14th) on New- 
bern, one of the most important sea-ports of North Caro- 
lina. As the troops advanced from the place of landing, 
the gun-boats shelled the woods in front of them, and 
thereby cleared the way. A march of eighteen miles in 
a rain-storm, and over execrable roads, did not damp the 
energy of the soldiers. They bivouacked at night by 
pitch-pine fires. Five miles below Newbern they came 
upon some works, which, after a sharp struggle, were 
taken by assault, and the enemy pursued toward New- 
bern. The city had been set on fire in several places, 
and also of New- an d the bridge over the Trent was in flames. 
Newbern was captured, and with it 46 heavy 
guns, 3 batteries of light artillery, and a large amount 
of stores. Burnside's losses were 90 killed and 466 
wounded. • 

Preparations were next made for the reduction of Fort 

capture of Fort Macon, which commands the entrance of 

Macon - Beaufort Harbor. On April 25th it was 

bombarded by three steamers and three shore batteries ; 

Chap.lix.] stone blockades. 497 

the former, however, in the course of an hour and a half, 
were compelled to withdraw. But the shore batteries, 
continuing their attack, silenced the guns of the garri- 
son, and, in the course of the afternoon, compelled the 
surrender of the fort. 

In connection with this expedition some operations of 
minor importance occurred — an affair at South Mills ; the 
obstructing of the entrance to the Dismal Swamp ; an en- 
gagement near Pactolus. The chief result, however, was 
the closure of the ports and suppression of commerce. 
General Burnside's forces were eventually, for the most 
part, withdrawn. They were taken to Alexandria, and 
joined the army of General Pope. 

Before the close of 1862 a large part of the Atlantic 
Southern coast had been" recovered from the 

General result of / ~ i „ -. .-p., . -, 

these coast expe- Confederacy, ihe navy was occupied in 

ditious. •« . *> ' _ . J • n \ 

suppressing the batteries and fortified works 
which had been constructed on the interior water net- 
work. Many of these, as on Otter Island and up the 
Coosaw, were found to have been abandoned. This was, 
perhaps, in part due to the terror of gun-boats inspired 
by the attack on Port Royal, and in part to the fact that 
the force of the Confederacy was already declining. 
Among the methods resorted to for completing the 

blockade, and preventing the egress of pri- 

The stone blockade. 7 . x °. i . r 

vateers seeking to commit depredations on 
commerce, was that of sinking in the channels of some of 
the ports vessels laden with stone. This was first done 
at Ocracoke Inlet, on the North Carolina coast. 

A number of old whale-ships which had become un- 
seaworthy, having been laden with stone, were sunk, on 
the 21st of December (1861), at the principal entrance 
of Charleston Harbor. They were placed in checkered 
rows across the channel. It was expected that they w r ould 
form a nucleus for the accumulation of sand, and thus af- 
II.— 1 1 


ford the required obstacle. The result, however, proved 
to be a failure. 

As the most important privateering operations of the 
The confederate Confederacy have to be considered in the 
privateers. following volume, I shall not, at this point, 

devote much space to that subject. The incidents that 
have to be related, or, rather, referred to, were intrinsical- 
ly of very little importance. They exerted no influence 
on the general issue, and were without any political re- 
sult, except in so far as they raised the question of the 
treatment of privateersmen as pirates. 

On June 2d., 1861, the Savannah, a schooner of 50 
tons, carrying an 18-pound swivel, eluded the blockading 
squadron off Charleston. Next day she fell in with a 
Maine brig, laden with sugar, bound to Philadelphia. 
Having decoyed her within reach by hoisting an Amer- 
ican flag, the privateer captured her without difficulty. 
Soon after the Savannah fell in with another brig, and 
her captain expected to make as easy a prize of it. It 
was, however, the United States brig of war Perry. Dis- 
captureofthe covering the mistake when it was too late, 
savannah. ^ g avanna ] 1 was obliged to surrender. Her 

crew were sent to New York. It was intended to try 
them for piracy ; but a threat from the Confederate gov- 
ernment that it would retaliate, led to their exchange 
along with other prisoners of war. 

Still worse fortune befell the Petrel, which likewise 
sinking of the ran out through the blockade of Charleston. 

Petrel. gj^ wag J^j^y a £ gea wnen sne foU i n with 

what seemed to be a large merchant vessel. She accord- 
ingly gave chase, and fired a shot across the stranger's 
bow to bring her to. The crew of the Petrel reported 
that they were at a loss to know what had next happen- 

Chap.lix.] confederate privateers. 499 

ed to them. They were floating among splinters and 
wreck ; their vessel had disappeared. They had been 
chasing the frigate St. Lawrence, which had opened her 
ports and instantly sent the Petrel to the bottom. Four 
men were drowned, and thirty-six rescued from the water. 
Several prizes were, however, made by other vessels 
The confederate sailing under the Confederate flag. At the 
pmes. close of the year (1861) these prizes were 

fifty-eight in number. The Confederate government car- 
ried its point that its prisoners captured at sea should be 
treated as ordinary prisoners of war. Colonel Corcoran, 
of the New York 69 th Eegiment, who had been wounded 
and captured at the battle of Bull Run, was handcuffed, 
placed in a solitary cell, and attached to the floor by a 
chain in the Libby Prison at Richmond. This was done 
to compel the national government to recede from the 
position taken by the President in his proc- 
respecting priva- lamation of April 19th, that persons thus 

teers. x ' x 

captured at sea " will be held amenable to 
the laws of the United States for the prevention and pun- 
ishment of piracy," and the measure proved successful. 
Among other naval operations may be mentioned the 
Burning of the destruction, in the harbor of Pensacola, of 

the Judah, a privateer. She was boarded 
early on the morning of September 14th by a party from 
the flag-ship Colorado, who spiked a 10-inch gun with 
which she was armed, and set her on fire. Their loss 
was 15 in killed and wounded. The Confederates, how- 
ever, shortly after retaliated. On the night of October 

9th they sent a force from Pensacola to San- 

The Confederates 

rout a zouave ta Rosa Island, and surprised the camp of a 

regiment. # ' # x t\» 

Zouave regiment stationed near Fort Pick- 
ens. They were successful ; the camp was destroyed, and 
the Zouaves lost about 60 killed and wounded. 

The steamer Sumter, Captain Semmes, had evaded the 


successes of the blockade of the Mississippi about the begin- 
sumter. ning of July, and captured several merchant- 

men in the West India Seas. She then went to Nassau 
for supplies. Having made many captures in the Atlan- 
tic, she was blockaded in the harbor of Gibraltar by the 
national steamer Tuscarora. Here she was sold, her offi- 
cers repairing to Liverpool, and being eventually trans- 
ferred to the Alabama, which had been built for them at 
that port. 

The Nashville, which had slipped out of Charleston, 
successes of the captured and burnt a valuable merchant- 
Nashvme. man, the Harvey Birch, near the English 

coast, and then went into Southampton, where the Tusca- 
rora happened to be. She, however, escaped from this 
national ship, as it was detained by the English govern- 
ment for twenty-four hours after the privateer had sailed. 
An attempt was made (October 11th) to drive the 
Attack on a block- blockading squadron from the mouths of 
admg squadron. ^ e Mississippi. For this purpose, a ram, 
three fire-ships, and five small steamers came down the 
river. The ram struck the national flag-ship Richmond, 
and stove in her side. The other ships slipped their 
cables and ran down to the Southwest Pass. One of 
them, the Vincennes, got aground, her captain attempt- 
ing, without success, to set her on fire. The alarm was, 
however, very quickly over, and the blockade remained 






Public opinion in Europe respecting the American Civil War was, to a great ex- 
tent, founded on the views of the English press. 

The middle classes in England were brought to coincide" with the privileged classes 
in sentiments unfavorable to the American Union, partly by appeals to historical 
recollections, and partly by- considerations connected with the revenue legislation 
of the American Congress. 

The people of the Confederacy very confidently expect- 
ed foreign aid, both moral and material, in 

The Confederacy . -, , , v -. . « , -. . . -, -, T 

expected foreign the establishment ox their independence. It 


was affirmed that promises of that kind had 
been given before the first public movements of secession 
in Charleston were undertaken (vol. i.,p. 512). 

The national government also, not without reason, 
looked for the favorable opinion of that 

and the national n -, . n • -rv> i • i 

government for- powerful influence in Europe which repre- 
sents itself as dedicated to the support of 
law, order, and liberty. 

Both, however, were disappointed. If a French army 
appeared on the American continent, it was not in avowed 
support of the Confederacy, but for \he carrying out of 
European purposes in Mexico. The intellectual power 
of England was engaged, as far as circumstances permit- 
ted, in promoting a partition of the republic. 


It is impossible to express the pain felt by loyal and 
conservative men in America when it was announced that 
the ministry of Lord Palmerston had determined to con- 
cede belligerent rights to the South. 

Republican America did not solicit the moral support 
of Constitutional England as a boon. She expected it as 
a right. Not without the deepest regret did she find 
that she must fight the battle of Representative Institu- 
tions and human freedom alone. 

Though no one imagined that the privileged classes of 
England would look with disfavor on the 

Course of the priv- -i - s» 11 s* i • i i 

iieged classes of downfall oi a democracy, no one m loyal 
America supposed that they could regard 
without horror a resort to conspiracy for the accomplish- 
ment of political ends, or contemplate without disdain 
great officers of state, who, with atrocious perfidy, had be- 
trayed their trust. 

No one supposed that the religious middle classes of 
The religious mid- England, who had ever been foremost in 
die classes. support of human liberty, could forget their 

traditions, and lend their influence to those who were 
attempting, by armed force, to perpetuate and extend 
human slavery. 

No one supposed that the literature of England, of 
which it is the glory to have been the chani- 

The literary classes. . t> itij.ij.--i 

pion 01 Order, .Progress, and all that is be- 
neficent in modern civilization, could view unmoved the 
resort of a faction to brute violence, insurrection, and the 
horrors of civil war — still less that it would seek to par- 
alyze a loyal people in their efforts to uphold a just, a 
great, a good government. 

No one supposed* that a commercial community would 
The commercial se ^ ^ ne Perilous example of building and 
classes. equipping war-ships to destroy the com- 

merce of its friend. 


Not without profound disappointment did loyal and 
educated Americans witness the direction of English in- 
fluence. In their eyes it seemed false to the destinies of 
our race. 

Of a conflict which has cost half a million of lives, 
which in four years has imposed financial burdens and 
occasioned a destruction of property equal in aggregate 
value to the public debt of England, what is the result ? 
Only this — the Confirmation of Free Institutions. The 
price to be paid was very great, but it has been paid by 
America without a murmur. 

Not among the titled — not among the educated — not 
The piam people even among the religious classes of England 
of England. ^ -pree America find favor. Her cause, 
however, was not without supporters in the ancestral 
land. The plain people, those who earn their daily bread 
by honorable industry, who recognized that her cause 
was their cause, were her friends, and that, too, though 
they were the chief sufferers by the commercial embar- 
rassments of the war. 

One illustrious man there was in England who saw 
The Prince consort ^ na t ^ ne gfeat interests of the Future would 
and the Queen. -j^ better subserved by a sincere friendship 

with America than by the transitory alliances of Europe. 
He recognized the bonds of race. His prudent counsels 
strengthened the determination of the sovereign that the 
Trent controversy should have an honorable and peace- 
ful solution. Had the desires of these, the most exalted 
personages in the Realm, been more completely fulfilled, 
the administration of Lord Palmerston would not have 
cast a disastrous shadow on the future of the Anglo- 
Saxon race. 

With the exception of Russia, the Continent of Europe 
was greatly influenced by the representations of the En- 


opinion in Europe glish press, which was supposed, for obvious 

mencan affairs. reasong? -fo ^ we ]J i n f orme( J on the State of 

American affairs. The German settlers in America ex- 
erted what perhaps may be spoken of as a correcting in- 
fluence in their native country, but they were not able to 
neutralize the power of the English press. 

The appreciation of European opinion on affairs con- 
it was influenced by nected with the Civil War turns, therefore, 
English journalism essen ti a lly n a study of the views which 

were taken in England. The material for such a study 
is very ample. It is to be found in the Journalism of the 
country, in the Parliamentary proceedings, and in the acts 
of the government. In truth, nothing more for this pur- 
pose is needed than may be found in the Times newspa- 
per, that powerful journal which not only reflects, but in 
no inconsiderable degree forms the public opinion of En- 

On this occasion I shall follow the course I have taken 
(vol. i., chap, xxvi.) in representing the opinions of the 
South, simply collecting and arranging together such 
statements as seem to have an important bearing on the 
subject, preserving, whenever possible, the language, and 
always the spirit, of the sources from which they are de- 

Perhaps it may not be inappropriate to make the pref- 

and English wstori- atory remark that from the outset there ex- 
cai recollections. igted {r England a disposition to bear in re- 
membrance the colonial war. It was said, The Southern 
States have as much right to assert their independence 
of the Union as the Colonies had to assert their independ- 
ence of England. The reasons that justified the latter 
justify the former. The cases are precisely alike. Amer- 
ica is suffering no more than she caused England to suf- 
fer. She should be the last of nations to complain. 
The cases would have been more nearly alike if a sue- 


Parallel between 

cession of American princes had for many 
coliEdSatemove- years sat upon the English throne; if all 
meDts ' the great offices of state, all the places of 

profit and power, had been largely engrossed "by Ameri- 
cans ; if Parliament had been entirely occupied in legis- 
lating for American interests, or, more truly, for one inter- 
est, and that one interest revolting to the conscience of 
the free Englishman ; if there had been a slave-pen in the 
vicinity of Guildhall, and the cry of the slave-auctioneer 
echoing from the walls of Westminster Abbey; if the 
citizens of London had seen the agony of waives parted 
forever from their husbands, and children, even those at 
the breast, separated from their parents. The cases would 
have been more nearly alike if, when under the Constitu- 
tion of England it became unavoidable that an English 
prince must displace those who had so long held the reins 
of government, the cabinet ministers of the retiring dy- 
nasty had engaged in the most atrocious treason ; if the 
army had been sent to remote territories for the pur- 
pose of being entrapped, the navy scattered on fictitious 
errands in distant seas, so that not more than two or 
three ships were to be found upon the coast; if large 
sums of money had been purloined from the treasury for 
the purposes of the conspiracy ; if every musket that 
could be secured had been stealthily sent across the At- 
lantic ; if the great arsenal at Woolwich had been seized 
and robbed, of its thousands of cannon ; if officers of the 
army and navy had been seduced to resign their commis- 
sions, and judges had refused to act ; if the House of 
Lords had become the focus of a conspiracy against the 
government, and members of the House of Commons had 
retained their seats for no other purpose than to obstruct 
legislation ; if the new sovereign had gone to his corona- 
tion in peril of being assassinated; if the malcontents 
had openly declared that they would either rule or ruin 


the nation, then there would have been an analogy be- 
tween the causes of the War of the American Revolution 
and those, of the American Civil War. 

Considered merely as a matter of policy, the ministry 
influence of English of Lord Palmerston regarded it as not unde- 
newspapers. sirable to promote a partition of the Amer- 

ican Union. With very great skill the journalism of 
England manufactured public opinion, and brought the 
middle classes into accord with the privileged. The tra- 
ditions of old dissensions furnished a starting-point, and 
the dexterous presentation of American revenue legisla- 
tion accomplished the rest. 

The manner in which an extensively circulated and 
powerful newspaper can imperceptibly direct public opin- 
ion, and thereby accomplish its ends, offers one of the most 
interesting subjects of psychological study. Very strik- 
ing examples of the kind are occasionally observed in 

Let us notice the successive phases of opinion exhibited 
by such a foreign journal in 1861. It begins 

The successive . , , n /» • 11 

opinions they with a generous sympathy for a friendly 

present. , ° . . . 

nation in trouble, and insensibly leads its 
unsuspecting reader to very different sentiments at last. 
It says : 

"The Southern States have sinned more than the North? 
The southern states ern - They have exhibited a passionate ef- 
m the wrong. frontery, not content with the sufferance of 
slavery, but determined on its extension. They refuse 
to have any man for President unless he regards a black 
servant and a black portmanteau as chattels of the same 
category and description. The right, with all its advan- 
tages, belongs to the states of the North. The North is 
for freedom, the South for the tar-brush and pine-fagot. 
Free and democratic communities have applied them- 


selves to the Honorable office of breeding slaves to be 
consumed on the free and democratic plantations of the 
South ; thus replacing the African trade by an internal 
one of equal atrocity. The South has become enamored 
of her shame. 

"If the Slave States be joined by the Border States, they 
will constitute the real United States ; the North will be 
a rump. She would have only a coast of a few hundred 
miles, from the British frontier to the Delaware ; all the 
sea-line and the great rivers will belong to the South. Vir- 
ginia pushes a spur of territory to within a hundred miles 
of Lake Erie, and splits the Free States of the Atlantic 
from those of the West. It is very well to speculate on 
Not Hkeiy that they the return of an erring sister, but it is the 
win return. nature of cracks to widen. In this country 

there is only one wish — that the Union may survive this 
terrible trial." 

Of the declaration by South Carolina of the causes 
which led to her secession, it is said that "it 

The South Carolina 



looks as if it had been long written, and 

carried about, like the redoubtable cane of 
the ever-to-be-regretted Brooks, ready to be put into re- 
quisition on the first convenient opportunity. It is not 
so lively and spirit-stirring a composition as a little more 
literary skill might have made it, but we can not tell how 
much a man is allowed to know of the history of the 
world in that fortunate country without being exposed 
to the vengeance of the halter and the tar-barrel. Noth- 
ing can be more frivolous than the grounds of this mani- 
festo ; its statements are utter falsehoods. Without law, 
without justice, without delay, South Carolina is treading 
the path that leads to the downfall of nations and to the 
misery of families. The hollowness of her cause is seen 
beneath all the pomp of her labored denunciations. 
Charleston, without trade, is an animal under an exhaust- 


ed receiver. Trade is lier very breath. She had better 
look before she takes the dark leap ; she may light on 
something worse than the present, or — on nothing *at all. 
It is easy to decide any day in the affirmative the ques- 
tion whether to cut one's throat or not, but when once 
one has come to that decision and acted on it, it is not so 
easy to review the arguments leading to a contrary view 
of the case. 

"Time, the Avenger, is doing justice between the Amer- 
ican people and ourselves. With what willingness would 
they not see their sonorous Fourth of July rhetoric cov- 
ered by the waters of oblivion ! They have fallen to 
pieces, but we have shown no joy at secession ; we have 
given no encouragement to the South; we have turned 
away from the bait of free trade, and have strengthened 
them by our sympathy and advice. The secession of 
South Carolina is to them what the secession of Lanca- 
secession is nothin- shire would be to us — it is treason, and 

but treason. * ^^y ^ ^ ^^ g^. ^ -jj^ j g ^jj 

of sophists, rhetoricians, logicians, and lawyers ; it has not 
a man of action. Mr. Seward can tell us what will not 
save the Union, but not what will. He looks upon se- 
cession as ideal and impossible. While he is dreaming, 
the Confederacy is strengthening. The Union seems to 
be destined to fall without a struggle, without a lament, 
without an epitaph. Each individual state finds num- 
berless citizens ready to lay down their lives for its pres- 
ervation ; but for the Union, the mighty firmament in 
which those stars are set, and which, though dark itself, 
lends them their peculiar lustre, nothing is done. The 
imbecility of the President says he can do nothing. His 
countrymen boast of the smallness of his sal- 
ary, but, according to our estimate, he is the most over- 
paid of mortals. With provoking inconsistency, he will 
neither fight nor run away. But perhaps his policy has 


not been unwise. Since the traitors Floyd, and Cobb, 
and Thompson have departed, he has adopted the best 
possible course — to stand on the defensive. His message 
is a greater blow to the American people than all the 
rants of the Georgia governor or the ordinances of the 
Charlestonians. He has dissipated the idea that the 
states which elected him are one people. The federation 
is not a nationality, it is only a partnership. 

" Considering the probable action of the Border States, 
Virginia w m be it ^ may be expected that Virginia will go 
lro c -seiling he inS?- with the South, for the simple reason that 
the South will buy her negroes, and the 
North will not. The Gulf States know the power which, 
as the purchasers of slaves, they possess over the specious, 
but unreal neutrality of the Border States. If Virginia 
should take that course, the North must find a new cap- 
ital. Washington will be lost. Every thing now turns 
on what the Border States will do; but their demands 
are exorbitant. Our own belief is that the ultimate set- 
tlement of the question turns on the mutual dependence 
of the two sections, and the essential identity of the peo- 
ple. The force of political cohesion will probably be too 
strong even for the ambition and the sectional hatred of 
the Charleston demagogues. Though things look so 
jDromising for them, it is evident that the secession lead- 
ers and their too willing followers are at the beginning 
of terrible disasters. Southern credit does 

The financial credit , , -1 i • i •;! • ,1 TT • • ,i 

of the south very not stand nigh either in the Union or in the 

low. °. 

world. Capital flies from a land ruled by 
fanatical demagogues. 

" At a moment when the destinies of the Union are 
trembling in the balance, and the republic is menaced 
with the worst catastrophe of civil war, its Legislature is 
engaged upon a measure which seems calculated at once 
to alienate foreign nations and embitter domestic strife. 


The foiiy of the The Morrill tariff bill is an act for the estab- 
lishment of protective duties on a most ex- 
travagant scale. It will almost prohibit all imports into 
the United States from England, France, and Germany. 
It has been said that slavery does not constitute the es- 
sence of the quarrel ; that it is a blind, and that the real 
point of contention is the tariff. We believe that the 
contest for territory is the real contest between the North 
and the South; but it is true that free trade is the natural 
system of the South. It is doubtful, however, if the 
Southern States have clearly conceived the object of their 
secession. Is it the question of slavery or that of free 
trade ? We have never read a public document so diffi- 
cult to interpret as the inaugural of the anti-President. 
He says that divine Providence is on the side of slavery, 
which, probably from motives of delicacy, he never men- 
tions by name. It is useless to disguise the fact that, 
whatever may be thought of Mr. Davis's rhetoric, so long 
as the Washington Congress adds* new re- 

The North is alien- . . . . . . -, . . . . 

ating the sympathy stnctlOnS to a protective policy, it CUtS lt- 

self off from the sympathy of its friends. It 
will not be our fault if the inopportune legislation of the 
North, combined with the reciprocity of wants between 
and modifying En- ourselves and the South, should bring about 
gush opmion. a (.onaiderable modification in our relations 
with America. The tendencies of trade are inexorable. 
It may be that the Southern population will now become 
our best customers. The Free States will long repent an 
act which brings needless discredit on the intrinsic merits 
of their cause." 

It wanted no more than statements of this kind to give 
currency to the opinion that the manufactur- 

Scandalous motives . -.-,- -,-, , -i n > i 1 1 1 

of New England mo; JN ew .Lnfflana states, and the lron-pro- 

aud Pennsylvania. ° <-^ . . , , . 

ducing state, Pennsylvania, were willing to 
push matters to the extremity of civil war, not for the 


sake of upholding the Union, but for the incurring of a 
vast national debt, the interest of which would insure a 
high tariff in perpetuity. At this time " one sixth of the 
population of England — four millions of persons — were 
depending on cotton manufactures for their daily bread, 
and 77 per cent, of the cotton consumed came from Amer- 
ica. There was imminent danger that the mills would 
only work half-time." But let us continue our extracts. 
* "It. is our duty to point out the tendency of this retro- 
The trade of the g m & e commercial policy in the North. It 
taSemd b to W *H transfer the European trade from Bos- 
the south. tQn and New Yor k to Charleston and New 

Orleans. The warmest friends of the Union can not ex- 
pect our merchants to celebrate its obsequies by self-im- 
molation. But let the Free States prove themselves ca- 
pable of postponing sectional interests to a truly national 
policy, and it will soon become evident on which side En- 
glish sympathies are engaged. From the commercial 
point of view, we are not blind enough to suppose that 
we shall gain by the disintegration of the American 
Union into such fragments as Mexico and the South 
American republics. 

" The Union is effectually divided into two rival confed- 
The union com- eracies. The Southern is tainted by slavery, 
piete y ivi e . filibustering, and called into existence, it 

would seem, by a course of deliberate and deep-laid trea- 
son on the part of high officers of the government at 
Washington. In the Northern, the principles avowed 
are such as to command the sympathies of every free and 
enlightened people. But mankind will not ultimately 
judge by sympathies and antipathies ; they will be great- 
ly swayed by their own interests. If the Northern Con- 
federacy evinces a determination to act in a narrow, ex- 
clusive, unsocial spirit, it will lose the sympathy and the 
regard of mankind. Up to this time Congress has done 


The blow struck by 

nothing against the rebellion, but has struck 
the North agamst a blow agamst tree trade. In jDirmingnam, 

English trade ° . ° 

nearly .£3,800,000 worth of cutlery is made 
worthless. Ill will against the North is every where 
arising. We can only wonder at the madness. Protec- 
tion was quite as much a cause of the disruption as slav- 
ery. We warn the government of the United States that 
in attempting to exclude at one blow £20,000,000 of ex- 
ports from their territory, they have undertaken a tasS 
quite 'beyond their power. They can not prevent En- 
glish manufactures from permeating the United States 
from one end to the other. The smuggler w T ill redress 
the errors of the statesman. 

" In the South we find the most convincing proofs of 
superior statesman- forethought and deliberation. The leaders 
ship of the south. are hurried awav by no momentary impulse. 

There are strong evidences of a deep-laid and carefully- 
matured conspiracy — a perfect understanding between 
the chiefs of the movement and the Federal officials. Re- 
union can never be expected. Men do not descend to 
such depths of treachery and infamy unless they are 
about to take a step which they believe to be irrevoca- 
ble. The men who devised and directed the great plot 
of secession knew that they must appeal for recognition 
to the world without, but they thought that, as the world 
could not do without cotton, it could not do without 
them. They have lost that monopoly. The policy of 
the North has been equally suicidal. By enriching a few 
manufacturers at the expense of the whole country, they 
have played into the hands of the seceders. They have 
alienated the feelings of Europe. While the North is 
passing a prohibitory tariff, and speculating on balancing 
the loss of the cotton regions by annexing Canada, the 
Liberality of south- Confederates are on their good behavior. 

ern trade views. They ^ free . traderSt T]ie coas ting trade 


from Charleston to Galveston is thrown open to the Brit- 
ish flag, but the North interprets a coasting trade to in- 
clude a voyage from New England round Cape Horn to 
California. It is not for us to sneer when an American 
community abolishes its navigation laws, declares that 
duties shall never be levied to foster particular branches 
of industry, and adopts a resolution for establishing an 
international copyright. But that is what the South has 
done. Will the South ever return to a Union in which 
native manufactures are, by an advantage taken of the 
absence of Southern representatives, defended by some- 
thing like a prohibition % The South offers to the Bor- 
der States a market for their slaves, and a law against 
the slave-trade to protect their commodity ; the North re- 
quires them to contribute to New England and Pennsyl- 
vania. The high price of manufactures and a good mar- 
ket for slaves will avail more than the con- 

A common interest , • , , • -i i , n ~\r t • t • i • • 

of England and the stitutional lectures 01 Mr. Lincoln in his in- 
augural. It is for their trade that the South 
are resolved to fight. They dissolved the Union to create 
more slave states — that is, to make more cotton. They 
undertook the war for the very object that we have most 
at heart." 

Before Mr. Adams, the minister accredited by Lin- 
coln's administration to the British court, 

England admits -. -. -1 i • jji t» "j • 1 

the belligerent could reach, his post, the .British govern- 

rights of the South. . -i " • 1 

ment, in accordance with a previous under- 
standing with the French, had admitted the belligerent 
rights of the Southern Confederacy. It was not possible 
but that this measure should be regarded by the Amer- 
ican government as unfriendly, and, considering the haste 
with which it was taken, as offensive. It made so pro- 
found and ineffaceable an impression that the conse- 
II— K K 


quences of it will doubtless be recognized in the foreign 
policy of the republic for many generations. 

The neutrality proclamation was issued by the British 
government on the 13 th of May. It was shortly followed 
by a circular from the Foreign Office interdicting the arm- 
ed ships and privateers of both parties. This was suc- 
ceeded, on the 11th of June, by a proclama- 

Neutrality procla- .. ^ . -, . . . -,, .-, -^ 

mations of France tion ot neutrality issued by the .Lmperor 

and Spain. J . *f . - 1 : 

JNapoleon, and still again (June 17th) by 
a neutrality proclamation of the Queen of Spain. The 
three governments, Great Britain, France, and Spain, were 
at this time in perfect accord on American affairs. 



The Southern conspirators had intrigued with the Mexicans for a new Union. The 
Emperor Napoleon resolved to turn that scheme to his own advantage in his re- 
lations with the Austrian Empire. 

He encouraged the disruption of the American Union with a view of neutralizing 
the power of the republic. He drew England and Spain into a joint expedition 
to Mexico. After the expedition had reached that country, those powers discov- 
ered his real intentions and withdrew. 

His army entered the City of Mexico. He established an empire, and'presented 
its crown to the Austrian Archduke Maximilian, who accepted it. 

Meantime, to his disappointment, the United States overthrew secession. The 
American government insisted that he should abandon his Mexican undertaking. 

Finding that it would be hopeless to contend with the Republic, he ordered the 
withdrawal of the French army, abandoning to its fate the empire he had cre- 

For the clear comprehension of the agreement which 
mi - ^ T . had been entered into between England, 

The Mexican expe- O 7 

?hedism a pu b on se o d f on France, and Spain, it is necessary to under- 

the United States. ^^ ^ a( J venturous pro jectS in which 

they were about to engage, affecting the whole North 
American continent. The Mexican expedition — a drama 
the scenes of which were acted in Rome, London, Wash- 
ington, Charleston, Paris, Mexico — was the immediate re- 
sult of this unhappy coalition, and the basis on which 
that ill-starred tragedy rested was the breaking of the 
United States into separate confederacies. 

After the peace of Villafranca, the Emperor Napoleon 
secret intention of HI. was sincerely desirous to heal the polit- 
Napoieon, j ca j woun( j g which had been made by his 

military operations in Italy — to find some compensation 
for the injuries he had inflicted on the Emperor of 





There were certain Mexicans of eminence — among them 
who is informed by Almonte, Gutierrez de Estrada, the ex-Pres- 
exican refugee i^ en ^ Miranion, and La Bastida, the Arch- 
bishop of Mexico — who were residing in Paris, and car- 
rying on various political intrigues with the Papal gov- 
ernment and with the Tuileries. From these the em- 
peror learned that attempts had been made by leaders 
of influence in the Southern States to come to an un- 
derstanding with persons of ^ similar position in Mexico 
, . with a view to a political union. These ne- 

of a proposed union x 

m stSeawif m«x- gotiations had taken a serious aspect shortly 
after Fremont was made the Republican can- 
didate for the presidency in 1856, when it had become 
plain that the South must before long inevitably lose its 
control of the government of the Union. 

Among the advantages expected by the South from 

such a scheme were deliverance from the 

vantages of that threatened domination of the Free States, 

scheme. •t/»t»i " • 

and another period of political supremacy in 
a new Union, of which the members would be bound to- 
gether by a community of interest, and be the dispensers 
of some of the most valuable products of the New World. 
Slavery had without difficulty been re-established in Tex- 
as; it was supposed that the same might be done in 
other provinces of Mexico. There was, moreover, the al- 
luring prospect of a future brilliant empire, encircling the 
West India Seas, and eventually absorbing the West In- 
dia Islands. To the Mexicans there would be the un- 
speakable advantage of a stable, a strong, a progressive 

The Mexican refugees in Paris saw in the success of 

this scheme an end of their influence in their 

Napoleon turns that .. . T . i , i p 1 1 i 

scheme to his own native country. It was better tor them to 

use. % ** 

introduce a French protectorate. The em- 
peror perceived with satisfaction that an opportunity had 


now arrived for carrying out his friendly intentions to- 
ward the house of Austria. Thereupon he determined to 
encourage the secession of the Southern States with the 
view of neutralizing the power of the Union, to over- 
throw, by a military expedition, the existing government 
of Juarez in Mexico, to establish, by French arms, an em- 
pire, and offer its crown to the Austrian Archduke Max- 

Gutierrez de Estrada says the Mexican affair is " exclu- 
sively confined to the Emperor Napoleon and the arch- 
duke (Maximilian), with the approbation of the emperor, 
his brother. This state of things is favorable to Austria, 
inasmuch as it puts Venetia or any other compensation 
out of the question." 

Count Keratry, in his history of these transactions, 
says " France granted belligerent rights to the Southern 
rebels, anxious as she was to inaugurate a military dicta- 
torship, the future head of which, the, celebrated Confed- 
erate general, had commenced negotiations with Mexico 

Of this complicated intrigue, the first step was the se- 
cession of the Southern States from the 

Its first step is TT . A -. . . n .-. , . . 

southern seces- Union. A lar^e portion or the population 

sion ox x x 

of the South was loyal, but it was rightly 
judged that political unanimity could be secured by caus- 
ing the action to turn on the slave question. The elec- 
tion of a Republican president was all that was necessary, 
and that could be accomplished without difficulty. 

Without war or with war, the secession might be made 
good — better the latter than the former, for it would give 
and the creation of a great, a well-drilled, a veteran, an indis- 
pensable army — indispensable for the com- 
pletion of the plan. It would accustom the Southern 
people to habits of discipline and subordination, and, 
from the bitterness inevitably produced, it would effectu- 


ally alienate them from their recollections of the old 

The powers who had interests in the West India Seas 
were not disposed to look with disfavor on 

Expected approval ,-t n , <• n ,i • i -r; p 

of European pow- the first portion oi this plan. It was lor 


. them, as far as they could with propriety, 
to promote secession. To divide the republic was to rule 
it. They never regarded the action of the South in se- 
ceding as having a shadow of justification. In their eyes 
it was a purely political movement, which, if it failed, 
would probably entail ruin on the communities who had 
attempted it. 

Encouragement was accordingly given to the leaders 
of secession. It strengthened them greatly 

They will accord • ,-r • ~ ,• -r> , x1 ! -j 

belligerent rights m their action. .But the momentous hazard 

to the South, , 

of separation once taken, and at Montgomery 
or Richmond a government apparently able to maintain 
itself established, it was not the interest of the powers of 

Western Europe to permit the carrying out 

but will not permit „ , -. . n , , °_ 

its union with Mex- oi the second portion oi the plan. It suited 
them to have the Cotton States — " an An- 
glo-Saxon Brazil easily curbed," hemmed in by the fleets 
of Europe on the south and east, by a strong military 
government on the west, and on the north by the pow- 
erful and embittered relict of the old republic. 

To separate the Union for the purpose of crippling it, 
but not to give such a preponderance to the South as to 
enable it to consummate its Mexican designs — such was 
the principle guiding the French government. That prin- 
ciple was satisfied by the recognition of belligerent rights, 
and by avoiding a recognition of independence. Herein 
we may see clearly the explanation of those 

Explanation of the . i i •» n i • i 1 1 i 

half measures of seeming; halt measures tor which that s;ov- 

the French, & • -• • i rrn 

ernment was so severely criticised. Thus 
Keratry says : " Here, too, one c*an not help being pain- 


fully impressed with the vacillations of the imperial gov- 
ernment, which seemed as if it dared not adopt a decided 
character in its trans-oceanic policy, and from the com- 
mencement to the conclusion of the expedition resorted 
to little else but half measures. . . ... . It is very certain 

that there was a favorable opportunity in 1862, looking 
at the secession of the Southern States from those of the 
North. Then was the time for France to have acted vig- 
orously, and to have obtained allies even in the enemy's 
camp. Two courses were open, and both were practica- 
ble, but here we shall not pretend to decide between 
them. Either it w 7 as necessary at the first onset to de- 
cide in good earnest for the cause of the Union, and to 
restrain the South by a threatening demonstration on the 
frontier of the Rio Bravo, or, if the belligerent character 
of the secession party was recognized, it was essential to 
go the whole length without hesitation, and 

who are blamed for , , ,, t n , • i 

not recognizing the to consummate the work or separation by 
declaring openly for the planters of the 
Southern States, who, fired w T ith the recollections of French 
glory, waited but the succor of our promise to offer tri- 
umphantly a helping hand to our expeditionary force 
which was marching on Mexico. Through an inconsist- 
ency which one can now, on looking back, hardly con- 
ceive possible, the imperial policy wandered away from 
every logical tradition. The belligerent character which 
had been accorded to the Southern States served only to 
prolong to no purpose a sanguinary contest, and our gov- 
ernment repulsed the reiterated overtures of the South- 
ern planters, whom they had encouraged, as it were, only 
yesterday, and then finally abandoned to their fate." 

In that extraordinary conversation which took place 
between Marshal Bazaine and Maximilian at the Haci- 
enda de la Teja, a similar opinion is expressed : " From 
the moment," said the marshal, " that the United States 


boldly pronounced their veto against the imperial system, 
your throne was nothing but a bubble, even if your maj- 
esty had obtained the help of a hundred thousand French- 
men. Supposing even that the Americans had observed 
neutrality during the continuance of the intervention, the 
monarchy itself had no spirit of vitality. A federal com- 
bination would have been the only system to be attempt- 
ed in the face of th@ Union, who would no doubt have 
acceded to it if the South had been recognized by France 
at the proper time. My advice is that your majesty 
should voluntarily retire." 

The French Mexican expedition was thus based on the 
disruption of theUnited States — a disruption 

The disruption of .-, -, -iijtoi ' • i ' i t 

the union consid- considered not onlv by the fepanish court and 

ered inevitable. ,!f ^ x . . 

by the Emperor JNapoleon as inevitable, but 
even by Lord Palmerston, who might have been better in- 
formed, and who regarded it as a predestined event. In 
Parliament he remarked, " Any one must have been short- 
sighted and little capable of anticipating the probable 
course of human affairs who had not for a long time fore- 
seen events of a similar character to those which we now 
deplore — the causes of disunion were too deeply seated 
to make it possible that a separation would not take 

The Spanish minister in Paris, in November, 1858, had 
suggested to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
Count Walewski, the advantages that would accrue from 
the establishment of a strong government in Mexico. 
Subsequently the views of the English government were 
ascertained, and in April, 1860, the Spanish Minister for 
™ txt i t> Foreign Affairs stated that France and En- 

The Western Pow- o 

favofabiy r Xinte?- gland were looking favorably upon the mat- 

ventionm Mexico. ^ rpfo st Umbling-block in the Way WaS 

the opposition which might be expected from the United 
States. That opposition had for a long time been embod- 


ied in a formula under the designation of the Monroe 
doctrine, which expressed a determination not to permit 
the interference of European powers on the North Amer- 
ican continent. In April, 1860, the project having ad- 
vanced sufficiently, Lord John Russell informed Isturitz, 
the Spanish minister, that England would require the 
protection of the Protestant worship in Mexico. The ob- 
The advantages ex- jects of the three contracting parties event- 
pected by each. ua iiy became apparent. Spain expected that 

a Bourbon prince would be placed on the Mexican throne, 
and that she would thereby recover her ancient prestige, 
and find security for her valuable possession, Cuba ; per- 
haps she might even recover Mexico itself. England, 
remembering the annexation of Texas, saw that it was 
desirable to limit the ever- threatening progress of the 
republic westwardly; to prevent the encircling of the 
West India Seas by a power which, possibly becoming 
hostile, might disturb the rich islands she held ; nor was 
she insensible to the importance of partitioning what 
seemed to be the cotton -field of the world. France 
Napoleon's osten- anticipated — but the emperor himself, con- 
cealing his real motive of compensating Aus- 
tria for his Italian victories, has given us his ostensible 
expectations in a letter to General Forey. 

In this letter (July 3d, 1862) Napoleon III. says: "There 
ms letter to Gen- will not be wanting people who will ask you 
erai Forey. why we expend men and money to found a 

regular government in Mexico. In the present state of 
the civilization of the world, the prosperity of America is 
not a matter of indifference to Europe, for it is the coun- 
try which feeds our manufactures and gives an impulse 
to our commerce. We have an interest in the republic 
of the United States being powerful and prosperous, but 
not that she should take possession of the whole Gulf of 
Mexico, thence commanding the Antilles as well as South 


America, and be the only dispenser of the products of the 
New World. We now see by sad experience how pre- 
carious is the lot of a branch of manufactures which is 
compelled to procure its raw material in a single market, 
all the vicissitudes of which it has to bear. If, on the 
contrary, Mexico maintains her independence and the in- 
tegrity of her territory, if a stable government be there 
established with the assistance of France, we shall have 
restored to the Latin race on the other side of the Atlan- 
tic all its strength and prestige ; we shall have guaran- 
teed security to our West India colonies and to those of 
Spain ; we shall have established a friendly influence in 
the centre of America, and that influence, by creating nu- 
merous markets for our commerce, will procure us the 
raw materials indispensable for our manufactures. Mex- 
ico, thus regenerated, will always be well disposed to us, 
not only out of gratitude, but because her interests will 
be in accord with ours, and because she will find support 
in her friendly relations with European powers. At 
present, therefore, our military honor engaged, the neces- 
sities of our policy, the interests of our industry and com- 
merce, all conspire to make it our duty to march on Mex- 
ico, boldly to plant our flag there, and to establish either 
a monarchy, if not incompatible with the national feeling, 
or at least a government which may promise some sta- 

As soon as it was ascertained that the Southern States 
were sufficiently powerful to resist the na- 

Secession occurs. . . , . n . -, . .... n 

The allies mature tional government, and that a partition of 
the Union was impending, the chief obstacle 
in the way of the Mexican movement seemed to be re- 
moved. Throughout the spring and summer of 1861, 
the three contracting powers kept that result steadfastly 
in mind, and omitted nothing that might tend to its ac- 
complishment. This was the true reason of the conces- 

Chap.LXL] the expedition sails. 523 

sion of belligerent rights to the Southern Confederacy in 
May. The downfall of Juarez was the next business in 

Affairs had so far progressed that, on November 20th, 
The convention of 1861, a convention was signed in London 
between France, England, and Spain. In 
this it was agreed that a joint force should be sent by 
the three allies to Mexico; that no special advantages 
should be sought for by them individually, and no in- 
ternal influence on Mexico exerted. A commission was 
designated to distribute the indemnity they proposed to 
exact. The ostensible reason put forth for the move- 
ment was the decree of the Mexican government, July 
17th, 1861, suspending payment on the foreign debt. 

The allied expedition reached Vera Cruz about the 
The expedition en d of the year. Not without justice did 
S aii s to Mexico. ffie Mexican Minister for Foreign Affairs 

complain of their " friendly but indefinite promises, the 
real object of which nobody unravels." Although M. 
Thouvenel was incessantly assuring the British govern- 
ment, even as late as May, 1862, that France had no in- 
tention of imposing a government on Mexico, it became 
obvious that there was no more sincerity in this engage- 
ment than there had been in imputing the grievances of 
the invaders to the Mexican decree of the preceding July. 
The ostensible cause was a mere pretext to get a military 
foothold in the country. Very soon, however, it became 
impossible for the French to conceal their 

England and Spain . . -r\ i n in • 'ill 

discover the inten- intentions. .Lngiand and fepam withdrew 

tions of France, <? . x 

from the expedition, the alleged cause on 
the part of the former being the presence of Almonte, and 
other Mexican emigrants of known monarchical opinions, 
w T ith the French, and a resolution not to join in military 
operations in the interior of the country ; on the part of 
the latter, the true reason was that not a Spanish prince, 


but Maximilian, was to be placed on the Mexican throne 
and abandon the — a disappointment to the Spanish com. 
expedition. mander, the Count de Eeuss (General Prim), 
who had pictured for himself a viceroy's coronet. 

It is not necessary, on the present occasion, to enter into 

details respecting the French military movements, which 

began by a breach of that article of the con- 

The French break ■* 

faith with the Mesi- vention of La Soledad which required that 

cans. . ■*- 

the French, who had been permitted to come 
into the healthy country, should retire beyond the strong 
pass of Chiquehuite in case negotiations were broken 
off. Had the Paris press been free, such events would 
never have occurred, and, indeed, as has been truly af- 
firmed by the French themselves, this shameful expedi- 
tion would never have been undertaken. As it was, 
things were done in Mexico which, could they have been 
brought to a knowledge of the French, would have thrown 
that great people into a profound reverie. 

The French entered the city of Mexico in July, 1863. 

They seize the city The time had now come for throwing off 
of Mexico. ^.j ie mas ]^ an( j ^q name f Maximilian was 

introduced as a candidate for the empire. Commission- 
ers were appointed to go through Paris and Rome to 
Miramar with a view of soliciting the consent of that 
prince. A regency was appointed until he could be heard 
from. It consisted of Almonte, Salas, and 

They establish the .•, A -i -i • i t t» i* i ht' • *t 

empire of Maxi- the Archbishop La Bastida. Maximilian 
had already covenanted with the Pope to 
restore to the Mexican Church her mortmain property, 
estimated at two hundred millions of dollars. In Mex 
ico there are but two parties, the Liberal and the Eccle 
siastical. The latter was conciliated by that covenant 
but as to the national sentiment, the collection of suf- 
frages in behalf of the new empire was nothing better 
than a mere farce. 


An empire was established in Mexico. Well might 
the leaders of the Southern Confederacy be 

The Southern States . , -, . -, TTr .-. . .-. « -,r,~,-i . n 

and that they have thunderstruck. Was this the iuliillment or 

been deceived. . -i • -i -i -i n it 

that promise which had lured them into the 
gulf of revolt — the promise which had been used with 
such fatal effect in Charleston? (vol. i., p. 512) Well 
might it be expected in France, as is stated by Keratry, 
that " the Confederates proposed to avenge themselves 
for the overthrow of the secret hopes which had been en- 
couraged from the very outset of the contest by the cab- 
inet of the Tuileries, which had accorded to them the bel- 
ligerent character, and had, after all, abandoned them." 
Yet no one in America, either of the Northern or the 
Southern States, imputed blame to the 

Discrimination be- -,-, -, -i • « i tit -i -i i 

tween the French .b rencn people in these bloody and dark 

and the emperor. . A 11 -i i i 

transactions. All saw clearly on whom the 
responsibility rested. And when, in the course of events, 
it seemed to become necessary that the French army 
should leave Mexico, it was the general desire that noth- 
ing should be done which might by any possibility touch 
the sensibilities of France. But the Republic of the West 
was forever alienated from the dynasty of Napoleon. 

Events showed that the persons who were charged 

with the administration of the Richmond government 

had not ability equal to their task. The South did not 

select her best men. In the unskillful hands 

The American gov- n , -, -, -, ■, „ . 

emment overthrows oi those who had charge oi it, secession 

secession. ° ' 

proved to be a failure. The Confederate 
resources were recklessly squandered, not skillfully used. 
Ruin was provoked. 

When it became plain that the American Republic was 
about to triumph over its domestic enemies in the Civil 
War, and that it was in possession of irresistible mili- 
tary power, they who in the Tuileries had plotted the 



rise of Maximilian in 1861, now plotted his ruin. The 
betrayed emperor found that in that palace 

Thereupon Napo- -, i x 1 1 

leon finds he must two languages were spoken, in the ago- 
ny of his soul he exclaimed, "I am tricked!" 
In vain his princess crossed the Atlantic, and, though de- 
He abandons Maxi- nie& access, forced her way into the presence 
ofNapoleon III., in her frantic grief upbraid- 
ing herself before him that, in accepting a throne from 
his hand, she had forgotten that she was a daughter of 
the race of Orleans — in vain she fell at the feet of the 
Pope, deliriously imploring his succor. 

It is questionable whether the United States govern- 
impolicy of Amer- ment pursued a correct policy in pressing 
remivaioffhf the the removal of the French. It may possi- 
bly prove to have been a mistake similar to 
that committed by the English respecting Canada, which 
hastened, if indeed it did not occasion the separation of 
the colonies (vol. i., p. 162). During the Civil War very 
conspicuous advantages accrued to the republic from the 
circumstance that Canada was a British possession. A 
foresight of the military consequences which might possi- 
bly ensue acted as a restraint on the ministry of Lord 
Palmerston, and strengthened whatever desire it had to 
maintain an honorable peace. European establishments 
on the North American continent can never be a source 
of disquietude to the republic. To those powers who 
maintain them they are ever liable to be a source of em- 
barrassment. Considering the questions which must in- 
evitably arise with the rapid development of the Pacific 
States respecting commercial supremacy on the Pacific 
Ocean, the trade of Eastern Asia, and the British empire 
in India, a correct policy would probably have indicated 
the encouragement of an exotic French establishment in 
Mexico. The Russian government recognized the truth 


of these political principles in its action in 1867 respect- 
ing its American possessions, which it disposed of to the 
United States. 

Admitting, however, the correctness of the policy of 
removing the French from Mexico, the firm 

Correspondence of , ... ....... ^ , T i Ti/r a 1 

Mr. seward on the but dimmed course taken by Mr. feeward 

subject. ° . . 

in his correspondence entitles him to the 
highest praise. In him there was no intrigue, no decep- 
tion, nothing which his countrymen can condemn, noth- 
ing at which they need blush. Even by the French 
themselves it was said, " The United States tracked 
French policy step by step ; never had the French gov- 
ernment been subject to such a tyrannical dictation^ The 
American correspondence is full of a logic never incon- 
sistent with its purposes." With a courteous audacity, 
the Secretary of State did not withhold his doubts as to 
the sincerity and fidelity of the emperor ; with inexora- 
ble persistence he demanded categorically that the French 
occupation should come to an end. A date once set, he 
held the French government to its word. " Tell M. Mous- 
tier," he says, in a dispatch to the American minister in 
Paris, " that our government is astonished and distressed 
at the announcement, now made for the first time, that 
the promised withdrawal of French troops from Mexico, 
which ought to have taken place in November (this 
month), has been put off by the emperor." " You will 
The American gov- inform tne emperor's government that the 
thedlparturcofth? President desires and sincerely hopes that 

the evacuation of Mexico will be accom- 
plished in conformity with the existing arrangement, so 
far as the inopportune complication necessitating this dis- 
patch will permit. On this point Mr. Campbell will re- 
ceive instructions. Instructions will also be sent to the 
military forces of the United States, which are placed in 
a post of observation, and are waiting the special orders 


of the President ; and this will be done with the con- 
fidence that the telegraph or the cornier will bring us in- 
telligence of a satisfactory resolution on the part of the 
emperor in reply to this note. You will assure the French 
government that the United States, in wishing to free 
Mexico, have .nothing so much at heart as preserving 
peace and friendship with France." 

The French themselves recognized that the position 
and on the removal of the two nations had become inverted. 
" The United States now gives orders. For- 
merly France had spoken boldly, saying, through M. 
Drouyn de Lhuys to Mr. Dayton, the American repre- 
sentative at Paris, 'Do you bring us peace or war?' 
Now Maximilian is falling in obedience to orders from 
Washington. He is falling a victim to the weakness of 
our government in allowing its .conduct to be dictated by 
American arrogance. Indeed, before rushing into such 
perilous contingencies, might not the attitude of the 
United States have been easily foreseen? Our states- 
men needed no rare perspicuity to have discovered the 
dark shadow of the Northern Republic looming up on 
the horizon over the Rio Bravo frontier, and only biding 
its time to make its appearance on the scene." 

" Only one thing was now thought of in Paris, and 
that was to leave as soon as possible this 

The Mexican expe- •. ■* * -, . i mi • 1 1 'n 

dition ends in a to- land oi destroyed illusions and bitter sacri- 

tal failure. • _"'.*' , -i • i .•■ . 

fices. In this great shipwreck every thing 
was swallowed up — the regeneration of the Latin race as 
well as the hopes of the monarchy, the interests of our 
countrymen (which had been the pretext for the war) as 
well as the two French loans which had but served to 
bring it to this disastrous conclusion. The only thing 
which swam safe upon the surface was the claim of Jeck- 
er, the Swiss, who had obtained his twelve millionV' 

Chap.lxl] failure of the Mexican empire. 529 

Was there ever such a catalogue of disappointed ex- 
ii. ™ • pectations as is presented by this Mexican 

The results obtain- x x . J 

louthSii fc se?es- e tragedy? The Southern secession leaders 
engaged in it dreaming of a tropical empire 
which they never realized ; they hoped it would bring a 
recognition of their independence, and they were betray- 
ed. The English were beguiled into it as a means of 
by the English checking the growth of a commercial rival, 
and of protecting their West Indian posses- 
sions. They were duped into the belief that there was 
no purpose of interfering with the government of Mexi- 
co. They consented to the perilous measure of admitting 
the belligerent rights of the South. They lent what aid 
they could to the partition of a nation with which they 
were at peace. They found that the secret intention was 
the establishment of an empire in the interest of France, 
the conciliation of Austria for military reverses in Italy, 
and the curbing of the Anglo-Saxon by the Latin race. 
England expected to destroy a democracy, and has gath- 
ered her reward by becoming more democratical herself. 
The Pope gave his countenance to the plot, having re- 
b y the Papal gov- ceived a promise of the elevation of the Mex- 
ican Church to her pristine splendor, and 
the restoration of her mortmain estates ; but the Arch- 
bishop La Bastida, who was one of the three regents rep- 
resenting her great influence, was insulted and removed 
from his political office by the French. In impotent re- 
taliation, he discharged at his assailants the rusty ecclesi- 
astical blunderbuss of past days — he excommunicated the 
French army. The Spaniards did not regain their former 
colony ; the brow of the Count de Eeuss 

by the Spaniards ; ■* ' 9 u 

was never adorned with a vice-regal coro- 
net. The noble and devoted wife of Maximilian was 
made a wanderer in the sight of all Europe, 

by the Austrians ; ° -i-i'-i 

her diadem removed, her reason dethroned. 
II.— L L 


For Maximilian himself there was not reserved the pag- 
eantry of an imperial court in the Indian palaces of Mon- 
tezuma, but the death- volley of a grim file of Mexican sol- 
diers, under the frowning shadow of the heights of Quere- 
taro. For the Emperor of Austria there was not the hom- 
age of a transatlantic crown ; Mexico sent him across the 
ocean a coffin and a corpse. For France, ever great and 
iust, in whose name so many crimes were 

by France; , ,/ . 

perpetrated, but who is responsible lor none 
of them, there was a loss of that which in her eyes is of 
infinitely more value than the six hundred millions of 
francs which were cast into this Mexican abyss. For the 
and by the Emperor Emperor — can any thing be more terrible 
Napoleon. than ^q dispatch which was sent to Amer- 

ica at the closing of the great Exposition ? — " There re- 
main now no sovereigns in Paris except the Emperor 
Napoleon III. and the spectre of Maximilian at his el- 




The Mexican expedition led to the propagation in Europe of views unfavorable to 

the American republic. 
Some Confederate officials were forcibly taken by an American captain from the 

Trent, an English mail steam-ship. The British government demanded their 

restoration and a suitable apology. The American government acceded to that 


The engagements which had been mutually contracted 
by the French Emperor and the ministry of 

Attack of Euro- t i t-» i i • i i • » a • n 

pean journals on Lord ralnierston in relation to American at- 

the Union. 

fairs were essentially based on the disrup- 
tion of the United States. The journalism of both En- 
gland and France, suitably inspired, spared no labor to 
accomplish that result. Thus we read : 

"The ferocity with which this war has been entered 

on shows that the government of Washing. 

Ferocity and folly , .-,-, i n j. 1 , 

of the American ton will soon lose all control over events. 


It is a mere quarrel for territory, a struggle 
for aggrandizement. With the deepest sorrow we see 
this people precipitating itself into civil war like the half- 
breeds of Mexico. Lord John Russell and his advisers 
have come to the conclusion that the Southern Confeder- 
acy must be treated as a belligerent ; it has acquired a cer- 
tain degree of force and consistency. The South has not 
understood the war. It calculated on a war with men 
holding its own opinions about slavery. Even Mr. Lin- 
coln declared that he would not meddle with that mat- 
ter. On the part of the North it is a war to keep South- 


ern debtors and their property from going beyond the 
grasp of Northern merchants. 

" Stripped of its trappings, it is a mere quarrel for ter- 
it is a savage quar- ritory. The antagonists are acting like Del- 
rei about territory. awares or Pawnees. War to the knife, push- 
ed to absolute extermination, is what they have resolved 
on ; government and people breathe language of massa- 
cre and extermination. Massachusetts is enforcing the 
doctrines of legitimacy and Toryism. It is a congregation 
of seceders protesting against a repetition of secession. 
Mr. seward has in- Mr. Seward's letter to Mr. Dayton, the Amer- 

sulted the French. • j_ x* • T> * * i? 

ican representative in r aris, is a message 01 
defiance, if not of insult, to France. 

" The march of events has made us regard this dispute 

as a more commonplace quarrel than at first it appeared 

to be. The South received no provocation and enjoyed 

Absurdity of Lin- no sovereign prerogatives,, and Mr. Lincoln 

is invoking resolutions made by one tenth 
of the present population nearly eighty years ago ; he 
thinks that by such a document as that all living Amer- 
icans must be bound. 

" Lord John Russell's accordance of belligerent rights to 
the South is discussed in a tone highly hostile to En- 
gland ; but what have we clone to deserve this American 
tornado of abuse ? We are neither to have liberty of ac- 
tion nor of inaction. That people has acquired a habit 
of petulance and insolence. The grievance is simply this 
— that we think as they thought six weeks before ; and 
yet we are expected to join in hounding on the invaders. 

But the French emperor has followed our 

France views the -, . -, . i r» i 1 • 

matter in accord example without a word oi explanation. 

with England. x a 

The terms he uses are like those that we 
employed. He places the two on an equality — " one or 
other of the belligerents." The North has had to take a 
great moral " cocktail," but it is of its own mixing. Net 


ther England, nor France, nor any other state supposes 
there to be any rights or any wrongs about it. It is sim- 
ply a quarrel. This is intensely disagreeable to the North, 
who thinks that heaven and earth are bound to avenge 
its cause. People give themselves no con- 

The war a mere -, , -, , . , 

quarrel between cern about a quarrel between two rival 

two rival shops. x . . 

shops, or are only concerned that there is a 
breach of the peace and public scandal. For some un- 
known reason the Northern States empty all their vials 
of wrath on the English nation. They are wounded be- 
cause we have not admired their movements sufficiently. 
Our course, however, has been followed by the French 
government." • 

On the news of the battle of Bull Run reaching Eu- 
Derision at the hat- rope, it was said, " The North has lost all — 
even military honor; her people were bel- 
lowing behind the army. It is a complete victory for the 
South — as complete a victory as Austerlitz. We have 
been cheated out of our sympathies; we don't like to 
laugh. They are shaking their knives at each other and 
their fists at us. But an American battle is not as dan- 
gerous as an American steam-boat. It is carried on upon 
strict humanitarian principles. Seventy-five thousand 
American patriots have fled twenty miles in an agony of 
fear, though there was nobody pursuing them." 

The solemn resolution passed by the houses of Con- 

The gasconading gress on the national defeat at Bull Run (p. 
vote of congress. x g 5 ^ ig st i gmat j ze a as a u g asc onading vote." 

" The two sections of the late republic had better part and 
be friends. The North is undertaking more than Napo- 
leon did in his Russian campaign. It is better for it to 

accept the situation, as we did eighty years 
more conjuer'th" ago on their own soil. Let it consider if it 
ieon could conquer can do what Napoleon could not. The 

United States of America have ceased to 


be ; the subjugation of the South is impossible, and its 
submission improbable. The almost unanimous opinion 
in England is that they should part on fair terms. 

" The Americans should give us credit for fair feeling 
and honest wishes. At first we regretted their quarrel, 
and any idea that a partition of the domineering republic 
would be advantageous was repressed. We inclined, if 
at all, to the North. The slavery of the South was an 
abomination to us ; we thought that it was the cause of 
the war. Our ideas of fair play were offended; the South 
had been fairly beaten in an election; it was perhaps 
their turn to lose. They could not take their beating. 
Moreover, we attributed the arrogance of the government 
to them. They were identified with the disgraceful sys- 
tem of repudiation. 

" But then a change came over us, owing to the conduct 
of the North ; its behavior was so unwar- 

Cause of the South . -. n . . , . 

rising in favor in rantable ; its menaces so insolent; its exac- 

Europe. . ._ . ' 

tions so fierce and irrational. We would 
not stigmatize the South as rebels ; they suggested to it 
to be friends, and together make war on us. They want- 
ed us to regard, as a worthless rabble, ten millions of 
people fighting for independence, and not to recognize as 
belligerents a confederacy holding their government in 
check with two hundred thousand soldiers. Meantime 
the South was winning its way to favor. It was not in 
human nature to consider their Bull Run achievement 
without admiration. But the one great fact which 
swayed English opinion was the decided and multiform 
antagonism between the North and the South which 
events disclosed. Secession had been in contemplation 
for thirty years, and the South is doing no more than 
hundreds of other states have previously done. They 
may be wrong, but they are ten millions. So long as 
the insurrection seemed only a spiteful rebellion against 


the results of a particular election, we regarded it as ut- 
terly unjustifiable. But it is not so ; the difference is as 
irreconcilable as that between the Greeks and Turks. If 
the whole case of the war is to be analyzed, we must 
needs say the Northerners have the right on their side, 
for the Southerners have destroyed, without provocation, 
a mighty political fabric, and have impaired the glory and 
strength of the great American republic. But, as they 
have chosen to do this ; as they have shown themselves 
hitherto no less powerful than their antagonists ; as the 
decision of so large a population can not be contemned, 
and as we can not persuade ourselves that a genuine 
peace is likely to spring from a protracted war, we .should 
rejoice to see the pacification of America promoted by 
other means. The secession of the Slave States takes 
away from the North all the violence, and 

Secession will be.... tit i 1 i • i , 

for the benefit of rmustice, and blasphemous teaching about 

the North el ■/..-. j. o 

the scriptural sanction of slavery. English- 
men think that the recognition of the Confederacy will 
accomplish all that the anti-slavery party has been advo- 
cating for years. It is perfectly true that the North is 
only fighting for empire. Separation will take away the 
horsewhips and revolvers from Northern Legislatures, and 
the blasphemy from Northern pulpits. It will diminish 
the power of the slave-owning filibusters, who will no 

longer have the Union to back them. The 
beau Angio-saxon South will be a kind of Anglo-Saxon Bra- 

Brazil. -i-ii 

zil, easily curbed. It would have demand- 
ed the extension of slavery over Mexico, and the North 
would have conceded it, but now the South will have a 
rival, and the cause of justice and civilization will gain by 
the quarrel of these partners in guilt. 

" Let us review the course we have taken. The Amer- 
icans allege that we precipitately gave up the Union. 
We did no such thing. We showed that South Caro- 


lina had neither right nor reason — no more 

Summary of the o 

JouraaiSy 811 right to secede than Lancashire; that the 
itself. Southern resentment about Mr. Lincoln's 

election was unwarrantable, and that nothing could be 
gained by breaking the Union. Americans were contem- 
plating the destruction of their government with indiffer- 
ence, while Englishmen were protesting against it on 
such unwarrantable grounds. Then came Sumter, and 
they changed. They were indignant that we would not 
denounce their antagonists as pirates. Then one third 
of the whole population seceded. Numbers make right 
as well as might. It became superfluous to discuss their 
arguments ; however, it appeared they had more warrant 
for disaffection than was at first imagined. The insurrec- 
tion might be traitorous, unprovoked, unreasonable, wick- 
ed ; but there stood the insurgents. We did not believe 
that they could be subdued. At that point 

The impossibility , AT , , . , . . 

of conquering the the JN ortn became angrv with us ; it got m- 

South. & J & . 

dignant about our declaration of neutrality ; 
it rebuked us for our cold-blooded serenity. Up to this 
time they have not made one step toward subjugation. 
The seceders are a match for them. The head and front 
of our offending is that we formed a just estimate. The 
one great argument with us has been, not the injustice, 
but the impossibility of the object proposed by the 

" We are very low in the good graces of the multitudi- 
nous monarch of the United States. We 

Contemptuous in- . -. . -, -, • < i r» rrn a 

difference to Amer- might have known it before, ine Amer- 
ican opinion. .. ° i • i • i i -n t si 

icans sympathized with the Jbrench Cana- 
dians; they held violent language about the Oregon 
boundary; they refused the right of search in connec- 
tion with the slave-trade ; they seized the island of St. 
Juan when in controversy with England. We bore all 
these things patiently, and do not regret it. We have 


got accustomed to their dislike, as we have to wet sum- 
mers and foggy autumns — " 

The American government had desired the people, in 
view of the great national affliction that 

Views on the proc- -1: 1 -1 /» -1-1 < .1 , -, -1 n 1 

lamationofaday had beiallen them, to observe a day ot hu- 

of prayer. ... , 

miliation, and, in their several places of wor- 
ship, to cast themselves on the goodness of the Almighty. 
On this it is said, " The republic has betaken itself to 
mortification on an appointed day, and has sought by 
mournful litanies to avert its dangers, in the hopes that 
a rupture may be avoided. Americans are religious even 
to superstition, and more than usually prone to those ac- 
cesses of fanaticism which, in their effect on the human 
frame, approach the confines of madness and epilepsy. In 
their national capacity they have been sufficiently pagan. 
Individually they have been miserable sinners ; as a 
people they have been the greatest, the most powerful, 
the most enlightened and virtuous that ever defied the 
universe. So they prayed yesterday. That great, pow- 
erful, unscrupulous government, which inspired uneasi- 
ness among politicians and anger among philanthropists, 
has not come to its end by means of those it had injured. 
The class to which it truckled has destroyed it. The 
Union has burst asunder by explosive forces generated 
within itself, and now the two republics stand like cliffs 
which of old were the same rock, but which can never 
again be united." 

Such were the views and opinions scattered over En- 
gland, and, indeed, all over Europe, in the 

Success of these in- -. ninni tvt • i* ^ 

sidious misrepre- summer and autumn of 1861. JNo impartial 

sentations. ■ . i i • 

person can now peruse these publications 
without being shocked. The poison did its work the 
more effectually since it was doled out in daily doses, a 


little at a time. Europe was drugged before she detect- 
ed the insidious practice perpetrated upon her. 

Again and again the guilt not only of provoking, but 
of declaring war, was laid upon Lincoln. He was accused 
of working upon the pugnacity of an excitable people, and 
making them fight for a shadow. u It is only a boyish 
patriotism which regrets to see the great republic rent 
asunder." Not a measure taken by the government was 
suffered to pass without misrepresentation and derision. 
By a profligate press, powerful and persistent attempts 
were unceasingly made to write down American finance 
and ruin American credit. Threats of the joint inter- 
ference of England and France in American affairs be- 
came more and more frequent as the Mexican understand- 
ing matured. 

Such persistent provocation could bring no other re- 
sult than retaliation. When the London 

Retaliation of -, . , n , 

American U ews- newspapers protested, in the name ot nu- 

papers. . -*- .... 

manity and civilization, against the closing 
of Charleston Harbor by the sinking of ships laden with 
stone, they were answered by the New York newspapers 
with engravings of Sepoys blown from the mouths of 
cannon in India. 

When Earl Russell stated in the House of Lords that 
the principle upon which England acted was always to 
encourage the independence of other countries, he was 
asked to illustrate his declaration by beginning with Ire- 

Sometimes these bitter repartees occurred in places 
more responsible than newspaper printing-offices. Ad- 
vantage had been taken of the "Stone Blockade" to cause 
a singular excitement in Europe. The French and En- 
glish journals denounced it in the name of modern civili- 
zation. Earl Russell stated to the Liverpool ship-owners 
that Lord Lyons would inform the American govern- 

Chap.lxii.] cause of the change in fokeign opinion. 539 

nient that England regarded it as unjustifiable even as a 
measure of war. In his subsequent communication with 
Earl Russell, Lord Lyons reported that " Mr. Seward said 
the best proof he could give me that the harbor of 
Charleston had not been rendered inaccessible was that, 
in spite of the 1 sunken vessels and of the blockading 
squadron, a British steamer, laden with contraband of 
war, had just gone in." 

"With an air of injured innocence, the London journal- 
ist raised up his hands and exclaimed, What 

Injured innocence , T , .. , . ■ . „ , n 

of the London jour- nave 1 done to merit this flood 01 transat- 


lantic insolence ? " Like Lord Clive, we are 
absolutely astonished at our own moderation. We shall 
probably be driven to give terrible proofs of our strength." 

It is said by Sallust, " Neither place nor friends pro- 
tect him whom his own arms have not protected." The 
conquest of the South — a work which, as we have seen, 
had been declared too great even for the power and ge- 
nius of Napoleon, transcending immeasurably in difficul- 
ty his Russian campaign, had been thoroughly completed. 
American battles, leaving their tens of thousands of dead 
and wounded on the field, had proved to be, both in hor- 
ror and result, something more than " the mere cricket- 
matches of Cockneys" — something more than the " blow- 
ing up of Western steam-boats." A navy of many hun- 
dred war-ships, some of them, perhaps, not unworthy an- 
tagonists of the most powerful cuirassed ships of Europe, 
kept watch and ward on the American coast, from the 
Bay of Fundy to the mouth of the Rio Grande. The Re- 
public had placed in the field, and for years had main- 
tained, an army of more than a million of men. Dis- 
banded without difficulty when their work was done, 
those soldiers would reassemble at a word. Not even 
the most profligate journalism could conceal the portent- 


ous facts that one of the greatest military monarchies 
of Europe had been constrained to obey an order from 
Washington, and that the Power which remembered Se- 
bastopol had come into firm accord with the Power which 
had been insulted by the concession of belligerent rights 
to its domestic assailant. No longer could it be hidden 
that the Republic of the West must inevitably share in 
the determination of the destinies of Europe. Then 
wh 9 finally modify many of those whose sentiments we have 
then- opinions. "been reading made haste to unsay what 

they had said. 

The United States sloop of war San Jacinto was return- 
The affair of the i n g from the African coast (October, 1861). 
Her commander, Captain Wilkes, learning 
that the Confederate privateer Sumter was cruising in the 
West India Seas, sailed from the port of St. Thomas in 
pursuit. While at Havana he was informed that the 
Confederate agents, Messrs. Mason and Slidell, with their 
secretaries, were about to proceed to Europe in the char- 
acter of embassadors to England and France. They had 
escaped from Charleston on October 12th, in a small 
steam-boat, running the blockade successfully on a dark 
and rainy night. They had taken passage from Havana 
in the English mail steamer Trent. 

Captain Wilkes determined to intercept them. He 
capture of the went out into the Bahama Channel, two 

Southern envoys, hundred an( J fifty mileg f rom Havana, and 

waited for them. On the approach of the Trent he re- 
quired her to heave to,